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This thesis is a chronological study of Broch's
work from the early 1930's until his death in 1951* The
former date is selected as the point of departure
because, with the publication of "Der Zerfall der Werte"
in Die Schlafwandler in 1932, Broch, for the first time,
gave definitive expression to his theory of values, tvhich
he had been gradually formulating in years of research
prior to that date. There are two main parts to this
study. Broch's theoretical writings are first examined
with a view to showing how and why the theory of "das
Irdiseh-Absolute" developed and to explaining exactly
what it is. In the second part his novels are examined
with the aim of establishing the extent to which the
developing theory of "das Xrdisch-Absolute" is reflected
in them.
It can be shown that the basic development in
question is a progression in Broch's thinking from reliance
on the purely formal, abstract, transcendental Absolute of
the Logos to the conviction that man, as the empirical,
earthly Absolute, must be the final criterion by and
against which all values must be judged. The main purpose
of the thesis, as explained in the introduction, is to
show how Broch, an intellectual and theoretician, was
forced by historical circumstances continually to modify
and revise his thinking on the basic question of ethics.
This revision, of which Broch was never fully aware
himself, is seen in the way he progressively abandoned a
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highly abstract, theoretical and speculative conception
of ethics, which seemed to have little immediate
relevance to the problems of his own generation, in
favour of a more practical morality of direct humanit¬
arian commitment.
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I. A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF BROCH1S THOUGHT
A preliminary explanation of the general lines
along which Broch's thought evolved throughout his life
and work will provide a useful introduction and frame of
reference for the subsequent, more detailed investigation
of the essays and novels.
The purpose of such an introduction is twofold.
It serves to give an insight into the chronological
development of Broch's thinking. This is important
because it reveals how Broch reacted to the decisive
historical events of his generation. Secondly, it
demonstrates the astonishing unity and consistency which
are one of the most characteristic features of Broch's
work.
It must not be thought that the two facts of
consistency and chronological development are incompatible;
rather they are complementary. In this section Broch's
correspondence will be used as the main source of
reference; I wish to show, above all, his personal
reactions to the history of his era. His letters confirm
that his thought developed on two levels. There is a
linear or temporal evolution, namely that which can be
traced directly to the way in which Broch responded to the
changing cultural and political atmosphere throughout his
life. To this linear pattern corresponds a vertical or
hierarchical development. The term "hierarchical" is used
advisedly because Broch repeatedly uses this word to
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describe his cwn scheme of thinking. It is in this dual
pattern that the unity of Broch's thought becomes apparent.
In his work he is always concerned with the problem of
ethics; this guarantees the consistency of his work. A
vertical or concentric approach is evident in the way he
confronts this one problem from different angles and on
different levels of human endeavour.
In the opening words of his "Autobiographie als
Arbeitsprogramm" Broch succintly delineates the central
focus of his works "es ist, ohne Umschweife herausgesagt,
das Problem des Absolutheitsverlustes, das Problem des
Relativismus, fttr den es keine absolute Wahrheit, keinen
absoluten Wert und sohin auch keine absolute Ethik
gibt, . . (GW 9: 37). The degree to which Broch was
obsessed by this question can be judged by the intensity,
variety and volume of work he dedicated to it in the
course of his life. Indeed, if any uninitiated reader
were to demand a single key to the comprehension of Broch's
oeuvre as a whole he could be given no better advice than
to approach it as a testimony to the single-minded
dedication of a twentieth-century intellectual in seeking
to face the challenge of the ethical crisis of his
generation. Every aspect of Broch's work bears witness
to this. In his novels, his theory of aesthetics, his
research in logic, mathematics, epistemology, psychology
and political theory the initial stimulus can always be
traced back to his conviction that, unless a new,
absolutely reliable Ethos were found, the European tradition
of civilization and humanity would founder amidst a welter
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of conflicting, relative values,
Broch's work reveals that he was aware of the
dangers of such relativism at the very earliest stage of
his intellectual development. In the "Autobiographic als
Arbeitsprogramm" he looks back to 1906 when he enrolled
as a part-time student at the university of Vienna, full
of hope that his studies, especially those in philosophy,
might provide answers to some of his questions. He goes
on to record his disillusionment: "Als ich 1906 die
Wiener Universit&t bezog, um Mathematik und Philosophie
zu studieren, erfuhr ich - wie so viele andere - bestiirzt
und entthuscht, dass ich nicht berechtigt sei, irgendeine
all der metaphysischen Fragen zu stellen, mit denen
beladen ich gekommen war; ich erfuhr, dass es keine
Hoffnung auf irgendeine Beantwortung gab." (GW 9: 37).*
Vienna was at that time the centre of the flourish¬
ing school of logical or scientific positivism, whose
maxim can be summarized in the closing words of
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: "Wovon man
nicht sprechen kann, darttber muss man schweigen." This
statement has been regularly misinterpreted. The logical
positivists did not deny the existence of metaphysical
problems, but they refused to classify their study under
the category of knowledge. Any enquiry into the realms
of metaphysics could, in their eyes, never be more than
empty speculation. Their rigorous definition of
knowledge was based on the application within every
discipline of a strictly logical methodology, which, in
its essence, was derived from the practice of the empirical
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sciences. Thus ideal philosophy ceased to be regarded
as a source of knowledge#, and a distinct dichotomy
developed between empirical and a priori reasoning; only
the former was honoured by the positivists as the
cognitive method which could attain knowledge.
Broch analyses this prevailing academic climate as
follows! "es ging (eben wie in den eiapirischen
Wissenschaften) urn die Ausschaltung aller rein spekulativen,
also auch aller rein aprioristischen Elemente aus dern
philosophischen Bereich, insbesondere aus der Erkenntnis-
theorie, auf dass nach Beendigung solcher Purifizierung
ein eindwandfrei gesicherter Realit&tsbestand der
Philosophie iibrigbliebe .... limner klarer zeigte sich,
dass eine Verst&ndigung zwischen Apriorismus und Bmpirismus
nicht mehr mbglich war." (GW 91 37-38).
For Broch this was not simply a question of
"universit&re Schulstreitigkeiten" (GW 9s 38). He
believed that it was symptomatic of the ethical crisis of
his era.
According to Broch reality had dissolved into
numerous, separate systems of values. There 'was no
longer any central standard or absolute criterion against
which every facet of human activity could be measured.
The security and direction offered to life by a teleo-
logical orientation, which itself could be guaranteed only
by a unitary religious faith, had been lost. Broch saw
in the Catholic Middle Ages the last epoch in which all
life had been united under such an Absolute, namely in the
faith in the personal God of Christianity. During that
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period, the intellectual atmosphere of which is embodied
in the \<?orks of Scholasticism, God was the final axiom
in every chain of enquiry. Where reason could proceed
no further, the enquirer was nevertheless satisfied
because he believed that ultimately all questions could
be traced back to God the Creator, the ground of reality.
Once such a religious faith weakened, the absolute
basis for life which it had guaranteed would be lost;
there could no longer be found a final instance or central
criterion to which all aspects of human experience could
be submitted. As the spirit of rationalism became
stronger so, Broch argued, logical validity came to be
accepted as the only standard of knowledge and hence of
reality. In Broch's eyes logical positivism represented
the culmination of this development. No longer was each
academic discipline, each profession and every sphere of
human activity related to a central Absolute. Life
dissolved into couiitless independent "realities", each
being pursued and perpetuated as logically as possible,
each with its own ethic, its own system of values. In
the modern era these conflicting interests can frequently
be identified with the steadily growing tally of "-isms":
materialism, imperialism, communism, aestheticism,
2
militarism, commercialism, etc.
These then, in very general term®, were the
processes which Broch saw leading up to the historical
situation immediately prior to the Great War. It was in
search for a solution to this crisis that he hopefully
turned to the study of philosophy at the university of
8
Vienna, only to be forced to concede failure: "das erste
Jahrzehnt des 20. Jahrhunderts war bereits von all der
Spannung und Zerrissenheit erftillt, die 1914 ihren blutigen
Ausdruck finden sollten; nationale, bkonomische,
staatliche, soziale Interessen tlberkreuzten sich allen-
thalben und standen allenthalben in gegenseitigem
Widerspruche, jedes von ihnen mit der Forderung nach
Alleingeltung seiner Wertsetzungen, und nirgends war eine
Iiandhabe zu finden, urn diesen Wertrelativismus unter eine
objektiv ausgleichende hfthere Instanz zu stellen. Und
wenn die Jugend - dies war ja gerade ihre metaphysische
und ethische Not - bei der Philosophie Rat einholen wollte,
so erkl&rte sich die Philosophie selber in diesen Fragen
als unzust&ndig." (GW 9: 38-39)•
Before proceeding any further it should be noted
that Broch was always very reticent about his personal
life, except in as far as such comment might be relevant
to his writings.
In 1948, replying to a student who xvanted some
personal information for a dissertation she was preparing
on the work of Broch, Kafka and Musil, Broch wrote;
"Etwas teile ich jedenfalls mit Kafka und Musil: wir
haben alle drei keine eigentliche Biographie; wir haben
gelebt und geschrieben, und das ist alles." (GW 8: 321).
The following year the same student wrote again and asked
for more details. Broch replied with the bare minimum
of additional information and concluded his letter on much
the same note as his first one: "Hfttte ich eine
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Autobiographie zu schreiben, ich h&tte wegen Material-
mangel allerlei Schwierigkeiten." (GW 8: 360). Perhaps
not surprisingly the dissertation in question dealt
largely with Kafka and Musil only. Nevertheless, the
two letters mentioned provide one of the feiv sources of
3
any comment by Broch on the earlier part of his life.
For the greater part of our knowledge concerning Broch's
life and work before he began his literary career we have
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to rely on the research embodied in secondary literature.
This thesis does not purport to be a comprehensive
biographical study and it is convenient to follow Broch!s
own example in concentrating only on those aspects of his
life which he himself considered relevant to his writings.
Broch's "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogr<amm" tends
to mislead the reader because, under the first section,
"Erste Erfahrungen (1905-1910)", it mentions only his
studies at university and his disillusionment with the
contemporary state of philosophy. No indication is given
that by 1906 Broch, in accordance with the wishes of his
father, had completed a professional training as a textile
engineer. He entered the family business in 1908.
During the period 1908-1927 Broch was deeply
involved in all aspects of the Austrian textile industry.
When the Great War broke out he volunteered for military
service but failed to pass the medical examination; he
spent the first years of the war managing the family
factory at Teesdorf. In the course of the war he was
also entrusted with the supervision of military hospitals,
first at Teesdorf and then in Baden, near Vienna. He
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carried out his duties so well that, in the critical days
just before the armistice when every available man was being-
called up, the Red Cross demanded that he be exempted
because his services were vital to the efficient functioning
of the hospital under his direction. At the same time he
began to be increasingly involved with the problems of
industrial relations within the Austrian textile business.
In the closing years of the war and in the difficult years
which followed Broch played an important role in the efforts
to rebuild the ruined industry and improve relations
between workers and management. Broch's own factories
suffered in the general depression of the 1920!s; after
a long struggle to preserve the family business he
eventually sold it in 1927 and dedicated himself entirely
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to his studies and writing.
Wolfgang Rothe has suggested that Broch did not
publish anything in the period 1919-1929 because it was
the one time in his life when he found a degree of fulfilment
in active social involvement•^ Although Rothe is correct
to emphasize the importance of this practical work his
facts are not accurate. Bibliographies compiled after
the publication of his article reveal that Broch published
a considerable number of articles and reviews during the
period in question. These dealt largely with literary
7criticism or socio-political questions. Most important
of all is the fact that it was during these very years,
when he was participating so actively in current
industrial and political affairs, that Broch formulated
his theory of values. The complexity and volume of his
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research into the theory of values prevented Broch from
publishing any of it at the time, but he tells us that he
amassed many thousands of pages of manuscript, many of
which were later lost when he was arrested by the Nazis
(GW 9: 44).
My aim here is to shoitf that Broch knew from his own
experience the practical difficulties of life* In the
political and economic chaos which engulfed Europe dui'ing
and after the Great War he did what he could to alleviate
the suffering of his fellow-countrymen, but everything
seemed coloured by desperate expediency. For Broch this
was not enoughs he was convinced that the problem had
to be attacked at its root, which he saw in the loss of
a unitary, absolute system of values. Before any lasting
solution to the crisis could be found a sound theoretical
basis of action had to be laid. This was what he sought
to achieve with his theory of values.
"Nichtsdestoweniger konnte diese praktische T&tigkeit
nicht genttgen: gerade weil die praktischen Verantwortungen
gewachsen waren und sich nun auch auf die Allgemeinheit
erstreckten, hatte sich das Bedttrfnis nach theoretischem
VerstSindnis mit verdoppelter St&rke gemeldet. Der Krieg
hatte sich als blutige Sinnlosigkeit entpuppt, und der
Friede wurde - zumindest in Zentraleuropa - erst recht
zum Kampf kontradiktorischex* Wertsysteme, von denen jedes
einzelne mit dem Anspruch auf absolute Alleingeltung
auftrat; ... angesichts solcher Wertzersplitterung
(Wertzerrissenheit, Wertvernichtung) war es kein Wunder,
dass das alte Problem der absoluten Werte sich aufs neue
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und mit aller Intensitftt anmeldete.
Im Laufe der Jahre war mir - im Gegensatz zur
entthuschten Verblttffung meiner Studentenzeit - Blanches
doch klar geworden und hatte einen konstruktiven Aspekt
gewonnen." (GW 9; 39-40),
With the above words Broch describes his turn to
research for a theory of values on which he worked
intensively for the period 1918-1928, It is not my
intention to analyse that theory here, but rather to show
what stage it represents in the development of Broch's
thought. Let it suffice to say at this point that such
a theory, since it was formulated to solve the ethical
problems caused by the loss of a central, absolute value
in life, would obviously have to attempt to restore a new
Absolute, This is what Broch tried to do.
Expressed in the simplest and briefest terms,
Broch sought to demonstrate that all values, all experience,
whether rational or irrational, and all forms of knowledge,
whether a posteriori or a priori, are complementary facets
of a single, ideal reality, the unity of which is
guaranteed by the ego ("das Ich") which, as the subject
of perception and cognition, has an invariable and
absolute epistemological structure.
Behind this intention lies Broch's belief that all
reality is one and that a universally binding code of
ethics can be evolved only xvhen the individual is in a
position to understand his personal role within the over¬
all context of such a reality. For Broch "die ethische
Frage" is that which asks: "Wie verhalte ich mich zur
Welt und zu dem, was ich Eiein Leben nenne?" (GW 10: 302)
It is Broeh's assertion that no final answer can be given
to this question until such a time as man can genuinely
claim to comprehend all reality and hence his individual
function within it. Throughout his work Broch never
ceases to stress the correlation between reality, know¬
ledge and ethics. Two passages from the correspondence
of the later years confirm this. In July 1948 Broch
xvrote: "Realit&t ist Verl&sslichkeit, und damit wird die
Seins-Realit&t zum ethischen Faktor. Wo die Realit&t
verl&sslich ist, da werden auch die Werte, da wird auch
der Mensch wieder verl&sslich. Und darauf komiat es an."
(GW 8: 292). In April 1951» just a few weeks before
his death, he wrote to Karl August Horst: "jede neue
Realit&tsaufdeckung muss notwendigerweise auch moralische
Konsequenzen in sich schliessen, denn es gibt nichts
Isoliertes in dieser Welt; gelingt es mir also, im Leser
eine neue Realit&tsahnung zu erwecken, so helfe ich ihm
auch, eine neue Moralitfttsahnung zu gewinnen, ..."
(GW 8: 417).
The purpose of Broch®s theory of values is twofold
He wants, firstly, to prove that there is a unitary
reality and, secondly, to show that man can come to under
stand it in its totality and thus be able to establish a
universally applicable code of ethics. In the modern,
scientific era, so Broch argues, logical validity has
become the only acceptable criterion of objective truth
and knowledge. Consequently, if his theory of values is
to gain general acknowledgement, and this is a necessary
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prerequisite to its being of any practical use, it must
be scientifically sound.
It is to this fact which Broch refers in
"Autobiographie ^ls Arbeitsprogramm" when he says that the
pessimism and disillusionment of his first studies at
Vienna university have yielded to a new, more constructive
insight. He now assents to the positivistic definition
of knowledge, namely that it be scientifically or
v
logically demonstrable but, and this is the crucial
difference, he believes that the attempt can and must be
made to apply this positivistic methodology to these
fields of enquiry which are normally deemed to lie beyond
the compass of objective knowledge. Above all he has in
mind ideal philosophy and all metaphysical questions.
He insists: "dass nochmals der Versuch unternommen werden
musste, streng kritische Methoden, also eben die des
kritischen Positivismus, im Gebiete der idealistischen
Position anzuwenden, urn solcherart den eigentlich
philosophischen, den idealistischen Ausgangspunkt alles
Philosophierens zu wahren und zu bewahren, andererseits
diesem Philosophieren jene Strenge und Eindeutigkeit zu
geben, deren auch die Philosophie bedarf, wenn sie, ihrern
steten Ehrgeiz gem&ss, Wissenschaft sein will." (GW 9:
40). Whether or not philosophy can or should be a
science is a matter for subsequent discussion.
This was Broch's declared plan of action, and
clearly his theory of values was to play a major part in
it. This theory obviously required intensive research
in the fields of logic, mathematics, epistemology and
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psychology as well as in that of philosophy. Initially,
during the period in question, the greatest emphasis lay
on mathematical studies because Broch saw in mathematics
the purest and most rigorous form of logical reasoning,
and, as has been said, Broch wanted to ensure that his
theory was logically valid. In this he acquiesced to the
demands of positivistic methodology and throughout his
entire life he saw in logic, and hence in mathematics, the
only absolute guarantor of objective knowledge. "Wissen-
schaftlichkeit ist heute bloss im mathematischen Gewande
zulStssig." (GW 8: 85).
Broch's ideal would have been to reduce the world
and man's experience of it to a single, mathematically
comprehensible system. Only then would man be in a
position to understand his individual function within the
whole context of reality; only then, according to Broch's
thesis, would a new, absolute code of ethics be feasible.
In all his work Broch recognizes the impossibility
of establishing such a finite, absolute, mathematical
formula, but he does not let this deter him from trying
to realize his ideal as far as is possible xvithin the
currently obtaining state of mathematical research. His
own studies are designed to extend the range of
mathematical methodology into those fields such as
psychology, sociology and even politics, xtfhich are not
normally regarded as strictly scientific disciplines.
Indeed, it is his insistence on the rigorously mathematical
basis of objective knoitfledge which prevented him from
publishing his theory of values. The frustration and
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anguish resulting from the exacting demands he makes on
his intellectual integrity reveal themselves repeatedly
in his correspondence, as the following extracts show.
"Aber ich muss isnxner wieder Jazu sageri, dass ich
lie werttheoretische Behandlung psychischer Fragen erst
dann fiir erlaubt eraehte, ivenn es gelingen sollte, sie
auf eine gesunde mathezaatische Basis zu stellen: dies
ist ja auch der Grand ihrer Nicht-Verftffentlichung."
(GW 8: 179).
"Mein Misstrauen gegen alles rein Spekulative and
Dialektische ist turmhoch; das ist einer der Hauptgrhnde,
urn deretwillen ich philosophisch so wenig publiziert habe,
obwohl meine erkenntnistheoretischen Aufzeichnungen
bereits Tonnengewicht haben: ich versuche, sie zu
matheraatisieren, da inir dies, mangels anderweitigen
Wissens, als der einzige Weg zur Eri eichung halbwegs
8
konsistenter Aussagen erscheinen will." (GW 8: 328).°
The decade 1918-1928 represents a period in Broch's
life when intensive mathematical research accompanies his
active involvement in the efforts to solve the economic,
social and industrial problems of post-war Austria.
It must not be thought that Broch's interest in
mathematics dates only from that period; the post-war
years merely saw the re-awakening and intensification of
a passion for this discipline which can be traced back to
Broch's school days. His ambition was always to be a
mathematician (GW 8; 322). At this point can be seen
a parallel between what I have referred to as the temporal
and hierarchical lines of development of Broch's thought;
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matheraatics remained the basic interest throughout Broch's
life and work, but, under the pressure of changing
historical circumstances and at various stages of his life
other interests dominated his thought. His literary work
represents an attempt to complement the mathematical
studies by doing what logic and mathematics can never do
in themselves, namely reveal the ideal unity of all reality.
He felt that art could at least afford a visionary or
intuitive glimpse of the goal toivards which science and
mathematics are condemned to move by an infinite series
of progression.
Similarly, his work on psychology and political
theory is linked to his mathematical studies in as far as
he tried to set it on a firm logical basis. The strange
fascination which mathematics held for Broch is
characterized on his part by what can best be described
as a love-hate relationship. In mathematics he saw the
only source of security for objective knowledge in a world
torn by relativism; and yet he was tormented because he
realized the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
applying mathematical criteria to every sphere of human
experience. His dilemma appears clearly in his descrip¬
tion of a mathematical congress he once attended in Prague
as "eine Orgie ungliicklicher Liebe" (GW 8 s 13).
In 1927 Broch sold the family textile business and
decided to dedicate himself to a literary career. It is
interesting to note that subsequent economic developments
confirmed Enoch1s business acumen in selling when he did.
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His decision to become a professional writer must be seen
in the overall context of the way his thinking developed.
Firstly, in the years prior to his resolution,
Broch had alxvays shown a lively interest in the contem¬
porary world of literature and had published a number of
reviews in which he revealed himself as a critic of
Q
uncompromising integrity. Although the emphasis in
those early years lay on literary criticism he nevertheless
wrote and published some creative work of his own. Until
comparatively recently this published material was
thought to comprise only two works, a poem entitled
"Mathematisches Mysterium" (1913) and a short story,
"Eine methodologische Novell©" (1918).*^ Some years ago
Manfred Durzak brought to light what certainly seems to
have been Broch's earliest published work. This is to
be found in a rather superficial society novel, Scn.ia oder
fiber unsere Kraft, which was published in 1909. Broch,
his fiancee, Franziska von Rothermann, and seven of her
friends collaborated in the production of the book. Each
wrote a chapter and Broch contributed the final one.^
Secondly, Broch's turn to literature must not be
interpreted as a break with his mathematical studios. He
explains in a letter that, having freed himself from his
business responsibilities, he at last had the time, not
only to pursue a literary career, but also to resume his
formal studies at university. At the same time he is
careful to state that he had been constantly preoccupied
with logical and mathematical problems while trying to
formulate his theory of values, i.e. during that period
when his business obligations prevented his attending
formal courses at the university.
"Daneben freilich hatte ich begonnen, Mathematik zu
studieren, konnte das aber erst 1929 wieder voll aufnehmen
als ich die Industrie verliess. Natiirlich habe ich mich
dazwischen unausgesetzt mit Mathematik besch&ftigt,
umsomehr als ich sie fftr meine erkenntnistheoretisch-
philosophischen Studien brauchte, denn ohne Mathematik
Ihsst sich kaum raehr philosophieren. Zugleich aber
entdeckte ich etwas anderes: jene Gebiete der Philosophic
welche ftlr die mathematische Behandlung unzug&nglich sind,
vor allem also die Ethik oder die Metaphysik, werdea bloss
im Theologischen 'objektiv' d.h. werdea ansonsten
relativistisch und im letzten 'subjektiv', und eben diese
Subjektivit&t dr&ngt mich dorthin, wo sie radikal legitin
ist, nhmlich ins Dichterische." (GhT 8: 322).
The above passage broaches the question of why, at
that particular stage in his life, Broch attributed such
importance to literature. Unlike the logical positivists
Broch refused to ignore those fields of enquiry where the
scientific critex^ia of truth and knoxvledge seemed
inapplicable. In his eyes such a position was
indefensible because it dogmatically declined to take
account of subjective reality and the ethical and meta¬
physical problems which, as he believed, were grounded in
the individual's inner experience of himself and the
world.
Broch maintained that, until such a time as the
logical criteria of objective knowledge could be extended
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to encompass even the most subjective of human experiences
within a single, comprehensive epistemological system,
then art, in his own case literature, had to fulfil the
function of a cognitive instrument. For Broch literature
originally justified itself only in as far as it afforded
a visionary insight into the ideal harmony of all reality
and human experience. The scientific and mathematico-
logical disciplines could only approach this goal of
totality through an infinite series of progression; they
could never attain it. Broch talks of "der unendliche
logische Regress, der die Wissenschaft von Resultat zu Resultat
vorw&rtstreibt" (GW 7; 95). he sees the essential
character of all science in its logical compulsion 11 zur
Totalit&t der Welt in unendlich vielen, unendlich kleinen
rationalen Schritten vorzudringen, ewig sich ihr
anzun&hern, niemals sie erreichend" (GW 7: 88).
Continual and intensive mathematical research is,
in Broch's opinion, necessary in order constantly to expand
the scope of the scientific disciplines and thus
increasingly to unite all experience within a comprehensive
logical system. At the same time he believed that a work
of art can, by virtue of the heightened perceptive talents
of the artist, grant an intuitive revelation of those
planes of reality which, for the time being, are beyond
such rational comprehension. Science and art are
complementary, although the former will increasingly
encroach upon the realm of the latter; "wissenschaftliche
und kllnstlerische Erkenntnis sind Zweige eines einzigen
Stammes, und der ist die Erkenntnis schlechthin." (GW 7:
21
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88). Xa the same passage Broch goes on to define his
view of the role of art: "den von der Wissenschaft
unerreichbaren 'Weltrest' ahnen zu iassen, jeuen Weltrest,
der doeh vorhaaden, der dock gewusst 1st und der zu
erfassen, die ewige Sehnsucht des Menschen ist, - imruer
ist Dicliten solche Ungeduld der Erkenntnls, und jedes
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Kunstwerk ist ahnendes Symbol der geahnten Totalit&t."
Vdiether pursuing his mathematical studies or
writing his novels, Broeh was primarily concerned with
the ethical crisis of his generation. As has been stated,
Broch envisaged a close relationship between the individ¬
ual's ability to understand his reality and to act
ethically. Broch turned to literature because at that
period of his life he saw it as a valuable means of over¬
coming the limitations of scieiitif'ic progress, which is
necessarily slo\*r. Art was to fulfil an ethical function
by revealing the ideal unity of reality in which
irrational, intuitive experience has the same validity as
objectively verifiable, scientific knowledge. Broch
believed that the time was ripe for such an endeavour:
"Formulieren wir, dass die Zeit des etliischen ICunstwerks
angebx^ochen ... sei." (GW 6: 207).
In his "Autobiographic ais Arbeitsprogramm", under
the heading of "Literarische Thtigkeit (1928-1936)",
Broch describes his two reasons for embarking on a
literary career; it is to be noted that he emphasizes
the practical results hoped for.
"Das metaphysische Bediirfnis Ihsst sich jedoch nicht zum
Schweigen bi'-ingen; wftre dies ratSglicli, so g&be es keine
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Philosophic, nicht einmal eine positivistische. Und wenn
die religibse SphSre, in der es seine Allgemeingiiltigkeit
besitzt, verschlossen ist, so muss es dort aufgesptirt
werden, wo es unauslbschlich und ewig verwurzelt ist,
n&mlich in der Seele des menschlichen Individuums: der
Zugang hiezu war seit jeher die Dichtung gewesen, die
Dichtung in ihrer gottsucherischen Mission.
Dichtung legitimiert sich an der metaphysischen
Evidenz, die den Menschen erfiillt und zu der sie vorstbsst,
wenn die rationalen Mittel des Denkens hiezu nicht
ausreichen; Dichtung ist stets Ungeduld der Erkenntnis
gewesen, und zwar eine durchaus legitime Ungeduld.
Dies war wohl der erste Grund fiir meine Wendung zum
ausserwissenschaftlichen, literarischen Ausdruck gewesen,
doch daneben gab es noch einen zweiten und eigentlich
rationaleren Grund, n&mlich den der unmittelbaren ethischen
Wirkung. Denn jede Philosophic zielt auf ethische Wirkung
im praktischen Leben, ist also letztlich in einem reinsten
Sinne auf Politik abgestellt .... Wer gehbrt werden
wollte, musste sich kiirzere und direktere Wege whhlen
als jene, welche durch die Philosophic gegeben waren.
Ethische Wirkung ist zum grossen Teil in aufkl&render
T&tigkeit zu suchen, und fiir eine solche ist das Dichtwerk
ein weitaus besseres Mittel als die Wissenschaft. Dies
war der zweite Grund fiir meine Wendung zur Literatur.
In den Jahren 1928-1935 verbffentlichte ich also
meine Roraane, ebenso ein Schauspiel, welches in Ziirich
1935 aufgeftlhrt wurde . . . . sie bemlihten sich um
exoterische Wirkung mit Hilfe dichterischer Mittel ....
Meine Hoffnung bei alldern war: clie erzieherische v/irkung
ethischer Dichtung." (GW 9: 45-46).*^
I have dealt with the reasons for Broch's decision
to undertake a literary career in some detail because I
intend to examine the novels in as far as they reflect the
development of his approach to the basic ethical problem
of his era. He believed that the current ethical crisis
could be resolved only once a new, absolute code of human
conduct had been devised; this alone would liberate man
from the chaos and insecurity of relativism which
dominated all aspects of modern life.
At this juncture, before the next stage in the
development of Broch's work is presented, one seeming
anomaly must be clarified. In retrospect Brock set his
literary activity in the years 192S-1936, and yet three
of his major novels appeared after that date: Per Tod
des Vergil (1945)* Die Schuldlosen (1949) and Per
Versucher (1953). The last of these was published
posthumously, but Broch was working on the final version
of the novel when he died in 1951*
During the period 1928-1936 Broch published numerous
theoretical essays on literature and aesthetics, five short
stories, four of which wer later included in Die
3chuId1osen, translations of poems by Edwin Muir, James
Joyce and T.S. Eliot, the two novels, Die SchlaiVanJler
and Die unbekannte Crfesse, and a play, Die Toteaklage,
which was performed in a much altered form in March 1934
under the title of Dean sie wissea nicht, was sle tun.
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lie also wrote a short story, Die Heimkehr des Vergil, for
a radio broadcast la the spring of 1935* These same
year's also saw the production of a considerable quantity
of fragmentary "work and unpublished material. This
included two novels, a film script adapted from die
ni.i.ooi£6uixxoo ci'dsso sac. a comedy entx^loo i\us our cu_ o
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n'egi'iffas* Oder die Geachhfte des bax'on Lsboi'de.
The disparity between the dates of publication of
Broch's last three novels and his claim that his literary
activity was concentrated in the years 1923-1936 can be
explained as follows. Until 1936 Broch genuinely believed
that literature as he conceived of it, namely in a
cognitive and ethical function, was morally and socially
justifiable even in a world threatened by imminent
political disaster. By 1936, however, the Nazi threat
to peace and humanity in Europe had become so powerful
that Broch decided that some more direct and immediate
action was necessary on his pare. The consequence of
this decision was that Broch abandoned his literary career
and dedicated himself to research in the fields of mass
psychology and political theory. V.lxy then, we may ask,
were three of his. major novels published after that date?
There were important personal factors relevant to
the genesis of each of these three novels; these will now
be briefly enumerated. It is not my purpose to analyse
the origins of these works in detail; I wish to show how
they came to be written and published despite Broch's
growing doubts as to the moral justification of any form
of art. ouch an examination also serves to illuminate
the integrity of broch5s personality, both as an artist
and a moralist, and the conflicts which sometimes arose
from the nigh demands he made on himself in both these
spheres of his work.
broch wrote Per ioa aes Vergil primarily as an
expression of his personal confrontation with death.
"Ich hatte meine dichterische Tatigkeit, soweit
sie exoterisch an das Publikum gericlvtet gewesen war,
zugunsteri der Vftlkerbundarbeit aufgegeben gehabt, weil ich
einsehen gelernt hatte, dass man sich keine Hoffnungen
mehr machen durfte, durch eixie literarische Pubiikums-
ueeinfiussung dem historischen Ablaut' eine andere Richtung
geben zu konnen oder auch nui» das Geringste zu solcher
ivichturigshnderung beizutragen. Aber die irunern
metaphysischen Impulse zur Dichtung waren trotzdem
geblieben, und je unentrirmbarer sich das Aussere Geschehen
gestaitete - 1937 gab es doer die verbAngnisvolie Richtung
dieses Geschehens keinen tweifei mehr - desto st&rker
wurden jene innern Impulse} der Tod war uns, die wir nun
gewisseraasaen am Rande des Konzentrationslagers lebten,
plbtziich so handgreiflicn nahe gertlckt, dass die
metaphysische Auseinandersetzung mit initi schlechterdings
nicht mehr aufschiebbar war, bnd so begann ich 1937,
beinahe gegen nieinen eigenen Willen, sozusagen als
Privatangelegenheit des eigenen beelenheiles, mit einem
strikt esoterischen Buche, dem Vergil." (GVv' 9: 51).
The figure of Vergil had attracted Broch*s interest
even before 1937. In the spring of 1935 he had written
a short story for radio, Die Keiinkehr des Vergil. At
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that time he was particularly interested in the medieval
legend that Vergil had prophesied the advent of
Christianity in his fourth Eclogue. Broch saw certain
parallels between the situation of the poec at the end of
the Golden age of classical antiquity and that of the
creative writer of his own generation. He wrote Die
Ileimkehr des Vergil specifically on the theme of "Kultur-
Ende unu Literatur" (GVv o: 243). As the Nazi threat
became increasingly evident so the emphasis of Broch«s
interest in the legend of Vergil's death, according to
which Vergil is supposed to have demanded that the
unfinished Aeneid be burnt, changed: he was attracted
more and more by the theme of death itself.
In March 1938 this fascination with the phenomenon
of death received dramatic stimulus: Broch was arrested
by the Gestapo. Fortunately none of his political
research had yet been published and his friends succeeded
in destroying large quantities of compromising letters
and manuscripts before these could be confiscated. Broch
was eventually released after two and a half weeks in
detention; in July of the same year he fled to London,
never to return to Austria again. In later correspondence
he regularly describes his arrest as a traumatic
experience, a trauma which gave birth to Per Tod des Vergil
as we know it to—day. At the time of his imprxsonment
Broch seems to have believed that he faced death at the
hands of the Gestapo or in a concentration camp. While
in prison he resumed work on his interpretation of the
Vergil legend as a form of private preparation for death*
All Broch's correspondence confirms that, whatever themes
and motifs there may be in the novel, and there is a
great variety of them, the central question is that of
the individual's personal confrontation with death.
"Es ist mir also um die nackte Todeserkenntnis gegangen."
(GW 8: 192) .
"The thane of Virgil came to me only by chance, but during
the work I came to a time in which I was really threatened
by death - the Nazis and from this moment on I wrote
this book exclusively for myself (partly in prison) and
in a sense as a private preparation for death and with no
thought of a public." (OW 8: 213-214).
"T'enn ich von Nicht—'Verbffentlichung spreche, so hat das
einan fftr mich sehr guten Grund , , , , Dean unter der
Hitler-Bedrohung, die einem ,ja den Tod recht nahe gerttckt
hat - einige der Passagen wares im GefSmgnis geschrieben -
war ich nicht nur sicher, nichts rnehr verhffentlichen zu
kSnnen, sondern wollte mich, solauge es noch mftglich war,
privat mit dem Todeserlebnis vertraut machen." (GW 8: 271)
"The Virgil was not written as a 'book*, but (under
Hitler's threat) as my private discussion with death."
(GW 8: 376).16
The above quotations reveal the importance attached
by Broch to Per Tod des Vergil as a personal document.
In the third of the quoted passages, taken from a letter
written in September 1947 to Egon Vietta, i,e. some two
years after the novel had appeared, Broch claims that at
one time he contemplated not publishing the novel at all.
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This statement is confirmed by another letter written even
before the first manuscript of the book had been
completed (GW 8: 172).
Jhy ohen was the novel ever published? Again it
is to personal factors wo must turn if Broch>s decision
is to be fully understood.
Although on one occasion, in a mood of despair,
Broch referred to Jer tod des Vergil as "ein brock"
(G.v 8 s 17s), there is no doubt that he set a very high
value on the literary quality of the book and on his own
talents in writing it. he believed that it represented
a significant experiment in the formal structure of the
modern novel and a genuine extension of the range of
3 7
expression of the German language. ' At the same time
broch felt that it was wrong, for two basic reasons, to
publish this novel. In the first place he questioned
the moral justification of a work of art which owed its
conception to she horrors of Nazi persecution and the
1 8
threat of the gas chamber.~ Secondly, although the
novel had au almost irresistible attraction for the artist
in Broch, he resented the time spent on it, time which, in
his opinion, could have been better employed for his
1°
political and psychological research. '
Despite such doubts the novel was published,
curiously enough also on moral grounds. The conflict of
Broch5s interests can be seen here, but it will be noted
that, whatever his final decision, he was always guided
by a sense of moral responsibility. then Broch arrived
in America in October 1938 lie was almost completely
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destitute and had to rely on the good will and charity of
friends# In the period 1939-1942 he received financial
support from various sources to enable him to conclude
his work on Per Tod des Vergil. The most important of
these grants were from the Guggenheim Foundation and the
American Academy of Arts and Letters. Having accepted
such financial help Broch felt morally bound to complete
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and publish the work for which the grants had been made.
There was one other reason for Broch's decision to publish
Per Tod des Vergil and this was connected with his
political and psychological studies. He wanted to
achieve public recognition in America with his novel, not
for personal or financial advancement, but because he
hoped that such a success might influence the public
favourably towards the massive, three volume work on mass
psychology which he was preparing at that time. At the
same time he hoped that the favourable reception of Per
Tod des Vergil by the reading public would guarantee the
continued interest and confidence of his American
publisher, Kurt Wolff, on whom he was dependent for the
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publication of his research findings#
In 1942 Broch was awarded a fellowship from the
Rockefeller Foundation for his psychological research,
and this brought further pressure to bear on him. He felt
he had to publish the novel as quickly as possible in order
to be free to dedicate himself wholly to his research,
which he believed to be of immediate and practical
relevance to the current political situation, and thus
prove himself tvorthy of the trust and confidence which the
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Foundation had displayed in making him such an award.
Although the first manuscript of the novel was
completed in 1940 (GW 10s 379) the novel did not appear
until 1945. The reason for the delay was that Kurt Wolff
and Broch wranted it to appear in a German and English
edition simultaneously. Jean Starr Untermeyer and Broch
worked together intensively on the translation for over
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four years. When Broch finished the first version of
the novel in 1940 he stated that he would not undertake
any revision of it because that would involve him in at
least three further years of work. He did not believe
that he was morally justified in spending so much time on
a work of art when the world was being devastated by war.
It was also his view that any revision could only lead to
the novel becoming increasingly esoteric, perhaps even to
23the point of becoming totally incomprehensible.
Nevertheless, Broch could not deny the artist
within himself and, during the period when he was collab¬
orating with Mrs. Untermeyer on the English translation,
he regularly introduced extensive alterations to the novel.
Despite this he always regarded this novel as a work which
he never completed to his personal satisfaction because he
had to sacrifice it to the moral demands for active
involvement in the world crisis of his generation,'"^
With the publication of Per Tod des Vergil he
believed that his literary career was at an end. He
emphasized that the decision was not an easy one, especially
for a person with any real creative talent,
"Ich habe verzichtet, das Buch wahr.haft kiinstlerisch zu
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vollenden, weil ich in dieser Schreckenszeit nicht noch
ein paar Jahre an ein Werk setzen durfte, das rait jedem
weiteren Schritt zunehmend esoterischer geworden wttre,
und ich glaube damit raeine dichterische Laufbahn endgttltig
abgeschlossen zu haben: es scheint mir, dass ich fttr mein
Gewissen nicht mehr tun konnte. Das war n&mlich gar kein
so leichter Entschluss. Denn wer einraai ins Kttnstlerisch©
geraten ist - und ausserdem (tvie ich von mir zu behaupten
wage) grftndlich gelernt hat -, der muss fttr einen solchen
Abschied schon einigen Mut aufbringen. Es ist ein
ziemlich schmerzlicher Abschied. Zudera ist es nicht
ganz einfach, sich rait Sechzig nochmals beruflich
umzustellenj bliebe ich ein 'Erz&hler', so wttrde sich
raein Leben jedenfalls leichter und erfolgssicherer
gestalten." (GW 8s 247)•
The genesis of the two subsequent novels can be
presented in considerably less detail. It is to be noted
that in both cases the original conception of the books
involved, Die Schuldlosen and what we know to-day as Der
Versucher, dates back to the early 19301s, i.e. to the
days when Broch still believed in the cognitive and
ethical mission of literature.
In 1948, at a time when Broch was already heavily
committed to his research in epistemology and political
theory, the Munich publisher, Willi Weismann, wrote to
Broch asking for permission to publish his early Novellen
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in a single volume. Broch, who seemed to have
forgotten most of the works involved, agreed but demanded
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to see the proofs of the texts before any further action
was taken. His first reaction was essentially one of
disappointment; these early works did not satisfy the
standards he applied to himself as an artist. It is
clear, however, that his interest was aroused; almost
against his will and better judgment he became increas¬
ingly involved in the creation of a new novel. Rather
than rewrite the existing Novellen entirely Broch contented
himself with minor alterations and wrote six more Novellen
and the introductory "Parabel von der Stiinme" • All the
stories were then linked together by a lyrical framework.
The final product was the novel Die Schuldlosen - Roman
in elf Erzfthlungen, which first appeared in the Weismann-
Verlag in 1949. What stands out from this is that Broch,
despite his reluctance to commit himself to further
literary work, was unable fully to suppress his talent
and love for i^riting. His artistic integrity is seen
in the fact that he was unwilling to accept anything but
the highest possible standard of work from himself; his
moral integrity is seen in the fact that, if necessary,
he was prepared to sacrifice the cause of art to the
demands of humanity. The result of this was necessarily
a conflict within himself.
This same dilemma is also evident in the origins
of Der Versucher, which, in its present form in the
Collected Works, was edited posthumously by Felix
Stftssinger and represents his own arbitrary blending of
three versions of the novel written over a period of
26
almost twenty years. One of the difficulties in tracing
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the genesis of this novel is that Broch rarely discusses
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it in any detail in his essays or letters. There is
still controversy concerning Broch's reasons for altering
his conception of the novel with each new version and I
shall comment on this when discussing the novel in the
2 8
third part of this thesis. At present I wish to
comment only on the personal factors responsible for
Broch's resuming work on the book in 1949 although he had
forsworn literature because he believed it to be morally
unjustifiable aestheticism. For this purpose a brief
summary of the development of the three versions is
sufficient.
Broch probably started work on the first version
some time in 1933 (GW 8{ 84)• Originally he conceived
of it as the first volume of a great religious trilogy
(GW 8: 144-145, 146), and he generally referred to this
first version as "das grosse religittse Buch" (GW 8: 84)
or simply as "der grosse Roman" (GW 10s 360). The
first draft of the book was completed in January 1936 and
Broch at once began to revise it (GW 8: 144-145, 146).
From this time on the novel is usually referred to as
"der Bergroman" (GW 8: 186, 232, 348, 367* 386) and it
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is this title which I shall subsequently use.
In the course of this revision Broch came to have
an entirely new conception of the novel and began to
rewrite it with an added emphasis on the mythical factors
which underlie the workings of the unconscious mind. He
worked intensively on this version until the end of 1936,
when he abandoned it. His correspondence reveals a
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growing dissatisfaction with his ability to cope with the
new form of the novel (GW 8: 156-157» 186, 301-302).
The political developments of 1936 also served to heighten
his personal doubts about the moral validity of any form
of art in the face of the growing threat of war. When
he broke off work on this second version he had reached
a point some two-thirds of the way through the eighth
chapter. There is some evidence that as late as 1938
Broch still contemplated finishing the book in its second
version (GW 8: 169; GW 10: 377).
For some years after this Broch's interest in the
Bergroman lapsed; for reasons already explained his
efforts were directed to completing Per Tod des Vergil
and to pursuing his political and psychological researches.
On the few occasions that Broch mentions the novel during
the next ten years it is usually x^ith a note of despair
as to his ever being able to complete it (GW 8: 173-174»
186, 232, 283).
In 1948 Alfred Knopf, the American publisher on
whom Broch was then relying for the publication of his
political book, began to press Broch to produce another
novel. Finally Knopf insisted that Broch give him a new
novel before he would accept the political book with its
more limited public appeal (GW 8: 297, 3Q5» 326, 351-352).
Once again Broch was forced to compromise: for the sake
of his political and psychological work, which he
considered to be of real practical value, he xvas forced
to return to literature.
Under such pressure Broch offered Knopf his
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Bergroman (GW 8: 297). Broch had considerable doubts
as to his ability to resume where he had left off in the
second version of the novel; he felt that another revision
would be necessary (GW 8; 301-302, 305; BB:497, 501).
When he finally set to work on the novel he in fact began
a third version, incorporating major stylistic changes.
By the time Broch died in 1951 work on this version had
progressed into the fifth chapter.
The aim of this lengthy digression on the novels
has been to show the conflicting demands of the artist and
moralist within the personality of Broch. Whether in his
capacity as a creative writer, a philosopher or a writer
of political and psychological theory Broch's main concern
was ethical. When he felt that art could no longer serve
his purpose he did not hesitate to renounce it. It was
due largely to external pressures, which also took the
form of moral obligations, that Per Tod des Vergil and
Die Schuldlosen were eventually published. The third
version of the Bergroman was also begun under similar
circumstances. Once forced to work on these novels,
Broch felt compelled to give of his very best in them.
It is my view that Broch's personal integrity was not
compromised by his return to literature after he had
decided to renounce it. Behind all he did there lay a
strict sense of moral responsibility, both to himself and
to others.
Bearing in mind that at various points in Broch's
career after 1936 pressure was brought upon him to resume
his literary work, we can now continue to pursue the gen-
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era! development of his thought and interests.
Broch explains in his "Autobiographic als
Arbeitsprogramm", under the section entitled "Vftlkerbund-
theorie (1936-1937)"» how current historical events
influenced his final decision to reject literature.
"So sehr diese dichterische Bet&tigung meinen innern
Wilnschen und Bedfirfnissen entsprach, sie wurde neuerdings
von den Ereignissen ttberholt. Hitler hatte die Macht in
Deutschland ergriffen, die Nazipropaganda begann mit
unwiderstehlicher Pr&zision in sftmtlichen Grenzl&ndern
zu arbeiten, und dahinter stand die Aufrttstung sowie die
t&glich deutlicher werdende Kriegsdrohung: das waren
M&chte, gegen welche mit Beeinflussung eines Lesepublikums
nichts mehr auszurichten war.
Wer in diesem Augenblick noch etwas gegen Barbarei,
Blutwahnsinn und ICrieg tun wollte, durfte keine Uiawege
mehr gehen, sondern hatte sich zu beintthen, sich unnittel-
bar in den Dienst jener Krhfte zu stellen, welche noch in
der Lage waren, sich dem kommenden Unheil zu widersetzen.
Wer dies in jenen Tagen nicht tat, der setzte die Silnde
der geistigen Arbeiter und Intellektuellen fort, die
Stinde des ivory tower und seiner Verantwortungslosigkeit;
gerade das Deutschland des Jahres 1933 zeigte, welche
Folgen aus der politischen Gleichgttltigkeit des geistigen
Arbeiters entstehen konnten: h&tte Deutschland mehr
Manner von der politischen Leidenschaft eines Max Weber
gehabt, hfttte der deutsche Intellektuelle sich nicht
jahrzehntelang vom politischen Geschehen ausgeschaltet,
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es w&re um die deutsche Demokratie besser bestellt
gewesen." (GW 9: 46-47).^°
In the year 1936-1937 Broch worked intensively on
a theory for a viable League of Nations, a theory to be
based on the principle of the essential dignity of the
individual. The political developments of 1937 out-
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stripped Broch's research and it was not published."
He refused to publish it after the events which it had
been designed to prevent because he felt that this would
be a form of hypocritical self-justification. As it
happened, it was perhaps fortunate for him, in view of
his subsequent arrest by the Gestapo, that this work
remained unpublished.
"W&hrend der Jahre 1936/37 stand ich mit einer Reihe
bedeutender europ&ischer Persttnlichkeiten in Korrespondenz,
um diese Arbeit zu einem kollektiven Dokument zu raachen,
welches in einem repr&sentativen Schritt beim Vftlkerbund
einzubringen gewesen w&re. Die politische Entwicklung
des Jahres 1937 zwang zur Aufgabe dieses Vorhabens; es
war sinnlos geworden.
Im Widerspruch zur Meinung mancher meiner Freunde
habe ich die Vftlkerbundarbeit nicht verftffentliclit.
Derartige Arbeiten sind an den Augenblick ihrer Verwirk-
lichbarkeit gebunden; nehmen sie hierauf nicht Rttcksicht,
so sinken sie zur Utopie eines wishful thinking herab.
Und diese Weigerung gegen die Ver&ffentlichung wurde
ttberdies fttr mich persBnlich zu einem Gltlcksfall: w&re
die Ver&ffentlichung erfolgt, so h&tte ich das Mazige-
f&ngnis, in dem ich mich einige Wochen befunden habe, kaum
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mehr verlassen." (GW 9: 51)•
From Broch's correspondence it is evident that,
even before he formally renounced literature in 1936, he
was experiencing considerable doubts as to its moral
validity in an era when more direct, practical inter¬
vention in human affairs seemed necessary. Throughout
the following years these misgivings grew to be a firm
conviction on Broch's part that art, despite its potential
as a cognitive and ethical instrument, was no longer
morally justifiable in his time. The following quotations
are all taken from letters written during the period 1933-
1936, a time in Broch's life when he self-avowedly
attributed great value to the cognitive and ethical role
of his literary work. They reveal not only his growing
discontent with literature, but also the increasing
urgency of his need to make a practical contribution
towards solving the ethical crisis of his generation.
"Im Grunde genommen weiss ich Uberhaupt nicht . . ,
ob Dichten heute noch eine legitime Lebens&usserung ist,
ob das, was man zu sagen hat, nicht auf ganz anderem Weg
und viel lebendiger in die Zeit wirken iniisste." (GY/ 8:
81-82).
Writing to his publisher, Dr. Daniel Brody, Broch
describes himself as being: "von einem brennenden
Ehrfceiz besessen, in diese Y/elt noch eingreifen zu kftnnen,
gerade weil die Welt so scheusslich geworden ist, und
beinahe ist es mir, als meldete sich in solchem Drang
eine metaphysische Pflicht an." (GW 8: 127).
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"Und doch erhebt sich da fttr mich wieder die Frages
ist der schriftstellerische Beruf als solcher heute noch
legitim? hat der Lese-Ekel, der die heutige Welt erfasst
hat, nicht seine tiefere (metaphysische) Berechtigung?"
(GW 8: 131).
"Ich stehe rait meiner dichterischen und geistigen
guten und vielleicht sogar sehr guten Mittelbegabung auf
sozial unethiseher Stelle." (GW 8: 149).
As Broch looked more and more askance at his
literary work, so his interest in logic, mathematics and
epistemology reasserted itself with increasing fervour.
More and more he came to believe that any new, universally
acceptable ethos could find a secure basis only in
absolute logical validity. Although Broch admitted the
value of art in affording an intuitive insight into
those planes of experience and reality which lie beyond
rational comprehension he felt that such art would need
to become steadily more esoteric if it was to remain true
to its cognitive principle. In these circumstances the
artist could expect to appeal to an ever decreasing public,
and the influence of his work would decline correspond¬
ingly. For these reasons Broch was drawn steadily back
to his logical and mathematical studies, obsessed by the
necessity of extending the range of their methodology to
all other disciplines and thus accounting for every
possible phenomenon of human experience, including those
still regarded as irrational.
In November 1932, soon after the final volume of
Die Schlafwandler had appeared, Broch wrote to his
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publisher's wife, discussing this problem.
"Dichten heisst, Erkenntnis durch die Form gewinnen wollen,
und neue Erkenntnis kann nur durch neue Form geschftpft
werden. Das ist in diesem Zusammenhang logisch und
folgerichtig, und ausserdem, was noch wichtiger ist, es
wird durch mein inneres Wissen best&tigt .... Neue Form
dagegen aber heisst zunehmende Publikumsfremdheit,
Unverk&uflichkeit. ... Es wird eigentlich erst jetzt
klar, warum ich im letzten Jahr immer dringender zur
mathematischen und wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis zurftck
will: die Schlafwandler und das Drama sind erste Etappen
auf dem Wege der irrationalen Erkenntnis, die eben
Erkenntnis durch die Form ist, und ich fiirchte mich
eigentlich vor der n&chsten Etappe. Vielleicht fttrchte
ich mich auch vor dem weiter aufbrechenden Irrationalen
als solchem." (GW 8: 78-79).
Some four years later, at the time when he finally
decided to renounce his literary work, Broch wrote to the
same person that he was obsessed by the concept of
knowledge and all that it implied: "der Begriff der
Erkenntnis, von der ich derart besessen bin, dass ich
unausgesetzt mit dem Gedanken einer Rttckkehr zur
Wissenschaft (die, wie ich glaube, mein sthrkstes
Begabungsgebiet ist) mich besch&ftige." (GW 8: 155).
Further evidence of Broch's growing interest in
the formal, scientifically defined category of knowledge
is to be found in the essay, "Einheit wissenschaftlicher
und dichterischer Erkenntnis", which was first published
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in July 1933. There Broch takes care to emphasize that
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literature and science should ideally complement each
other in the pursuit of knowledge, but this essay shows
clearly that by this time his attention was focussing
more closely on the formal disciplines of logic and
mathematics.
Although Broch's personal inclination at this time
would have been to return to these formal and abstract
fields of research his first action after renouncing
literature was, as has been said, to devote himself to
the theory of politics. He felt strongly that any
practical contribution towards the attainment of a new,
absolute code of ethics would have to be made in this
sphere of thought. And, in turn, he was convinced that
no viable theory of humane politics could be evolved
until man properly understood the phenomena of mass
psychology, which play such an important part in practical
politics. For Broch the study of politics and psychology
always went hand in hand, and it is no coincidence that
his first detailed studies in politics and psychology
date from 1936, the year when he abandoned his literary
career to seek more direct involvement in current affairs.
The two works in question are the "Vftlkerbundtheorie"
and the uncompleted essay, "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen
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zur Psychoanalyse".
Two important points must be made here. Firstly,
Broch's political and psychological research was forced
upon him by contemporary historical events. From his
earliest days he had evinced a deep distrust of practical
politics. In an open letter to Franz Blei, written in
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the troubled days of December 1918, he contrasts the
ideal conception of politics with the inevitably harsh
realities of practical life.
"Der Begriff des Politischen deckt sich mit dem der
Gerechtigkeit. Eine andere Politik als eine, die zur
Gerechtigkeit strebt, gibt es nicht. Interessenpolitik
ist nicht Politik, sondern einfach Geschftft, mehr oder
weniger verhftllt .... Das reine Politische ist
nichts sonst als Idee ... Die reine Politik ist aus
der Autonomie des Geistigen geboren ... Reine Politik
ist die zum formalen Gebilde gewordene reine sittliche
Forderung .... Politik ist das Unabv/endbare
schlechthin. In ihr wird, was sich am Wesen des
praktischen Politikers zeigt, ... das Allererb&rmlichste
in die Welt getragen. Sie ist die letzte und bftseste
Verflachung des Manschen. Das radikale Bftse als
notwendige Folge der Dogmatisierung des Sittlichen
schlechthin. Kurzum die Hblle." (GW 10: 259-260).
Broch never entirely lost these misgivings and
they colour many of his despairing comments as to the
practicability of his political theories, itfhich he
naturally regarded as "reine Politik". Although he
regarded politics with distaste he maintained that the
intellectual had to accept his moral responsibilities and
face up to the challenge of the current political
situation. Broch was never an advocate of the "innere
Emigration". In the draft of a letter prepared in
April 1950 he describes "das ganze Verhhltnis des
geistigen Arbeiters zur konkreten Politik" as "das ftlr
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uns heute vielleicht wichtigste Problem" (GW 8: 423)
It is in the letters written during Broch's years
in America that we can most clearly see to what extent he
felt compelled to suppress his primary interests and
talents, which lay in the direction of literature and
mathematics, in order to pursue his research in political
theory. In July 1939 he wrote to Carl Seeligs "ich
arbeite sehr viel wissenschaftlich, und im Grunde meines
Herzens m&chte ich ja immer mehr auf Mathematik, Logik
und Physik llbergehen. Wenn nur die Politik nicht w&rel"
(GW 8: 171-172).
One of the most interesting letters with respect
to this conflict of Broch's interests is that written to
James Franck in February 1946, particularly the
following passages.
"Ich ... hatte mir vorgenoimnen, mit meinem 60. Jahr
zur mathematischen Logik zurttckzukehren, da ich mir
stets eingebildet hatte, da etwas leisten zu kbnnen;
doch statt dessen bin ich in die Massenpsychologie geraten,
urn wohl bis zu meinem Lebensende darin zu bleiben: denn
es schien und scheint dies einer der wenigen Wege zu sein,
auf denen ein theorieverhafteter Mensch zu politischer
Wirksamkeit zu gelangen vermag .... Politik ist nicht
nur Gesinnung, sondern eben auch Verantwortung, und
diese kann sich bloss am praktischen Ziel, an praktischen
Zielsetzungen bew&hren; nur hiedurch wird Politik zur
Konkretisierung von Ethik." (GW 8: 248)?J
The second point to be made is that on no account
should Broch's political and psychological work be
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dissociated from his research in logic, mathematics and
epistemology. As has been said, he believed that a
practical application of his political and psychological
theories would be possible only if they could be shown
to be logically sound.
Here we can turn from the chronological or linear
development of Broch's thought to \-diat I have called its
hierarchical or vertical evolution. Again the later
correspondence confirms that Broch's primary concern can
always be traced back tc the ethical question. His aim
was always to construct a new, absolute code of ethics,
absolute because it v/ould be logically correct,
scientifically verifiable and, as a result, universally
acceptable. As a "theorieverhafteter Mensch" he believed
that all practical action had to have a reliable
theoretical foundation. It is possible to see that all
his practical theories, as he believed them to be, in
psychology and politics were built up from one single,
dominating interest. This hierarchical unity of Broch's
thinking is most strikingly illustrated in a letter of
April 1950 to Dr. Daniel Brody: " 'Totale Humanit&t'
ist ein Auszug meines politischen Buches, das ein Auszug
meiner Massenpsychologie ist, die ein Auszug meiner
Werttheorie ist, die ein Auszug meiner Erkenntniskritik
ist, die ein Auszug meiner mathematischen Logik ist."
(CW 8: 456).35
The above extract not only reveals the single-
mindedness of Broch's work but also shows how historical
circumstances continually forced him to alter the emphasis
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of his interests in the hope of being able to make some
direct, practical contribution towards ameliorating the
current crisis of humanity. Just as a moral obligation
to his publisher and financial patrons had led Broch to
publish Per Tod des Vergil, so this same sense of
responsibility compelled him, in the closing years of his
life, to sacrifice his personal inclinations in order to
dedicate himself to research in politics and psychology.
Once more his letters afford us a penetrating insight
into the inner conflicts caused by the high ethical
standards he set for himself. The correspondence reveals
clearly that Broch's political and psychological work
developed as a response to the moral challenge of his era.
In a letter to Egon Vietta of November 1948 Broch
lists seven books on which he was currently working,
including his "Psychologische Grundlagen der Demokratie.
Mir iia Augenblick das wichtigste Buch" (GW 8: 305)^
Some six months later this programme has increased to
eight books and the conflict of personal inter»est and
moral commitment is even more apparent: "acht Bftcher,
von denen mir die Erkenntnistheorie am wichtigsten ist,
w&hrend eine Theorie der Politik, eine Frucht der
Massenpsychologie, am aktuellsten w&re." (GW 8: 345).
It must be conceded that Broch's final attitude to
all his political research, in which he believed he could
make practical suggestions for the preservation of a
humanitarian civilization, was one of disillusionment and
pessimistic resignation. He believed his political
theory, in its definitive formulation, contained the
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answer to the ethical problem of the loss of the Absolute,
but he despaired of ever seeing it put into practice.
Just a few months before his death he wrote the following
words: "Da ich der Ansicht bin, dass ich mit meiner
politischen Schreiberei, oder genauer mit meiner Theorie
nicht den geringsten Einfluss werde ausiiben kbnnen,
trage ich mich sehr mit dem Gedanken, diesen ganzen
T&tigkeitsteil stillzulegen. Es ist nur schade urn die
vielen Jahre, die ich darauf verwendet habe. Ich h&tte
lieber meine Erkenntnisbheorie machen sollen, obwohl
auch diese in den neuen Glauben nicht hineinpasst."
(GV 8: 412).
The purpose of this outline of the development of
Broch's thought and work has been to provide a general
frame of reference for an enquiry into the way in which
his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" evolved. This
introduction has shown the essential consistency in all
the diverse aspects of Broch's work, namely his concern
with the question of ethics, while at the same time
illustrating how his acute sense of moral responsibility
led him to react to current historical events. Such a
reaction is inevitably reflected in a certain chrono¬
logical development and alteration of emphasis within
his work. These changes can be largely seen as a
desperate search on Broch's part for some means of active
intervention to resolve the ethical crisis of his day.
Broch's tragedy is that of the idealist and theoretician
confronted with the contingencies and harsh realities of
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practical politics and morality. The development of the
theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" closely follows Broch's
attempts to find a scientific method of influencing the
course of history for the better.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF "DAS IRDISCH-
A3S0LUTE" IN THE THEORETICAL WRITINGS
1. INTRODUCTION
"Spiegel seiner selbst, in jedem Begriff and in
jecler Einheit, die er setzt, leuchtet dem Menschen der
Logos, leuchtet Hue das Wort Gottes als Mass aller Jinge
entgegen." (GW 2; 598)i.
"Die Entdeekung des Individuums vollzog sich fttr
das christliche Europa in der Spiitrenaissance, and zwar
durch jene Geisteshaltung, die auch zurn Protestantismus
geflihrt hatj das Uber-Individuelle, das Platonische,
vor allem das Kirchliche als geistige Gemeinschaft wurde
plbtzlich als etwas erkannt, das vom irdisch-sichtbaren
Menschen getragen 'wird and daher von diesem aus nicht
nur lebendig erhalten, sondern auch st&ndig erneuert
werden muss. Ketzerhaft wurde der Einzelmensch rnit
seiner irdischen Zinzelseele in den Mittelpunkt ies
UniversaEs gcstellt, auf dass er, das Mass aller Oinge,
eben auch das aller gftttlichen Gti.ltiglceit werde." (GW 6:
44-45)."
The first of the above quotations is taken from
"Der Zerfall der Werte", written in 1931. The second
passage appears in "Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit", one of
the last pieces of work which Broch completed before his
death and parts of which were first published in 1949 and
3
1951. The ideas expressed in these two quotations
represent the poles between which Broch's thought moved
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in the years 1931-1951# In this part of the thesis
Broch's theoretical writings on philosophy, epistemology,
psychology and politics will be examined with the
intention of showing how his thinking developed in such
a way that he could turn from "der Logos ... das Wort
Gottes als Mass aller Dinge" to "der Einzelmensch mit
seiner irdischen Sinzelseele ... das Mass aller Dinge",
This important change of emphasis in Broch's thought, and
it is a matter of emphasis rather than a radical alteration,
can usefully be described as a move away from reliance in
human affairs on the guiding pov/er of a formal, transcen¬
dental, abstract Absolute towards the use of a qualitative,
empirically confirmable or earthly Absolute as a standard
for guiding and judging human behaviour.
No attempt is made here to give a comprehensive
analysis or criticism of Broch's philosophy. This is a
matter which must be left to the competent professional
philosopher. Any critical analysis undertaken here is
directed solely at isolating and clarifying the line of
thought which led Broch to propound his theory of "das
Irdisch-Absolute" in the last years of his life.
Clarification is important here because Broch himself was
not fully aware of the extent to which his theories
changed over the years. This failure on Broch's part
explains a number of important contradictions which appear
in the theoretical writings when they are considered as a
whole.
Some mention should be made of the current state
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of research on Rroch's theoretical writings. Until
recently the dominating feature of what little research
has been done in this field has been its lack of
objectivity. The reason for this is that those people
who first took an interest in Broch's work were friends
and admirers who saw in Broch the prophet of the collapse
of western civilization in the early part of the
ti'/entieth century. For such commentators, they can
scarcely be called critics, Broch can say little that is
wrong. He acquires almost the stature of a cult figure.
His theories are reproduced with little or no attempt at
critical analysis and any contradictions are ignored or
explained ax/ay with a logic which defies any evidence to
the contrary.
Inevitably a reaction set in and in the past few
years a book and several articles on Broch have appeared
which have a declared iconoclastic intent. As a
corrective to the previous trend this may be welcomed,
but the iconoclasts seem to be no less extreme in their
viexvs than the idolators were in their's. Their main
charge is that Broch reveals himself in his work as an
arch-conservative, a crypto-fascist and the prophet of
irrationalism. In him they see a representative of the
social and intellectual type of person who made possible
Hitler's rise to power.^ The weakness in these studies
is that they isolate his thought entirely from his life,
from the circumstances x*hich prescribed the lines along
which Broch's thinking developed. It is difficult to
imagine how anyone familiar with the facts of Broch's
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life and the evidence of his correspondence can describe
him as a fascist. These critics have failed to
appreciate Broch's dilemma, namely that of the
theoretician and idealist who desperately sought for
absolute values but was condemned to live in a world
where such values clearly did not exist. It is the
conflict of theory and practice which lies at the root of
many inconsistencies and weaknesses in Broch's thinking.
His concern with practical humanity throughout his whole
life gives the lie to the charges brought against him by
Osterle and Menges and similar critics, Strangely, such
dedication on his part often exposes the futility of his
efforts to re-establish rigorously demonstrable, absolute
values for human conduct. Broch, no less than countless
other people, acted in the belief that there were
absolute values in life, even if they could not be
scientifically proved. Reason and science play little
part in such beliefs and decisions.
It is the intention of this present study to trace
the evolution of Broch's theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute"
with relation to his personal response to contemporary
historical developments. Such an approach has much to
offer. It helps us to understand why certain changes
occur in Broch's thought and interests at certain times.
They can usually be traced back, with the help of his
letters, to some given political event of the history of
the period. Such developments, sometimes even
contradictions in Broch's thinking gain a new relevance
when we remember that in different historical situations,
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in widely differing fields of study Broch's primary
concern was always ethical: how could and should man
regulate his conduct in any given situation? What
Broch refers to as the essential ethical question recurs
frequently in his writings in implicit or explicit form:
"Was sollen wir tun?" (GW 6: 313); "Wie verhalte ich
mieh zur Welt und zu dem, was ich mein Leben nenne?"
(GW 10: 302); "das ethische 'was soli ich tun?'"
("Trotzdem1^ NR; 9)« Variations in Broch's answer bo
this question do not indicate a change in his basic
interest, but rather that he is seeking or adapting an
answer to fit a changing world-situation.
Clearly the following examination of the develop¬
ment of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" will proceed
chronologically. In order to achieve the clearest
possible presentation of a very complex, development a
certain schematic simplification has been undertaken:
the three most important stages in the development of the
theory will be examined. Broch's original position, as
$
seen in "Der Zerfall der Werte" (1932), is that in which
he relies exclusively on a formal, abstract, trans¬
cendental Absolute. The point at which, almost despite
himself, Broch turns increasingly towards empirical
reality in his search for the Absolute is marked by
n
"Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse" (1936),
n
The final stage is to be found in "Uber syntaktische und
kognitive Einheiten" (c. 1946), "Politik: Ein Kondensat"
(c. 1949) and "Trotzdem: Humane Politik" (1950): in
the first of these three studies Broch proves, to his own
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satisfaction at least, the existence of an Earthly
Absolute; in the last two he sets out the possible
practical application of this new discovery in the fields
8
of politics and legislation.
This chronological development follows the outline,
given in Part I, of Broch's change of interests. From
1936 until the mi 1-1940's Broch worked on psychological
and political research for his Massenosychologia. He
abandoned this in despair when he realized that the
crisis of the war against fascist Germany had simply
been replaced by the political tensions of the Cold War.
In the mid-1940,s he returned to his first, love of mathe¬
matics and epistemology. It was here that he believed
he found a scientifically demonstrable Earthly Absolute
which, at the end of his life, he then tried to apply in
practical terms to the problems of politics and
legislation.
Such a simplified sehematization of the development
of the theory is necessary because it evolved over a long
period of years and evidence of its evo3.ution can be
found in numerous essays on a wide variety of subjects.
Broch himself never traced this line of development
through the years of his work; he concentrated soleljr on
the final discovery of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in the last
years of his life. Where necessary, relevant material
from other essays will be considered, but the three
stages described above provide the basic structure of the
following study. It should be noted at this point that
Broch himself was not fully aware of the extent to which
54
the main emphasis in his thinking altered. In much of
his later work there appear inconsistencies and even
contradictions which clearly did not register as such
with him.
It is in relation to some of these changes that a
second methodological approach is used in this part of
the thesis. The general trend of Rroch's research
interests in psychology, eplstenology and politics can be
seen as a progressive movement away from formal, abstract
theory in search of some means of practical intervention
in world affairs for the general benefit of mankind.
Corresponding to the unresolved conflict in Broch's work
of theory and practice there recur in his writings pairs
of concepts which, depending on the specific context,
may be used as dialectical opposites or mutual comple¬
ments. In general terms these concepts can all be
subsumed under the relationship which exists between
"Form" and "Inhalt", formal, abstract criteria and





das reine Ich das psychologische Ich
das erkenntnistheoretische Ich das empirische Ich
Gott Mensch
The first group of terms refers to aspects of
formal, intellectual experience and abstract theory; the
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second refers to the qualitative factor of empirical
experience. The above pairs of concepts will be
discussed in due course. It can be shown that over the
years, as Broch came closer to formulating his theory of
"das Xrdisch-Absolute", the second group of concepts
became progressively more important for him and assumed
an increasingly positive value in his scheme of thought.
Although the explicit juxtaposition of the two terms is
never found in Broch's work, there is every justification
for suggesting that the most important pair of terns in
such a list has still to be added, namely that of "das
Transzendenta1-Absolute" and "das Irdisch-Absolute".
The full significance of the dialectical relationship
between these pairs of concepts and of the progressive
change of emphasis in Broch's thought from the first to
the second term of each pair will become evident in what
follows. This change of emphasis regularly provides
strong evidence of the progressive development of the
theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". The t\/o quotations
which introduce this chapter reveal clearlj' that over a
period of years Broch, in his search for an absolutely
reliable criterion of value-judgments, abandoned "Gott"
and "Logos" in favour of "der Einzelmensch mit seiner
irdischen Einzelseele".
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2. "PER ZERFALL PER WERTE" AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS
THEORY FOR BROCK'S THINKING.
a) Broch's Conception of Value.
Until recently Broch's theory of values has
normally been discussed in the context of critical studies
9of oie dchlafwandter, of which it is part. Such studies
rarely moke any attempt at a critical analysis of the
theory itself. Of these commentators who deal
specifically with Broch's philosophical writings, most
restrict themselves to the informative role of collating
facts and presenting the theory in a compact and easily
understood form. They can be said to popularize Broch's
theory of values, but they do not try to criticize it.
For such a general presentation of the theory of values
the reader is referred to the works of Erich Kahler,
Ernestine Schlant and Hermann Krapoth. For a genuinely
critical study of Broch's philosophy the only book which
can be recommended is the very provocative work by Karl
Vf 10Menges.
In the following analysis of "Per Zerfall der
Werte" it will be shown that, as a result of his original
theory. Broch was forced to assume that the only absolute
standard on which man could rely in the modern world was
that of reason, which he understand solely in terms of
formal logic. As will become evident, Broch regularly
equates this absolutely invariable logic with the
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transcendental Absolute of the Logos; according to Broch
human reason can be understood only as a derivative of
the latter.
Before discussing the dissolution of values, it
is necessary to explain briefly what Broch understands
by "value". Basic to this understanding is Broch!s
conception of the dualistic structure of the human self
("das Ich"). Throughout Broch*s work the word "loh" has
a wide range of meaning which, depending on the context,
varies from the psychological ego to the epistemological
subject of perception and cognition. It is more
convenient to retain the German word and define it more
closely in English when the need arises. For Broch the
"Ich" consists of two indissolubly combined complementary
components or functions which he regularly subsumes under
the Cartesian terms of "cogito - sum".** The former is
man in his function as a rational, thinking being,
subject to the formal dictates of logic. The latter is
man as a physical creature. As such he is subject to
time and must die; as a thinking being he knows of the
inevitability of approaching death but cannot imagine
the cessation of existence because temporal experience is
wholly foreign to the purely formal relationships of
logic with which the rational being operates. The
result of this knowledge, this tension between the two
indissoluble functions of the "Ich" is fear: fear of
time, fear of death and fear of the unknown which lies
12
beyond death. The following quotations clarify the
relationship postulated by Broch betiveen this fear and
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the phenomenon of value.
"Der Mensch befindet syteh nieht nur stets im
Zustand des Totalerlebens, sondern er weiss auch davon;
er weiss, dass sein Ich unteilbar 1st, zeitlos von der
Geburt bis zua Tode, und sein letzter metaphysischer
Wunsch gelxt nach Aufhebung des Todes in dieser Zeitlosig-
keit, geht nach Erreichung dieses Zieles kraft seines
geistigen Wissens uti seine Totaiitht." (GW 10: 189)*
"Alies, was Wert genannt wird und Wert genannt zu
ii
werden verdierxt, zielt auf Aufhebung und Uberwindung des
Todes. Der Tod ist der eigentliche Unwert, der Unwert
an sieh." (GW 6: 317).
"Hinter dem cogitare, hinter dem sum, hinter jeder
Intuition steht, als letztes menschliches Wissen, las
Wissen um die Einsamkeit, das Wissen uia die Br-Hcken-
losigkeit und die Einsamkeit des Todes, hintex"* allem
Denken steht die Angst, - so steht dex** Unwert ties Todes
hinter alien Werten, dex-" Unwert als eixi Absolutes, das
stets vorhanden ist, weil es das Nichts ist, von dem wir
uraf lessen sind und in dem 'Gott trauernd tliront'. "
(GW 7: 48).
"Vom negativen Pol, von dem Tode her erfahren wir
was 'Wert' berfeutet: er bedeutet Todesilberwindung, oder
genauer Hinwegt&uschung fiber das Todesbewusstsein, ohne
dessen st&ndige Anwesenheit ier Mensch wahrscheinliclx
>1
nicht Mensch wftr'e, so dass er es sich trotz Uberwindung
erhalten muss. " (GW 7: 2 33).
The first and last of the above quotations reveal
the essential nature of Broch's conception of value.
The human reaction to the fear of time and death is to
try to arrest, even if only symbolically, the relentless
passing of time, by understanding the world in terms of
formal, spatial and consequently timeless relationships
instead of experiencing it as a dynamic, temporal process.
Broch describes this reaction as: "das Bemlihen urn die
Umwandluny ies ellenden Lebenslaufes in einen statischen
Zustand und in eine Rube, die als Ann&herung an das
Endgttltige die Illusion der Zeitaufhebung unci der
Aufhebung des Todes zu geben verrnag." (GW 7: 98)•
The most important factor in these formal structures
is that they are rational. As a rational being man, so
Broch believes, has inherited the divine spark of reason
which enables him to try to comprehend the world as a
unitary, objective reality. Man creates his reality,
indeed creates the world as he knows it^ by projecting
the formal, logical structures of his own thought processes
into what would be, without such a formative principle,
merely an amorphous mass of irrational and unrelated
experience. Broch's debt to Kant here is obvious. He
is clearly thinking of the Kantian "Bedingung der
mttglichen Erfahrung". Kant's formulation of this
proposition is: 'Mass die oberste Gesetzgebung der
Natur in uns selbst, d.i. in unserem Verstande, liegen
railsse, und dass v/ir die allgemeinen Gesetze derselben
nicht von der Natur vermittelst der Erfahrung, sondern
umgekehrt die Natur Hirer allgemeinen Gesetzm&ssigkeit
nach bios aus deir in unserer Sinnlichkeit und dem Verstande
liegenden Bedingungen der HBglichkeit der Erfahrung suchen
mtissen . „ . der Verstand schBpft seine Gesetae (a
priori) nicht au.s der Natur, sondern schreibt sie dieser
.,13vor."
In this application of the formative, creative
principle of reason to experience Epoch sees the charact¬
eristic feature which raises humanity above the animal
condition; it is "der Akt der Humanitftt schlechthin"
(GW 6: 317) > which Broch further defines as follows;
"Indem es die Welt, sie avis der Dunkelheit heraushebend,
sie aus der Dunkelheit schBpfend, im v/ahrsten Sinne als
Wert 'erschafft', wird das wertwollende Handeln zu dem,
was es ist: 'Wert schaffen* heisst, sich dem Schhpfertum
Gottes ann&hern, und sich dieser humansten aller Aufgaben
entziehen, heisst Versinken in der 'nolitio' des Nicht—
tun-Wollens, heisst in den 'Mangel' an gut-em Willen
geraten, in jene privatio boni, die fiir die Kirche, wie
fttr Spinoza die Abkehr von Gott bedeutete und dem Humanen
an sich entgegensetzt ist." (GW 6; 319-320). For
Broch knowledge ("Erkenntnis") and value are identical.
It is Broch's belief that man must act rationally and
logically. Even in his most irrational behaviour man
will try to provide logical motivation for his actions
which, formally at least, will be valid (GW 2: 401, 403,
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443, 66l). The contradictions and dangerous results
which arise from such a view will be discussed.later.
This formative principle which is central to human
reality is identical with the creation of values. The
stimulus to the creation of values is fear of death.
Death is feared not only because it is inevitable, but
because it is and will always remain unknown. It is
something man must experience, but which can never, in
the strictly scientific use of the word demanded by Broch,
be known. the following passage, in which Broch talks
of death, makes this very point.
"Seine RealitdVfc ist die der Grenze, und durch lie
Dunkelhe.it seines Tores strbmt die metaphysische Angst
a.ls psychische Real itSit in das menschliche Leben. '/or
dem Feindlichen fllrchtet man sich, vor der Dunkelhe.it hat
man Angst, Ein Mittler zwischen psychischer und
metaphysischer Real itSit, steht der Tod an der Grenzscheide
zwischen der hellen Welt des Bewr.sstseins, in der alle
Djnge bekannt. sind, in der sie ihre Namen tragen und
definiert werden khnnen, und der Welt der Dunkelheit, in
der nichts zr lefinieren ist, aus der alles Unheil kommt,
auch hier im wahren Wortsinn •namenloses Unheil' - es
ist jenes Unheil, das auf die Erlbsung durch den
definierenden Namen wartet, auf dass es erkannt und man
dagegen gefeit. sei, " (GW 6: 231-232).
For Broch knowledge and reality are essentially
rational and logical: "Das Unwirkliche ist das
Unlogische," (GW 2: 401). Whatever man does, he acts
rationally, imposing a formal, spatial relationship on
his experience of the world and thus symbolically at
least halting the inexorable progress of time which
culminates for him in death; "was limner der Mensch tut,
er tut es, urn die Zeit zu vernichten, um sie aufzuheben,
und diese Aufhebung heisst Raura." (GW 2: 426), Any
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rational process or logical development \vhich extends the
body of knowledge, which contributes to man's knowledge
of himself or his world and thus pushes back the border
of the unknown or irrational encroaches symbolically on
the realm of death, the greatest unknown of all, and
helps to remove some of its fearful threat. Broch
summarizes this in the following passage.
"Alles Handeln ist Formen, es gibt kein Handeln,
empirisches oder ideelles, das nicht auf Formung oder
Umformung von Gegebenheiten hinzielte. Jede T&tigkeit
des Menschen ist ein Forinen, und die Welt, die er schafft,
damit sie Welt werde und den Tod aufhebe, entsteht iiamer
ivieder aus dem Apeiron Anaximanders, aus dem 'Urgrund'
des Amorphen, aus diesem Irrationalen schlechthin, in
dessen Qualit&tslosigkeit das Leben und der Tod, das
Nichtsein und das Sein noch ungeformt vereinigt sind."
(GW 6: 320).
It is Broch's belief that all such rational
creation of values, and it is his view that all rational
action or thought creates values (GW 7 s 91), has an
ethical function, ethical because it is dictated solely
by an absolutely autonomous reason which is subject only
to its formal laws. Again the debt to Kant is obvious.
Broch talks of "'die Wertrichtung', die ethische Forderung
an das Tun" (GW 2: 515)• He regularly interprets this
according to the Kantian definition of what is good,
namely actions carried out for their own sakes according
to the dictates of autonomous reason (GW 2 s 595; GW 7:
50, 59).
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We may ask with Broch: "Wie aber verwirklicht
sich diese ethische Forderung?". His answer reveals the
very close relationship he envisages between ethics and
aestheticss "imnier durch gewis&e Formungen, die dem
Weltbild aufgepr&gt werden ... das Resultat ist immer
ein Akt der Formung und Formgebung, ist also, im weitesten
Sinne gesprochen ein hsthetisches Resultat. Ethischer
Akt und hsthetisches Resultat1" (GW 6s 212).
This is what Broch refers to as "das Doppelgesicht
des Wertes" (GW 7: 49), or "die ethisch-ftsthetische
Doppelansicht des Wertes" (GW 6s 319)• He concludes:
"es spaltet sich der Wertbegriff in die komplement&ren
Kategoriens in den ethischen Wert des Tuns und den
hsthetischen Wert des Getanen, Avers- und Reversseite der
gleichen Medaille." (GW 2s 593 )•
The full significance of this relationship between
ethical, formative action and aesthetic, formed result
becomes evident when we remember the primary stimulus to
the creation of values, namely fear of time and death.
The aesthetic results of ethical action can be seen in
all monuments throughout history to human thought and
endeavour. Such monuments may be of an abstract nature,
such as histories of civilizations or institutions,
systems of philosophy or religion, or the more familiar
and obvious examples of the plastic arts, especially
architecture, in which Broch sees the most concrete
example of man's attempt to reduce his experience of the
world to a formal, spatial structure.
"Die Pr&valenz des Baustils innerhalb der Charakteristika
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eiuer Epoche ist eine der sonderbarsten Angelegenheiten.
(I
Uberhaupt diese ganz merkwllrdige Vorzugsstellung, die die
bildende Kunst innerhalb der Historie erhalten hatI Sie
ist gewiss nur ein sehr geringer Ausschnitt aus der Fillle
der menschlichen T&tigkeiten, von denen eine Epoche
erfftllt ist, sicherlich nicht einmal ein sehr geistiger
Ausschnitt und doch ilberragt sie an Charakterisierungs-
kraft alle anderen geistigen Gebiete, tiberragt die
Dichtung, Ilberragt sogar die Wissenschaft, ttberragt sogar
die Religion. Was durch die Jahrtausende hin dauert,
ist das bildende Kunstwerk, es bleibt der Exponent der
Epoche und ihres Stils." (GW 2: 425)
Such monuments, whether of an abstract or concrete
nature, have outlived those who created them. They are
a lasting witness to the efforts of their creators to
understand the total significance of life by imposing a
rational order on their experience of the world. Thus
ethical action, which Broch sees as an attempt to create
values and symbolically remove fear of death by imposing
a formal, spatial structure on temporal experience,
produces an aesthetic result which, in a sense, defeats
death by testifying to the humanity of those who produced
it long after they have died. "So darf ... von den
ftsthetischen Residuen der Historie auf die ethischen
Taten geschlossen werden, die allein sich im ftsthetisch
Bleibenden ftir die Ewigkeit erhalten." (GW 6: 321-322)
At first sight it may seem difficult to reconcile
Broch8s conception of ethics with what one normally
understands by this word. This becomes more comprehen-
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sible when it is remembered that in Broch's thinking the
aesthetic result of ethical action is not the primary
l6
goal of such action, but merely its indirect product.
The main purpose of rational, ethical action is to impose,
as far as possible, a coherent order on life, thus
creating a unitary, objective reality within the overall
context of which the individual can understand his
personal role and regulate his conduct accordingly.
Clearly this is closer to the generally accepted concept
of ethics.
Death is the greatest unknown factor in life. Any
attempt to come to terms with life inevitably involves the
individual in a confrontation with what death means for
him: "der Tod, ein Mahner, das Leben mit letzterrcich-
barem Sinn zu erfttllen, auf dass es nicht umsonst gelebt
sei." (GW 6: 205)• Fear of death can only be removed
if the individual can understand and accept it as an
integral part of human experience within the context of
some higher, ideal reality which lies beyond the
limitations of human perception. We thus return again
to fear of death as the great stimulus to ethical action
and the creation of values.
"Es ist jene einzige und wahre metaphysische Angst, jene
grosse unbez&hmbare und unbezwingbare Lebensangst, die
den Menschen mit dem gleichen Augenblick bef&llt, in dem
sein Bewusstsein zum ersten Male die Augen aufschl&gt und
die Einsamkeit seines Todes vor sich sieht, - es ist jene
Angst, die bloss zum Schweigen gebracht wird, wenn der
Mensch den Zusammenhang seiner erschreckenden Endlichkeit
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mit der Unendlichkeit des Kosmos zu ahnen beginnt."
(GW 6s 231)
The two above quotations make clear the relevance
of Broch's definition of values to his concern with what
the layman would probably regard as more practical ethics,
as expressed in the question as to how one should take
decisions about one's own personal behaviour. By
creating values, by increasing the field of knowledge,
by attempting to reduce his experience of the world to a
unitary, objective reality, man is laying the foundations
on which a reliable code of ethics may be constructed.
It would seem, however, that no absolute, definitive
formulation of ethical standards is possible because man,
subject as he is to the limitations of empirical reality,
can never expect to know or understand his individual
role in the context of infinity and eternity. This
question is central to Broch's work.
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b) The Dissolution of Values.
With Broch's conceptions of value and ethics in
mind we can now proceed to examine his theory of the
dissolution of values. The two main sources of
reference are the two essays, "Der Zerfall der Werte"
in Die Schlafwandler and "Logik einer zerfallenden Welt".
The latter was also written in 1931 and was published in
a collection of essays, entitled Wiedergeburt der Liebe,
17
edited by Frank Thiess. This second essay deals with
exactly the same subject as "der Zerfall der Werte", but
its style suggests that it was written with the intention
of popularizing Broch's theory of values. In it Broch
presents the theory in a simpler and less abstruse way
than in the former work.
Obviously the aesthetic results of ethical action,
as seen through centuries of history and exemplified most
clearly in the plastic arts, reveal many varying styles.
If, as Broch maintains, all such formal structures are
created by the projection into experience of the
absolutely invariable, formal relationships of logic or
reason, "die absolute Logik des Ichs, die absolute Logik
Gottes (GW 2: 451)» why do we find such a variety of
styles in art, architecture, thought and civilizations?
Broch bases his discussion of the dissolution of values
on an analysis of the reasons for the progressive changes
of style.
He argues that in one very important respect the
application of formal logic is influenced by qualitative
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("inhaltlich") factors. Stated simply, this factor can
be seen as the currently obtaining stage of development
of the human intellect which, at any given time, dictates
what people living in that era are prepared to believe
and accept as truth.
"Die absolute formale Logik bleibt ja bestehen, ist auch
fttr die menschlichen Gehirne unab&nderlich, - es Sndern
sich bloss die Denkinhalte, es Bindern sich die Einsichten
in das Wesen der Welt, es ist also bestenfalls eine
erkenntnistheoretische, nie und nimmer eine logische
Frage. Die Logik bleibt 'stillos' wie die Mathematik."
(GW 2: 451)
Broch goes on to exemplify his argument by briefly
explaining why, as he sees it, the intellect of Western
1 8
European man has developed as it has. He suggests
that the style of thought, the understanding of the world
in any period of history, is dictated not by formal logic,
but by what is accepted as and believed to be a plausible
explanation of what constitutes the Ground of Being.
This is not a question of logic: theoretically, there
is no reason to assume that any ontological enquiry
pursued on strictly logical lines should ever come to a
definitive end. The relevant factor in determining what
the final "PlausibilitSttsschranke" (GW 2: 451) or
"Plausibilit&tspunkt" (GW 2: 452) in such an enquiry
should be, or if there should be one at all, is the
current level of intellectual attainment, which regulates
what is accepted as axiomatic in the obtaining system of
thought.
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To illustrate his theory Broch quotes the example
of the first Greek philosopher, Thales of Miletus, who
lived about 600 B.C. In his philosophical system Thales
11 proved" that water is the basic matter of the universe.
Thales® argument is formally valid. His conclusion,
which we now know to be wrong, was the result of lack of
information. This is a qualitative factor of which
Thales could not be aware and which we can appreciate
only from our historical perspective with our much more
advanced understanding of Nature.
"An welcher Stelle eine derartige Fragekette abgebrochen
wird, ist nun Angelegenheit des Wahrheits- und Evidenz-
gefiihls, also Angelegenheit der in Kraft stehenden
Axiomatik. Wenn nach der Lehre des Thales dieser
Plauslbilit&tspunkt fiir die ontische Fragekette mit der
Substanz 'Wasser' zu setzen war, so deutet dies
daraufhin, dass fiir Thales ein Axiomensystem in Geltung
stand innerhalb dessen die Yvasser-Qualit&t der Materie
•beweisbar' erschien. Hier sind es inhaltliche und
nicht formal-logische Axiome, die die Fragekette abstoppen,
es sind Axiome der geltenden Kosmogonie." (GW 2: 452)
The ontologies of primitive, polytheistic societies
must be, according to Broch, extremely complex. In such
ft
a society, where every animate or inanimate object has its
own god, demon or spirit, any ontological enquiry into the
nature of the world will very soon reach its final axiom.
A tree exists because it has its own spirit or god, and
any question into the reason for the tree's existence
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can be pursued no further. Compared to this system of
philosophy, Thales' theory represents a considerable
advance. Broch maintains that up to the Catholic Middle
Ages this process of simplification continued until it
reached the point where the God of Christianity was seen
as the sole Ground of Being. Every ontological
investigation logically led to God and this intellectual
argument coincided with man's belief and his experience
of the world. The formal logical structures of all
ontologies postulated throughout history remain invariable
and identical. What alters is the style of thought and
this is determined by the final axiom obtaining in any
given historical era. Broch uses an example from
geometry to illustrate his thesis.
"Bei gewissen geometrischen Konstruktionen wird der
unendlich feme Punkt willkttrlich innerhalb der endlichen
Zeichenebene angenommen, und dann wird so konstruiert,
als idirde dieser fiktive Unendlichkeitspunkt wirklich der
unendlich weit entfernte sein. Die Lage der einzelnen
Konstruktionsglieder zueinander bleibt in einer solchen
Konstruktion die gleiche, als wttrde jener Punkt wirklich
unendlich weit entfernt sein; bloss haben sich alle
Masse verzerrt und zusammengeschoben. Und so fthnlich
darf man sich die Ver&nderungen vorstellen, welche die
logischen Konstruktionen erleiden, wenn der logische
Plausibilit&tspunkt aus dem Unendlichen ins Endliche und
Irdische gerftckt wird: die forraale Logik als solche,
ihre Schlussweise, ja sogar ihre inhaltlichen Assoziatione-
nachbarschaften bleiben bestehen, - was sich ftndert, sind
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ihre 'Masse', ist ihr 'Stil'." (GW 2: 454)
Broch's understanding of the system of values
created by Christianity and the Scholastic philosophy of
the Roman Catholic Church in medieval Europe is central
to his analysis of the dissolution of values. In his
interpretation the Middle Ages had a perfect or absolute
value-system: one which subordinated every aspect of
daily life and thought to a single guiding principle,
namely belief in the Christian God. The Neo-Platonic
Scholasticism of the period could even logically deduce
the existence of the whole cosmos from God. Belief in
this God was the obtaining "Plausibilit&tspunkt" (GW 2:
476). In such a context of thought all life, every
facet of human activity and self-expression could be seen
to have its individual significant function within the
general coherence of the divine will. Even death lost
much of its fearful threat because it was seen to play
a meaningful role in the individual's relationship to God.
"Das Mittelalter besass das ideale Wertzentrum, auf das
es ankommt, besass einen obersten Wert, dem alle anderen ,
Werte untertan waren: den Glauben an den christlichen
Gott. Sowohl die Kosmogonie war von diesem Zentralwert
abh&ngig (ja noch mehr, sie konnte aus ihm scholastisch
deduziert werden) als auch der Mensch selber, der Mensch
mitsamt seinem ganzen Tun, bildete einen Teil jener
Weltordnung, die bloss Spiegelbild einer ekklesiastischen
Hierarchie war, in sich geschlossenes und endliches
Abbild einer ewigen und unendlichen Harraonie." (GW 2:
475).
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To illustrate this point Broch regularly uses the
same examples. He maintains that in the Middle Ages
all itfork, all human activity was undertaken, not primarily
for its own sake, but in service of God. God could best
be served, however, if the individual produced the best
possible results in his work by concentrating entirely
on it and constantly applying his mind to improving the
techniques involved. In Broch's eyes this \tfas
essentially the ethical action of applying creative,
formative reason to life which in turn produced aesthetic
results.
"Der Mensch hatte wohl den Dogmen gera&ss zu leben, er
hatte sich, wie wir sagen dttrfen, der Technik der Kirche
zu unterwerfen, aber darttber hinaus hatte er seiner
ethischen Pflicht als Christ zu geniigen, d.h. Gott
ausschliesslich dadurch zu dienen, dass er seine irdische
Arbeit urn der Arbeit selbst willen ausftihrte. Erst im
Zusammenhalt all dieser Einstellungen handelte er
wahrhaft ethisch, erst durch die Aneinanderreihung aller
ethischen Akte, von denen jeder, wie wir sagten, ein
&sthetisches Resultat ... zeitigte, gelangte er zum
endgtiltigen Usthetischen Effekt, der im Unendlichen lag,
zum ttber-Ssthetischen Ziel, zum Effekt der Gnade und der
ewigen Seligkeit." (GW 61 215)*^
The aesthetic result, the experience of grace, was
never the aim of ethical action} it was the result of the
rigorous application of logic and reason to perfecting
one's god-given talents, an exercise which allowed one to




The scholastic view of reality did not, however,
represent the ultimate development in ontology.
Inevitably there came a time when scientific and
philosophical thought could no longer be subject to the
dictates of religious belief. There was a growing
disparity between belief and knowledge. For the
scientist and philosopher, especially for* the former, it
became increasingly evident that the personal God of
Christianity could no longer be regarded as the final
axiom in any logical enquiry into the nature of the
universe. The pursuit of the ontological question no
longer culminated in a single final axiom which united
and explained all facets of reality. All that remained
was the invariable formal structure of rational investig¬
ation which had to be pursued into infinity. There was
no longer any generally accepted interpretation of
reality to give a common direction to such questions.
The qualitative factor vanished and there remained only
the absolutely invariable, formal structure of logic, which
could be applied to the practice of any human activity.
Such a development led to the loss of a characteristic,
unifying style of civilization. The only typical feature
of the modern era which was ushered in by this development,
is its complete lack of a distinct, unifying style.
Broch sees this crucial development taking place in the
21
Reformation and Renaissance. The clearest statement
of his view is to be found in "Der Zerfall der V7erte".
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"Der Schritt, der liber die monotheistische Kosmogonie
hinaus noch zu tun blieb, war ein fast unmerklicher, und
war doch von grbsserer Bedeutung als alle vorhergegang-
enen: der Urgrund wird aus der 'endlichen® Unendlichkeit
eines immerhin noch anthropomorphen Gottes in die wahre
abstrakte Unendlichkeit hinausgeschoben, die Frageketten
nllnden nicht mehr in dieser Gottesidee, sondern laufen
tats&chlich in die Unendlichkeit (sie streben sosusagen
nicht mehr nach einem Punkt, sondern haben sich
parallelisiert), die Kosmogonie ruht nicht mehr auf Gott,
sondern auf der ewigen Fortsetzbarkeit der Frage, auf
dem Bewusstsein, dass nirgends ein Ruhepunkt gegeben ist,
dass iinmer weiter gefragt werden kann, gefragt \*erden
muss, dass weder ein Urstoff noch ein Urgrund aufzu-
weisen ist, dass hinter jeder logik noch eine Metalogik
steht, dass jede Lbsung bloss als Zwischenlbsung gilt
und dass nichts iibrigbleibt als der Akt des Fragens als
solcher: die Kosmogonie ist radlkal wissenschaftlich
geitforden und ihre Sprache und ihre Syntax haben ihren
'Stil* abgestreift, haben sich zum mathematischen
Ausdruck gewandelt." (GW 2: 454-455)
In this process, which he describes as "die
Entfesselung des Logischen" (GW 2: 476) and "die
Radikalisierung der Logik" (GW 7: 56) Broch sees the
dissolution of the absolute value-system of the Catholic
Middle Ages, Reality could no longer be comprehended as
a harmonious, meaningful unity and it gradually
disintegrated into the countless "-isms" which are such
a distinctive feature of modern life: militarism,
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pacificism, communism, fascism, materialism, aestheticism
etc. Common to them all is a "brutale unci aggressive
Logik" (GW 2: 475) with which each of these independent
value-systems seeks to assert itself.
"Zur Logik des bftrgerlichen Faiseurs gehftrt es, mit
absoluter Konsequenz und Radikalit&t den Leitspruch des
Enrichissez-vous in Geltung zu setzen: auf diese Weise,
in solch absoluter Konsequenz und Radikalit&t entstand
die Weltleistung des Abendlandes - urn an dieser Absolutheit,
die slch selbst aufhebt, ad absurdum geftthrt zu werden:
Krieg 1st Krieg, l'art pour l'art, in der Politik gibt
es keine Bedenken, Geschhft ist Gesch&ft dies alles
besagt das n&mliche, dies ist alles von der n&mlichen
aggressiven Radikalit&t, ist von .jener unheimlichen, ich
mhchte fast sagen, metaphysischen Rttcksichtslosigkeit,
ist von .jener auf die Sache und nur auf die Sache
gerichteten grausamen Logizit&t, die nicht nach rechts,
nicht nach links schaut, - oh, dies alles ist der
Denkstil dieser Zeit." (GW 2: 475)
The most obvious result of this "Atomisierung der
einstigen Ganzheit" (GW 2: 513) is that all the separate
value-systems born of the dissolution of the absolute
system of the Middle Ages become, relatively, equally
important. Each ss'-stem concentrates on achieving its
own ends, on strengthening and propagating itself without
regard for the standards or needs of any other value-
system. This is "Wertautonomic" (GW 6: 334), which
inevitably leads to "Wertanarchie". The picture of the
modern world painted here by Broch seems to be one of
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total chaos. He shows us a world torn apart by
conflicting systems of values, each concentrating on
ruthlessly pursuing its aims, regardless of external
considerations. But, and here Broch's conception of
ethics is important, each value-system functions ethically
by actively pursuing these goals as logically as possible.
"Eben in der 'Tat', in dieser •Tats&chlichkeit' liegt
auch hier die Strenge, die lcategorisch-imperative
Pfllchterfttllung, die Absperrung gegen alle anderen
Wertgebiete . • . Die 'Wertrichtung', die ethische
Forderung an das Tun, hatte sich gegen&ber dem Mittelalter
nicht ge&ndert und h&tte sich auch nicht &ndern dllrfen,
denn nur in dem handelnden Willen zum Wert and zu seiner
Absolutheit konstituiert sich der Wert, - andere als
absolute Werte gibt es nicht. Was sich ge&ndert hat,
war die Abgrenzung der wertsetzenden Tat: w&hrend sich
bisher die Intensit&t der Absolutierung auf den Gesamtwert
des christlichen Organons bezogen hatte, wurde nun die
Radikalit&t der auf sich selbst gestellten Logik, wurde
die Strenge ihrer Autonomie jedem Einzelgebiet separat
zugeordnet, wurde jedes dieser Einzelgebiete zum eigenen
Wertgebiet absolutiert, wurde jene Vehemenz in die Welt
gebracht, mit der die absolutierten Wertgebiete brttckenlos
und beziehungslos nebeneinander bestehen sollen, jene
Vehemenz, die der Renaissance ihre eigentttraliche F&rbung
verliehen hat." (GW 2: 515-516)
Despite such assurances from Broch it is hard to
see what comfort this knowledge can be since the only
absolute standard left in life seems to be the purely
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formal one of reason or logic, "die autonom gewordene
Vernunft" (GW 2 s 663) or "die zura Absoluten durchbrech-
ende Ratio" (GW 2: 684)* with no qualifying criteria as
to how it should be applied. With Broch we are compelled
to ask: "Bedeutet dies Relativierung aller Werte?"
(GW 2: 595).
He answers this question very emphatically in the
negative. According to this argument reality and all
value-systems are products or creations of the
intelligible self, the subject of cognition. "Die Welt
ist Setzung des intelligiblen Ichs." (GW 2: 596) All
value-systems are formally identical and absolutely
invariable because they reflect the structures and formal
relationships of human thought and perception which are
projected into the world by man in order that he might
experience it as a unitary and objective reality. Value-
systems can be created by an individual subject, "ein
effelctives Wertsubjekt". They can also be posited by
some supra-personal entity such as a state, a nation, a
culture or any institution, "ein fiktives Wertsubjekt",
but even these higher value-positing ("wertsetzend")
subjects reflect in their formal organization the
invariable logical structure of the function of the human
mind.
"Jedes Wertsystem versucht, die Welt nach gewissen
Prinzipien zu formen, sich selber in die Welt zu
projizieren. Das Wertsystem, oder richtiger, das fiktive
oder effektive Wertsubjekt, das ihm zugeordnet wird,
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vollzieht in der Wirklichkeit genau das, was jede
idealistische Philosophie vom theoretischen Ich fordert:
es projiziert sich selber in diese Wirklichkeit,
solcherart die Identit&t von Sein uni Wirklichkeit nicht
nur theoretisch, sondern in aller praktischen Lebensfillle
durchzuftthren.
Eine derartige Formung der Wir&lichkeit, ihre
•Umformung zu einer Wertwirklichkeit', wird nicht nur von
jedem einzelnen Menschen rait mehr or minder grossein
Erfolg unentwegt versucht, sie ist bei ttberpersbnlichen
Wertgebieten noch viel deutlicher sichthar: Staaten,
Vttlker, Kulturen sind solche Wertkreise, die sich urn
fiktive, O.berpers&nliche Wertsubjekte legen, und je
deutlicher die Wertbezogenheit hervortritt, desto
deutlicher wird dieses fiktive Wertsubjekt zum 'Kultur-
geist', wird der Wertkreis zum 'Kulturkreis', um mit
hftchstem Wertziel in den weitesten Kulturkreis einer
Religion zu miinden." (GW 7: 46)
Broch describes this formal organization of
experience as "Setzungen von Setzungen" (GW 2: *>96; GW 7:
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46), In it he sees the only hope for a world torn by
conflicting values. This hope is based on the fact that
every system of values is formally invariable and that
within each there functions the same formal, ethical
Absolute which operates through man and is guaranteed by
the transcendental Absolute of the Logos, The importance
of Broch's identification of ethics vrith the function of
reason or logic is at once evident. It leads to "die
Unterordnung des Ethischen unter die Absolutheit des
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Logos" (GW 7: 49).
The optimistic conclusion which Broch draws from
his theory of the dissolution of values and with which he
offers reassurance to his generation and its successors
is contained in the following passages, although it is
hard to imagine v/hat comfort the reader is expected to
derive from his words. These two quotations give
definitive expression to the position adopted by Broch in
the earlj1- 1930' s. At that time he was convinced that he
had proved that the only reliable Absolute left to man in
the modern world was the purely formal, abstract one of
logic. Not only is such an Absolute pureljr formal in
its application and thus incapable of providing
qualitative criteria for human conduct, but it is
essentially transcendental and impersonal because through
it there functions the Logos, the formal creative
principle underlying all reality.
"Die Welt ist Setzung des intelligiblen Ichs, denn
unverloren und unverlierbar bleibt die platonische Idee.
Doch die Setzung ist nicht ' aus der Pistole geschossen',
es kbnnen nur immer wieder Wertsubjekte gesetzt werden,
Wertsubjekte, die ihrerseits die Struktur des intelligiblen
Ichs widerspiegeln und die ihrerseits ihre eigenen
Wertset zungen, ihre eigenen W7eltformungen vornehmen: die
Welt ist nicht unmittelbare Setzung des Ichs, sondern
dessen mittelbare Setzung, sie ist 'Setzung von Setzungen',
'Setzung von Setzungen von Setzungen' usf. in unendlicher
Iteration. In dieser 'Setzung von Setzungen' erh&lt die
Welt ihre methodologische Organisierung und Hierarchie,
So
sicherlich eine relativistische Organisierung, trotzdem -
der Form nach - eine absolute, denn die ethische Forderung,
die an die effektiven oder fiktiven Wertsub.jekte grestellt
wlrd, bleibt ungemindert bestehen, mit ihr aber auch die
immanente Geltung des Logos innerhalb des yetanen Werkes:
2 ^
es bleibt die Logik der Dinge bestehen." (GW 2: 596)"°
"Spiegel seiner selbst, in jedem Begriff und in jeder
Einheit, die er setzt, leuchtet dem Menschen der Logos,
leuchtet ihm das Wort Gottes als Mass aller Dinge entgegen.
Und mag das Ruhende dieser Welt, mag ihr S.sthetischer
Wert aufgehoben und zur Funktion aufgelbst sein,
aufgelbst in den Zweifel an aller Gesetzlichkeit, mehr
noch, aufgelBst in die Pflicht zur Frage und zum Zweifel,
unangetastet bleibt die Einheit des Begriffes, unanget-
astet die ethische Forderung, unangetastet bleibt die
Rigorosit&t des ethischen Wertes als reine Funktion,
Pflichtwirklichkeit strengster Observanz und als solche
immer noch Einheit der Welt, Einheit des Menschen,
aufscheinend in alien Dingen, unverloren und unverlierbar
liber R&ume und Zeiten hinweg." (GW7 2: 598)
The second of the above passages contains the words
quoted at the start of this part of the thesis as evidence
of Broch's adherence in the early 1930's to a formal,
transcendental Absolute. It has now been shown how he
came to such a conclusion. The last section of this
chapter examines some of the problems, contradictions,
even dangers, inherent in such a philosophy.
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c) The Results of Brochfs Theory of the Dissolution of
Values.
Broch can be seen very much as a victim of his
own theory of the dissolution of values, According to
this theory formal logic is the only demonstrable
Absolute in modern life. Because Broch was convinced of
the validity of his argument he was inevitably obsessed
with the need to provide scientifically verifiable
evidence for many phenomena in life which are simply not
susceptible to such proofs. The example which recurs
most frequently in his work is his desperate attempt to
formulate a universally applicable code of ethics, a
set of criteria which would be absolutely reliable
because they would be scientifically irrefutable. The
desperation and contradictions evident in Broch's efforts
are one of the most striking aspects of his theoretical
writings when they are viewed as a whole. As yet very
24
few critics have commented on this.
There can be no doubt that Broch was aware of the
contradictions inherent in his reliance on logic and
scientific method. Throughout his essays and corres¬
pondence there recurs the doubt that all his theoretical
work consists of ultimately futile efforts to provide
objective confirmation for what could never be more than
passionately held personal beliefs. In August 1933
Broch wrote to Egon Vietta describing his \vork on the
theory of values: "Es ist dies eine Art Ungeduld, und
selbstverstftndlich bemtthe ich mich seit Jahren, die
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pr&zise logistische Fundierung filr meine philosophische
Arbeit nachzutragen, freilich wissend - obwohl ich in
mancher Einzelheit ein gutes Stflck damit vorwSrts gekommen
bin, - dass dies, iir ganzen, eir zum Scheitern verdammter
Versvch bleiben muss. Denn das Fthiscbe, urn. das ee sich
schliesslich dreht, 1st bei abler Logisierung des
Ausdrucks chne den 'Glauben' niemals su fassen." (0V 8:
2 5
85). " it is significant that such doubts appear more
frequently as Broch grows older. His tenacious,
adherence, despite all such reservations, to formal logic
as the only demonstrably reliable Absolute in modern life
merely setves to emphasize the extent to which he was a
prisoner of his own system of thought.
Broch pursued his research with such rigorous logic
because he believed that in a world of relative values
only scientifically irrefutable evidence as to the
necessity for any course of action could gain universal
acceptance for that action. This seem? to reveal a
naively optimistic and simplistic view of the role played
by reason in human affairs. If Broch's theoretical
vritings arc studied as a whole in their chronological
order it is evident, that as he grew older, so he became
increasingly pessimistic about the chances of his
theories, no matter how logically convincing, ever having
anjr practical results. His "Autobiographie als Arbeits-
programm" frequently reveals his misgivings. When
describing his research on the phenomenon cf mass
hysteria in the years 1939-19*11 he states: "mit
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rationalen Uberredungen, Predigten oder Beweisen ist
gegenttber einer festsitzenden uni gar wahnhaften
*" 26
Uberzeugung nichts auszurichten." (GW 9: 180). Such
words in the mouth of a prophet of reason are clearly
paradoxical and reveal Broch's personal dilemma, he was
convinced that he had to rely on reason and logic, but
he doubted their appeal to the greater mass of his
public*
Such explicit comments made by Broch with
reference to his attempts to prove the validity of personal
beliefs are of special relevance to his conception of the
Logos. "Logos" is one of the most widely and vaguely
used words in Broch's vocabulary. Although he uses it
regularlj'" he admits that it is a concept constantly
requiring examination and definition (GW 10: 299).
Unfortunately he contributes little to any definitive
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interpretation of the concept. On several occasions
Broch identifies the Logos with God, the Word of God or
the divine creative function. There are clear parallels
here to the biblical Logos of St. John I, 1, but Broch
2 8
never envisages a personal God as does Christianity.
He conceives of God as the abstract, formal,
unifying principle underlying the unitary, systematic
reality of Creation, even if this reality is not all
currently accessible to human experience and understanding.
Although Broch talks of the creative power of the Logos
he clearly does not imagine an individual, historical
act of Creation as such. The problem of how the
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Creation came into being is never explained, Broeh
conceives of the Creation as an abstract, unitary, formal
structure reflecting the ideal, formal, organizational
principle of the Logos and containing all potential
reality. This potential reality, or such parts of it
that can be rationally accommodated within the systematic
unity of the currently obtaining style of thought, is
then given concrete expression through human experience
and apperception, \vhich in turn depends on the functioning
of the divine spark of reason or logic in man. Broch
never explains how the divine spark comes to be in man:
this is another example of belief rather than knowledge
on his part. It is clear that the creative function,
as we normally understand the word, is performed by man
and not God. The most important result of Broch's
argument is his conclusion that in human experience the
Logos is completely identified with the fujiction of formal
29
logic and rational thought-processes.
In Broch's thinking the absolutely invariable
structures of formal logic are guaranteed by the trans¬
cendental Absolute of the Logos. His attempts to prove
this again reveal a certain naivety scarcely in keeping
with his usual insistence on logical validity as the
criterion of objective knowledge. An analysis of his
argument also reveals the point where Broch, whose
epistemology owes so much to that of Kant, as formulated
in Die Kritik der reinen Yernunft, attempts to go beyond
the latter's findings. Before proceeding any further
it must be emphasized that Broch understands the Logos in
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two ways. Firstly, it is a function which reveals
itself in man's ability to reason logically. Secondly,
it is a state or* condition, namely that of the ideal,
unitary, formal structure of ail potential reality. By
applying the function of the Logos to his experience of
the world man contributes to the revelation or concrete
realization of the potential reality guaranteed by the
Logos. For Broch the creative function and the attain¬
ment of knowledge are identical and reflect the Platonic
concept of anamnesis.
Broch uses two variations of a single argument to
prove, to his satisfaction at least, the existence of
the Logos. The first is based on the assumption that
the pursuit of objective, scientific knowledge is
paradigmatic for the structure of all value-systems in
that it projects the formal relationships of logical
thought into experience. He argues that the constant
progression of scientific enquiry necessarily implies a
final goal or condition of total or absolute knoivdedge
where all potential reaiit3^ would be understood by mans
it would then be actual and no longer merely potential
reality. A summary of this argument is to be found in
the essay, "Gedanken zum Problem der Erkenntnis in der
Musik".
"Nirgends 1st das Logische so eindeutig wirksam wie ±m
bewussten Erkenntnisprozess, nirgends 1st es so eindeutig
auf das uaendliche . iel der im Logos ruhenden v ahrheit
gerichtet, nirgends hat das Ergebnis lex* irdisch-endlichen
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Schritte so sehr den Charakter des Provisorischen wie
hier. Der unendliehe, ewig unabgeschlossene Prozess
der Wissenschaft, fortschreibend von Teilresultat zu
Teilresultnt, Konkretisierung der rationalen bewussten
Erkenntnis und ihres Fortschrittes, zeigt mit aller
Deutlichkeit, v.rie unmittelbar dieser Fortschritt aus deni
Wesen des Logos und des Logischen selber stammt. Die
Verrautung liegt nahe, dass das, was fttr dieses speziellste
und dcch sichtbarste und lichteste L'ertgebiet und seinen
Fortschritt gilt, auch fttr den Fortschritt der ftbrigen
Wertgebiete gelte, dass in diesem verallgemeinerten und
allgeR'einen Fortschreiten gleichfalls dem Logos und der
Erkenntnis die ftthrende Rolle zufalle ... Die 'Logik
der Dingef, die alles menschliche Geschehen scheinbar
ohne Zutun des Menschen vorwftrtstreibt, wird in eine
supra-humane spirituelle Sphttre zurttckvei'legt. " (GhT 7:
92-93)
The last sentence of the above quotation reveals
beyond all doubt that Broch, at the time in question,
namely the early 1930's, relied on an impersonal,
transcendental Absolute as the determining factor in
history. On occasion he even equates "Logos" with
"Schicksal" (GW 6: 252-253; GW 10: 297). In support of
the above argument Broch regularly asserts that no
epistemological system could ever be developed unless man
had some intuitive awareness of a possible final goal of
absolute knowledge. At a later point in the above quoted
essay he writes as follows:
"KBnnte ttberhaupt das bewusste Erkennen in Funktion
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treten, kfennte das Logische in F|jnktion bleiben, wean
das apriorische Wissen tun den Logos erlftsche? Hier
rtthrt das Wissen ura das Supra-Hnmane, das Wissen urn die
Totalitfet ier Welt und des Geistes, hier rtthrt das Wissen
an den Glauben, und die erkenntnistheoretische Notwendig-
lceit wird gleichzeitig zur geschichtsphilosophischen
Wahrheit: wenn das Wissen urn den irrationalen Geist, der
der Anfang, der Weg und das Ziel des Logos 1st, vsrloren-
geht und die leere Rationalitht ftbrigbleibt, in diesem
Augenblick tritt der Umbruch des Fortschritts ein, -
entblftsst seiner Humanit&t, ftihrt er zum Tode und ins
B5se»M (GW 7; 95)
Only the first sentence of the above passage is
strictly relevant here, The implications of the rest of
the quotation will be discussed later. Its main purpose
here is to show a typical and disturbing stylistic
feature of Broch's philosophical writings. It
illustrates how quickly Broch's thinking can cross the
border between rational argument or justified conjecture
into the realms of mystical speculation, A comparison
of Broch's conception of the Logos with Kant's epistemology
as expounded in Die Kritik der reinon Vernunft helps to
clarify the weakness of Broch's argument, Kant's
critical philosophy remains strictly within the rational
limits which he originally set himself: as a result he
refuses to look beyond the autonomous, intelligible self
as the bearer or source of the rational free will. To
do otherwise would be to indulge in uncritical speculation
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about matters beyond human experience. Broch, however,
demands a higher, transcendental guarantee of the
rational law. If rigorously logical reasoning cannot
furnish such a guarantee he turns to mysticism and
intuitive speculation.
Kant stresses the distinction between the logical
maxim of reason and the fundamental principle of reason.
The former compels man to try to establish a systematic
unity of judgment by pursuing the course of knowledge in
a rigorously logical fashion to the point where the final
condition, the ground of all knowledge is reached in the
Absolute or God. Such a maxim, useful, indeed
essential as it is in daily life and thought, does not
imply that there is any such ultimate ground of knowledge.
The fundamental principle of reason assumes that there is
such an Absolute and consequently a systematic unity of
knowledge and reality. Kant takes care to emphasize
that there is no logically valid transition from the
3 1
maxim to the fundamental principle of reason. Where
Kant sees "die Bedingung der mftglichen Erfahrung" in the
invariable formal relationships of the functioning of the
rational mind, Broch sees it in the transcendental
Absolute of the Logos (GW 2s 598; GW 7; 59).
One of the most important results of Broch's
conception of the Logos and his theory of values is to be
seen in his interpretation of history as a cyclical or
dialectal process. As has been sho\m, Broch relates the
creation of values in any historical era to the
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contemporary style of thought which, in turn, is
determined by the final axiom or axioms ("PlausibilitSt-
spunkt") of the currently accepted ontology* He
postulates a progressive simplification of these
ontologies and a corresponding reduction in the number of
value-systems in any historical period. The culmination
of such a development is seen in the Catholic Middle
Ages, when a single, comprehensive system of values
subordinated every aspect of life and thought to the
Absolute of belief in the Christian God. Such a
development could not halt there. Man's intellect, his
insight into the nature of the universe continued to
develop and could no longer be subject to the restrictions
imposed by religious belief. At this point the cycle of
the creation of values is reversed. From the historical
perspective it can be seen that after the Middle Ages and
over a period of centuries reality, as lived and under¬
stood by man, progressively disintegrated into a welter
of independent, conflicting value-systems.
According to Broch this dissolution reached its
climax in the Great War. In its chaos and brutality he
sees the "Nullpunkt der Wertatomisierung" (GW 2: 683).
The characteristic feature of this period is what Broch
calls "'die irrationale Ratio': der heutige Zustand der
Welt" (GW 10: 28l)« He uses these words to describe the
seemingly paradoxical situation in which the individual
acts rationally'- within a state of complete chaos which is
clearly dominated by the irrational. For Broch the
explanation lies in the fact that the dissolution of
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values has reached the stance where the individual has
become the centre of his own value-system, where he can
recognize no general code of conduct or values as a
criterion for his own behaviour and is therefore subject
to every whim of self-interest, no matter how irrational
ifc may be. The crucial factor, however, is that the
individual will act logically to attain any end suggested
to him by any irrational impulse. Broch's analysis of
Huguenau's position at the end of Die Schlafwandler
summarizes the .above explanation,
"Letzte Zerspaltungseinheit im Wertzerfall ist das
rrenschliche Iodividuum. Und je weniger dieses Individuum
an einem iibergeordneten System beteiligt und je mehr es
auf seine eigene empirische Autonomie gestellt 1st . , . ,
desto schmftler und bescheidener wird seine 'Privattheologie1,
desto unffthiger wird diese, irgendwelche Werte ausserhalb
Hires engsten individuellen Bereiches zu erfassen: was
ausserhalb des engsten Wertkrelses vor sich geht, kann
nur noch unverarbeitet, ungeformt, m.a.W. dogmatisch
hingenommen werden, - es entsteht jenes leere und
o
dogmatische Spiel von Konventionen, also von Uberrational-
it&ten kleinster Dimensionen, die fttr das Wesen des
philistr&sen Menschen typisch sind . , , , es entsteht
das konfliktlose Neben- und Ineinanderwirken einer dem
Irrationalen verhafteten Lebenligkeit und eines
a
Uberrationalen, das in gespenstisch totem Leerlauf nur
noch diesem Irrationalen dlent, stillos und ungebftndigt
sie beide, vereinigt in einer Disparatheit, die keinen
hert rcehr zu bilden vermag, Der Mensch, der, aus jedem
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Wertverband entlassen, zum ausschliesslichen Tr&ger des
Individualwertes geworden 1st, der metaphysisch
' ausgestossene • Mensch, ausgestossen, well sich der
Verband zu Indlviduen aufgelbst und zerstftubt hat, 1st
wertfrei, stilfrei und nur noch vom Irrationalen her
bestimmbar." (GW 2: 664-665)
In this situation reason ceases to perform any
formative, creative function. It no longer tries to
create a progressively more comprehensive system of values
by imposing a systematic unity of experience on reality.
It has become autonomous and dissociated from the
irrational, amorphous mass of life into which, ideally,
it should project its unif3ring, formal structure. The
rational .and irrational elements in life, which should be
complementary, the former providing the systematic frame¬
work which renders the material or content of the latter
comprehensible, have become independent, absolute
functions. The result is chaos which man cannot under¬
stand even although he always acts rationally,
"Es ist eine Zerspaltung des Gesamtlebens und -Erlebens,
die viel tiefer reicht als eine Scheidung nach Einzel-
individuen, eine Zerspaltung, die in das Einzelindividuum
und in seine einheitliche Wirklichkeit selber hinablangt,
Ach, wir wissen von unserer eigenen Zerspaltung
und wir vermftgen doeh nicht, sie zu deuten, wir wollen die
Zeit, in der wir leben, dafttr verantwortlich machen, doch
ttbermftchtig ist die Zeit, und wir kbnnen sie nicht
begreifen, sondern nennen sie wahnsinnig oder gross. Wir
selbst, wir halten uns fttr normal, weil ungeaohtet der
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Zerspaltnng unserer Seele, alles in uns nach logischen
Mot j veil sbl&uft." (GW 2: 4-03) 32
The above passage and those indicated in the
accompanying note reveal the optimistic note in Broch's
theory of the dissolution of values. The functioning of
an invariable Absolute, namely that of logic, can be
demonstrated throughout history, even in the most
catastrophic situations. This purely formal Absolute
is guaranteed the Logos.
Rroch's optimism clearljr needs some explanation.
The cycle of the creation and dissolution of values
illustrates the history of man's efforts to reduce reality
to a systematic unity and thus to understand his meaning¬
ful role within such a context and to be able to act
accordingly. In this respect the creation of values is
an ethical act. According to Broch all creation of
values represents the attempt to give concrete expression
to the abstract, pre-ordained structure of all potential
reality contained in the Logos. If the Logos could be
fully and definitively realized, and Broch knew this to
3 3
be impossible, then man would achieve the divine state
of timelessness and absolute knowledge. Man would
become God. Fear of time, death and the unknown would
vanish: "Wem es gelingt, alles zu erkennen, der hat die
34Zeit und damit auch den Tod aufgehoben." The
hypothetical nature of Broch's argument is evident in the
following passage.
"KBnnten tatsftchlieh s&ntliche Weltinhalte zum Gleich-
gewicht erhoben werden, kftnnte die Welt tatshchlich zu
einem Totalit&tssystem geformt und umgeformt werden, zu
einem System, in den jeder Teil den andern bedingt und
tr&gt, kftnnte dieser Zustand - der von der Wissenschaft
in streng Rationalem gesucht wird - tatsftchlich eintreten,
dann w&re auch die endgfiltige Befriedung des Seins
eingetreten, die Erlftsung der Welt, in die jedwedes
metaphysisch religiftse Streben der Menschheit mftnden
will." (GW 7: 98)
Clearly the ideal of a system of absolute knowledge
with its concomitant absolute system of values, which the
former necessarily implies^will never be realized.
Nevertheless any progressive realization of the ideal, no
matter how imperfect or incomplete, is itself an ethical
action and to be welcomed as such. In the different
styles of thought which succeed each other throughout
history there can be seen the progressive development of
the human intellect and its growing understanding of the
nature op the universe. The abandonment of any outdated
style of thought, the invalidation of any ontology no
longer corresponding to man's experience of his world is
an ethical act because it furthers man's attempts to
understand his reality as a systematic unity.
Any attempt to hinder this dynamic progression by
subordinating reason to the dictates of dogma, belief or
convention is essentially evil ("bftse"). Such adherence
to dogmatically asserted values and the refusal to
acknowledge the ethical dynamism of reason and logic ar-e,
in Broch's view, characteristic of all morality and moral
systems. Virtually all of Broch's theoretical writings
up to the micl-1930's reveal this distinction in
terminology between ethics and morals. Ethical systems
are essentially dynamic, their dynamism being that of
logical development. Moral systems are to be rejected
as dogmatic and reactionary because they stand in the way
of the formal, ethical dynamism of reason which is leading
progressively closer to the unattainable ideal of full
realization of the Logos. The clearest presentation of
Broch's argument is to be found in the essay, "Das Bftse
in Wertsystem der Kunst" (GW 6: 311-350).^
An important point which will be amplified later
is the fact that as Broch grew older, as he became more
desperate in his search for a means of practical,
humanitarian intervention in world affairs, so his
criticism of morality, as he understood it, became less
rigorous as did his insistence on the unrestricted dynamism
of the ethic of logical development. In the latter years
of his life he frequently used the words "ethisch" and
"moralisch" virtually as synonyms. This identification
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is never found in the earlier theoretical writings.
The result of Broch's particular conception of
ethics and his theory of values would seem to be to
postulate the progressive liberation of the rational
function from any qualitative restrictions as to its
application. This is exactly the situation described and
welcomed in the last two chapters of ,,r>er forfait der
Werte" in Die Schlafwandlar. There we see Huguenau,
"der wertfreie Mensch", as the representative of the
95
modern era in which the individual is the centre of his
own value-system. In the concluding chapter of the
novel, "Zerfall der Werte: Epilog", Huguenau commits
rape, murder, robbery and fraud without scruple and with¬
out retribution. This ending is regularly referred to
by Broch as "das ethische happy ending" (GW 8: 57; RB:
117j 153). He also repeatedly describes his theory of
values and its conclusions, which are most clearly
expressed in the last chapter of Die Schlafwandler, as
37his "ethisches Credo". According to Broch the end of
his novel is ethically satisfying and the conclusions
drawn from his analysis of the dissolution of values are
optimistic because they show that by 1918 reason and logic
had finally and irrevocably freed themselves from the
restraint imposed on them by dogmatic prejudices and
ignorance. The results were admittedly catastrophic for
humanity but at least reason and logic were now fully
autonomous and free to try again to express the systematic
unity of all reality, as guaranteed by the Logos, without
"5 Q
being limited or distorted by qualitative factors.
It is clear that at the time of writing this novel
Broch relied on the purely formal Absolute of the function
of logic, hoping that in time it would progressive!};- evolve
a new unitary system of values just as happened in the
centuries of intellectual development which culminated in
the Scholasticism of the Catholic Middle Ages. At no
39time does Broch suggest how this might happen. He can
only assume that in the future a time will come when once
again faith in^ and knowledge of the systematic unity of
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reality will coincide as it did in medieval Catholicism,
thus creating an absolute system of values and restoring
the security and purpose in life which this offers the
individual (GW2: 676-677, 685)» For Broch this was more
than simply a pious hones it was a logical necessity
following upon his nroof, as he saw it, of the existence
of the transcendental Absolute of the Logos as the
guarantor of the systematic unity of reality. Broch
could say of the end of Die Schlafwandler: "der eigent-
liche Sieg liegt in der neuen Ethik, die rationell im
Warden ist," (GW 8: 28),^ Nowhere in the writings of
this period can Broch be more specific, other than to
suggest that the new ethos might initially have to develop
at the (Simplest, most, basic level of human relationships.
Thus Bertrand Mftller, in Huguenau, tries to analyse
a faint hope for the prospects of humanity after the war:
"Ist es die plfttzlich erwachte Uberzeugung, dass die
Einheit von Denken und Sein nur im bescheidensten Rahmen
zu verwirklichen ist? Denken und Sein beides auf ein
Minimum Reduzierti" (GW 2: 609). In the same novel Dr.
FlurschlVtz expresses the same philosophical insight in
more practical terms: "'Eigentlich wttrde ich mich nicht
wundern, wer.n jetzt eine Periode k&ne, in der die Menschen
es ttberhaupt bloss darauf anlegen wftrden, zu vergessen,
nur zu vergessen: Schlafen, Essen, Schlafen, Essen . . ."
(GW 2: 621), Such statements are not restricted to
characters in novels. They recur in the essays and
correspondence, where Broch is obviously expressing his
personal convictions and hopes for the future (GW 7: 60;
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GW 8: 106, 131).
It cannot be strongly enough emphasized that the
conclusions expressed in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and
exemplified in the action and characters of Pie 5chlaf~
wandler are a direct result of Enoch's adherence to his
theory of the dissolution of values. This theory proves
beyond doubt, so Eroch believed, that the only Absolute
functioning in modern life and on which man must therefore
necessarily rely is the formal one of autonomous reason,
which must be free to follow its dictates without the
distorting influence of qualitative limitations,^ This is
made particularly clear in an important letter where
Eroch describes the "ethische Konstruktion in den
'Schlafvandlern'" (GV*T 8: 2-4-27).^ Here the distinction
he makes between ethics and morals is ver3r evident,
"Die 'Freiheit.', auf die es letzten Endes in allem
v/ahrhaft. Ethischen immer ankommt, nimmt auf ilb erkommene
Werte keine Rttcksicht, der Begriff der Autonomic, in dem
die Freiheit ihre logische Begrftndung erfRhrt, hat mit
moralischen Haltungen nichts zu tun: gewiss ist diese
Autonomic noch nicht die Erffillung des letzten gBttlichen
Wertes, aber sie ist die alleinigre Form, in der er sich
erfftllen kann ... In den Schlafwandlernj Pasenow
und Esch, beide moralische Typen, wenn auch verschiedenen
Moral-Dogmen unterworfen. Moral-Pogmen, die aber in
dieser Zelt des Wertverfalles eben absterbend sind, zur
'Romantik' werden . , , Bloss Huguenau ist der wahrhaft
'wertfreie' Mensch und damit das ad&quate Kind seiner Zeit.
Er allein kann daher fortbestehen, er allein ist in der
'Autonomie dieser Zeit', in der sich ein revolution&res
Ringen nach Freiheit ausdriickt. Er 1st der passive
Revolution&r, vie eben die Masse der Revolution&re jede
Revolution passiv mitmacht und dcch macht. Sicherlich
hat er - bloss der Form des Autonoiren nach ethisch,
sonst aber vftllig amcralisch - noch keineswegs die
Freiheit der neuen Ghttlichkeit, des neuen Glaubers
errungen. . « Aber as ist die Lebensform, die 'Form der
Freiheitr, in der allein einmal der newe Inhalt erstehen
kaunj er steht am Beginn des Weges." (GW 8j 26)
From the above letter it is clear that Broch is
taking care not to pass any comment of approval or
criticism about IIugu.er.au' s behaviour, Within the context
of the dissolution of values any such comment is
irrelevant because Hugucnau is "bloss der Exponent eines
grhsseren Geschehens, er ist Exponent des europHischen
Geistes schlechthin" (GW 2: 674). Respite this assertion
Broch seems to feel compelled to pass judgment on Huguenau
in the closing pages of Die Schlafwandler while at the
same time trying to reconcile this critical judgment with
the conclusions of the theory of the dissolution of values.
"Mord bleibt Mord, BBsheit bleibt Bftsheit, und die
Philistrosit&t eines auf das Individuum und seine
irrationalen Triebe eingesehr&nkten Wertgebietes, dieses
letzte Produkt eines jeden Wertzerfalls, bleibt der Funkt
der absoluten Verworfcnheit, bleibt gewissermassen der
invariant absolute Nullpunkt, der alien Wertskalen und
alien Wertsystemen ungeachtet ihrer gegenseitigen Relativ-
i -Wv Z / W i
it it gemeinsam zu sein hat, weil kein Wertsystem aufge-
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stellt werden kann, das in seiner Idee und in seiner
logischen Wesenheit nicht der 'Bedingung mttglicher
Erfahrung' unterworfen whre, empirische Abschattung einer
alien Systemen gemeinsamen logischen Struktur und einer an
den Logos gebundenen apriorischen Unwandelbarkeit." (GW
2s 683) The transition from what is clearly a moral
judgment to its supposedly epistemological justification
is both confused and logically unacceptable. Two pages
later Broch describes Huguenau as "schicksalhaft unethisch,
ausgestossen aus der Epoche, ausgestossen aus der Zeit"
(GW 2; 685).
These passages directly contradict the point made
by Broch in the above quoted letter and in the ninth
chapter of "Der Zerfall der Werte", namely that the final
stage of the dissolution of values, as embodied in Huguenau
and exemplified by his behaviour, has a positive ethical
value because the formal Absolute of the Logos can be seen
to function through reason and logic. A possible
explanation of this contradiction is that Broch himself
was horrified by the logical conclusion of his theories.
He could not reject his findings, precisely because he
believed them to be logically irrefutable, but he felt
compelled to add a note of hopeful, if not entirely
convincing optimism at the end of the novel in xdiich he had
exemplified in practical terms the consequences of his
abstract theory.
It is obvious that the last five pages of Die
Schlafwandler contain ideas and hopes which do not follow
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logically from Broch's arguments on the preceding pages.
From the paragraph on p.683 introduced by the words
"Unerreichbar fiir jedenl" Broch leaves the realm of
logical argument and indulges in an outpouring of mystical
speculation and pious hope for which there is no rational
justification. Even the language and sentence structure
change perceptibly and become noticeably similar to that
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associated with mystical writings. The contradiction
can further be seen in a comparison of two brief but
important phrases which occur in the closing pages of the
novel. On p.681 Broch describes the culmination of the
dissolution of values as "schmerzliche Pflicht zur Freiheit".
Five pages later Broch suggests that the new ethos he hopes
to see develop will grow out of "die schmerzliche Freiheit
der Pflicht" (GW 2s 686), and here "Pflicht" seems to be
understood as moral duty or commitment to one's felloitf-men.
"Die schmerzliche Pflicht zur Freiheit" is the logicallj^
inevitable result of the theory of the dissolution of
values: "die schmerzliche Freiheit der Pflicht" is a
laudable ideal, expressed in hope. But the latter cannot
be deduced from the former.
Broch's theory of the dissolution of values not
only postulates the liberation from the external influence
of qualitative factors, but it also postulates absolute
freedom of action as the necessary complement to the
autonomy of reason. This all follows from reliance on
the impersonal, transcendental Absolute of the Logos. As
will be shown later, when Broch finally came to formulate
his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" he sought to re-
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introduce the qualitative factor into thought and action
and tried to prove that humanitarian conditions were a
logically necessary restriction which must limit extreme
freedom of thought and behaviour.
Broch criticism is generally divided upon the
interpretation of whether his work, particularly his
theoretical writings, reveal him as an optimist or
pessimist in his view of the historical development of
civilization. More specifically, there is radical
disagreement between those critics who see Die Schlaf-
wandler ending on a note of optimistic prophecy and those
who read the novel as the exemplification of a pessimistic,
even nihilistic theory of history.
The former seem to be at fault because they accept
Broch's theory of values and interpretation of history
uncritically. They accept that Broch believed his theory
to be optimistic and interpret the novel accordingly.
They fail to see that Broch was a prisoner of his own
logic and do not appreciate the change of tone in the
closing pages of the novel. Furthermore they fail or
refuse to analyse the implications of using such a cyclical
theory of history as a prognostic instrument for deter¬
mining human reactions to future historical developments.
That Broch intended his theory to be used for just such a
purpose will be discussed in due course. Of these critics
the two most representative are Leo Kreutzer, in his book,
Erkenntnistheorie und Prophetie. Hermann Brochs
Romantrilogie 8 Die Schlafwandler', and Manfred Durzak, who
enlarges on Kreutzer's interpretation in his article,
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"Apokalypse oder Utooie? Bermerkungen zu Hermann Brochs
44
Schlafwandlern" »
Other critics have spoken out against what thejr see
as the inherent pessimism and latent nihilism of Die
Schlafwandler, Those that do so generally emphasize,
correctly in my vieiv, that the optimistic conclusion cannot
be logically derived from Broch's premises. This is a
serious weakness in an argument which is supposed to
demonstrate the logical inevitability of the growth of a new
humanitarian ethos out of the catastrophe of war. These
critics suggest that the optimistic prophecy at the end of
the novel was grafted on as a desperate, instinctive reaction
against the inevitable apocalypse postulated by the theorjr of
the dissolution of values. This criticism is argued most
closely by Heinz D. Osterle in two articles, "Hermann Broch:
Die Schlafwandler. Kritik der zentralen Metapher" and
"Hermann Broch. Die Schlafwandler: Revolution and Apocalypse".
The fault in Osterle1s criticism is that he then proceeds
to denounce Broch as a nihilist and crypto-faecist without
relating Die Schlafwandler and "Der Zerfall der Werte" to
the rest of Broch's life and work. He fails to see
Broch's personal dilemma, a dilemma revealed by viewing
his life and work as a whole from a chronological
perspective. Broch could not deny the irrefutable logic,
as he saw it, of his theory of values, no matter how
apocalyptic the results might be. At the same time he
hoped and believed that his cyclical interpretation of
history prophesied the growth of a new, humanitarian ethos
out of the "Nullpunkt" of the Great War. Having proved
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to his own satisfaction that the only reliable Absolute
of his era was that of reason and logic he tried to use
them to make some direct, practical contribution, on a
scientific basis, to further the development of the new
ethos. From the mid-1930*s onwards Broch worked against
time, trying to formulate what can only be described as a
scientifically valid theory of humanity. Anything less
nihilistic is hard to imagine. This is not to say that
Broch's position was not paradoxical. His analysis of
the dissolution of values does much to discredit reason
and reveal the dangers of uncontrolled, ruthlessly applied
logic. Yet because he believed that he had proved that
reason was the only Absolute left to modern man, he was
forced to have recourse to it in his search for a new
absolute ethos.
At this point it is relevant to ask in greater
detail why the charges of pessimism and nihilism are
brought against Broch. The reasons can be traced directly
to his belief in the transcendental Absolute, and its
functioning through the processes of logic, as the
guiding principle behind all historical development. In
his analysis of the dissolution of values Broch reveals
his conviction that the cycle of the creation and
disintegration which characterizes the evolution of the
human intellect and its progressive attempts to realize
the Logos is logically inevitable. At all stages in the
cycle the function of the Logos or logic remains absolute
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and invariable.
"Es bleibt die Logik der Dinge bestehen. Und muss auch
der logische Fortschritt der Geschichte immer wieder
umbrechen, sobald die Unendlichkeitsgrenze ihrer meta-
physischen Konstruktion erreicht ist, und muss auch das
platonische Weltbild immer wieder einer positivistischen
Schau \tfeichen, unbezwingbar bleibt die Wirksamkeit der
platonischen Idee, die in jedem Positivismus stets aufs
neue die mtttterliche Erde beriihrt, urn, getragen vom Pathos
der Erfahrung, stets aufs neue das Haupt zu erheben."
(GW 2s 596-597)
"Das Absolute aber ist immer Konstruktion, gibt bloss die
Richtung des unendlichen Weges an und ist selber als
solches unerreichbar. Selbst dort, wo die Verwirklichung
bereits weitgehend erreicht war, wie im christlich-
platonischen Weltbild des Mittelalters, musste das
Gesamtwertsystem aus eben diesen logischen Grttnden v/ieder
zerbrechen, musste sich in die Teilwertsysteme aufIbsen."
(GW 6s 212)4°
This is obviously a mechanistic interpretation of
history. On at least three occasions Broch even uses the
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word "Wertmechanik". The Collected Works alone contain
three schematic summaries of the stages of historical
A R
development in the cycle. 0 This historical cycle is
formulated in terms of man's psychological reactions to
the cyclical creation and dissolution of values. The
latter cycle is essentially an episteraological one govern¬
ing man's knowledge of reality. The laws of historical
development parallel this exactly in the field of human
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psychology and govern man's reactions to this reality.
According to Broch such a cyclical law can be used to
anticipate and prepare for man's psychological reactions
to the foreseeable stages in the rise and fall of value-
systems and their concomitant interpretations of reality.
Wolfgang Rothe provides a useful summary of Broch's
theories.
"Der Kassenpsychologie Brochs liegt eine xvertheoretisch
unterbaute Geschichtsphilosophie (oder geschichts-
philosphisch gefasste Werfctheorie) zugrunde, die Geschichte
wird als Abfolge von 'Zentralwertsystemen* begriffen, die
jeweils mit gesetzm&ssiger Zwangslftufigkeit vier Stadien
durchlaufen: zwei Normalit&ts- und zwei Wahnperioden.
Die erste, zeitlich l&ngste und sozusagen wertvollste
Epoche ist gekennzeichnet durch die uneingeschr&nkte Herr-
schaft des zentralen Wertes (etwa Gottes im christlichen
Mittelalter), die zweite, negative Epoche ist die des
'Hypertrophiewahns' nach der dogmatischen Erstarrung der
rationalen Werttheologie (etwa das 'finstere Mittelalter'
des Hexenwahns, ftlr Broch bereits Nachmittelalter), die
dritte Epoch ist wieder eine 'Normalit&tsperiode', in der
aufs neue ein angemessenes Verh&ltnis zur Realit&t gefunden
wird (Aufklftrung und Beginn des naturwissenschaftlichen
Zeitalters), w&hrend das letzte Stadium die endgiiltige
Auflbsung der Werthierarchie in die einander bekriegenden
Wertsysteme von Partialbereichen und damit den
»Zerrissenheitswahn' mit sich bringt, aus v/eichein Chaos
unter gr&sslichen Opfern ein Prozess der 'Wertvereinheit-
A 9
lichung1 zum n&chsten ' Zentralivertsystem' filhrt."'
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It is at once evident why such an interpretation
of histor^y provokes accusations of pessimism and nihilism.
If it is correct, and Broch always insisted that his theory
was logically irrefutable and confirmed by verification
against past history, then man is clearly helpless in the
face of an impersonal power beyond his control and can
make no significant contribution towards altering the
course of histpry. That this is a very real danger
inherent in Broch's theory is confirmed by his own
repeatedly stated opinion that the rise of Hitler and
Nazism was a historical necessity to be accepted in the
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cyclical progress towards a better world. Such an
assertion is in keeping with his cyclical interpretation
of histoi^y. His personal dilemma is seen when he argues,
with evident signs of embarrassment at trying to manipulate
his own theory accordingly, that Hitler and all he
represents must be resisted as vigorously as possible
(GW 8: 201). The conflict Broch felt between adhex^ence
to logical theory and his belief in pr*actical humanitarian
needs is revealed in the letters to Willa Muir, written
when Hitler's power was increasing steadily. In a letter
of May 1934 Broch points out that he had correctly
prophesied the rise of Nazism, but he adds the revealing
comment: "Aber vielleicht habe ich nicht ganz recht; und
das wiinsche ich mir natiirlich insgeheim." (GW 10: 358).
Another letter1, written soon after his emigration to the
United States in 1938, shows the conflict between abstract,
logical theory and the needs of practical humanity even
more clearly. Broch states that war is now inevitable and
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continues as fellows. "Die Frage ist nur, ob man
tiberhaupt noch etwas gegen den Zeitgeist tun kann oder ob
man die Pest liber sich ergehen lassen muss. Nun ist die
Weltgeschichte zweifelsohne eine Kette derartiger
Pestseuchen, und alles, was wir Wahrheit nennen, ist
Produkt dieser Wahnsinnskette, die noch lange nicht
abgeschlossen ist und niemals abgeschlossen sein wird.
Nichtsdestoweniger gibt es hinter allem eine absolute
Wahrheit (wenn auch das Absolutum nicht tibersetzbar ist),
und weil es diese Wahrheit gibt, kbnnen wir den Wahnsinn
als das erkennen, was er ist, nhmlich als verbrecherischen
Irrsinn, und ebendeshalb muss er, genau so wie jede andere
Seuche, bek&mpft werden." (GW 10: 366) Broch is here
condemning as criminal insanity what, according to his
oxm theories, he should welcome as a necessary stage in the
cyclical development of history towards a better world.
Why does Broch take such an optimistic view of his
theory of history? It was his belief that since the
theory demonstrates invariable laitfs of historical develop¬
ment it could be used as an instrument of prognosis to
forecast future developments and allow man to prepare for
them accordingly. The obvious flaw here, of which Broch
was iv'ell aware, is that if there are such laws then no
human intervention can affect them - otherwise they would
not be valid laws. Broch deals with this problem in
great detail in a treatise which he wrote as part of his
studies in mass psychology in the early 1940's. When
found among his papers after his death this piece of work
had no definitive title, but Wolfgang Rothe, editor of
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volume nine of the Collected Works, has given it, on the
grounds of its subject-matter, the very apt title of
"Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit".^*
At no time does Broch ever resolve the conflict
between his belief in historical laws, whose validity he
claims to have demonstrated, and his belief in the ability
of the human will to influence history. We see again
that he is the reluctant victim of reason and logic,
clinging to them because in them he sees the only logically
demonsti-able Absolute in modern life. An interesting
attempt of Broch's to achieve a reconciliation betiveen
free \tfill and historical determinism is to be seen in his
"Massenwahntheorie" of 1939-1941. There he suggests that
the cyclical model of history might be reformulated in
terms of a pendulum rather than a circular movement. He
advances the idea that although human will and reason
cannot halt the cyclical progression of history through the
rise and fall of civilization and culture, which is all the
cycle of values basically means in historical terms, they
might nevertheless slow down or somehow restrict the swing
of the pendulum of historical development between one
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period of dissolution and the next.
One possible criticism of Broch's cyclical
interpretation of history has, as yet, received little or
no attention, perhaps because it is so obvious. Broch
maintained that his theory was formally, logically valid.
He also asserted that the abstract theory could be tested
empirically and verified by the evidence of past history.
By thus using the scientific method of testing a theory
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against reality he believed he could demonstrate the
absolute reliability of his theory of history and the
conclusions he drew from it. Unfortunately, the very
question of empirical verification is here open to question.
We know from his writings that Broch thought that at least
two full cycles of the progressive creation and dissolution
of values had taken place in the history of Western
Europe. The first culminated in the culture of classical
antiquity; the second cycle, which rose out of the
disintegration of that civilization, reached its
harmonious climax in the absolute value-system of medieval
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Catholicism, Broch saw his own era in the first half
of the twentieth century as the last stage in the
progressive dissolution of the medieval value-system, a
stage of complete chaos out of which a new unified system
of values and understanding of reality must necessarily
arise.
The empirical verification claimed by Broch for
his theory rests therefore on two repetitions of the cycle;
this would scarcely seem to constitute scientific grounds
for assuming its general validity. One can ask if Broch
even succeeds in demonstrating this double repetition of
his cycle. He regularly analyses the cycle which centres
on the Middle Ages, but he never describes the cycle
leading up to classical antiquity and fails to explain
satisfactorily why this period should be regarded as having
an absolute system of values. A further objection is
possible. In "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch states
explicitly that the Great War represents the nadir of the
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current dissolution of values. Years later, however, he
maintains that the rise of Hitler and Nazism are to be
welcomed because this represents the last crisis to be
passed through before the development of a new humanit¬
arian ethos can begin. Such a criticism may seem trivial
when it is remembered that the cycle envisaged by Broch
covers a period of centuries. Nevertheless, throughout
his writings Broch regularly insists that his theory of
history offers hope of a better future to his generation;
the individual living in that period which is supposed to
show an improvement in human affairs is entitled to ask
for some evidence of such a development. If, as Broch
might have conceivably replied, the time-scale of his cycle
is too vast to show any improvement within the span of one
generation, then he can scarcely expect the individual to
accept his theory of history as relevant to his way of
life.
The purpose of this analysis of Broch's theory of
values with particular reference to the dissolution of
values has been to show that by the mid-1930's Broch was
convinced that the only demonstrably reliable Absolute in
modern life was that of formal logic, which was guaranteed
by the transcendental Absolute of the Logos. Such is the
conclusion draim from years of research and given definitive
expression in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and a number of
essays written in that periods "Logik einer zerfallenden
Welt" (1931) j "Leben ohne platonische Idee" (1932), "Das
Weltbild des Romans" (1933), "Das Bftse im Wertsystem der
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Kunst" (1933)» "Geist und Zeitgeist" (1934).^
Convinced as he was by the logic of his own argument,
Broch was forced to accept a mechanistic view of history
in which the individual is at the mercy of an abstract,
impersonal, transcendental power. At the same time Broch
personally believed that this power was essentially
beneficial in its function because it guaranteed the
systematic unity of reality within which man had a meaning¬
ful role to play. Broch!s problem at this time was
twofold. He had to convince the general public that the
Logos, as he conceived of it, existed, because this would
guarantee the ultimate security and purpose of life amidst
the chaos of the modern world. Secondly, he had to show
that such knowledge had any practical value in contributing
to the improvement of the human condition. The former
problem is a purely abstract one of epistemology; the
latter, so Broch felt, could be best approached through
research in mass psychology and political theory. These
two fields of study proved to be the principal areas of
Broch»s work from 1935 until his death in 1951* His
varying degrees of interest in these subjects and the
fluctuation of his mood between optimism and pessimism
concerning the practical application of his political and
psychological theories have been described in the first
part of this thesis.
In all these fields of research Broch insisted
upon applying a strictly rational, scientific methodology.
This was the logical consequence of his own theory of the
dissolution of values. He felt that people would not
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accept or respond to a suggested course of action unless
it could be shown to be logically necessary and scientif¬
ically valid in its formulation. Such a naive faith in
man's response to reason seems even more questionable
when it is remembered that Broch postulated scientific
certainty in disciplines such as psychology and political
and legislative theory which are notoriously inaccessible
to rigorous scientific enquiry.
This insistence on the scientific pursuit of
objective knowledge no matter how fragmentary or incomplete
is evident in the two essays, "Einheit wissenschaftlicher
und dichterischer Erkenntnis" (1933) and "Gedanken zum
r c
Problem der Erkenntnis in der Musik" (1934). Both
these essays expand on the conclusion drawn from the
analysis of the dissolution of values: Broch acknowledges
the subjective value of intuitive knowledge, but in his
search for a means of practical intervention in human
affairs he feels he must rely solely on the logical pursuit
of objective knowledge if his theories are to achieve any
general recognition and be put into practice. These
essays, especially the former, suggest that any contri¬
bution to the sum of human knowledge is to be welcomed as
an ethical act. Inevitably this conjures up visions of
a relentless pursuit of knowledge for its own sake,
regardless of its consequences for man and without any
qualitative factors to impose a limiting or directing
influence on such activity. Such, however, is the
inevitable result of Broch's reliance on the formal,
Impersonal and transcendental Absolute of the Logos.
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From 1935 he concentrated increasingly on his
scientific research in epistemology, its related discipline
of mathematics, and psychology and political theory. It
was only considerably later, as he grew increasingly
desperate in his search for some demonstrably reliable
means of practical intervention in human affairs, that
Broch revised his reliance on the Logos as the abstract,
formal principle directing all human activity. He then
formulated his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", with
which he sought to re-establish humanitarian considerations
as the absolute, qualitative criterion by which all thought
and activity should be judged. This implied imposing a
limitation on the absolute autonomy of reason and opened
the way for the practical intervention of the human
factor in determining the course of history.
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3. THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF 19.36-1947
The reasons for Broch's abandonment of his literary
career in favour of his self-imposed task of research into
mass psychology and political theory have been described
in the first part of this thesis. His correspondence from
this particular period, 1935-1936, reveals clearly that his
personal preference would have been to pursue his studies
in mathematics and epistemology, i.e. in disciplines of
an essentially formal and abstract nature. This
preference is obviously influenced by the conclusions
drawn from the analysis of the dissolution of values,
namely that reason and logic are the only absolutes in
modern life. At the same time Broch realized that abstract
theory and the pursuit of formal knowledge were of little
direct or immediate use to the cause of humanity. As a
result he reluctantly turned his interest to the more
concrete and empirical disciplines of psychology and
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political theory.
Broch's obsession with logic and formally valid,
objective knowledge is a direct result of his belief that
the Logos can be seen to operate through human reason.
Until the mid-1930's Broch's research dealt primarily with
man as a rational being, a purely abstract, formal,
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rational function: "das mathematische Ich", "das
intelligible Ich" (GW 2: 596; GW 7: 67), "das autonome
Ich" (GW 6: 322), "das erkennende Ich" (GW 10: 169), "das
bewusstseinstragende Ich" (GW 7; 62), "das reine Ich"
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(GW 7; 67). This emphasis in Broch's work at this
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stage was determined by his desire to prove that, despite
the dissolution of values, there was a systematic unity
of reality guaranteed by the Logos: it is only through
the formally invariable logical relationships of the
thought processes, themselves a reflection of the Logos,
that man can experience the world as a systematic unity
of objective reality. This is not to say that Broch
ignored the other aspects of life, particularly the
physical and psychological factors, but he believed that
they could be understood and experienced only in terms of
man's relationship to reality, which in turn could be
explained only by man's function as a rational being.
Any enquiry into this function necessarily takes
place on an abstract, hypothetical plane and produces
purely theoretical conclusions, Broch acknowledged this
problem and admitted that any attempt to make a practical
contribution to the improvement of the current human
condition demanded a study of empirical reality and man's
role in it. The first result of this somewhat reluctant
decision on Broch's part can be seen in the essay,
"Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse" (1936),
in which he states: "Zum Heilen braucht man ngunlich
Empirie." (GW 7: 65)#^ The greater part of this essay
is concerned with translating Broch's purely abstract,
epistemological theories of the pursuit of truth by man in
his function as a rational being into the psychological
terms of the creation of values by man in his function as
an empirical being in whom are united rational and
irrational elements of behaviour, physical and intellectual
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or spiritual qualities. Broch refers to man in this
latter role as "das psychologische Ich" or "das empirische
Ich": "Tritt man aus dem Bereich der (erkenntnistheoretisch
hypostasierten) Inhaltlosigkeit in den der 1Inhalte' (der
empirischen Weltinhalte) so verwandelt sich das Non-Ich in
die konkrete Aussenwelt, und statt des reinen Ich erscheint
das psychologische auf dem Plan, freilich ohne - wie sollte
es auch - hiebel die Ziige seines erkenntnistheoretischen
Kernes zu verlieren." (GW 7: 71-72).
This "psychologische Ich" is man as we normally
think of him. According to Broch all psychological
reactions are conditioned by the fact that each individual
is aware of a conflict within himself. In his function
as a rational being man knows only the abstract, purely
formal relationships of logic and has no conception of
time. As a physical being he experiences temporal
progression, decay and finally death. The "psycholo¬
gische Ich" is the area in which this conflict is
expressed: "Das psychologische Ich ist dem konkreten
Menschen der Inbegriff seines Selbstbewusstseins und ist
daher auch der Exponent seines erkenntnistheoretischen Ich-
Kerns wie seines KBrper-Ich. Was immer im Ich-Kern oder
im KBrper-Ich vor sich geht, es gelangt (soweit es
(lberhaupt bewusst wird) ins psychologische Ich des
Menschen." (GV/ 7: 77).
The main relevance of this essay to an examination
of the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute"
is that it marks the point where Broch, however
reluctantly, abandoned his abstract, epistemological
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theories in order to study the immediate human problems of
empirical reality. In the current world-situation of the
late 1930' s and early 194-0's he felt that he could best
make some direct, practical contribution to the advance¬
ment of humanity by devising a reliable plan for the
ideological defeat of totalitarianism and the restoration
of a healthy democracy on a sound theoretical basis. The
first major attempts to do this which are relevant to the
study of "das Irdisch-Absolute" can be seen in three
excursions he made into the fields of mass psychology and
political theory before 1947. They are his "Massen-
wahntheorie" and its accompanying summary, "A Study of Mass
Hysteria - Preliminary Table of Contents", "Geschichts-
gesetz und Willensfreiheit" and "Gibt es noch Demokratie?".^
Some comment must be made here on the dating of
these three pieces of itfork. With the "Massenwahntheorie"
there are no difficulties. Broch himself gives the dates
of composition as 1939 and 1941 (GW 9: 77). This is
confirmed by internal evidence: the \*ar is already in
progress, but America has not yet become involved (GW 9:
149-150). "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" is
thematically very closely related to the "Massenwahn¬
theorie". It is a specific and detailed examination of
the major problem thrown up by the "Massenwahntheorie",
namely the question of how or if the cycle of periods of
normality and mass hysteria can be controlled. This
suggests that it was written after the earlier work, i.e.
after 1941. From his study of the original manuscripts
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Wolfgang Rothe suggests simply the early 1940's (GW 9: 14)•
Manfred Durzak puts forward the probable date of 1940.^*
These two suggestions are tenable, although, for the
reasons already given, a date soon after 1941 would seem
to be more accurate. In his bibliography in the Collected
Works Harald Binde gives 1949 as the approximate date
(GW 10: 417). It can be shown that this is not tenable.
"Gibt es noch Demokratie?" ivas certainly written
after 1945 as it discusses the war as a past event,
expressing Broch's disillusionment at the Western Allies'
failure to exploit their victory and formulate a democratic
ideology to challenge the expansion of Russian Communism.
It is generally agreed that it was probably written about
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1948. Without giving any firm reason for doing so,
Rothe suggests that it \tfas probably written slightly
earlier than that (GW 9: 15). As will be shown, his
tentative suggestion can be confirmed by internal evidence
gained from examining the development of the theory of
"das Irdisch-Absolute". This evidence, which is
presented in part below and partly in the following
chapter, reveals that "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit"
and "Gibt es noch Demokratie?" must have been written
before another study, entitled "Zur politischen Situation
unserer Zeit" (GW 9; 361-441). It can be shown from
internal evidence that this was written at the very
earliest in 1948. To anticipate one of the conclusions
dratvn from this evidence, it can be assumed that "Gibt es
noch Demokratie?" was probably written in 1947.
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Broch believed that in his cyclical interpretation
of history he had found the instrument with which he could
implement his programme of action. Using the findings
of "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse" he
constructed "ein Gesetz psychischer Zyklen" (GW 7: 269-271;
GW 9; 93-99) which is structurally identical with the
epistemological cycle of the rise and fall of value-
systems described in "f)er Zerfall der Werte". It was
Broch's belief that this cycle could be used to forecast
historical developments and the individual's psychological
reaction to them. On the basis of such predictions
corrective action could then be taken to prevent such
crises arising or at least to help people cope with them.
The essential contradiction inherent in such a theory has
already been discussed: if the cyclical law is valid it
cannot be altered; if it is not valid it is not a reliable
instrument of prediction.
One of the distinguishing features of the political
and psychological writings of this period is the way in
which Broch vaccil^ates between optimism and pessimism as
to the practicability of his theory. His "Massenwahn-
theorie" in particular reveals this dilemma. At one
point he suggests that the relentless cycle of historical
development cannot be halted or altered (GW 9: 92); then
he suggests hopefully that perhaps man can take active
steps to prevent the crises predicted by the cycle (GW 9:
97> 132). Broch was convinced that if any such course of
action was to be generally accepted and implemented then
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people must be rationallj' persuaded of its logical
necessity. In the "Massenwahntheorie" he regularly
claims that reason and the human will can be used to
control the cycle of history and convert man to a permanent
state of humanitarian democracy.^ Just as frequently he
despairs of reason ever achieving this.^ His predicament
can be summarized in two comments about the rise of Nazism
and the outbreak of the war. "Was also kann einer solchen
Entwicklung der Massenseele entgegengesetzt werden?
Nichts und doch alles." (GW 9: 98) "Das Grauen wurde
mutwillig entfesselt. Es v;ar nicht notwend ig gewesen.
Oder doch, es war notwendig gewesen, well Politik immer
Ausnfttzung der SchwHtchen dec anderen gewesen ist."
(GW 9: 136)
"Gesehichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" makes a
more detailed^but no more conclusive study of the dilemma
caused by reliance on a mechanistic cycle of history.
Both in this study and in his "Massem^ahntheorie" Broch
maintains a note of optimism which the reader cannot really
share. Again, as at the end of Die Schlafwandler in the
last chapter of "Der Zerfall der Werte", he seems to
challenge his own rational and essentially pessimistic
conclusions with an irrational and hopeful faith in
humanity. "Gibt es noch Demokratie?" is entirely
pessimistic. Written soon after the war it reveals
Broch's disillusionment that the cause of humanitarian
democracy seems hardly more advanced after the defeat of
fascism than before. In a large part of the world
communist totalitarianism then appeared as a greater threat
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than fascism and the Western Allies could only meet its
challenge with the threat of force. Broch believed that
a scientifically sound theory of democracy was the only
answers because only then would the peoples of the world
be rationally convinced of the benefits of genuine
democracy. Again a naive timst in the power of reason
is evident.
The correspondence of the early 1940's confirms
this fluctuation of Broch?s mood between optimism and
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pessimism. Two of these letters contain references of
special relevance to "das Irdisch-Absolute". One mentions
the research in psychology. Broch writes as follows.
"Aber ich muss immer wieder dazu sagen, dass ich die
werttheoretische Behandlung psyc.hischer Fragen erst dann
filr erlaubt erachte, wenn es gelingen sollte, sie auf
eine gesunde mathematische Basis zu stellen." (GW S: 179)
This insistence on the need to establish the study of
psychology and its application in political theory as
rigorously scientific disciplines on a sound logical basis
appears in another letter of the period, written to Br.
Brody. Referring once more to his psychological studies
Broch writes: "Was man da alles an Soziologie, Geschichte,
Psychologies aber auch ttberdies an Methodologie und Logik
wissen miisste, geht in einen einzelnen Kopf ttberhaupt
nicht hinein." (GW 8: 189). These quotations reveal
Broch's predicament. He wanted to formulate a scientific
theory of humanity in which it could be logically
demonstrated, that respect for human life and dignity were
necessarily the final qualitative criterion for all thought
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and behaviour. This qualitative principle was to be
introduced to control, or at least modify the purely
formal, logically inevitable development of the historical
cycle. It will be remembered that this formally
invariable cycle, as explained in "Oer Zerfall der Werte"
and other essays of that period, is grounded in Broch's
belief in the transcendental Absolute of the Logos and in
man's function as a rational being through which the Logos
is progressively realized. In these earlier writings
Broch welcomed the successive rise and fall of civilizations
and culture and approved the ruthless pursuit of knowledge
as ethical actions because he saw all this as part of the
dynamic process through which man came to understand more
and more of the potential reality inherent in the Logos.
The dangerous consequences of such a conception of ethics
have already been discussed.
In his political and psychological writings Broch
-does not discard his theory of a formally invariable cycle
of history, but he tries to introduce a qualitative factor
which would subordinate all developments, in as far as
they are subject to any control, to the dominant needs of
humanity. Here he is clearly no longer thinking of man
as an abstract logical function but in terms of his total
personality as a flesh-and-blood, thinking creature living
in empirical reality. Using Broch's own terminology from
his argument in "Der Zerfall der Werte" we can say that he
wants to re-introduce into modern ontological thinking a
final axiom, an absolute qualitative criterion which would
re-unify the many disparate systems of values which grew
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out of the progressive dissolution of the absolute value-
system of the Catholic Middle Ages. There would then
necessarily develop a single style of life and thought.
If the qualitative criterion could be shown to be that
of respect for humanity then the new style of life and
thought would be a humanitarian one. Basically Broch's
idea in the writings of the period in question is to
re-unite belief and knowledge; many people believe in
the standards of humanity, but their logical necessity must
be scientifically proved. Even as early as "Ber Zerfall
der Werte" Broch postulated the unity of belief and
knowledge as the necessary pre-condition for a unitary or
absolute value-system, but at the time he could offer no
suggestions as to how this ideal might be realized in the
modern world. In that essay the ideal is expressed as
follows. "Es 1st jene Einheit, die das Wesen jeder
Theologie ausmacht und die bestehen muss, selbst wenn
versucht wird, das Denken aus der Welt wegzuleugnen, die
aber auch bestehen kann, wenn der wissenschaftliche
Plausibilit&tspunkt des 'Fttr-wahr-haltens' zusammenfhilt
mit dem Plausibilit&tspunkt des 'Glaubens' und die doppelte
Wahrheit wieder zur eindeutigen Wahrheit wird." (GW 2: 676)
The absolute system of values obtaining in medieval Europe
was possible, according to Broch, because people not only
believed in the personal God as the ground of all life,
but the obtaining style of thought, exemplified in
Scholastic philosophy, could prove it: faith and belief
were identical. In his "Massenwahntheorie" Broch attempts
to formulate this same ideal in political terms relevant to
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the modern situation when he says that the political
conviction of the need to fight outbursts of mass hysteria
can be shown to be logically necessary for the preservation
of humanitarian values: "die politische Uberzeugung wird
zur wissens^haftlichen Uberzeugung." (GW 9s 141).
In his "Massenwahntheorie", "Geschichtsgesetz and
Willensfreiheit" and "Gibt es noch Demokratie?" Broch
outlines the case for establishing a generally acceptable
humanitarian criterion for modern life and thought, but he
can offer no scientific proof as to why it should be
regarded as absolutely binding. Nevertheless, in the
three above expositions of Broch's thought at this time
there can be seen the seeds of the idea xtfhich he was to
develop later.
He appeals in the "Massenwahntheorie" to "die
regulativen Prinzipien der Freiheit, Gleichheit und
Brtlderlichkeit, kurzum die Prinzipien der Menschenwilrde
und des Schutzes der menschlichen Persfenlichkeit" (GW 9:
l6l). He talks further of "die Heiligkeit und Unantast-
barkeit alles menschlichen Lebens" (GW 9s 214)> and
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regularly pleads for common human decency ("Anst&ndigkeit").
One of the passages central to "Geschichtsgesetz und
Willensfreiheit" deals with the familiar problem of the
pursuit of knowledge. Broch's conclusions in "Der Zerfall
der Werte" and the related essays of that period, especially
"Einheit wissensehartlicher uni dichterischer Erkenntnis"
and "Gedanken zum Problem der Erkenntnis in der Musik",
indicate that at that time he favoured the acquisition of
knowledge for its own sake because the only reliable
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absolute he could see in life was the purely formal one of
the invariable logical structures of the thought-processes.
At this later stage here in question he qualifies his
earlier opinion, suggesting that a new, regulative
principle should be applied to ensure that the demands of
formal logic in the pursuit of knowledge should be
subordinated to the needs of humanity. He talks of "ein
neues Prinzip • • • , n&mlich das einer •Erkenntnishier-
archisierung' , welehe die Fiille des akzeptierten
Erkenntnismaterials urn den humaneu Zentralwert anorinet,
oder richtiger, ihm unterordnet, hierarchisch einordnet"
(GW 9: 30 5-306).
All of this reveals a radical change from the
vievtfs expressed in the last chapter of Die Schlafwandler.
There Broch ascribed a positive ethical value to the
inhumanity and chaos of the Great War and the revolution
which followed it* "Dcch nie una nirgends ist der Geist
der Epoche so stark, so wahrhaft ethisch und historisch
wie in jenem letzten und zugleich ersten Aufflackern, das
die Revolution ist, - Tat der Selbstaufhebung und der
Selbsterneuerung, letzte und grbsste ethische Tat des
zerfallenden, erste des neuen Wertsystems, Augenblick der
radikal geschichtsbildenden Zeitaufhebung im Pathos des
absoluten Nullpunktes." (GW 2: 685)
A further characteristic of the political and
psychological writings, and even more so of the corres¬
pondence of the late 1930's and early 1940fs is the growing
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importance attributed by Broch to practical morality and
commitment to helping his fellow-men as directly as
possible. There is a clear contrast here \tfith his
position in the early 1930's when he formulated his highly
theoretical concept of ethics in terms of the logical
dynamism of the pursuit of objective knowledge and the
progressive realization of the Logos. At that time he
condemned moral precepts as reactionary dogmas which
stood in the way of ethical development, which in turn,
as he believed, was dependent on the acquisition of
knowledge and man's progressively widening understanding
of reality. During the period now in question this
distinction between ethics and morality is frequently
blurred. On occasion Broch even uses the two words
synonymously. Where he continues to differentiate between
the two he attributes greater importance to morality than
to ethics.
Basic to this change in emphasis is Broch's
suggestion as to how the historical cycle might be modified.
In the preliminary table of contents of his study on mass
hysteria he suggests that the cycle of development in
which man's psychological condition moves from one period
of mass hysteria through normality to the next period of
mass hysteria could perhaps be accelerated. "The law of
'system cycles' shoi^s that there are phases with
dangerous tendencies toward mass aberration (as, for
instance, our present epoch) alternating with phases, in
which these tendencies are fading away. Is there no
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possibility to accelerate the forthcoming* changement of
phases? The answer can only be found in the formal
structure of the lav., i.e. in the model of the ego; and
it is an affirmative answer because ir» principle the
ti^rilight state of the mind can be submitted to rational
guidance*" (GW 7: 271) bre must assume that Broch's
plan was to accelerate the critical phase of the cycle
and somehow slow it down when a period of normality was
reached.
Such an assumption is confirmed by the more
detailed treatment of the same problem in the "Massen-
wahntheorie". There he suggests that the cyclical model
of history can be usefully seen in terms of a pendulum
movement. In his description of this model it is at once
evident that he envisages a deliberate prolongation of the
periods of normality. This of course implies a
retardation of the dynamic progression of the cycle.
"Der psychische Geschichtsablauf, insonderlich soweit er
die sogen&nnte Massenseele betrifft, stellt sich nunaehr
als eine Pendelbewegung dar ... Eine Pendelbewegung
ist ebenso 'unentrinnbar' wie eine Kreisbahn . . doch
gerade an einer Pendelbewegung wird es aueh ersichtlich,
dass man den Ausschlag zu verkfirzen oder die Mitteilage
zu verlStngern verraag: einen freien Willen im Gebrauch der
Vernunft fftr die Menschheit vorausgesetzt, mftsste also
diese in der Lage sein, nach Erkenntnis der Gesetzlichkeit
die Wahnabstiirze zu vermeiden oder zumindest zu raildern.
Dies ist sine optimistische Ansicht, und sofern sie
zutrifft, wiirde sie den 'dialektischen Fatalismus', mit
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dera man sonst- die Ereignisse hinnehmen mftsste, vielfaoh
entlcr&ften," (GW o; 97)67
In terms of his theory of values as expounded in
"her Zerfall der Werte" Broch is here obviously attaching
far less importance to the ethical dynamism of the
logically necessary development of history than to
practical morality which is concerned with preserving a
status ouo conducive to the general benefit of a balanced
humanitarian society* This is even more evident in
"Geschiehtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" where Broch talks
of history specifically in terms of the progressive
expansion of the sum of human knox-rledge and the development
of man's intellect. This is of course the epistemological
cycle of values described in "Der Zerfall der Werte"*
There Broch regarded the pursuit of knowledge and the
application of a rigorously logical methodology in all
value-systems as the ideal form of ethical behaviour* In
"Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" he explicitly
qualifies this unconditional commitment to such a
conception of ethics by admitting that the uncontrolled
acquisition of knowledge is at least partly resoonsible
for the insecurity of modern life, caused by man's
inability to understand life as a coherent unity,
"Hier nag es gestattet sein, der Erkenntnis, insonderheit
in ihrer gegenw&rtigon hyperrationalen Oestalt, doch ein
Stttck Verantxvortung ansulasten* . * Hiezu kommt, dass
die Menge der Erkenntnisvorstbsse, welche das Abftnderungs-
und Vervollkoramnungsvolumen der heutigen Zivilisation
geformt haben und welter forraen, zu einer glattwegs
unftbersehbaren Komp.lexhe.it angewachsen 1st, in alien
Lebansgebieten und insbesondere in dem der Technik mit
schv;indelnd zunehmender Geschwindigkeit welter und welter
anwachsend. Sogar derjenige, welcher am unmittelbarsten
an dieser Erkenntnxs und ihrem Fortschritt beteiligt 1st,,
n&mlich der wissenschaftliche Forscher, vermag solchem
Ausdehnungstempo heute kaum mehr zu folgen." (GW 9: 291-
292)
His growing interest in practical morality at the
expense of his own original conception of ethics is further
emphasized in this same piece of work. He concedes that
a deceleration of the progressive development of the
intellect, which he sees as a series of "Erkenntnisvor-
stfesse", may be detrimental to the rigorous pursuit of
knowledge, but at the same time it will create a period of
stability and social security.
"Fflr die Erkenntnis als solche sind diese Stabilisierungs-
perioden ein Verlust, fiir das *Leben' des Menschen sind
sie ein Gewinnj sie sind jene Ruhestrecken grbsseren oder
kloineren Ausmasses, durch die jeder raenschliche
Gesehohens- und Lebenslauf, der des Individuums ebensowohl
wie der einer Sozialgemeinschaft, in deutlich voneinander
geschiedene Zeitabschnitte geteilt wird, und in dleser
Eigenschaft dftrfen sie ohneweiters als Kulturabschnitte,
als Kulturperioden, als Kulturepochen erkannt und demnach
auch so benannt werden," (GW 9: 2.65-266)
Broch's correspondence of this period provides a
most useful personal commentary on his grov/ing interest in
the morality of practical commitment to his fellow-men and
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the cause of humanity. The letters to be studied show
that pressure of circumstances, above all the rise of
Nazism and the crisis of the ttfar, forced him to acknowledge
that his cyclical theory of history and, associated with
it, his purely formal, abstract, epistemological conception
of ethics could offer no direct, practical aid or guidance
to his own generation or its immediate successors. Such
hope as his theory did offer lay so far in the future as
to be largely irrelevant to contemporary problems.
Several of the letters in question reveal that at
that time Broch no longer regularly maintained his original
distinction between the dynamic ethic of the logical
pursuit of knowledge and the reactionary dogmas of
morality which, according to the original theories,
prevented the former ethical developments. In 1936 he
wrote to Frau Brodyt wich stehe mit meiner dichterischen
und geistigen guten und vielleicht sogar sehr guten
Mittelbegabung auf soeial ixnethischer Stelle." (GW 8:
68
1A9). Less than two years later he wrote to Frank
Thiess and referred to the same question, namely that of
the moral Justification of a literary career at a time of
political crisis: MDu hast vftllig recht, dass sich das
Heraberz&hlen einer erfundenen Fabel schlechterdings
nicht mehr verlohnt; es ist eben angesichts der Zeit und
ihres Grauens einfach unraoralisch geworden, und mag der
Leser es auch verlangen, es ekelt einem zu sehr, sich zu
solcher Unmoral herzugeben.n (GW l6l).^ In a letter
written to Aldous Huxley in 1945 Broch explained why he
did not revise and improve Per Tod des Vergil as much as
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he would have liked: "The decision was not an easy one,
and was taken only for moral reasons. It is my belief
that in this time the ivory tower has become immoral."
70
(GW 8: 216). These three passages suggest that at the
time of writing Broch regarded "ethics" and "morality"
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as synonymous terms.
Is/here Broch continues in his writings to
differentiate between the two he obviously attributes a
greater positive value to morality. In another letter of
1936 Broch expressed his desire to abandon his literary
career and return to his mathematical and epistemological
studies ("eine Kttckkehr zur Wissenschaft")• The letter
continues: "Allerdings 1st dazu zu fragen . • . ob die
heutige Mensehheit ttberhaupt noch Erkenntnisse braucht,
ob sie nicht nit Erkenntnissen ttbers&ttigt ist, m.a.W. , ob
nicht ttber der Erkenntnis eben j-ene schlicht menschliche
Haltung und Gesinnung steht, deren Anstrebung mich im
tiefsten Grund in die Dichterei getrieben hat." (GW 8:
72
155). Apart from the fact that Broch's doubts as to
the value of knowledge are in direct contradiction with
his original conception of ethics, the most important word
in this passage is "Gesinnung". Here and elsewhere in
his writings Broch uses it to imply a form of dogmatic
idealism. The full significance of this word in the
particular development of Broch's thinking which is being
examined here is to be found in a letter to Hans Sahl
written early in 1945 (GW 8: 204f). There Broch discusses
his formal conception of ethics as a progressive
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expansion and constant revision of man's insight into the
systematic unity of reality which is potentially inherent
in and guaranteed by the transcendental Absolute of the
Logos, lie points out that any progressively revised
understanding of reality brings with it revised demands
as to how the individual should conduct himself: "Wo
iiamer Wahrheiten im Geisteswissenschaftlichen gewonnen
werden, da werden sie zu ethischen Aussagen, zu mnraiischen
Forderungen, werden sie letztlich politisch." (GW 8: 207)•
It is a natural tendency for these new moral precepts to
become increasingly dogmatic as man seeks security in the
face of the inevitable changes caused by the irresistible
progress of knowledge. Broch goes on to suggest that even
if this is so, the moral code of any given era has a
positive value. It provides a generally recognized code
of conduct and it also reflects the extent to which the
people of that age have been able to understand their lives
as part of a systematic unity of reality. The relevant
passages are quoted below,
"Jede Wahrheit innerhalb der empirischen Welt hat die
Tender.Zj sich zu {absolutieren' j sie vergisst, lass sie
bloss Teilwahrheit und Annhherung ist, und wii^d zuai Dogma.
Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung ist bereits sin
Akt absolutierender Dogmat.isierung, ist rxicht mehr
erkemitnistheoretische Geschichtsphilosophie, sondern
Geschichtsausdeutung und muss daher einen absoluten
Endzustand phantasieren,
Das aenschliche Viech verlangt nach logmen, wail
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es daran seine 'Gesinnungen' heften kann. Ethik 1st in
sieh selbst Gesinnung, kennt aber keine Gesinnungen, well
sie keine Beqnemlichkeit dnldet, . .
Die RealitRtsrichtung wird von von den
' Erkonntnisvorstbssen' festgelegt, . , . Christentum,
Liberalisinus, Sozialismus - all dies liegfc, nachweisbar,
in solcher Realit&tsrichtung* Und wenn auch iramer wieder
zur 'Gesinnung' degradiert, wenn auch irnmer wieder
absolutiert und dograatisiert, es bleibt ein Stftck der
moral!schen Erbsehaft, es bleibt etwas, an dam slch
zumindest Verantworttingsethik anknfipfen l&sst, es bleibt
ein Stilck echter Erkenntnis und ethischer Realitftt,"
(GW 8: 207)73
From the above quotation we can see that Broch
differentiated between what he elsewhere referred to as
"Gesinnungsethlk" and "Verantwortungsethik" (GW 9: 48).
The former is the belief in and reliance on the cy&Ie of
history and the development of the intellect to bring
about a progressively more comprehensive understanding of
the systematic unity of experience. The latter refers to
those immediate moral responsibilities to one's fellow-men
which are necessary to create and maintain a humanitarian
society, at any given time. As has been shown, over the
years Broch's interests moved noticeably from the former
to the latter conception of ethics, the latter being
synonymous with the practical morality of humanitarian
74
commitment.
The final important evidence in the political and
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psychological writings of this period that Broch was then
coming closer to formulating his theory of "das Irdisch-
Absolute" is to be found in three passages where he
discusses the reform of the legal systems of the Western
world, with special reference to the abolition of the
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death penalty and all forms of slavery5 It is
significant that he analyses the current situation,
explains his ideal of a democracy founded on a humanitarian
ideology, but explicitly states that, at the time of
writing, there is no sound theoretical foundation on which
to construct such a new legal and political system.
In his "Massenwahntheorie" he writes: "Es liesse
sich einwenden, dass von diesem neuen Gerechtigkeitstypus -
ausser seiner Abneigung gegen die Todesstrafe - noch kaum
etwas bekannt sei und dass daher im 7,usammenhang mit ihm
noch lange nicht von Konkretheit gesprochen werden dttrfe,
da Konkretheit stets genaue Bekanntheit und Aufweisbnrkeit
innerhalb der empirischen Welt voraussetzt," (GV 9:
733-234). He emphasises in "Gibt es noch Deriokratie?"
that his purpose at this time is "wohlgemerkt eine
analysierende Untersuchung, die vorderhand noch keinerlei
Forderungen aufstellen will" (GW 0: 315)®
Just a few years later, in "Politik: Ein Kondensat"
(1949); Broch was able to give a detailed description of how
such a nev? political and legal system could be established
on the scientific basis of his theory of "das Irdisch-
Absolute". It is to the work of these last 3^ears of
Broch's life that we now turn our attention.
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4. THE FORMULATION OF THE THEORY OF "DAS IKPISCH-ABSOLUTE"
a) Introduction
Broch!s correspondence of the second half of 1948
reveals that much of his work in that year was dedicated
to research in epistemology, almost certainly with the
specific intention of providing a sound theoretical basis
for his new, humanitarian democracy. In November 1948 he
wrote to Egon Vietta of his "Erkenntnistheorie, an der ich
mich im ersten Halbjahr totgerackert habe" (GW 8: 305).
In the same letter he talks of a book he is currently
working on, entitled Psychologische Grunllagen der
Pemokratie, and adds the comment "mir im Augenblick das
wichtigste Buch". The importance so clearly attributed
by Broch to his political and psychological studies and
the repeated mention of a period of intensive research in
76
epistemological research in 1948 suggest that he finally
succeeded in formulating his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute"
at this time.
Two further letters of this year would seem to
confirm this. In October 1948 he mentions seven books on
which he is working and emphasizes that they represent
complementary attempts to approach the same problem from
different sides: "zwar im Grunde alle das gleiche Thema
behandelnd, dennoch von der Erkenntnistheorie bis zur
Politik reichend." (GW 8: 300). It is significant that
the two poles of his work, the abstractly theoretical and
the empirically practical are mentioned together here.
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Another letter to Egon Vietta in November 1948 contains
the following words: "Meine erkenntnistheoretische Studie,
die ich bis zuiu Sommer fertig zu haben hoffe, soil Wirkung
haben." (GW 8: 310). The importance of this comment and
Broch's own emphasis in it is the insistence on practical
results. It was Broch's conviction that a practical
contribution to the improvement of the human condition
could only be made in the field of politics. The
episteniological studies were to provide the theoretical
basis for a new, humanitarian democracy.
The findings of the epistemological research of
M
1948 are to be found in "Uber syntaktische und kognitive
Einheiten" (GW 7: 152-202). Harald Binde, in his
bibliography in volume ten of the Collected Works, suggests
1946 as the date of this work (GW 10: 417). This date,
which Binde admits is only approximate, must be revised.
The editor of Broch's correspondence in volume eight of
the Collected Works maintains, correctly in my opinion,
that the frequent references in the letters of 1948 to
<1
epistemological research relate to "Uber syntaktische und
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kognitive Einheiten". This dating is further confirmed
by the fact that this study presents certain important
aspects of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" which are
then applied to political theory in "Politik: Ein
Kondensat" (1949)• As early as February 1949 Broch
discussed his new theory of politics in an exchange of
letters with Hannah Arendt (GW 8: 323-324? 328-332).
Knowing Broch's impatience for practical results, there is
every reason to assume that, once he had formulated what
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he considered to be an irrefutable argument that humanity
should be the absolute qualitative criterion in making
any value-judgment, he would immediately apply this
7 8
knowledge to his study of politics and psychology. The
results of this practical application of abstract theory
are to be seen in "Politik: Ein Kondensat", hereafter
referred to as "Politik", "Trotzdem: Humane Politik"
(1950), hereafter referred to as "Trotzdem", and in "Zur
politischen Situation unserer Zeit" (1948-1950).
b) The Epistemological Research.
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First of all we must briefly examine the
epistemological foundation of the theory of "das Irdisch-
)■
Absolute" as found in "Uber syntaktische und kognitive
Einheiten". Much of this lengthy and detailed study,
especially the first half, is not directly relevant to
such an examination. A comprehensive evaluation of this
essay must be left to the trained linguist and mathemat¬
ician. Where the need for clarity makes it necessary,
reference is also made to "Politik" and "Trotzdem", where
aspects of the same problems are dealt with more simply.
Stated briefly, Broch's intention in this essay
is to prove the basic philosophical principle of
Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things". Broch
was convinced that if he could show that a determining
human factor could not be excluded even from the most
formal and abstract discipline of mathematics, then this
would necessarily hold true for all less abstract
disciplines and particularly for those of the social
sciences. Whether or not Broch's proof is valid must be
decided by experts in the fields of logic and mathematics.
What matters for the purposes of this study is the fact
that Broch believed his proof to be correct.
It should be remembered from the outset that Broch's
argument is a development of the conclusions reached in the
ninth chapter of "Der Zerfall der Werte (GW 2 s 592-598).
There he concluded that the creation or understanding of
reality, which for him are identical processes, must be
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seen as the projection into experience of the formal
structures of the transcendental Absolute of the Logos
through man's rational function ("Setzung der Setzung").
As a result of this he postulated that every value-system
must have its real or hypothetical value-positing subject
("Wertsubjekt"), whose function it is to select and
assimilate such aspects of reality as contribute to the
logical extension of that system of values.
It has already been shown that Broch's writings
up to the mid-1930's point to his reliance on the purely
formal absolute of logic as seen in man's abstract function
as a rational being. After that period he became
increasingly interested in man as he is generally thought
of, namely a physical being endowed with certain
intellectual and spiritual attributes. This new emphasis
is particularly evident in the political and psychological
writings of the later years of his lifes "Das Ich ist ein
physisch-psychisches Aggregat" (GW 9: 407); "Das Ich ist
mit dem Leben identisch und sogar im medizinischen Sinn"
(GWT 7: 233) • Such statements would be wholly out of place
in "Der Zerfall der Werte" with its repeated insistence on
the purely formal and abstract function of man as a
rational being. As will now be shown, this change of
emphasis clearly influenced the epistemological research
in the last years of Broch's life.
Even at that time, however, Broch adhered to his
conception of the transcendental Logos as the formal
principle underlying the systematic unity of reality. In
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"Uber syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" he asserts that
man must necessarily have some sort of intuitive, eidetic
awareness of the possible forms of empirical reality
inherent in the potential reality of the Logos. Without
such intuition the simplest decisions of daily life would
be impossible. He argues "dass ohne ein unaufh&rlich
wirkendes Wissen urn Eigenschaftsganzheiten und Eigen-
schaftszusammenhftnge das menschliche Individuum seinen
Alltag nicht einmal im Rationalsten, geschweige denn im
Irrationalen auch nur fttr eine halbe Stunde zu bew&ltigen
vermbchte" (GW 7: l64)« Broch insists that intuition and
inductive reasoning, which he sees as the function of "die
erkenntnistheoretische Unbewusstseins-Sphhre" (GW 7: 167),
are a necessary complement to the normal rational processes
of deductive thinking in every sphere of life. Broch
summarizes his theory of intuition, which closely resembles
the Platonic concept of anamnesis, as follows.
"Gleichghltig jedoch, xfie weit die rationale Erfassbarkeit
je reichen mag, der Mensch verdankt der erkenntnistheor-
etischen Unbewusstseins-Sph&re, in der er (genau so wie
in der psychologischen) lebt, sein eidetisches Vor-Wissen
um die Vielfalt der in der Welt mftglichen Ding- oder
Eigenschaftskombinationen und darhber hinaus auch das
Wissen um die in der Welt unm&glichen (und nur im Traume
mbglichen) Konstellationen. Und nur well er dieses
Wissen besitzt, vermag er sich in seinem Alltag 'intuitiv'
zurechtzufinden, vermag er aus der Fillle der jeweiligen
Handlungsmftglichkeiten 'instinktiv' die frichtigen'
auszuwShlen." (GW 7: 166-167)^
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From a general discussion of inductive reasoning
Broch turns to the particular example of mathematics,
which he defines as "die Wissenschaft von der Gesamtoasse
aller mbglichen Beziehungen zwischen 'eigenschaftslosen
Dingen'". He then adds the important qualification:
"diese Definition bliebe unerfhllt, wenn nicht, gein&ss der
positivistisch-intuitouistischen Forderung, zu jeder neu-
A
entdeckten Beziehung auch das zugehbrige Bezug-Ding,das
ist eine empirisch sichtbare oder zumindest potential
sichtbar zu machende, reale Zahlform aufgewiesen werden
wtirde." (GW 7: 163). He suggests that the character¬
istic feature of mathematics is the way in which the
systematic unity of the formal relationships is either
revised or extended by research into mathematical problems,
research which progressively produces new categories of
numbers as a concrete expression of these newly discovered
relationships, e.g. natural numbers, rational numbers,
irrational numbers right up to transfinite numbers (GW 7:
163).
Here again, according to Broch, intuition plays a
necessary role. How else, he asks, can problems be set,
"denn ohne Vor-Wissen urn ein Unbekanntes g&be es nirgends
Problemstellungen, und die Mathematik ist hievon nicht
ausgenommenj es ist das Vor-Wissen um das Unendliche und
das Kontinuum, von dem sie zum zunehmend komplexer
werdenden Aufbau der infinit-dimensionalen Vielfalt im
Eigenschaftslosen getrieben wird" (GW 7: 105-166). Broch
concludes that deductive reasoning receives its initial
stimulus from some intuitive perception: "Das Deduktions-
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System braucht den induktivischen Bewegungsanstoss, ohne
selber ihn erzeugen zu kbnnen." (GW 7: 178). At this
point Broch develops his theory of intuition to the point
where he introduces the human factor, "das Irdisch-
Absolute", into the discipline of mathematics. He points
out that in mathematical research a decision has to be
made as to which problems should be investigated. Given
the currently obtaining developments in mathematical
thinking at any given time, only certain problems will be
of any use in leading to the extension or revision of the
existing system. The human factor involved in this
selective process cannot be excluded from mathematics, even
although it is the most objective and formal of all
scientific disciplines. "Denn ungeachtet und unbeschadet
der in der Mathematik wirkenden strengen Objektgebunden-
heit, die dem Forscher sozusagen nicht eine Spur freien
Willens zugesteht. . . , es lassen sich ohne eine gewisse
Entscheidungsfreiheit nie und nimmer Exempel erstellen,
und so ist sogar auch das 1inner-mathematische' Exempel
von einem willkttrlichen (oder zuf&lligen) menschlichen
Akt, eben dem der Exempel-Wahl bedingt, ist von einer
'Freiheits-Bedingung' gef&rbt." (GW 7: 187)^°
It is precisely in this selective principle that
Broch sees the function of "die raathematische Person".
He deliberately introduces the personification because he
believed that an unavoidable degree of anthropomorphism
is present in every discipline, no matter how formal or
abstract it might be.
"Es l&sst sich die anthropomorphierende Ketapher iiberhaupt
143
aus keiner Menschensprache (und vielleicht nicht einrnal
aus einer rein logischen) je vbllig ausinerzen, und fast
scheint es dringlicher zu sein, sieh urn eine pr&zise
Absteekung des anthropomorphen Geltungsbereiches denn um
seine Ausiaerzung zu bemlihen. Nach dera Durchbruch der
Relativit&tstheorie, welche mit der Einfiihrung des
abstrakten Seh-Aktes, d.h. der Lichtgeschwindigkeit, erst-
malig gezeigt hat, dass der abstrakt ideale (dennoch
anthropomomhe) Beobachter nie aus dem Beobachtungsfeld.
p
ausgeschaltet werden kann, hat die physik dieser
abstrakten 'physikalischen person1, (wie man sie nach dem
Muster der juristischen wohl nennen diirfte) in zunehmendem
Masse Einlass gew&hrt, und vieles spricht dafiir, dass es
sich in der Mathematik, soli sie in alien ihren Zweigen
logisch verstanden werden, ganz hhnlich verhalten wird,
d.h. dass der Bedarf nach der abstrakten 'mathematischen
Person' vorliegt." (GW 7: lSO-lSl)^*
liroch regularly uses Einstein's theory of
relativity as an example of a principle which he thought
could probably be generally applied to all disciplines.
One of the basic tenets of the theory of relativity is that
the very act of observation introduces an unavoidable
disturbance factor into the field of observation. Thus
the human factor, even if only in its most abstract
function as the observer, limits and qualifies the purely
formal pursuit of knowledge in physics. This human
element is the standard by and against which empirically
confirmable absolutes such as the speed of light and
absolute zero temperature are measured. As will be shown
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later there is a regular inconsistency in Broch5s
terminology in this respect. Sometimes man is referred
to as the earthly absolute, i.e. the constant and
invariable criterion against which all else is necessarily
and unavoidably measured. At other times Broch describes
as earthly absolutes those phenomena which have been shown
to be absolute by measurement by and against the human
standard, e.g. the speed of light or absolute zero
temperature. In general terns, and this applies to both
of the above cases, an earthly absolute is one which is
open to empirical confirmation. This is simply the
principle of "das Irdisch-Absolute der Empirie" (GW 7: 241).
There is no logical reason why measurements of speed,
temperature or space should have an upper or lower limit.
That there are such absolutes, earthly absolutes, is
determined solely by the limitations of the invariable
human factor in any act of observation or measurement.
Broch expresses this much more clearly in "Politik" as
follows.
"Es ist damit doch die Menschengestalt in die exakten
Wissenschaften eingefiihrt, allerdings nicht als Ebenbild
Gottes und nicht als biologisches oder ftkonomisches tresen,
sondern als ein abstraktes Gebilde, dem ausser den Eigen-
schaften einer pr&zis bestimmbaren, pr&zis messbaren
physikalischen Beobachtungsgabe nichts Menschliches
belassen worden ist und das daher als *physikalische Person
an sich' bezeichnet werden k&nnte. Indes, man t&usche
sich nicht, die Abstraktionsbasis bleibt trotz alledem das
Leben und der lebendige Hensch, und so ist er es auch, der
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im letzten als Tr&gex» dor rieuen ' irdischen Absolutheit en1
Q O
zu gelten hat," (GW 7: 216-217)
Hex^e it must be said that even to a layman the
parallels Broch draws between his "mathematische Person"
and the function of the observer in the theory of
relativity seem very dubious. Of all those critics who
have written on this aspect of Broch's work only Karl
Menges has been prepared to question Broch's argument,
8 3
although even he does not go into any great detail.
As Broch's argument stands, he regularly assumes that in
the theory of relativity and in physics in general the
human factor is present as an invariable constant in every
calculation simply through the act of observation. This
is an unavoidable physical limitation and does not imply
any intuitive act of selecting what is to be observed,
which is the function Broch attributes to his "mathematische
Person", Broch suggests, however, that his "mathematische
Person" represents, as it were, that discipline's own
awareness of its current level of achievement and the
possibilities of development open to it at any given time.
As such it is a variable, progressively developing function.
He refers to it as "ein 'ideal-mathematisches Wissen',
eine Art 'Wissen der Mathematik um sich selbst' oder gar
ein WissenstrSger in Gestalt einer 'mathematischen Person'"
(GW 7: 183), Broch's indulgence in "die anthropomor-
phierende Metapher" is all tooevidetxt here. The most
Important point about this "matheraatische Person" is that
even in its abstract function and despite its progressive
development it represents the absolute limitations of
human knowledge in the study of mathematics at any given
time. Above all* this limitation, the existence of "die
mathematische Person" is, according to Broch, empirically
demonstrable. It will be remembered that his definition
of mathematics implies that any extension or revision of
the existing system by the discovery of new mathematical
relationships must be capable of expression in a new
numerical formula or category of numbers. In mathematics
therefore and, as Broch believed, in any discipline the
earthly absolute or human limitations of that discipline
can be constituted from and confirmed by empirical research.
blieji discussing this, Broch characteristically
digresses from a technical analysis of mathematical
problems into quasi mystical speculations about the
relationship of God and man. If one remembers that he
identifies God with the impersonal formal structure of the
Logos these speculations become somewhat clearer.
"Im matheraatischen Bereich deckt sich das Erkenntnis-
gebilde der 'Empirie an sich' mit der Real-Empirie und
zeigt, dass zu ihren Konstituanten die 'mathematische
Person' gehbrt, und zuar - fern vom konkreten Menschen und
seinen subjektiven Geistesm&ngeln - als exaktes und kraft
Objektivitht absolutes 'Ignoramus', als eine inherent©
'Erkenntnisbegrenzung', deren 'finite Abstraktheit' allem
irdischen Denken die (kategoriale) Norm gibt und es vom
hypothetisch-gbttlichen unterscheldet: nicht nur dass
Gott zeitlos der Schbpfung Anfang und Ende in einera 1st,
also in solcher Seins—SimultaneitSt keiner Problematik und
keiner Erkenntnis-Systematik bedarf, geschweige denn einer,
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die sich mtihselig voa Lhcke zu Lficke vorw&rtsbewegt und
dabei unabgeschlossen bleiben muss, Er benbtigt zu seinem
Denken auch keine 'Konstanten', weder physikalische nach
Art der Lichtgeschwindigkelt, noch mathematische nach Art
der logischen Operatoren und Axiome." (GW 7: 194-195)
II
The closing chapter of "Uber syntaktische und
kognitive Einheiten" makes it quite clear that at that
stage Broch's thinking had reached the point where he was
convinced that the qualitative human factor played a
determining role as an absolute factor in the pursuit of
all formal knowledge. The statement of this view in this
essay is both confused and confusing.
"Gott, kraft des reinen hissens, das seine Schftpfungstat
1st, fiber alles Benken, fiber alle Induktion and Deduktion
erhaben, muss die Welt (im wahrsten Doppelsinn des Wortes)
'sich selbst' (iberlassen, kann in ihr nichts entscheiden,
vielmehr hat er hiezu, auf dass sie stets aufs neue
antinomie-frei werde und ethische Schftpfung bleibe, den
menschenhaft denkenden, empirischen 'Sohn' zu delegieren:
genau das n&mliche trifft fiir die Philosophie zu, d.h. sie
hat den Wissenschaftsbereich sich selbst zu ilberlassen,
umsoraehr als sie - die hier vollgtiltige positivistische
Vorschrift befolgend - allein hiedurch analogen Wissen-
schaftsrang zu erverben vermag; denn die methodologische
Notwendigke.it, der sich Gott - als Logos - unterworfen hat,
da er dem Sohn die irdische Mutter gab, gilt erst recht
ftir las deifizierte traaszendentale Bewusstsein und zwingt
es niclvt nur einen ebenso irdischen Vermittler als die
'ideale Person an sich1 zu erzeugen, sondern bindet diese
auch unabnabelbar an ihren empirischen Ursprung", an die
einzelnen Wissenschaften, von denen sie (z.B. als die
Jfum Sehakt abstrahierte *physikalische Person') qualitativ
'disziplin-adhquat' konstituiert wird, und denen sie
umgekehrt Wissenschafts-Konstitution verleiht, indem sie
(wie eben die Relativit&tstheorie zeigc) scheinbare
Antinomien als IBshare Exampel entlarvt." (GW 7: 201-202)
V-That Broch intends to say here is clear enough:
the human element cannot be excluded from any discipline
and represents an inherent, qualitative, absolute limiting
factor imposed on the pursuit of knowledge by man's
physical limitations. Again we see the confusing mixture
of scientific terminology and mystical speculation. The
difficulty Broch has in expressing his ideas is emphasized
by the frequency with which he resorts to pex'sonification
and the use of quotation marks tc enclose the more unusual
terms found in his argument. This impression of uncert¬
ainty and confusion is heightened by his use of the phrase
"das deifizierte transzendentale Bewusstsein". This is
the only occasion on which these words occur in the
published body of his work, and the term seems to be
wholly redundant here since the "ideale Person" is clearly
envisaged as the intermediary betitfeen the Logos and
empirical reality.
The full implications of Broch's conclusions are
much more briefly and simply expressed in "Trotzdem" as
follows. "Das Universum ist Ganzheit und Einheit, i/eil
und nur well es von der irdischen Absolutheit des Menschen
her erfasst wird." (Nil; 31) Obviously the emphasis is
very much more on the human, factor than on the Logos, as
was the case in the earlier writings# Having proved to
his satisfaction that man is present as "der Liraitierungs-
Mechanismus" (GW 7: 241) even in the most formal and
abstract discipline of mathematics, Broch set about with
some optimism to applying this principle to the social
sciences and particularly to political and legislative
theory.
In conclusion to this section and with reference
to the doubts .raised above concerning the parallels drawn
by Broch between his "ideale Person" and the function of
the observer in the theory of relativity it should be
mentioned that in the political studies, "Politik",
"Trotzdera" and "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit"
he makes very sparing use of his theory of the "ideale
Person" and concentrates almost entirely on using the
O A
theory of relativity as his model.
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c) The Practical Application of the Theory of "das
Irdisch-Absolute" to Politics and Legislation.
The declared purpose of Broch's research in
policies and legislative theory at this time was to
formulate a scientifically valid democratic ideology based
on respect for^ and preservation of human rights and
8 *>
dignity." In the writings to be studied he attempts to
prove tnat totalitarian dictatorships whose basis of power
is the denial of human rights have no legal status. His
thinking is clearly influenced by recent events in Nazi
Germany, which had just been defeated, and by the
predominant atmosphere of the Cold War. In ais letters
and essays he regularly empnasizes that the strength of
Communism lies in its claim to offer a definitive inter-
pretation of history which points conclusively to the
ultimate success of the socialist revolution. Such an
ideology provides its adherents with a unifying bond and
a general feeling of security as to the purpose of their
lives. Brocn argues that the crucial error in Marxist
theory is that it regards the individual merely as an
economic factor and ignores his specifically human qualities,
above all his desire for, and right to freedom. Neverthe¬
less, if any democratic ideology is successfully to
challenge Marxism or any other totalitarian system which
subordinates humanity to some abstract principle, it must
prove beyond all doubt that humanity is indeed the central
value in life. If such an ideology is to supersede
Marxism in its appeal to the world masses then it must be
shown, to be scientifically ("wissenschaftlich") accurate
and logically valid.^
In order to prove that totalitarian states are
illegal Broch proceeds to examine the concepts of law and
Justice, the formal structure of a legal system and above
ail the relationship between a lav; and the punishment
designed to protect it and ensure its enforcement. The
simplest presentation of his case is to be found in
"Trotzdem", probably because this was written specifically
for publication, with a viei-f to gaining as wide a hearing
as possible for his ideas. Where relevant, details will
also be drawn from "Politik" and the correspondence of
those years in question, liis intention in these writings
is to prove that in any legal system the basic human
rights, as expressed in the American. Declaration of
Independence, of freedom, equality and the pursuit of
happiness must be respected. Again it is evident that
Broch's thinking at this time was conditioned by his
personal situation, namely that of a European refugee who
had found sanctuary from Nazi persecution in the United
States of America.
Broch correctly suggests that in the modern,
soculax1 world the concept of a divinely ordained law is
simply not accepted and cannot be recognized as the basis
of a generally binding legal system. The emotionally
coloured concept of a natural law according to which all
men are free and equal is too vague anl cannot account for
or regulate the conflicts which arise when different groups,
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individuals or institutions try to assert their freedom at
the expense of others. Clearly a new absolute and
demonstrably reliable foundation for humanitarian
legislation is needed.
"Dass die Menschen allesamt als gleich und frei geboren
sind, ist eine zwar plausible, dennoch mystische Annahme,
zu deren Sttttzung man sich noch wahrlich am besten auf
die gbttliche Ebenbildhaftigkeit des Menschen und somit
auf ein Gottesrecht berief, w&hrend das an seine Stelle
getretene Naturrecht (ganz zu schweigen von der Farce mit
der 'Gbttin der Vernunft* in der Franzftsischen Revolution)
ein eher dttrftiger Abklatsch davon ist, wenn es nicht
gelingt, es auf eine vbllig neue Basis zu stellen."
(GW 9s 392)
Of all the traditional legislative systems the
only factor which is generally acknowledged is the abstract
concept of justice, which is open to abuse. Apart from
that, Broch claims, man as a political creature responds
only to such dictates as can be shown to be logically
necessary, formally valid.
"Vom einstigen auf dem lieben Gott basierten Moral-
Glauben der Menschheit ist bloss der an die Gerechtigkeit
libriggeblieben, weil sich unter deren Flagge (berechtigte)
Ressentiments ausleben lassen.
Ansonsten glaubt der Mensch nur das, was ihm in
Gestalt wissenschaftlicher, also sozusagen 'beweisbarer•
* 87
Uberlegungen gebracht wird." (GW 8s 402)
In the introduction to "Trotzdem" Broch explains
the historical and sociological factors determining the
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need for an absolute criterion as the basis of political
power and legislative systems and traces the development
down to the modern era where a voting majority is invested
with the power previously attributed only to God or
absolute monarchs,
"Macht, welche innerhalb einer sozialen Geineinschaft
ausgetibt wird und nicht nur auf brutaler Gew^alt beruhen
soil, sondern eine dauernde, das heisst von der Gemeinschaft
hingenommenne, ja sogar von ihr bestelite sein will, niuss
eine den Gemeinschaftsmitgliedern einleuchtende, ihnen
'natttrliche* Legitimation besitzen. Das mag unter
Umst&nden wie eine 'freie', einfach auf Vernunft gegriindete
Ubereinkunft ausschauen, doch selbst noch in der banalsten
♦4
Ubereinkunft wirkt eine bestimmte Vertragsmoral: ivenn die
Vertragspartner keine sie gemeinsam bindende 'absolute'
Moral besitzen, wenn sie nicht 'eidf&hig' sind, gibt es
keinen contrat social, gibt es weder eine haltbare soziale
Gemeinschaft noch irgend eine verl&ssliche Funktion in ihr.
Wgtre dem nicht so, der Eid wftre niemals als 'heilig'
erklhrt und unter schwersten Strafschutz gestellt worden.
Eid, Macht und Machtiibertragung berufen sich letztlich
auf ein 'Absolutes'.
Je mehr eine Gemeinschaft auf Dauer (oder gar fifcr
die 'Ewigkeit') berechnet ist, desto mehr bedarf sie
solcher Fundierung ira Absoluten, und desto mehr ist sie
»»
bemiissigt, dieses ins Uber-Irdische zu verlegen, denn im
Irdischen schient sich ja alles fortwhhrend zu Stndern, so
dass sich da nichts Absolutes auffinden lhsst. Aus
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diesem Bedtirfnis nach iiberirdischer Absolutheit entstand
die Vergottung der orientalischen und rftmischen Monarchen,
entstand iin Mittelalter die Theorie des Gottesgnadentums.
Aber auch die Theorie der modernen Demokratie stammt aus
dieser Quelle, da der von Rousseau verkiindete Glaube
/ ' /
an die volonte generale und an deren unbedingte Vernunft
nichts anderes als eine Ubertragung des Gottesgnadentums
(und damit der gbttlichen Vernunft) auf die zura Macht-
trhger gewordene Volksgemeinschaft darstellt, zu deren
Representanten sp&ter die Volksmajorit&t gemacht wurde:
die mittelalterliche Staatsmystik hat eine gbttliche
Selektion in der Verleihung des Herrscheraiates angenominen,
die moderne zieht die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung heran
und nimrat an, dass die Ebenbildhaftigkeit, kraft der die
Menschen allesamt zur 1Freiheit* und 'Gleichheit' geboren
werden, sich am deutlichsten in der grossen Zahl aus-
driickt, und dass daher diese, und zwar als Majoritht, mit
dem gbttlichen Recht der Machtausiibung betraut werden
muss," (NR: 1-2)
Broch repeatedly points out how fallible or
gullible that majority may be and how it can infringe
8 8
drastically on the basic human rights.uu
Having shown that the traditional legislative
systems are unable, in the modern context, to provide an
absolute guarantee for human rights Broch then begins to
formulate his own system for this purpose. He believed
he could prove that the human values of freedom and
equality had necessarily to be the central criteria in
any legal system. To this end he first examines the
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abstract, formal structure of a legal system and the
relationship within it of the functions of law and punish¬
ment. The most detailed presentation of the argument is
found in "Politik" (GW 7; 219-224)# He argues that there
exists a formal logical relationship between a law and the
sanction protecting it; "Die Begriffe Gesetz, gesetz-
esverletzende Tathandlung und gesetzesschtltzende Strafe
sind korrelativ; sie bilden ein logisches Deduktiv-System
und sind als solches in einer abstrakten Sph&re, der des
•s echts an sich' beheimatet." (G1 7: 219). The court of
laxv is the intermediary institution which attempts, as far
as possible, to relate the formal, abstract relationships
necessarily inherent in any legal system to the realities
of the empirical world in such a way that it passes
ju gment only on those who have broken the relevant law.
The absolute ideal or abstract concept of justice (" ias
: echt an sich") is and can be concerned only with the
formal logical relationships of law, crime and punishment
which are implied by the very concept of justice. herever
a legal system is created it must, if it wishes to be recog¬
nized as such, comply with the three essential formal criteria
logically implied in the abstract concept of justice: no
one can be punished who has not broken a law; all are
equal in the eyes of the law; ignorance of the law is no
protection against punishment (NR: 10; GW 7: 220). Broch
concludes; "Das sind nicht Forderungen, die an las 'Recht
an sich' gestellt werden, sondern die Ergebnisse der von
ihm vorgenommenen Sinngebungen; wo Recht gesetzt wird, da
hat es die Struktur des 'Rechts an sich' und akzeptiert
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seine formalen Sinngebungen." (GW 7: 220).
Such a formal definition of justice and the
relationship of law, crime and punishment within a legal
system can offer no criteria for deciding on the nature
of the punishments to be used as legal sanctions. The
abstract concept of justice can provide no moral basis
for rejecting such punishments as the death penalty,
slavery or the use of concentration camps. As long as
the formal relationships of law, crime and punishment are
preserved within a legal or political system then that
system is itself legally valid. "Das 'Recht an sich'
verh&lt sich 'inhalts-neutral•, d.h. es ist imstande zu
jeglicher, nicht in sich selber widerspruchsvollen, also
zu jeder nicht formal sinnlosen Gesetzgebung des Staates
die ihr n&tige Rechtsstruktur beizustellen." (GW7: 243)
Broch points out that, formally at least, a political
regime is acting in a legal fashion if it uses imprisonment
in concentration camps as a sanction to protect its laws
(GW 7s 220). If a regime decides to declare that any
part of its population is to be enslaved or set beyond the
law there is nothing within the formal definition of
justice x-zhich can prevent this: "Wenn der absolute Herrs-
cher oder Diktator seine Untertanen als absolut rechtlos
erkl&rt - und das ist ein Zustand, der oft genug
eingetreten ist - , so kann dies vom 'Recht an sich' bloss
akzeptiert werden, . . wer absolut rechtlos ist, steht
ausserhalb jeglichen Rechtes, also auch ausserhalb des
'Rechts an sich', und was immer mit dem Rechtlosen geschieht,
es bleibt rechts-gleichghltig." (GW 7; 224). To support
157
his argument Broch quotes the examples of the Jews in
Nazi Germany and the Negroes in North America before the
Civil War,
It xtfould seem therefore that the protection of
human rights cannot be founded on the absolute ideal or
abstract concept of justices "der Mlssbrauch ist mftglich,
well Justitia ihre Augen verbunden h&lt. Ihre Blindheit
ist nicht die des Propheten, nicht die des Dichters,
nicht die der grossen und zornigen Gtite, sondern die der
willentlichen Abstraktionj sowohl dem Bereich des
unmittelbaren Lebens wie dem der absoluten Idee
angehftrend, verquickt sie - niemand tut dies ausser ihr -
unaufhftrlich das eine rait dem andern, grelft mit dem
Abstrakten ins Leben ein, verwandelt das Leben ins
Abstrakte, und das gibt ihr einen dhraonischen Aspekt, den
keine andere Sozialsph&re neben ihr hat." (GW 7: 221).
Clearly a new lav/ of human rights is needed and
Broch goes on to argue that it can be based not on any
abstract or absolute concept of justice but on man as the
object of the law. He was convinced that he could
demonstrate the logical necessity of this and also the
fallacy of the "Inhalts-Neutralit&t" (GW 7: 244) of the
purely formal relationships of law, crime and punishment
postulated by the absolute ideal of justice. No matter
how invariable or abstract these relationships might be
they are nevertheless applied to man as the object of the
law: "so bleibt das Recht noch immer auf den Menschen
bezogen: ohne Kenntnis der physischen und psychischen
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Leistungsfcihigkeit des Menschon kftnnen an ihn keiae
sinnvollen Gesetzesforderungen gestellt werden, und ohne
Kenntnis seiner Furcht-Komplexe lassen sich keine
wirksamen Strafandrohungen an ihn richtenj . der Mensch
ist ftlr das Recht 'irdische Absolutheit' und darait stete
inhaltliche Bedingung," (NR: 9-10).^ The qualitative
limitations imposed on the purely abstract concept of
justice and the formal relationships of law and punishment
by this human factor become particularly evident when one
considers the practical problems of finding sanctions to
protect the laws in any legal system. The abstract con¬
cept or absolute ideal of justice can only determine the
formal relationships of law, crime and punishment in a
logical way. In doing this it takes no account of man's
specifically human qualities, especially his physical
nature. In the eyes of such a legal system man is
reduced to an abstract function, "eine juristische Person"
(GW 7; 247).
"Denn das 'R.echt an sich* hat mit der lebendigen
Rechtsprechung und ebendeswegen auch mit dem Menschen als
solchem kaum mehr etwas zu schaffen; es will das logische
System, den logischen Mechanismus darlegen, nach deren
Vorschriften Recht gesprochen wird, und demzufolge
operiert es vor allem mit juristischen Allgemeinbegriffen
wie 'Gesetz' und 'Stx-afe', die ihrerseits so weit
abstrahiert werden, dass sie ohneweiters durch logische
Symbole A, B usw. ersetzt werden kBnnten. Solcherart
baut sich das Gesaratsystem aus funlctionalen Beziehungen
zwischen den Systemteilen auf, und darunter finden sich
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auch-nach Festsetzung gewisser, manchmal axlomatischer
Definitionen-gewisse Skalen-Beziehungen uad in letzter
Simplifizierung solche von der Forms 'Je grbsser X,
desto grosser Y', also etwa unter anderem 'Je schwerer
das Verbrechen, desto schwerer die Strafe', " ((5tr 7: 247)^
On a purely formal and theoretical basis there is
no logical reason why such a. progressive scale of crimes
and corresponding punishments should not be capable of
infinite extension® The human factor, however, at once
imposes an obvious and absolute limitation to such a scale
in the form of murder and the death penalty respectively.
Before proceeding any further, two points must be
made which suggest that the basic premises of Brocb's
subsequent arguments are not as sound as he might have
liked to think. Firstly, he assumes that death, whether
in the form of murder or legal execution, is the worst
thing which can happen to a man as it means, according to
Broch, the extinction of the conscious self. As "der
negative Pol alien Lebers schlechthin" or "der TJnwert an
sich" (GW 7: 277) death represents the ultimate sanction
available to the law and the worst crime a man can commit
against his fellow. This seems a rather naive assumption
in view of the extreme forms of physical or psychological
91
torture to which a person may be subjected. It is
suite conceivable, and history has freouently confirmed
this, that a person faced with such torments or forced to
choose between death and some passionately held belief may
well prefer death as the lesser of two evils. Broch
txvice mentions such objections in passing but dismisses them
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casually and unconvineingly (GW 8: 330; GW 7: 232-233).
Secondly, Broch asserts that all forms of punish¬
ment, particularly any form of imprisonment, are to a
greater or lesser degree symbolic of the death penalty.
In "Trotzdem" he states this as a self-evident fact and
makes no attempt to explain it further (NR: 10-11), A
more detailed presentation of the reasoning behind this
assertion can be found in "Zur politischen situation
unserer Zeit" (GW 9: 406-410) and "Politik" (GW 7: 232-
241); it is in fact simply an extension of the psychol¬
ogical theory of values formulated more than ten years
previously in "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur
Psychoanalyse" (GW 7: 6l-8l). When death destroys the
conscious self it destroys the distinguishing character¬
istic of the human individual, namely his function as a
rational creature ttfithin the limitations of empirical
reality. It is from his experience of the autonomy of
reason that man inherits an intuitive or eidetic awareness
of the phenomenon of freedom. That is Ttfhy, according to
Broch, any infringement, on human freedom is unconsciously
experienced and feared as a partial or symbolic form of
death. Death is the ultimate deprivation of freedom, the
extinction of the conscious self and the autonomous
function of reason from which man derives his ideal or
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abstract concept of absolute freedom.
This argument allows Broch to equate absolute forms
of slavery, as seen in the concentration camps of Nazi
Germany and other totalitarian states with death. Just
as death reduces man to a literally inanimate object, so
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too does such a form of slavery because it deprives him
of all freedom and reduces him to the status of a mere
object, "ein lebender Leichnam" (NR: 10), "eine am Leben
gebliebene Leiche, die wie jede Leiche ein blosser
Gegenstand ist" (GW 7: 225), "eine am Leben gelasssne
Leiche" (GW 7: 230). The importance of the equation
Broch makes between leath and slavery is emphasized by
the frequency with which he repeats variations of the
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above argument. Two objections can be made against
Broch's identification of slavery and death. Broch
seems to assume that a slave necessarily accepts and
conforms to the value placed upon him by his master, namely
that of an object. Again historical evidence is against
Broch: there are numerous examples of people who have
kept alive their freedom of mind and spirit in the most
oppressive circumstances. A second obvious flaw in
Broch's thinking is the way in which he argues from the
epistemological phenomenon of the autonomy of reason to
the political freedom under the law of any individual.
There seems to be no possible logical transition from the
former to the latter, and if Broch is trying to argue by
analogy then he stands condemned out of his own mouth:
"wer keine Analogien in der Welt sieht, ist blind, loch
wer mit ihnen zu operieren versucht, ist es erst reeht."
(GW 7: 217).94
We can now return to Broch's definition of man as
"die irdische Absolutheit" for legislative and political
theory and practice. Such an assertion applies to all the
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social sciences, which, by definition, are concerned with
studying and, where necessary, attempting to regulate
human relationships. In his attempt to set these studies
on a genuinely scientific basis Broch again draws
attention to modern developments in epistemology and
especially that seen in the theory of relativity.
"hie Denk- und Erkenntnisrevolution, in der wir uns
befinden, zeigt unzweideutig - und gerade die Naturwissen-
schaften gehen larin wegweisend voraus - , dass zur
Gewinnung prhziser Erkenntnisse fortab stets die reale
Erkenntnisfunktion als solche, nhmlich die abstrakte Gestalt
eines 'Beobachters an sich' (trotzdem, bei aller Abstrakt-
heit, die Menschengestalt) in das Beobachtungsfeld
einprojiziert werden muss; hieraus ergibt sich ein neuer
Absolutheitsbegriff, den ich als den der 'irdischen
Absolutheiten' bezeichnen will," (GW 8: 355-356)
Just as in physics the introduction of the human
factor led to the discovery and empirical confirmation of
certain absolutes such as the speed of light and absolute
zero temperature, so, according to Broch, the recognition
of the unavoidable human factor in all social sciences will
confirm that the absolute zero of human behaviour lies in
enslaving or killing one's fellow-men.
"Im Gegensatz zum alten, rein logisch fundierten
Absolutheitsbegriff ist der neue vornehmlich der einer
•untern Grenze', hat also 'Negativ-Charakter'; im Gebiet
des Rechtes - also dem Formalgebiet kat'exochen der
Sozialwissenschaften und der Sozialerkenntnis - wird ganz
offensichtlich die Introduktion der (abstrakten) Menschen-
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gestalt gleichfalls unvermeidbar werdenj hiebei 1st die
'irdische Absoluthe.it', die als Pegel der Sozialbeziehungen
zu gelten bat, im Ph&nomen der 'Totalversklavung'
(konkretisiert durch das Konzentrationslager) nur
allzudeutlich sichtbar." (GW 8: 356)
These absolute limitations imposed by the human
factor on the formal structure of a legislative system are
particularly evident when any attempt is made to codify
laws in such a way that punishments should correspond to
the seriousness of the crime. In theory, according to the
formal relationship of crime, lav/ and punishment, it is
possible to construct an infinite scale of progressively
serious crimes incurring correspondingly serious sanctions.
In practice no such scale is possible.
"Doch mit einem Male ist das Irdisch-Absolute auf dem Plan
und 'limitiert', hior einerseits als Mord, andererseits
als Todesstrafe, das an sich grenzenlose deduktive Spiel.
Die 'Limitation' liegt also an der Menschengestalt als
solcher, an der menschlichen Qualitht des Sterbenmttssens,
und diese DualitHit wird keineswegs nur als mechanisches
Skalen-Ende in das deduktive System projiziert, sondern
affiziert es durch und durch, jedenfalls V'/eit mehr als
das juristisehe Menschenbild, mit dem die praktische
Rechtsprechung sich besch&ftigt: bei aller Reduzierung
auf nackteste Abstraktheit, es ist ein inhaltlicher Faktor,
der da, wie liberal! mit dem Iriisch-Absoluten, in einen
rein formalen Bereich introduziert wird - der Vergleich
rait der relativit&ts-theoretischen Introduktion deS Sehakts
in das physikalische Beobachtungsfeld ist nicht unerlaubt."
164
(GW 7: 247-248)
The lack of precision in Brock's use of terms
referring to the earthly Absolute is evident. The general
principle of the existence of earthly Absolutes, i.e.
absolute values which can be empirically confirmed, is
usually referred to as "das Irdisch-Absolute". The
invariable standard of measurement, what Broch elsewhere
calls "das tertium comparationis" (GW 6: 277; GW 7: 252),
against which such absolutes are evaluated is man himself,
"die irdischa Absolutheit, welche die seiner spezifisch
menschlichen Eigenstrulctur ist" (NR: 30). Measured
against this criterion the lowest absolute of human conduct
is to dehumanize one's fellow-men by killing or enslaving
them. In scientific terms death or slavery represent
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merely "ein irdisches Absolutum" (NR.: 10). In the
narrower field of the social sciences they represent "das
'irdische Absoiutum'" (GW 9: 421), "die irdisehe
Absolutheit" (GW 9; 424), "das 'irdisch Absolute'" (NR: 12),
"das irdisch Absolute schlechthin" (GW 7: 232), "das
Irdisch-Absolute" (GW 7: 247). Clearly Broch is not
consistent in his use of terminology, but the context
generally leaves no doubt as to what he means.
Broch concludes that any genuinely humanitarian
legislation or political regime must be founded on the
formula which he exj>resses in three different ways as
follows. "Bu sollst nicht tbten." (NR; 10) "Der Mensch
darf niemals als Sache behandelt werden." (GW 7: 222)
"Der Mensch darf den Menschen nicht versklaven. " (GW 9:
366) For Broch these three statements are synonymous
because they all prohibit the reduction of the individual
to an inanimate object. Clearly these principles must
be embodied in his new legislative system, and just as
clearly they imply the abolition of the death penalty and
the use of concentration camps or any other form of total
ensla\rement. The next step in Broch's argument is to
prove the logical necessity of such humanitarian
legislation and thus rebut the charges of subjective
emotionalism in his thinking, "es handelt sich hiebei um
Forraalkonstatierungen, nicht um inhaltliche oder gar
geffthlsra&ssige, und well es Forraalkonstatierungen sind,
ergibt sich aus ihnen eine Neufundierung des an sich
legendftren Menschenrechtes, ohne das es koine soziale
Humanit&t g&be." (GW 8: 3C>6).
Broch bases his proof on a hypothetical situation
where a government passes a law stating that every citizen
over the age of fifty should be executed (GW 7: 2 43f»;
NR; 10f.). He admits that such an idea is "karnavalesk"
(GW; 7: 243), but points out first of all that, formally
at least, such legislation i^ould be valid because it
maintains the formal relationship of law and punishment.
Secondly, he adds that his hypothesis is not as strange as
it seems since it illustrates a form of legislation
characteristic of certain dictatorships, specifically that
of Nazi Germany. He takes care to comment that such
legislation is not limited exclusively to dictatorships
and cites as an example the condition of the negroes in
North America prior to the Civil War. By virtue of their
colour negroes were set beyond the law and condemned to
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lifelong slavery (NR: 11-12).
In a practical context the hypothetical legis¬
lation envisaged by Broch would produce chaos because
everyone reaching the age of fifty would, in the knowledge
that he is condemned to die anyway, feel fx*ee to commit
any crime he wanted without incurring a more severe
punishment. Here the problems raised by Broch's view
of the death penalty as the ultimate legal sanction are
at once evident. But the crux of his argument lies in
the fact that any such legislation is self-contradictory,
logically invalid and demonstrably illegal. All of this
can be deduced from a logical analysis of the necessary
formal relationship which must exist between a law and
the sanction designed to protect it.
"Denn vie soil sioh der Begriff 'Gesetz' von dera der 'Strafe'
unterscheiden, wenn beide das nftmliche meinen dtirfen?"
(NR: 12)
"Da iiegt Uberhaupt kein Gesetz vor. Denn eine strafrecht-
lich nicht schlitzbare Bestiinmung verdient gerade im Sinne
des 'Rechts an sich' nicht den Naiaen 'Gesetz'. Und der
Strafschutz entflillt, weil den Gesetzeslibertreter, der
sich nach Erreichung der Altersgrenze nicht freiwillig der
Ilinrichtung stellt, keine versehSr-fte Strafe, sondern eben
nur v/ieder der Galgen erwartet. ... Mttgen daher die
Bestimmungen, die seine Ilinrichtung verlangen, formal
noch so korrekt ausgebaut werden, das 5Recht an sich1 ist
trotz seiner 'Inhalts-Neutralit&t' nicht befugt, ihnen
Gesetzeharalcter zuzuerkennen. Es handelt sich hiebei um
167
keinerlei Rechts-Antinoraiej nein, es handelt sicli
lediglich iarum, dass die 'Inhalts-Neutralit&t* unter
gev/issen TlmstJiaden durchbrochen werden muss." (GW 7: 244)
The necessity of avoiding; such an anomalous
situation and preserving the formal validity of all legal
systems leads to the following logical conclusion: "Der
Xnhalt eines Gesetzes darf nit der Strafe, die es zu
seinem Sohutz verftigt, lie identisch sein." (GW 7: 245).
Broch emphasizes that this is a purely formal deduction
and seems self-evident. The real value of such a
postulate is seen only in the extreme cases, "wo die
absolute Grenze der Strafbemessung, ihr Irdisch-Absolutes
erreicht wird j und es uo die Todesstrafe und ihre Nicht-
verschErfbarkeit geht." (GW7: 245)* He admits that his
hypothetical example of the death penalty for all people
who attain the age of fifty is an extreme one, but adds
that it illustrates the formal structure of legislation
which has already been seen in those dictatorships which
are ruled by terror. The great value of the formally
demonstrable principle that the content of a law should
never be identical with the sanction designed to protect
it is that it provides a logically infallible formula for
deciding whether any legislation is technically or
formally correct and legal.
"Das Beispiel von den FttnfzifjEhrigen ist ein ...
Extremfall, und es tut dar, dass der Hinrichtungsbefehl,
obwohl aus der Autonomic der Gesetzgebung; erfliessend und
offenbar nit keiner andern Regierungsverordnung oder
gesetzlichen Bestimmung in Widerspruch stehend, trotz
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lieser Formalkorrektheit formal - wohlgemerkt formal -
inkorrekt 1st, well oben an den Extremgrenzen die Inhalts-
Strulcturen ihre innern Formal-Widersprttche sehen lassen,
unci dass infolgedessen jene Iiinrichtungs-Verfttgung infolge
ihres Gegensatzes zum 'Recht an sich' nie und nimmer
rechtlich-gesetzlichen Charakter rcu erwerben vermag. Und
eine ungesetsliche, lediglich titular-gesetzliche
Lebensberaubuag ist Mord. Es muss kaum unterstriehen
werden, lass das Beispiel von den FttnfzigjShrigen ein
Schatteariss der Terror-Biktaturen ist." (GW 7: 245)
On purely formal grounds, therefore, one is entitled
to examine the qualitative content of a legislative system
and the sanctions it uses and decide if they are legal
(GW 7: 245-256).
This must necessarily apply not only to the extreme
ease of the death penalty, but also to every form of
punishment. Here the abstract formal relationship of law
and punishment can offer no cx-iteria for judgment. The
types of punishment can be determined only by an analysis
of what acts as a deterrent to man. As has been said,
Broch believed that all punisliments were to a greater or
lesser extent symbolic of the death penalty because they
all represented the partial reduction of the individual
to the condition of an inanimate object by depriving him
of soma of the freedom which is the distinguishing
characteristic and right of man. The practical corollary
of the abstract formula that no law should be identical
with the sanction protecting it is a declaration of human
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rights which states that no man nay be deprived of these
rights if he has not committed any crime. Such a
declaration is not merely a pious hope, but is logically
valid and legally binding because it is the concrete
expression in the human context of the necessary formal
relationship existing between law and punishment,
««
'Gesetzesbestimiiungen Gftrfen nit Ten fftr ihre Ubertretung
festgesetzten Strafen nie identisch sein.■
7a\ dieser formalen Bestinimung muss aber - eben
wegen <!es inlialtlichen Charakters des Kechts - noch eine
tnhaltlicho treten, uad diese ist aus der Definition der
Strafe als 'Versachlichung' zu gev/innen, so dass sich der
Satz folgendermassen erweitert:
•Gesetze dfirfen dem Bhrger keinen stra^-Shnlichen
Zustand auferlegen, das heisst ihn seiner spezifisch
menschlichen Attribute der Freiheit, Gleichheit und des
Rechts auf Streben nach Glfick berauben, vielmehr ist eine
solche Versachlichung des I'enschen ausschliesslich der
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Strafe bei Gesetzesftbentre-':- -ty--n vor-behalten, 1" (NR: 12)
Broch thus claims to have proved that a humanit¬
arian form of legislation based on respect for^ and
preservation of the basic human rights of freedom, equality
and the pursuit of happiness is not only morally
desirable but a logical necessity if the absolute ideal or
abstract concept of justice is to be given concrete
expression in society. The political implications of
this are immediately evident, Such a law of human rights
provides a logically valid and legally binding criterion
for deciding if a political regime is legal or illegal in
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its constitution. Clearly any government xvhich, like
Nazi Germany, declares certain groups of its population
to be beyond the laxtf is demonstrably illegal.
"Das ist ein immerhin bemerkensxvertes, ja vielleiclit eben
sogar iiberraschendes Ergebnis, denn es besagt, dass das
n
rein auf formalen Uberlegungen gesttttzte 'Recht an sich'
unter gewissen Umst&nden f&hig und befugt ist, inhaltliche
Gesetzgebungsmassnahmen zu tiberprilfen und zu beurteilen,
und dass es sie bei abf&lliger Beurteilung, genau so wie
bei formalen Unstimmigkeiten, als unrechtlich verwerfen
kann, verwerfen darf, verwerfen muss. . , Mit andern
Worten, soweit der Staat ein Rechtssystem repr&sentiert
und es sein will, darf es keine rechtlosen Enklaven geben;
es kbnnen zur Not Gruppen-Unterscheidungen gemacht itferden -
das Milit&rrecht war stets stronger als das fttr die
Zivilbevblkerung geltende gewesen -, und Hitler w&re es
unbenonuaen gewesen, fttr Juden besonders drakonische Strafen
einzuftthrenj aber zwischen Drakonismus und vblliger
Rechtlosigkeit besteht kein gradueller Unterschied, nein,
das ist der Gegensatz schlechthin, und vfellig rechtlos,
vbllig vogelfrei darf niemand gemacht werden. Und
ebendarum zerstbrt Sklaverei, sei es nun die des Privat-
oder die des modernen Staatssklaventums, die Komplettheit
jeglichen Rechtssytems. " (GV/ 7: 245-246)
The above quotation makes clear why Broch goes to
such lengths to prove, as he thinks, that the absolute
form of slavery embodied in the use of concentration camps
is synonymous with death. The inmate of a concentration
camp, like the person automatically condemned to death on
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reaching the age of fifty, is beyond the law. Both stand
beyond the law because the formal relationship between law
and punishment, which is logically implied by the ideal
concept of justice, has not been preserved. As a result
they cannot be said to have been legally condemned to
deaths both are murdered.
We must pause here and ask what practical results
Broch envisaged for his politico-legislative theories.
He clearly not only believed them to be correct, but urns
convinced that they represented important new advances in
this field of study (GW&356, 387). Nevertheless, he
regularly admitted that governments were unlikely to act
according to his theories, no matter how logically correct
they might be, if they believed that their own interests
would be thereby endangered. This would be particularly
true of fascist dictatorships (GW 7: 252-253). Nor could
Broch envisage any effective form of international
executive which could be empowered to take steps against
any government proved to be illegal (NR: 25f•J GW 7:
253-254). At the most, his theories could provide
illegally oppressed groups of people with a legal
justification for revolution.
Inevitably such doubts helped to heighten the
general pessimism he felt in the last years of his life
about the prospects for the development of a more humanit¬
arian civilization. This note of increasing despair is
very evident in the letters of this period. More and
more he gives up any hope of making a practical contribution
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to the improvement of the human condition and expresses
the desire to abandon his wasted political studies in
favour of his first love of mathematics and epistemology.
It must be emphasized that he believed his political
research wasted, not because the conclusions were wrong,
but because there seemed no way of having them put into
action. Broch seems never fully to have realized how
his pessimism reflected a basic flaw in all his research.
All his theories were constructed on a rigorously logical
basis in the belief that man will respond to, and act
upon a clear rational motivation. Finally he was forced
to concede, even if only implicitly, that reason alone
cannot provide a sufficiently strong stimulus for human
action. This implicit admission of failure is succintly
expressed in a letter written to his publisher in 1950 in
which he describes his political theories as "praktisch"
but "leider so unpraktikabel" (GW 8: 456). He further
admits defeat when he says that he has produced a
scientific theory of humanity and can do no more; the
implementation of the theory is not the responsibility of
the theoretician. In a letter of March 1950 he claims
that his conclusions have "die Kraft zur 1konkreten
Utopie'" and continues, "ob dann diese sich verwirklicht
oder nicht, geht mich nichts mehr an" (GW 8: 387). His
pessimism is seen even more clearly in a letter written
in January 1951» just a few months before his death,
where the following passage occurs.
"Da ich der Ansicht bin, dass ich mit meiner politischen
Schreiberei, oder genauer mit meiner Theorie nicht den
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geringsten Einfluss werde austiben k&nnen, trage ich mich
sehr mit dem Gedanken, diesen ganzen T&tigkeitsteil
stillzulegen. Es 1st nur schade um die vielen Jahre,
die ich darauf verwendet habe. Ich hStte lieber meine
Erkenntnistheorie machen sollen, obwohl auch diese in den
08
neuen Glauben nicht hineinpasst." (GW 8: 412)
It is clear that Broch's formulation of a practical,
if not practicable theory of humanitarian politics is
based not on any abstract concept or absolute ideal of
freedom, justice and equality, but on the phenomenon of
slavery or death as the empirically confirmable negative
or lower absolute of human experience. He regularly
refers to death or slavery as the lower or negative pole,
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the earthly or empirical absolute of human experience.
The abstract ideal of absolute freedom is the upper or
positive pole and as such can only be the subject of
logical speculation. Absolute freedom is a transcendental
ideal which cannot be definitively expressed or realized in
the empirical limitations of human society. The absolute
freedom of any individual, group or institution
necessarily implies the subjugation of all others. If
everyone tries to attain such freedom the result is
anarchy. If such freedom could be realized this would
represent the state of "Ebenbildhaftigkeit" where human
society would have achieved the divine perfection of the
freedom and order of the Logos. "Ebenbildhaftigkeit und
Anarchie, in dem einen der positive, im andern der negative
Pol des Weltgetriebes, sie spiegeln beide den Schbpfungs-
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vorgang, jene wie er am siebenten, hingegen diese wie er
vor dem ersten Tag, also im Zustand des Tohuwabohu
ausgeschaut hat. Im Ph&nomen der Politik hat sich
offenbar ein Rest der Vor-Schbpfung erhalten." (GW 7: 210)
Broch1s argument leaves no doubt that he now
rejects the thesis expressed in "Der Zerfall der Werte"
in Huguenau where he postulated the absolute freedom of
the Logos and the resultant anarchy in the social context
as a necessary ethical factor in the progressive cycle of
history. The pressure of circumstances, the lessons
taught by the horrors of the Second World War, and the
need for some immediate, practical contribution to the
restoration of humanitarian principles in politics forced
Broch to abandon his formal concept of ethics founded on
the transcendental Absolute of the Logos and turn to a
more concrete, practical morality grounded on man as the
earthly Absolute. Broch himself describes this change in
several virays. His law of human rights is based not on
the ethical question, "Was soil ich tun?" (NR: 19)» hut on
the negative moral command, "Du eollst nicht" (NR: 12).
In his earlier writings Broch had been highly critical of
precisely this negative aspect of morality as opposed to
the positive, progressive nature of his conception of
ethics,His law of human rights is founded not on the
positive principle of what man should be, but on the
negative command that man must never be deprived of his
humanity by being reduced to the status of an inanimate
object.
"Die Menschenrechte sind moralische Forderung, sind
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raoralisches Gebot und sollen oolitisches werden, und wie
hinter jedem moralischen Gebot steht auch hier die Form
'Du sollst nicht.' Das heisst, sie richten sich gegen
das radikal BBse, und als solches enthttllt sich die
•Versklavung', die 'Versachlichung1 des Menschen. Das
ist das »irdisch Absolute', an dem die Menschenrechte sich
#•
fundieren und definieren: es ist eine Wendung vom Uber-
Irdischen (der Ebenbildhaftigkeit) zum Irdischen (des
Konzentrationslager-Grauens) eine Wendung von der bloss
logischen Spelculation zum inhaltlichen, dennoch nicht
minder absoluten Faktum, und die Notwendigkeit dieser
Wendung hat sich aus der Erfahrung der totalit&ren
Schrecknisse ergeben." (NR: 12-13)
It is very evident that Broch associates his concept
of "das Irdisch-Absolute" with practical morality rather
than with his original definition of ethics. On the rare
occasions when he discusses "das Irdisch-Absolute" in
terms of ethics the word "ethisch" is used as a synonym
of "moralisch", an identification which is never found in
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the earlier theoretical writings.
Broch's increased interest in the need for an
immediate moral commitment to humanity is also seen in his
explicit rejection of political revolution in favour of
evolution. This is a direct contradiction of the views
expressed in the last chapter of "Der Zerfall der Werte"
(GW 2: 66lf.). There revolution is seen as the necessary
ethical instrument of the cyclical development of history
towards a better civilization. In an obvious contrast to
this Broch states in "Zur politischen Situation unserer
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Zeit" that the first principle of any humanitarian policy
must be "das Prinzip der unmittelbaren Wohlfahrt,
besagend, dass den Menschen und der Menschheit nicht fiir
einen chim&rischen kiinftigen Gltickszustand inhumane oder
gar ... barbarische Opfer auferlegt werden dtlrfen"
(GW 9s 440).103
In "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch had postulated
the absolute, anarchic freedom of the individual, and hence
the dissolution of any social order, as a necessary if
unpleasant stage in the regular cycle of history. In the
formulation of his law of human rights this earlier theory
is radically and explicitly revised. As a result of his
analysis of the function of the death penalty as a
limiting factor in any formally correct legal system
Broch believed that he had proved the guarantee of human
rights to be a logical necessity in any formally valid
legislation. Such legislation must guarantee the maximum
possible freedom for the individual in the current social
and political situation. Direct empirical examination of
that situation would reveal if the actions of any group
or individual were infringing on the rights and freedom of
others and new legislation could be drawn up accordingly
to protect those rights with legal sanctions. All such
legislation, in order to be formally correct and legally
valid, urould have to preserve the formal relationship of
law and punishment as implied in the abstract concept of
justice. According to Broch this necessarily implies the
abolition of the death penalty.
In theory at least, such legislation would
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progressively define and guarantee the maximum possible
freedom under the law of the individual within the social
context at any given time. This process would necessarily
be one of the progressive realization of the concept of
freedom. Any legislation which was retrogressive in that
it attempted to encroach on the freedom already guaranteed
under the law could be shown to be formally illegal if it
did not conform to the principle, already proved to be
formally and legally binding, that no person may be
deprived of any freedom if he has not committed a criminal
act (GW 7: 245-246; GW 9s 410). Clearly, according to
the above theory, freedom is not postulated as an absolute
but is progressively realized and defined within the
limitations of empirical reality.
"Gewiss wird sich auch aus den S&tzen dieses Menschen-
rechtes letztlich ein Bild des Menschen entwickeln, und
gewiss wird es - gerade weil es unter der Kontrolle des
'Rechts an sich' zustande kommt » sich letztlich mehr und
mehr der Ebenbildhaftigkeit ann&hern, indes die ihr
zugehftrige menschliche Freiheit wird statt dogmatisch am
Anfang nunmehr erst am Ende der Definitionsreihe stehen,
ein Definitionsziel der unendlichen Ann&herung, ohne je
vbllig erreicht werden zu kbnnens sukzessive aus Rechts-
s&tzen entstehend, von denen jeder einzelne vom empirischen
Anlass ausgeht und empirisch aussagt, was dem Menschen,
sofern er Mensch bleiben soil, nicht angetan werden darf,
wird sich von ihm ein juristisch-empirisches, also ein
abstraktes Gesamtbild ergeben, etwa das einer abstrakten
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'Recht-erzeugenden Person an sich' (einer Recht-schaffenden
und eben - wie die Sprache so schbn vorwegnimmt - einer
rechtschaffenen Person, nicht verwechselbar mit der
'juristischen Person'), und gleich der analog konstruierten
'physikalischen Person' wird sie, ungeachtet aller
Abstraktheit, den Vorzug konkreter Irdischkeit, den Vorzug
der fruchtbaren Empirie fiir sich in Anspruch nehraen kbnnen,
denn gleich jener ist sie die Tr&gerin des 'irdisch
Absoluten'." (GW 7: 218-219)
According to Broch this "Recht-erzeugende Person
an sich" fulfils the same function in the field of
jurisprudence as does "die mathematische Person" in the
discipline of mathematics. Here it is impossible to avoid
the anthropomorphic metaphor. The "Recht-erzeugende
Person" represents a humanitarian legislation's self-
awareness of its own formal, legal structure based on the
preservation of the maximum human freedom within the
limitations of empirical reality at any given time. As
such it has a selective role and can approve the extension
of the legal system by the incorporation of only these
statutes which further help to guarantee and define human
freedom. All the doubts expressed earlier about Broch's
"mathematische Person" apply equally here. What is of
greater relevance here is the explicit statement that
absolute freedom is unattainable in the context of human
society and that such freedom as man can achieve must be
progressively defined and realized by the expediences and
limitations of empirical reality. The creation of a
humanitarian civilization is envisaged in terms of a
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progressive, linear development, that of "eine wachsende
Absolutheit" (GW 9s 141) or "eine wachsende MumanitStt"
(GW 9: 234). Such a development, controlled by the
principle of the earthly Absolute, contrasts very obviously
with Broch's original, cyclical interpretation of history
which, based on the transcendental Absolute of the Logos,
postulated regularly alternating periods of civilization
and chaos.
The radical nature of Broch's rejection of the
transcendental Absolute of the Logos as the determining
factor in life in favour of the earthly Absolute is further
emphasized by his description of this decision as "die
kopernikanische Wendung" (NR: 13J GW 7: 242-249). Broch
borrowed this expression from Kant and uses it in much the
*1 f\ A
same way. Neither Kant nor Broch was interested
primarily in Copernicus1s discovery that the universe is
heliocentric and not geocentric. For both of them the
significance of the Copernican revolution in astronomy lay
in the method of the proof rather than in its conclusion.
Copernicus abandoned the abstract speculation of the
Ptolemaic cosmology and refused to distort observable
facts to conform to a patently untenable theory. He
proved that the universe is heliocentric by a process of
empirical observation. Similarly, Kant's epistemology
and ethics are founded with rigorous logic on the
observable phenomenon of the autonomy of reason and not on
abstract speculation about God or some transcendental
Absolute. Ii\ exactly the same way, so Broch maintains,
his theory of politics is built up from the empirical fact
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of death as the lower absolute of human experience and not
on the basis of abstract, undefinable ideals of justice or
freedom. The Copernican revolution in scientific
methodology is mentioned in "Der Zerfall der Werte".
There Broch describes it as "die-wahrhafte-kopernikanische
Wendung ziun unmittelbaren Objekt", and continues: "Oder
mit andern Worten, es ist die Wendung vom Platonismus zura
Positivismus, von der Sprache Gottes zu der Sprache der
Dinge," (GW 2: 513). Only in the closing years of his
life did Broch apply this principle consistently in his
own thinking and the result is to be seen in his theory of
"das Irdisch-Absolute".
Nevertheless, in his reliance on the earthly
Absolute Broch could not, indeed did not \^ant entirely to
abandon the transcendental Absolute of the Logos.
Copernicus's cosmology, Kant's ethics and epistemology,
and, as Broch maintained, his own theory of politics are
all logically valid even if based on empirical observation,
and the absolutely invariable formal relationships of logic
are the reflection in human reality of the Logos.
"Deshalb darf aber doch nicht vergessen werden, dass dies
alles mit Hilfe des Logos geschieht, dass daher ein oberes
Absolutura als st&ndiges Vehikel benutzt i/ird, das man
hbchstens verheimlichen, aber nicht ausschalten kann."
(GW 8: 391-392)
Broch's analysis of the dissolution of values had
led him to the conclusion that the only demonstrably
reliable absolute in modern life is the purely formal and
abstract one of reason. The last chapters of Huguenau,
IS l
ani particularly the concluding section of "Der Zerfall der
Werte" accurately describe the chaos and anarchy caused by
the absolute autonomy of reason and logic. The whole
purpose of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is to prove
the necessity for the re-introduction of the human factor
into every realm of activity and thought in order to
impose qualitative limitations on the autonomy of logic
which, as a purely formal absolute, is so abstract and
impersonal that it can provide no such qualitative
criterion of conduct. "Die logische Spekulation ist fiir
die oenschliche Erkenntnis zwar das 'absolut1 unerlhss-
liche Vehikel, aber was sie inhaltlich zutage f&rdert,
ist verd&chtig, ist trobz 1richtiger' Deduktion noch
keines'wegs absolub, muss vielmehr unaufhbrlich vom
Empirischen her hberpriift und eingeschrhnkt werden."
(NR: 13)
With specific reference to his theory of humanitar¬
ian politics, Broch believed that he had shown that the
legislative system he envisaged was logically correct and
legally valid as long as it preserved the formal
relationship between law and punishment which is logically
implied in the abstract ideal of justice. He had also
demonstrated that in the context of any human society
such a formally correct legal system necessarily implied
the protection of the basic human rights of freedom and
equality. Absolute freedom can never be idealized because
the result would be chaos and the loss of freedom for many
people. A law of human rights cannot therefore be
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founded on the abstract ideal of freedom but must proceed
from the empirically confirmable statement that if man is
to retain his characteristic human status he may never
be wholly deprived of freedom. This imposes a limitation
or qualification on the abstract concept of ideal or
absolute freedom.
"Hit andern Worten, die unendliche Deduzierbarkeit aus
dein Ideal-Absoluten benbtigt eine 'Limitation', und die
wird ihr vom Irdisch-Absoluten der Empirie geliefert,
w&hrend umgekehrt die empirischeErkenntnis in erster Linie
eine Limitierungs-Funktion hat, d.h. als solche an den
Absolutheits-Deduktionen ausge&bt wird, urn ebenhiedurch
zur Erkenntnis zu tverden. Demzufolge ist auch auf die
Begriffe 'Freiheit' und 'Gleichheit' nicht zu verzichten;
sie sind legitime Deduktionen aus dem Apriorisch-
Absolutenj und ihre Fruchtbarkeit liegb in ihrer Limit-
ierungsffthigkeit, ihrer Limitierungsbedttrftigkeit: wird
dieser durch das Irdisch-Absolute Genftge getan, so
entsteht das System von S&tzen, das wir als das des
'irdischen Menschenrechtes' bezeichnen durften.
Da der Limitierungs-Mechanismus die Erkenntnis
alltlberall und allzeit begleitet, wird er gew&hnlich nicht
bemerktj er wird erst bemerkt, wenn seine konstanten
Wendungen vom Deduktiven zum Empirischen (und umgekehrt)
besonders einschneidend werden: dann wird er kopernik-
anische Wendung genannt." (GW 7: 241)
It is interesting to note that Broch's theory of
humanitarian politics based on a law of human rights is
the closest he ever comes to proving that in the social
context man's "Pflicht zur Freiheit" (GW 2: 681; GW 7:
208) necessarily implies "die schmerzliche Freiheit der
Pflicht" (GW 2: 686). Maximum freedom for every
individual in society, the greatest possible realization
of the ideal of freedom can be attained only when everyone
accepts his responsibility to respect the freedom and
human dignity of his fellow-men and willingly recognizes
the moral obligation of self-control which this imposes on
him. In "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch stated with more
hope than conviction that "die Pflicht zur Freiheit" must
eventually yield to "die schmerzliche Freiheit der Pflicht"
(GW 2: 681—686). It is significant that he could offer
no proof of this until he turned from the transcendental
Absolute of the Logos to the earthly Absolute of man as
the determining factor in life.
In another interesting respect the theory of "das
Irdisoh-Absolute" represents the logical culmination of
Broch's speculations in "Der Zerfall der Werte" as to when
and in what form a new, universally binding ethos ivould
develop out of the total disintegration of values in the
Great War. At the time he suggested vaguely that such an
ethos could evolve only once faith and knowledge again
coincided as they had done in the Scholasticism of the
Catholic Middle Ages and the individual could once more
enjoy the security of understanding his function within a
coherent, systematic unity of reality (GW 2: 676). The
theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" realizes this ideal by
restoring man as the central qualitative value in reality.
This is an ideal everyone might like to believe in, but
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Broch's theory actually proved it scientifically, or so he
claimed. Thus faith and knowledge again coincide, but
only through the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute".
A final confirmation of Broch's rejection of the
transcendental for the earthly Absolute is to be seen in
the way he describes this as a process of secularization.
His use of this word is best understood if it is remembered
that, although he did not believe in a personal Deity, he
identified God with the Logos or absolute formal principle
which guarantees the systematic unit}*- of reality. For
Broch this secularization is synonymous with "die
kopemikanische Wendung"• Man can no longer rely only
on logical speculation with abstract concepts or absolute
ideals. Ever}' discipline must recognize the inevitable,
absolute, empirical limitations imposed on it by the human
factor xvhich can never be excluded from the process of
observation or thought. As is so often the case when he
discusses aspects of "das Irdisch-Absolute" Broch again
cites the example of the theory of relativity and its
influence on the development of physics as an example of
xtfhat he means by secularization. He writes to Gftnther
Anders of "die S&kularisation der oberen Instanz, resp.
u
ihre Ubertragung auf eine empirische Absolutheit", and
continues: "Bei mir folgert das alles aus methodologischen
Erw&gungen, die sich am Gang der Wissenschaftsforschung,
nicht zuletzt der physikalischen, illustrieren lassen,"
(Gf 8: 391).*^ Broch's application of the word
"S&kularisation" to the principle of "das Irdisch-Absolute"
can be best seen in references to his theory of politics.
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Writing to the editor of the Neue Rundschau after the
publication in it of "Trotzdem: Humane Politik", he
explains that one of the most important findings in that
article is "die Sftkularisation der Absolutheitsgrundlagen
filr die Menschenrechte" (GW 8: 385) - relevance of
such a secularization is made even clearer in another
letter written just a week later, in English, to Alvin
Johnson.
"A democratic ideology has ... to be based on a theory
of human rights. However, though we have histories of
the development of human rights, there does not exist a
real scientific theory, quite simply because the human
rights are still a religious concept deriving from the idea
that man is an image of God, What we need is secular¬
ization. We have to bring back to earth the absolute
that as yet was only in Heaven, and I think that the time
is ripe for it. Everywhere in scientific thinking you
see that the dialectical absolute had to yield to an
empirical and earthly one." (GW 8: 389-390)
The findings of the second part of this thesis
can be summarized as follows. An examination of the
theoretical writings of the period between the early
1930's and Broch's death in 1951 reveals a progressive
change in the emphasis of Broch's thinking. During these
years he gradually abandoned his reliance on the purely
formal, transcendental Absolute of the Logos and turned to
the earthly Absolute of man as the central value in life.
This necessitated a revaluation of the conclusions of "Der
1.86
Zerfall cter Werte" and esjjecially of the mechanistic,
cyclical interpretation of history deduced from these
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conclusions. It has been shown that the formulation
of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absoiute" was an attempt to
re-introduce the qualitative human factor into the formal
discipline of logic and into all disciplines. By doing
this Broch rejected his original formal, dynamic and
epistemological conception of ethics in favour of a more
pragmatic moral commitment to one's fellow-men. This
revision of Broch's ideas was directly conditioned by
historical and personal circumstances which convinced him
of the need to prove that humanity and not the abstract
Absolute of the Logos was the determining criterion for
all value-judgments. The seeds of the theory of "das
Irdisch-Absoiute" ivere already present in Broch's original
theory of values and, despite the change in emphasis from
the transcendental to the earthly Absolute and the
re-introduction of the human factor as a qualitative
limitation on knowledge, logical validity alivays remained
for Broch the final criterion of objective knowledge. It
has also been shown that Broch's personal dilemma of the
theoretician in a world demanding immediate, active
involvement, which is seen above all in his frequent
vacillations between optimism and pessimism, is reflected
in the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absoiute".
In the next part of this thesis cei>tain aspects
of Broch's novels will be studied with a view to
establishing the extent to which they reflect the change
of emphasis seen in the theoretical writings.
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Before this part of the thesis is concluded some
comment should be made on the current state of research
into the theory "das Irdisch-Absolute" in Broch's work.
Very little research has been dedicated specifically to
the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", either in its
epistemological or political application. The term is
sometimes cursorily mentioned in publications on other
aspects of Broch's work, but in such cases the reference
is often impossibly vague or, not infrequently, based on
a complete misinterpretation. A few examples must
suffice.
Hermann Kann describes "das Irdisch-Absolute" as
"der originellste Gedanke Brochs im Bereich der
Geshichtsphilosophie", but in the course of a very vaguely
written and eulogistic essay he fails to define the concept
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in any detail. In his very confused and confusing
introduction to the anthology, Hermann Broch. Die
Heimkehr, Ilarald Binde finally concludes that Broch's
concept of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is identical with his
philosophical concept of simultaneity and timelessness:
"so ist das 'Irdisch-Absolute', 'dieser Einheitsraura der
Zeit und der Zeiten, das Ziel und die Aufgabe der
historischen Dichtung ... Der Einheitsraum, nach dem
die Seele sich sehnt imd in den sie eingehen will, weil
109in ihm das Zeitlose und daher sie selber ruht ...'".
Helmut Arntzen completely misinterprets the concept when
he applies it to Pasenow in the first novel of Die
Schlafwandler and makes the following statement. "Joachim
v. Pasenow ist insofern Schlafwandler, als sein Wirklich-
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keitsverh&ltnis von dogmatischen Vorstellungen gepr&gt ist,
die nicht mehr von einer Transzendenz besthtigt werden,
Er 1st darura Romantiker, und das meint bei Broch die
unerlaubte Steigerung des Irdischen zum Absoluten. . .
Er ist Offizier, und die Uniform ist ihm der Ausdruck des
'irdisch Absoluten', sie wird ihm zur zweiten Haut."**^
The term "das irdisch Absolute" never appears in the novel
and there is no justification at all for using these words,
which have such a soecialized meaning in Broch's work,
to refer to Broch's definition of Romanticisms "Romantik:
wenn Irdisches zum Absoluten erhoben wird" (GW 2s 19)•
Timothv Casey, in his article on the Bergroman, maintains
that the distinction which Broch makes between his own
narticular conceotion of Romanticism and "das Irdisch-
■\bsolute" is oroblematical. While acknowledging that in
theory the distinction may be valid, Casey suggests that in
practice, and particularly as exemplified in the context of
that novel, there is little to choose between these two
concepts.*** Harry Pross wrongly describes "das Irdisch-
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Absolute" as "die Pflicht zur Freiheit". This is all
the more surprising because the article in question is
otherwise quite helpful in understanding Broch's thinking
on the subject. Finally a more understandable misinter¬
pretation, but nevertheless a surprising one because it
comes from Manfred Durzak, probably the leading scholar in
the field of Broch studies.- Qurzak suggests that death is
the earthly Absolute ("das irdische Absolute"),"1^ failing
to realize that death is simply one of many earthly
Absolutes which can be established by measurement against
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the absolute, invariable human factor. It happens to be
the earthly Absolute in the social sciences.
The most useful piece of work done in this field
of research is almost certainly the earliest, namely
hannah Arendt1s introduction to the sixth volume of the
Collected Works (1955)«**^ Other helpful contributions,
although they tend to be expository rather than critical
in nature, can be found in works by Erich Kahler,
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Ernestine Schlant, Joseph Strelka and Wolfgang Rothe.
In conclusion it is interesting to note that another
famous Austrian novelist, whose extreme oolitical
conservatism would certainly never have annealed to Broch,
exnressed opinions similar to those found in "Politik".
At one noint in his diary, Tangenten, Heimito von Doderer
da jribes his distrust of the masses and claims that a
ne\tf humanitarian political solution must lie in "diese
Rflckverweisung des Menschen auf sich selbst" • * * ^ In
"Politik" Broch sums up the situation of modern man as a
oolitical animal as follows. "her Mensch ist ... auf
sich selbst zurttckverwiesen worden, vielleicht sogar ura
die Erde zu rotten." (GW 7s 218)
190
THE THEORY OF "DAS IRDISCH-ABSOLUTE'' AS REFLECTED
IN THE NOVELS.
1. INTRODUCTION.
Broch's novels will be examined in chronological
order in an attempt to show that the progressive develop¬
ment of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in his
theoretical works is also reflected in his creative
writing. Such a chronological study presents certain
obvious problems. Broch's Bergroman consists of three
different versions, two of them uncompleted, which were
written between 1933 and 1951. His last completed novel,
Die Schuldlosen, comprises a lyrical framework, an
Introductory parable and eleven Novellen written at
various times between 1918 and 1949. for the sake of
clarity these two novels will be examined after Die Schlaf-
wandler, Die unbekannte Grbsse and Per Tod des Vergil:
attention will then be drawn, where relevant and necessary,
to the chronological complications of their gerieses.
In form and intention this study of the novels is
exactly parallel to the previous examination of the
theoretical writings. No general analysis of the novels
is intended. Specific passages and certain common themes
will be studied with the aim of showing that the
progressive development of the theory of "das Irdisch-
Absolute" can also be seen in the novels. Walter Baumann
describes the results of Broch's application of "das
Irdisch-Absolute" in political and legislative theory as
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"logisch-positivistisch definierte Humanit&t", saying:
"Zur dichterischen Gestaltung dieser logisch-positivistisch
definierten Humanitht kam es eigentlich nicht mehr,"^
This is true in as far as Broch wrote no single novel
specially to exemplify this particular form of humanity,
but aspects of the developing theory of such a humanity can
be traced through all the novels. This part of the thesis
concentrates on showing that the novels reveal a
progressively increasing concern with a practical,
humanitarian morality at the expense of Broch's original
epistemological conception of ethics. Such a development
in the course of the novels has been briefly hinted at by
a number of critics. It is frequently suggested that Die
Schlafwandler represents Broch's pessimistic analysis of
the early twentieth century and that in the subsequent
novels, especially Per Tod des Vergil and the Bergroman,
he attempts to offer possible solutions to the crisis
depicted in his first novel, usually in the form of an
appeal for a direct humanitarian commitment to one's
fellow-men. To my knowledge, this argument has not been
2
developed at length by any critic. The following study
of the novels, and particularly of Esch oder die Anarchie,
confirms one point of special interest that has already
been mentioned, namely the suggestion that Broch himself
was not perhaps fully ax^are of the extent to which his
thinking changed over the years.
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2. DIE SCHLAFWANDLBR - ESCH ODER DIE ANAKCHIE
a) Current Criticism.
The concluding part of Esch (GW 2: 328-366), ivhich
follows the hero's meeting with Bertrand at Badenweiler,
is one of the most problematical sections of the whole
Schlafwandler trilogy. This is confirmed by the fact that
although numerous critics have attempted to interpret the
three important sleepwalking chapters which deal with the
confrontation between Esch and Bertrand (GW 2: 314-328)
few have gone on to analyse Esch's reaction to that
meeting in any detail.
A brief summary of the most important studies of
these passages will reveal the general confusion still
surrounding the sleepwalking episodes and Esch's
subsequent reactions. It is generally agreed that Bertrand
represents "der Typus des 'ratlonalen Menschen'" (GW 8:
18) or "der spezifisch Ssthetische Mensch" (GW 8: 26) who
correctly analyses the problem of the dissolution of values
but withdraws into aesthetic isolation rather than help
his fellow-men cope with what he sees as an inevitable
3
catastrophe. Bertrand stands in the same relationship
to Esch as he does to Pasemw in the first novel of the
trilogy. He inspires fear, insecurity and hatred because
he understands the dissolution of values and lives his
life accordingly, refusing to be bound by outdated
conventions. At the same time both Esch and Pasenow hope
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that Bertrand, by virtue of his heightened perception of
the disintegrating reality of life* will be able to offer
them guidance as to how they might come to terras with the
fear and insecurity caused by a situation they themselves
do not fully understand. This is precisely what Bertrand
cannot do. It is significant that in the first two
novels of the trilogy Bertrand is repeatedly referred to
as a doctor, but he is a physician who can only diagnose,
but not cure the ills of his generation.^
The meeting of Esch and Bertrand can only be fully
understood if it is realized that fisch approaches
Bertrand both as an accuser and as a supplicant, Bertrand
cannot help Esch. He merely promulgates Broch's theory
of the cyclical rise and fall of value-systems, saying
that Esch, like everyone else, must simply await the
coming catastrophe in the hope that a new and secure system
of values will eventually grow out of the chaos. Bertrand
makes it quite clear that although some attempt may be made
to px^eveut the threatening disaster he personally does not
intend to become involved. "'Ja, Lieber, es wird sonst
inuner ikrger werden, und wir wollen es zu verhtiten trachten.
Ich habe ja von tins beiden den leichteren Tell; ich
braache bloss wegzugehen. Der Fremdo leidet nie, er ist
losgelftst, - es lei let bloss der, der verstrickt bleibt.'"
(GW 2: 324)
After the meeting Esch eventually returns to
Cologne and marries Mutter Hentjen. There he learns that
Bertrand has committed suicide, presumably as a result of
the confrontation with him. Only once Esch's plans to
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emigrate to America have been frustrated by financial
disaster does he fully resign himself to the human and
social responsibilities he has taken upon himself in his
marriage. This is a very brief summary of the end of
the novel, provided simply as a necessary background for
the following interpretations of these scenes* Esch's
reactions to the Badenweiler episode '/ill be examined in
detail in due course.
Karl Robert Mandelkow emphasizes the fairy-tale
(Snov; Tliite) and religious symbolism of the meeting. lie
suggests that Esch plays the prince to Bertrand's Snow
White, wakening the latter to the guilt incurred bj' his
selfish withdrawal into aastheticism. Mandelkow sees
Bortrand failing Esch by refusing to help him. Despite
a relatively detailed examination of this episode Mandelkow
makes no attempt to explain Esch's reactions to his meeting
5
with Bertrand.
Dorrit Cohn expands on Mandelkow's analysis, but
interprets the scene almost entirely in religious terms
with Esch seeking salvation from Bertrand in whom he sees
attributes of both God and Christ. Like Mandelkow, she
suggests that Bertram! fails to help Esch and she sees
the former's suicide as a symbol of failure and sterility.
Also like Mandelkow, she makes no attempt to explain Esch's
subsequent behaviour.^
Heinz D. Osterle stresses the religious symbolism
but adds a more unlikely interpretation by suggesting that
the erotic element plays an important function. He says
that Esch asks for help and friendship from 3ertrand in
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homosexual terms, challenging him to create a secure
relationship which he (Esch) cannot enjoy with women. By
implication at least Osterle agrees that Bertrani fails
Esch, although on a different plane from that usually
7
rearl into the confrontation.
Ernestine Schlant stands apart from the majority
of critics in that she attributes a positive value to the
role played by Bertrand in this episode. She too stresses
the religious symbolism, but envisages Esch playing Judas
to Bertrand's Christ. She seas the letter's suicide as
a sacrifice which brings peace to Esch, As will be
shoxm later, such an interpretation simply does not conform
to the given facts in the novel. Strangely enough, when
Schlant goes on to discuss Esch's reactions to the meeting
she comes to what, in my opinion, is the correct
conclusion but for the wrong reasons. She sees Esch's
commitment to Mutter Hentjen in a very positive light and
suggests that the improvement in his moral character is
the natural result of Bertrand's sacrificial suicide. X
hope to show that Esch's moral insights at the end of the
novel are attained despiterather than because of
8
Bertrand's influence on Esch.
All the critics mentioned, and especially Dorrit
Cohn, emphasize the religious nature of the meeting. In
doing so they overlook the fact that Broch regularly uses
the language of religious symbolism and mysticism to
express the essentially epistemological or cognitive
problems of man's understanding of his reality. This is
particularly evident in the use of the symbolism of the
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Apocalypse in the last chapter of Huguenau and that of
Mariology and the biblical Creation myth in the last
chapter of Dor Tod des Vergil. In these passages, as in
the Badenweiler episode, the religious symbolism must be
interpreted as such and not taken literally as the
statement of any particular religious doctrine.
The true meaning of the Badenweiler episode is
best approached by those critics who see Esch seeking out
Bertrand as the person who can offer him the knowledge and
advice as to how he can find a new security and direction
in life amidst the developing chaos of dissolving values.
Bertrand•s failure lies in his refusal or inability to
take active steps to help his fellow-men in the crisis
which he has correctly analysed.
Helmut Arntzen makes exactly this point and goes
on to attribute a positive value to Esch's reaction to the
meeting. He claims that Esch at least tries to find an
answer to the problem of a disintegrating reality whereas
Bertrand takes refuge in aestheticism and ultimately in
9
suicide.
The two most detailed interpretations are provided
by Leo Kreutzer and Hartmut Steinecke. Kreutzer
correctly states that Esch undergoes a change of heart as
a result of the meeting with Bertrand, a meeting which he
sees as a failure for Esch because he fails to kill
Bertrand as originally intended. According to Kreutzer,
Esch's final position in the novel must be criticized
because his resigned commitment to the responsibilities and
limitations of empirical reality confirm his inability to
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realize in his own life the doctrines of extreme
alienation, isolation and absolute freedom which Bertrand,
and also Broch, postulate as the necessary nadir of human
experience out of which alone a neiv, unified, humanitarian
1 C
system of values might evolve.
Steinecke's interpretation of the passages in
question is that Bertrand fails to help Esch and that the
latter returns disillusioned from the meeting. Unlike
Kreutzer, Steinecke, correctly in my opinion, assigns a
certain positive value to Esch's final commitment to human
1 1
love and responsibility. x Kreutzer sees Esch taking
refuge from the insecurity of a disintegrating reality in
a conventional and outdated concept of romantic love.
Steinecke maintains that Esch accepts the limitations of
empirical reality and eventually sees human love and
moral commitment to a fellow-being as the only practical,
even if partial and symbolic realization of the
unattainable ideal of perfect love which is the complete
12
unity and identification of two individuals. Broch
gives this definition of love as an unattainable absolute
in his theoretical writings (GW 6: 1.55; GW 7: 235-236).
In Die Schlafwandler such a view of love is always expressed
by Bertrand or people ivho, consciously or unconsciously,
X
have adopted his belief. 0 Clearly such love can never
be fully realized in empirical reality, but only in the
transcendental reality of the spiritual world, a reality
which man can experience completely only once he has shed
his physical limitations in death.
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It is obvious that a number of relatively detailed
studies of the sleepwalking episodes in Bsch have led to
differing conclusions. Nevertheless, with the exception
of Ernestine Schlant's interpretation, there is general
agreement that Esch leaves Bademv'eiler as a disappointed
and disillusioned man. He went there seeking help and
found none. The disagreement among the critics concerns
the kind of aid he was seeking.
No such detailed interpretations have been made of
Esch's reaction to the Badenweiler meeting and, above all,
the "Schlaflose" episode (GW 2: 334-340). As has been
mentioned, a number of critics read a positive interpre¬
tation into the end of Esch, but, apart from Hartmut
Steinecke, few attempt to justify their conclusions from
a close study of the text. Their decision in favour of
Esch often seeias to be emotionally rather than rationally
determined; they simply cannot accept Broch8s explicit
condemnation of Esch8s position at the end of the novel.
Esch seeias after all to have undergone a genuine moral
regeneration.
Broch1s criticism of Esch is precisely that a
moral commitment is involved. By taking a firm moral
stand, by accepting the responsibilities of marriage and
seeking security in human fellowship and love Esch,
according to Broch's theory of the inevitable cyclical
development and dissolution of value-systems, acts
unethically. He is refusing to face up to the fear,
isolation and alienation which accompany the progressive
dissolution of a unitary system of values and out of which
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alone, according to Broch, a new secure, humanitarian
value-system may arise. Broch explicitly draws an
unfavourable comparison between Esch's position at the end
of the second novel of the trilogy and that of Haguenau
in the last chapter of Die Schlafwandler. The two
following passages occur in letters written to his
publishers while he was still working on the novel.
"Wenn Pasenow die Lhsung in der traditionellen
Religiositht sucht, Esch in einen erotischen Mystizismus
sich •rettet', so sind dies Halblbsungen, die keine
Befreiung aus dem Traumhaften bringen, sondern viel eher
das Ethische in die Sphftre des Dunkeln und Triebhaften
Ziehen - Urtynus der tragischen Schuld. Der R&cher flir
solche Schuld entsteht, 8iusserlich begttnstigt durch die
Krise 1918, notwendig in dem 'wertfreian' sachlichen
Menschen (symbolisiert durch einen fast verbrecherischen
Typus, der seinen Kindheitstraum in der Wirklichkeit e.in-
fach naiv zu Ende lebt): Huguenau, ff\r den im Epilog die
Mbglichkeit des wiederkehrenden FJthos angedeutet wird, im
Bliclc auf die platonische Freiheit, auf die alleine es
ankommt." (GW 8: 18)
"In den Schlafwandlern: Pasenow und Esch, beide
moralische Typen, wenn auch verschiedenen Moral-Dogmen
unterworfen. Moral-Dogmen, die aber in dieser Zeit des
Wertverfalles eben absterbetid sind, zur 'Romantik'
werden. . . Bloss Huguenau ist der wahrhaft 'wertfreie'
Mensch und damit das adequate Kind seiner Zeit. Er
allein kann daher fortbestehen, er allein ist in der
'Autonomie dieser Zeit', in der sich ein revolutionhres
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Ringen nach Freiheit ausdrtickt. Er ist der passive
Revolutionhr, wie eben die Masse der Revoiution&re jede
Revolution passiv mitmacht und doch rnacht. Sicherlich
hat er - bloss der Form des Autonomen nach ethisch,
sonst aber vbllig amoralisch - noch keineswegs die Freiheit
der neuen Gbttlichkeit, des neuen Glaubens errungen; er
erstrebt dies auch gar nicht, ersehnt es auch nicht, obwohl
hie und da ein Lichtblick kommender Mbglichkeiten in ihm
aufzuckt: genau so wie diese Zeit noch nicht ihre
Glhubigkeit gefunden hat, noch lange nicht finden wird,
sondern nur hie und da ahnt. Abei* es ist die Lebensform,
die 'Form der Freiheit', in der allein einmal der neue
Xnhalt erstehen kannj er steht am Beginn des Weges (eines
Weges, den Esch in der Anarchie der Werte - am Schluss des
II. Teiles - nach der BerUhrung mit Berti^and vorgeahnt
nat, ohne ailerdings die Mbglichkeit zu haben, ihn je
gehen zu kbnnen)." (GW Si 26)J
It will be noted that Broch, although criticizing
the morality of Esch's decision, acknowledges that the
latter does achieve a degree of insight into the ethical
problems of his generation, namely the need to achieve
absolute freedom from moribund conventions in order to
clear the ground for the growth of a new system of values.
/ /
Similarly, in the resumee of the novel entitled "Der
Roman Die Schlafwandler", Broch's criticism of Esch is
qualified by a certain conciliatory tone which acknow¬
ledges that Esch achieves at least "eine Kompromisslbsung".
Those critics who condemn Esch's resigned commitment
to Mutter Hentjen at the end of the novel do so because they
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accept Broch's judgment which, in turn, is conditioned by
his own theory of values, his cyclical interpretation of
history and his highly specialized conception of ethics.
The following examination of Esch's reactions to his
meeting with Bertrand sets out to show that the insights
attributed to Esch at the end of this novel, and above all
his understanding, vague though it is, of the relationship
of empirical and transcendental reality, namely that the
fopia^V can never be more than a limited and symbolic
I a
realization of the former, anticipate numerous similar
statements in the later novels. Broch explicitly
criticises Esch's position as unethical although, in the
later novels, he no less explicitly approves exactly the
same attitude to reality as the only basis for the devel¬
opment of a healthy social reality built upon respect for-
every individual's human dignity. It can be argued that
the change in Broch's opinion was conditioned by a
progressively growing interest in practical morality, a
realization of the dangers inherent in his conception of
ethics, and the awareness that a new, humanitarian ethoe
must be based not on the transcendental Absolute of the
Logos, but on the earthly Absolute of man with all the
limitations this implies.
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b) Each'a Reactions to bis Heating with Bertrani.
Each meets Bertrand in the trance-like state of a
sleepwalker. The sleepwalking phenomenon has been best
analysed by Steinecke. Tie correctly emphasizes that
sleepwalking and the associated dream condition are
basically forms of heightened perception which combine
fear and hope, which look to the past and future. The
sleepwalker is aware of the dissolution of values and the
loss of security which comes from the disintegration of a
familiar although moribund reality. He wishes to free
himself from this past, but at the same time he fears the
freedom, insecurity and isolation to which he would be
exposed if he should succeed in breaking with his past.
In this freedom lies the hope and possibility, in theory
at least, of attaining a new understanding of reality, a
new form of life and human community based on respect for
both the vulnerability and inherent human dignity common
to all individuals. Such freedom may hold hope for the
future, but it necessarily implies a radical severance of
all connections with the past. This in turn implies a
rejection of all existing duties and responsibilities in
this life, a rejection which provokes justified feelings
of guilt, in the mind of the sleepwalker. These
distinguishing characteristics of the phenomenon of
sleepwalking in this novel are most clearly expressed in
three important passages (GW 2: 239-242, 314-319# 326-323).
When Esch meets Bertrand (GW 2: 319-326) he hopes
that the latter can advise him how to act in the above
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situation. As has bean mentioned, Bei'trand merely says
that the cycle of the dissolution and formation of values
must take its course; others xaay try to prevent the
catastrophe, but he intends to remain aloof from it all.
Esclx seems to understand what Bertrand means and attempts
to imitate his characteristic gestures. "Das war
einleuchtend wie alios, was Bertrand sagte, so einleuch-
tond und vertraut, dass das Wagnis, seine ironische kiene
nachzualmien, fast zur VerpflichLung, fast zum Binvei--
st&ndnis werden wollte." (GW 2: 324)
Bertrand warns 2soli that he will forget what he
has Been told (GW 2: 325) and, as will be shown, Esch's
subsequent behaviour reveals how he misunderstands and
distorts Bertrand's message. Bsch's first reaction to
mis meeting with Bertrand is an attempt to follow the
latter1s example of severing all connections with the
demands of social reality (GW 2: 323-334)• he fails to
realize the full import of bertrand's words: they imply
u withdrawal into aesthetic isolation and in the final
consequence, if carried to their logical conclusion, to
suicide. Esch, however, tries to achieve such freedom
and isolation within the limitations of empirical reality
and the social context. lie hurriedly tries to settle his
affairs in Mannheim and break off all personal relation¬
ships there. It is noticeable that he comments upon his
decisions and actions with Bertrand's words and gestures.
"Es gait sich loszul&sen aus der Verstrickung des
Vergangenen, auf dass man nicht leide. . . Esch machte
eine wegwerfende Bewegung mit seinerx schierxkernderx H&rxden,
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unl eine ironische Grimasse gelang ihm lesgleichen."
/ n-'.r o « \ 17
(G • 2 % J o 1)
Esch's last meal with his Mannheim friends is
described as "ein Fest der Losl&sung aus lienor irdischen
Gomeinschaft" (G".> 2: 332) » This section of the novel
ends With the following words. "Solcherart endete der
Tag seiner orsten Losl&sung uad lie ersto Nacht des
ungewohnten,• unangenehmon Verzichtes bracfe ftlr ihn an."
(GW 2: 334) "Dies© irdische Gemeinschaft" is shown in
two lights. Its negative aspect is embodied in the
selfishness and hypocrisy of Erna Kora and in the brutal
sexuality of her brother, Salthasar. Srna is described
as "dor Toufal der Verganganheit selber, . » . Fratze des
Irlischen, unbesiegbarer und h&hni :?cher derm je, fordernd,
'ass nan stets aufs neue hinabsteige in die Verstrickung
Aos Gowesenen" (G'h 2: 331) * b7© read of "all das Irdische
und Flelschlicha von ICorns haisshungrigom Gehaben", and
Broch continues; "os quoll fiber das Zimrner hinaus, drchte
die ganze h'elt ftberin&clitig zu orf(Allen, aufquoll das
Vergangene und Unab&nderliche, alles andere verdr&ngend,
die Hoffnung erstickend." (GLr 2: 332-333) • However
unpleasant empirical reality and the past may be, they
cannot be simply obliterated. For better or worse the
individual must come to terms with his own reality.
It is revealing, however, that Esch is more worried
by the positive aspects of the reality he lives in,
especially by the need for moral responsibility and duty
to one's fellow-men. In Esch Martin Geyring, the crippled
socialist and trade-unionist, stands for such a commitment.
T05
bithin the given possibilities of action, accepting the
limitations imposed upon him by the current political
climate, he does what he can to improve the lot of the
18
working man. Eschfs decision to break with the past,
to seek absolute freedom from all commitments it. over¬
shadowed by Geyring1s threat that he will end his friend¬
ship with Eseh if he ever finds out that Esch has acted
immorally or irresponsibly towards other people (GY' 2:
330-231). In this passage Geyring is referring above all
to Esch's earlier1 boast that he will kill Bertrand or at
least denounce him to the police as a homosexual. lie had
already warned Esch against any such action before the
latter left ''or Ba-ionweiler (GTr 2; 311-312), Geyring's
threat, his remia - or of the common decencies and human
responsibilities in life hang ever Esch and more than
outweigh his delight at escaping, as he thinks, from the
mora unpleasant aspects of human society as embodied in
Ei'na and Balthasar Kora,
We now come to the "Sclilaflose" episode (GW 2:
334-340). There can ba no doubt that Broch attached
considerable significance to this part of the novel: apart
from the sleeptalking passages, it is the only section of
the novel to be given a separate sub-title. Steinecke
suggests that Broch here merely presents a further
19variation of the sleepwalking phenomenon. The very
choice of Broch's title would seem to speak against such
an interpretation. The state of the sleepless person is
exactly the opposite of that of the sleepwalker. Kreutzer
°,06
mentions this passage very briefly without commenting on
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the choice of title. He reals a negative interpretation
into this episode, suggesting that in it Esch makes the
mistaken decision to try to find absolute security by
committing himself totally to Mutter Hentjen and. by
raising human love to the level of an absolute value,
According to Kreutzer, Esch is guilty of resorting to a
21
nromantische Scheinlbsung". Romanticism is here under¬
stood in the special definition formulated by Broch and
use d throughout all his writings: "P.omantik . ., wean
Irdisches zu Absolut em erhoben wird." (GW 2: 19)
Kreutzer supports his conclusion with a quotation from the
end, of the "Schlaflose" episode: "die wahre Aufgabe der
Liebe hatte or in einer vollkommenen Entscheidung nuf
sich genommen, da or sein irdisches Loben Mutter Hentjen
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unterwarf," Kreutzer' s criticism must be called in
question because he omits an extremely important quotation
from the same page of the novel (CM ?: 340) which shows
that Esch was well aware of the limited and merely symbolic
value of his love for Mutter Hentjen. This passage will
bo quoted in due course. Manfred Lange and Manfred Sera
both offer positive interpretations of the "Schlaflose"
episode and Esch's commitment to flutter Hentjen, seeing in
23
it a reaction against Bertrand's aestheticism and nihilism.
Their views confirm the following analysis of that part of
the novel.
As shown above, in the interval betxvpen the sleep¬
walking and the "Schlaflose" episodes Esch can be seen
attempting a literal realization of Bertrand's prophecy
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that the only way to avoid suffering in the dissolution of
values is to attain absolute freedom from any involvement
in the problems of empirical reality and social
responsibility. Esch fails to understand that such a
solution can only be achieved in death.
In "Der Schlaflose" we see Esch coming to a re¬
assessment of his previous decision, but not yet fully
shaking off Bertrand's influence. One of the problems
of interpreting this episode is that it deliberately
reflects the confusion in Esch's mind of the various
concepts of salvation and methods of restoring order to
the world which he has unconsciously assimilated from his
meetings with other people in the course of the novel.
The most important are as follows: his belief, adopted
from Bertrand, that the new utopia will be ushered in by
the sacrificial death of a saviour and the birth of a new
saviour; his conviction that he can begin a new, ordered
existence only if he can obliterate the memory of Mutter
Hentjen's first husband and father a child on her; his
assumption that justice and order will, symbolically at
least, be restored to the world only if he saves Ilona
from Balthasar Korn's lust and from Teltscher's knife-
throwing act. Common to all these viex^s, which are
deliberately intermingled with perplexing confusion, is
Esch's conviction that a break must be made with the past
through some sort of self-sacrifice before the new utopia
can be realized.
This analysis of the passage concentrates on those
aspects which illustrate Eschss reaction to the Badenweiler
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meeting. Some comment must first be made on the
phenomenon of sleeplessness. Like that of sleepwalking
it clearly implies a degree of heightened perception.
Commenting on some of Esch's more confused speculations,
Broch states: "Dem Wachenden mag solches unlogisch
erscheinen, aber er vergisst, dass er selber zuiaeist in
einer Art D&mmerzustand sich befindet und dass bloss der
#1
Schlaflose in seiner Ubewachheit wahrhaft logisch denkt."
(GW 2: 336-337)# The sleepless person, like the sleep¬
walker, is endowed with a form of higher logic. In his
dream-like state the sleepwalker envisages salvation and
the establishment of a new utopia following upon the
catastrophic dissolution of values and the necessary
exposure of the individual to the terrifying isolation of
absolute freedom. The sleepless person, however, itfhose
condition is described as "Uberwachheit" and to whom can
perhaps be ascribed a more conscious and rational form of
perception, comes to a completely different conclusion.
He decides that a nex* social order can be approached not
by the irresponsible destruction of the old one and the
abandonment of all responsibilities, but through a positive
acceptance of the moral duties of life and a practical
commitment to one's fellow-men in love and service.
At the start of "Der Schlaflose" Esch prepares
himself for bed, successfully imitating Bertrand's grimace
(GW 2: 334). He is thoroughly satisfied and convinced
that he has followed Bertrand's advice and severed all ties
\tfith the past, freeing himself from all social and personal
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responsibilities. His newly found sense of freedom and
peace of mind are soon disturbed when he re-reads a letter
from Mutter Hentjen in which she reminds him of her
reliance on him and says that she will take him with her
into the grave rather than lose him (GW 2s 334)• He
tries to banish such thoughts by deliberately conjuring
up prurient pictures of the sexual initiation, just then
taking place in a neighbouring room, of Lohberg by his
own former lover, Erna Korn. He also does this to
convince himself that he is now beyond such temptations
(GW 2: 335). Again the memory of Mutter Hentjen
intrudes: "Leicht w&re das Leben, wenn ihn dies alles
bei Mutter Hentjen ebenso gleichgttltig liesse." (GW 2s
335).
The new found freedom and the sexual abstinence
put too great a strain on Esch. He would willingly give
them up, abandon Bertrand's example and return to Erna1s
bed. An irrational fear prevents him from doing this,
but he rationalizes it in accordance with Bertrand's
prophecy that the new era will be heralded by the birth of
a saviour. He imagines that this will be Erna's child
and that it would be a fitting fulfilment of the prophecy
if the child were to be fathered not by himself but by
"ein keuscher Josef", as Lohberg is regularly referred to
in the novel. Esch then angrily rejects any such literal
realization of Bertrand's words, largely because he
cannot imagine a saviour being born of Erna, "das
ktimmerliche irdische Gef&ss" (GW 2: 336). This insight
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is accompanied by an abortive attempt to imitate Bertrand's
grimace# "Der Schlaflose versucht wieder, seine
ironische Grimasse zu Ziehen, aber es gelingt ihm nicht
mehr," (GW 2: 336)
At this point Esch is beginning to realize that
complete withdrawal from life is impossible except through
death, but he still envisages some sort of literal
fulfilment of Bertrand's prophecy, Esch, "der Schlaflose",
then embarks on a nex\? chain of thought in which Bertrand's
ideas are modified to suit his own situation (GW 2: 336-
337). Confused memories of the concept of sacrificial
death and Mutter Hentjen's letter lead him to imagine that
he and she might be united in death and thus inaugurate
the new era. It is significant that Esch here departs
radically from Bertrand's thinking. The latter had stated
that the dissolution of values must lead to the absolute
isolation and freedom of the individual and that the only
way one could avoid the resultant chaos was by total
withdrawal from all social contact and responsibility.
Esch has not the courage to accept the consequences of
such a step: even in his imagined death he seeks the
comfort and security of human fellowship: "Der Schlaflose
. . . will in aller Ernsthaftigkeit fiber die erreichbare
Geraeinschaft nachdenken, fiber des Traumas Erffillung, die
zur Vollendung ftihren soil." (GW 2: 337). Still
obsessed by the prophecy that a new saviour must be born
after the sacrificial death, Esch is perplexed as to how
he and Mutter Hentjen could produce a child if they were
both dead, Broch here comments explicitly that Esch
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himself cannot understand his own thoughts*
Esch's thoughts mw approach even closer to the
plane of familiar, empirical reality as he tries to
rationalize his ideas of death, sacrifice and re-birth to
correspond to his personal situation (GW 2s 338-339) He
decides that Mutter Hentjen's infertility and her
refusal to forget her dead husband in fact constitute a
form of symbolic death since they prevent her living life
to the full in the present. He concludes that if he
takes this death upon himself by marrying her he will make
the sacrifice necessary to restore order to the world and
save Ilona from Teltscher's knives. Clearly Bertrand's
words about the need for a single sacrificial death to
redeem the world still influence Esch's thinking. Such
a symbolic form of death satisfies Esch because his
marriage to Mutter Kentjen would create the possibility of
the fulfilment of the second part of Bertrand's prophecy,
namely the birth of a new saviour. "Nun war kein Zweifel
mehr, dass er, der Lebende, von dem die Frauen das Kind
empfangen durften, dass er, sich hingebend an Mutter
Hentjen und an ihren Tod, dass er durch diese ausser-
gew&hnliche Massnahme nicht nur die Erl&sung Ilonas
vollendet, ... sondern dass er notwendig damit auch
Mutter Ilentjen vora Tode errettet, lebend wieder ihr Schoss,
jenen zu geb&ren, der die Zeit aufrichten wird." (GW 2:
339)
If the "Schlaflose" episode were to end here one
could agree with Kreutzer's criticism that Esch deliberately
refuses to accept the frightening implications of Bertrand's
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prophecy of the dissolution of values. According' to this
criticism, Esch cannot face the isolation and alienation
which the dissolution of values must bring. He therefore
distorts and rationalizes Bertrand's message in such a way
that he convinces himself that he is making a sacrifice
for Mutter Hentjen, whereas he is really making an
absolute of love in order to create a false haven of
security in which to shelter from the increasing
uncertainties of life.
Esch's decision is, however, qualified by the
following passage which Kreutzer chooses to ignore. "Da
ist es ihm nun, als k&me er mit seinera Bett aus weitester
Feme angefahren, und als sttlnde es nun wieder an einer
bestimmten Stelle in einem bestimmten Alkoven, und der
Schlaflose, wiedergeboren in neuerwachtem Verlangen, weiss,
dass er am Ziele ist, zwar noch nicht an jenem letzten, in
dem Sinnbild und Urbild wieder zur Einheit werden, aber
doch an jenem vorl'Aufigen Ziel, mit dem der Irdische sich
begntigen muss, Ziel, das er Liebe nennt und das wie ein
letzterreichbarer fester Punkt der Kttste vor dem
Unerreichbaren steht." (GW 2: 339-340)
Here it is quite clear that Esch, with the
heightened perception of "der Schlaflose", is aware of the
limited and merely symbolic nature of his commitment to
Mutter Hentjen. He does not raise it to the level of an
absolute, but knows that within the limitations of daily
reality this love is the closest he can come to realizing
the unattainable of perfect union and identification
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between tx\?o individuals. As a normal human being, Eseh
cannot face the logical consequences of Bertrand's
analysis of the dissolution of values, namely that the
individual should accept the complete disintegration of
his familiar reality in the hope, and it is no more than
that, that the fear and alienation born of the resulting
chaos will unite people in love who, for the first time
have been compelled to recognize their desperate need of
each other and to acknowledge their identity in the fear
and isolation which they share.^
As will be shown, Esch's understanding of the
symbolic significance of his love for Mutter Hentjen is
initially clouded for a time when he returns from his
"sleepless" condition to the pressures of daily life.
The positive value we can assign to his decision to marry
Mutter Hentjen is confirmed by a comparison between his
marriage and that of Joachim v. Pasenow and Elizabeth v.
Baddensen in the first novel of the trilogy. Pasenoxv's
marriage is romantic in Broch's definition of the word,
Pasenow consciously takes refuge in the conventions of
Christian marriage, knowing these conventions to be
irrelevant to the pressures, tensions and needs of the
modern world. In his own mind he raises Elisabeth to the
level of the Madonna and at the same time selfishly
sacrifices her feelings by marrying her not out of love,
but out of a desperate need for security. Pasenow makes
an absolute of human love, failing to realize that it is
only an earthly symbol of the unattainable ideal of man's
perfect union and harmony with all Being. The cycle of
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the creation and dissolution of values represents the
progressive but never ending realization of that ideal as
man continually revises and extends his understanding of
reality. Pasenow is terrified of what such new reality
might hold, above all the challenge of isolation and
absolute freedom as moribund dogmas and conventions become
increasingly irrelevant to the human situation and the
individual is more and more thrown back upon himself.
Esch is better aware of the implications of the
dissolution^ of values although he does not see it in the
philosophical terms of an existential crisis. For him
the problem remains on the more concrete level of trying
to rebuild a new ordered life from the anarchy of social
values surrounding him. He decides to build his new life
on the foundation of his commitment to Mutter Iientjen,
but, unlike Paaenow, he has no illusions about the frailty
or transience of his love. It represents a dogged
decision on his part to make the most of the given
possibilities of living a decent, ordered life, recognizing
his own weaknesses and needs and, eventually, those of his
wife. Such resignation does not blind him to the possible
existence of a different, better life, sjrmbolized in his
case by his dream of emigrating to America. He comes to
accept that in the given circumstances such an ideal is
beyond his reach and that he must make the best of what
he has.
His thoughts about his situation never receive
articulate philosophical expression. The closest they
come to this is in the passage already quoted from the
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"Schlaflose" episode, and at the very end of the novel
(GW 2; 363-365)# Even here his ideas are coloured and
distorted by his confused thoughts about salvation and
his obsession with somehow attaining it literally in the
context of a new life within a new, secure and harmonious
2 5
social order. The essence of these insights, which he
does not and cannot express as such, is as follows. Like
Pasenow, Esch is frightened by the dissolution of values,
but his knowledge is such that he can honestly admit the
limitations of love and all human relationships in the
face of eternity and the transcendental reality of the
Logos. He can see love as an imperfect and symbolic
realization in empirical reality of the ideal harmony and
order of all Being. By accepting his human responsibil¬
ities he helps to create a degree of harmonious order in
the earthly context which mirrors, however imperfectly,
the ideal unity of all reality tvhich is guaranteed by the
Logos•
Esch's solution in marrying Mutter Hentjen can
thus in no way be equated with Pasenow's Romanticism.
The final episodes in Esch's story can be dealt
with more briefly. He returns to Cologne and Mutter
Hentjen. "Er hatte sich fttr Mutter Hentjen entschieden.
Endgttltig." (GW 2: 341) It is at once evident that the
insights gained by him in his "sleepless" condition have
been, at least temporarily, forgotten. He again thinks
of making a complete break with the past and seeking out
his new Utopia by emigrating to America, if necessary with
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Mutter Hentjen (GW 2: 345)* At one point he even feels
that his self-sacrificial commitment to Mutter Hentjen has
been wasted because it prevents him from attaining such
freedom (GW 2: 344). As long as he thinks that he can
accomplish the complete break with the past by emigrating
to America and thus, as he thinks, follow Bertrand's
advice of staying aloof from the threatening crisis of the
dissolution of values in Europe he can still imitate
Bertrand's grimace (GW 2: 349). Clearly Bertrand's
influence has once again re-asserted itself.
At this point Broch introduces the meditation of
the homosexual musician, Alfons, about the nature of human
love and its seeming futility (GW 2: 349-350). Alfons
repeats Bertrand's ideas about the impossibility of making
an absolute of human love,
"Er wusste, dass man das Absolute noch lange nicht erreicht,
indem man sich fttr eine Frau entscheidet. Und er
entschuldigte auch die bbsartige Wut der Manner, denn er
wusste eben auch, dass sie aus der Angst und aus der
Entt&uschung entspringt, wusste, dass jene leidenschaft-
lichen und bftsartigen Mhnner hinter einem Stttck Ewigkeit
her sind, damit es sie vor der Angst beschfttze, die in
ihrem Riicken steht und ihnen den Tod verkttndet. Ein
dummer und gedankenloser Orchestergeiger war er, aber er
konnte Sonaten auswendig spielen, und vielerlei wissend,
durfte er trotz seiner Traurigkeit darttber Iftcheln, dass
die Leute in ihrer angstvollen Sucht nach dem Absoluten
sich ewig lieben wollen, vermeinend, ihr Leben v;erde dann
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kein Ende nehmea und ewig w&hren. Mochten sie ihn
geringschStzen, weil er auch Potpourris und Polka-Schnell
spielen musste, er hatte trotzdem erkannt, dass diese
Gehetzten, die das Unverg&ngliche und Absolute im Irdischen
suchen, immer nur Sinnbild und Ersatz finden flir das, was
sie suchen, ohne dass sie es benennen k&nnten." (GW 2:
349-350)
Steinecke has suggested that these words must be
read as a criticism of Esch's decision to marry Mutter
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Hentjen. In the context of this novel such an inter¬
pretation can only have a limited application to Esch's
behaviour immediately after his return from the
"Schlaflose" episode in Mannheim at the time when he seems
to have forgotten the insights he gained as "der Schlaflose".
Alfons's words, and especially occurring where they do in
the novel, raise certain difficulties. The problem is
that they confirmbut criticize Esch's insight in the
"Schlaflose" episode where he realizes that his love can
only be a symbol and not an absolute in itself. As that
passage, which has already been quoted above, stands, it
leaves no doubt that a definite positive value is
attributed to Esch's new found belief. Similarly, the
last four pages of the novel (GW 2: 363-366), which will
be quoted in due course, confirm that Esch after the brief
period when he hopes that he can realize the new order by
fleeing to America, returns to that original conclusion
already reached in "Der Schlaflose" and which Alfons
reiterates; all human life, all aspects of love, duty and
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service are merely earthly symbols of a higher reality
which, as is explained later in "Der Zerfall der Werte",
is guaranteed by the Logos. The important difference
between Alfons and Esch is that the former, speaking as
he does for Bertrand and thus indirectly for Broch himself,
can see no point in clinging to and perpetuating human
relationships which, at the best, can be only an imperfect,
symbolic realization of a higher, ideal reality and which,
by their continued existence, temporarily hinder the
dissolution of values which must precede the progressive
revelation of that new reality, whether it be seen in
purely social or existential terms, Alfons, like Bertrand,
is prepared to sacrifice all human relationships because
they can never have an absolute value. Esch, fully aware
of his human weakness and his need for fellowship and
security, cannot take such a step. He resigns himself
to the limitations of current, empirical reality,
ackmwledges the imperfect, merely symbolic nature of human
love and makes a virtue of it by seeing in it the best,
indeed the only possible realization in the human context
of the unattainable ideal of the perfect harmony, unity and
identification of the individual with all Being. The
difference is essentially one of perspective, namely
between that of the idealist and the realist, and, one
could add, between Broch as the author of Die Schlafwandler
and as the writer of the later novels.
Any implied criticism of Esch in this novel is
directly conditioned by Broch5s theory of the dissolution
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of values and his cyclical interpretation of history.
According to that theory, Esch's "moral" behaviour must be
condemned because it represents a refusal to accept the
"ethical" progress of the inevitable dissolution of values.
That is why Alfons describes human love as a false
2 g
Absolute, as "nur Sinnbild und Ersatz". It can be
argued that in the context of the whole of Broch's work
Esch's final decision must receive a much more positive
evaluation. It can be shown that in Per Tod des Vergil
and in the Bergroman Sroch explicitly welcomes earthly
life, human and social responsibilities, love and duty as
the onlj^ possible means by which man can approach and
realize, even if only partially and symbolically, the
ideal harmony of transcendental reality. In these novels
words such as "Sinnbild", "Echo", "Gleichnis" and "Spiegel"
all represent positive qualities of human life and
empirical reality in their relationship to transcendental
reality.
We can now return to Esch. A financial crisis
finally destroys all hope of escaping to Americaj "Hit
Amerika war's also Essig. Endgiiltig. " (GW 2: 356),
Esch's dreams of attaining absolute freedom, of breaking
with the past and reaching his utopia vanish; he is
forced to accept the inevitable limitations of his
situation: "Bern Unverhnderlichen, dam Gewesenen, dem
Irdischen ist nicht so leicht beizukommen." (GW 2: 358).
Esch's first reaction to this disillusionment is to make
Mutter Hentjen suffer for his bitterness and anger. Only
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very slcwly does he resign himself to his fate and fully
accept his responsibilities to his wife. He does not
forget his ideals of freedom, salvation and the creation
of a Utopian society, but he comes to accept that they
represent unattainable absolutes which can at best be
mirrored in the human community where each individual does
his best by his fellow-man. The last four pages of the
novel, which contain the statement of Esch's final position,
are quoted at length below,
" Er erkannte, dass im Realen niemals Erfiillung sein kbnne,
erkannte imiaer deutlicher, dass auch die weiteste Feme im
Realen lag, sinnlos jede Flucht, dort die Rettung vor dorn
Tod und die Erfiillung und die Freiheit zu suchen, - und so-
gar das Kind, komrnt es auch lebendig aus dem Leib der
Mutter, es bedeutet nicht mehr als der zufhllige Schrei
der Lust, in dem es empfangen wurde, verhallender und
Ihngst verwehter Schrei, der nichts ftir die Existenz des
Liebenden beweist, dem er gegolten hat. Frerad das Kind,
so fremd wie der vergangene Laut, frenid wie das Vergangene,
frerad wie der Tote und der Tod, hfelzern und ausgeleert.
Denn unab&nderlieh ist das Xrdische, mag es sich auch
scheinbar ver&ndern, und w&rde selbst die ganze Welt aufs
neue geboren, sie wlirde trotz des Erlbsers Tod den Stand
der Unschuld im Irdischen nicht erlangen, nicht ehe das
Ende der Zeit erreicht ist.
allein sie genttgte, um Esch zu veranlassen, dass er sich
in seinem irdischen Kblner Leben einrichtete, eine
Zwar war deutlich,
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anst&nriige Stellung suchte und seinern Gesch&fte aachgiag.
Dank der gutea Zeugnisse, die er besass, faad er eiaea
stolzerea uad verantwortungsvolleren Postea als je vorher
und erwarb nun wieder all denStolz und die Bewunderung,
die Mutter Hentjen ftlr ihn bereitliegan hatte. Sie
liess die Gaststube mit braunem Linoleum bespannen, und
jetzt, da die Gefahr der Auswanderung wohl eadgiiltig
gebannt x^ar, begann sie selber von den araerikanischen
Luftschlbssern zu sprechen. Er ging darauf ein, teils
x^reil er ftthlte, dass sie ihm mit solchen Gespr&chen eine
Freude zu machea glaubte, teils aus Pflichtgefiihl: denn
xtfird ar Amerika auch kaiun mehr zu Gesieht bekoramen, er xvird
den Weg dorthin nicht mehr verlassen, wird sich nicht urawen-
den, trotz des Unsichtbaren, der mit der Lanze folgt,
bereit zuzustossen, und ein Wissen, schwebend zwischen
Wuasch und Ahnung, sagfc ihm, dass der Weg nur mehr S3111bol
und Andeutuag eines hbheren Weges ist, dea man in
Wirklichkeit zu gehen hat und f&r den jener bloss das
irdische Spiegelbild ist, sehwankend und unsicher wie das
Bild im dunklen Teich. Es war ihm dies alles nicht v&llig
klar, ja selbst das Wort vom Geistigen, in dem die
Erfiillung und das Absolute zu suchen w5re, stand ihm nicht
zu Gebote. Aber er erkannte, dass es blosser Zufall war,
wenn die Addition der Koloanen stimmte, und so durfte er
das Irdische immerhin wie von einer hftheren Stufe aus
betrachten, wie von einem lichteren Schloss, das ttber der
Ebene sich erhebt, abgeschlossen gegea die Welt und doch
spiegelnd ihr ge&ffnet, und oft war es, als ob das Getane
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und das Gesprochene und Geschehene nichts w&re als eiri
Vorgang auf mattbeleuchteter Btihne, eine Darbietung, die
vergessen wird und nie vorhanden war, Gewesenes, an das
niemand sich klammern kann, ohne das irdische Leid zu
vergrBssern. Denn immer vei'sagt die Erflillung im Realen,
aber der Weg der Sehnsucht und der Freiheit ist unendlich
und niernals ausschreitbar, ist schrnal und abseitig wie
der des Schlafwandlers, wenn es auch der Weg ist, der in
die gebffneten Arme der Heimat fiihrt und an ihre atmende
Brust. So war Esch frenxd in seiner Liebe und doch mit
deia Irdischen vertrauter als frilher, so dass es nichts
verschlug und eigentlich iia Unirdischen blieb, wenn urn der
Gereehtigkeit willen noch nianches Irdische fllr Ilona zu
erledigen war. Er sprach mit Mutter Hentjen von dem
freien Amerika und von dem Verkauf der Wirtschaft und von
der Heirat ivie rait einera Kinde, dean man gern seinen "illen
tut, und manchmal konnte er sie nun wieder Gertrud nennen,
raochte sie auch in den NBchten, da ar in sie versank,
ihm namenlos sein. Sie gingen Hand in Hand, gioichwohl
ein jeder auf seinem andern und unendlichen Weg. Als sie
dann geheiratet hatten, und die Wirtschaft urn einen viel
zu billigen Preis verschleudert worden war, da warea es
Stationen auf dem Wege des Sinnbilds, dennoch Stationen
auf dem Wege der Ann&herung an das HBhere und Ewige, das
man, w&re Esch kein Freigeist gewesen, sogar das GBttliche
h&tte nennen kBnnen. Aber er wusste trotzdem, dass wir
hier auf Erden alle auf Krilcken unsern Pfad zu gehen haben.
Als das Theater in Duisburg Bankerott machte und
Teltscher mlt IXona wieder brotlos zu werden drohte,
steckten Esch und seine Frau fast den ganzen Rest ihres
VermBgens in das Theatergesch&ft, und bald hatten sie das
Geld endgtlltig verloren. Doch Esch fand nun die Stelle
eines Oberbuchhalters in einem grossen Industrieunter-
nehmen seiner luxemburgischen Ileimat, und seine Gattin
bewunderte ihn darob nur urn so mehr. Sie gingen Hand in
Hand und liebten einander. Manchmal schlug er sie noch,
aber immer weniger und schliesslich gar nicht mehr.
(GW 2: 363-366).
The reference to crutches here is particularly
interesting because Martin Geyring, the crippled trade-
unionist who walks on crutches, is the only person in the
whole novel who consistently speaks and acts according to
the dictates of practical humanity. There is a suggestion
that Esch, to some extent at least, concurs with Geyring's
views of simply doing the best possible for his fellow-men
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in the given circumstances. Further confirmation for a
positive interpretation of the end of Esch can be found in
the last chapter of the trilogy, the epilogue of "Der
Zerfall der Werte". There Broch says that even in the
final catastrophe of the dissolution of values and the
collapse of social order man cannot and should not try to
escape from his responsibilities. He must come to terms
ttfith the problems of life and not try to stand aloof from
them. In the chaos which lies between the destruction of
one absolute system of values and the gradual rebirth of
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the next man can only seek "die endliche Furt, die sein
Leben und seine Sicherheit sein soil" (GW 2: 678). A
similar opinion is also expressed later: "die Idee der
Freiheit 1st es, in der die eivige Erneuerung des Humanen
sich rechtfertigt, denn im Irdischen muss der Weg zu ihr
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stets von neuem beschritten werden," (GW 2: 68l).
It should be remembered that in Hunuenau Esch suffers,
as it were, a relapse. He is still concerned with common
decency, "Ansthndigkeit" (GW 2: 456, 562), but has taken
refuge in Protestant sectarianism, seeking there a
security he cannot find elsewhere. Broch's critical
analysis of Protestantism in "Der Zerfall der Werte" (GW 2i
510-517, 554-559) leaves no doubt that, according to his
theory of values, Esch's conversion represents a retrograde
step in his perception of the problems caused by a
disintegrating reality.
At this point part of the study of Der Tod des
Vergil and the Bergromac can be usefully anticipated.
Broch's explicit criticism of Esch's position at the end
of the second novel of the trilogy, both in his corres¬
pondence and through the words of those characters who are
used to express his theories of love and values, is that
he clings to the existing conventions of behaviour in his
search for meaning and security in life. In doing this
Esch acts morally but, in Broch's definition of the word,
unethically because he resists the dissolution of values
which must occur before a new absolute system of values can
develop. I have suggested earlier that a certain
ambivalence can be seen in Broch's criticism of Esch. On
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occasion he seems prepared to acknowledge that Esch's
solution of accepting the limitations of empirical reality
and his human responsibilities within the social community
may have a certain value as a provisional compromise
because he at least recognizes them as symbols, however
imperfect, of a higher reality beyond his grasp.
In Per Tod clas Vergil and the Gergroraan all such
reservations on Broch's part vanish. There he regularly
emphasizes that although man may, indeed should know that
his earthly life is but a shadow or symbol of the higher,
Platonic reality, his first responsibility lies in living
this earthly life to the full by finding fulfilment in the
service of humanity. Only in this way can he, within his
natural limitations, approach and realize, even if only
partially and symbolically, the Platonic reality guaranteed
by the Logos, Man can be fully integrated into this
higher reality only through death, as are Vergil, Mutter
Gisson and also Andreas in Die Schuldlosen, but until he
dies he must accept his physical limitations and seek to
recreate the ideal harmony of the transcendental plane
within the context of human life and society.
It is possible to see in this change of emphasis a
reflection of Broch's increasing interest in practical
morality and humanity at the expense of his reliance on his
dialectical theory of values. In the political application
of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" Broch rejects the
idea of absolute freedom, which he had postulated in "Der
Zerfall der Werte" as the necessary pre-condition for the
growth of a new unitary value-sj^stem, and maintains that
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in the social context man can attain only a limited degree
of freedom which is nevertheless symbolic of the ideal,
absolute freedom of the Logos.
The result of this change in Broch > s thinking can
be clearly seen by comparing the last four pages of Esch
and the insights gained in the "Schlaflose" episode with
numerous passages from Per To 1 des Vergil and the Bergroman.
In Esch \irords such as "Sirinbild", "Spiegelbild" , "Symbol",
"das Irdische", "das Reale" are all supposed to carry for
the reader negative or pejorative implications. Broch
deliberately uses them in a context which expresses
failure and a tired resignation, a reluctant acceptance
of the limitations of human life as a mere shadow of
something higher. Whether the reader concurs with Broch's
interpretation must depend on whether he can agree with
the theory of the dissolution of values and the cyclical
interpretation of history exemplified in the trilogy.
In the two later novels such words and others like
them, especially "Echo", "Abbild", "Spiegel" and "Gleichnis"
assume an unequivocally positive value for Broch. The
following representative passages from the Bergroman have
been chosen from all three versions, which were written in
1933-1936, 1936 and 1950-1951 respectively. This makes
clear that Broch's revised and more positive evaluation of
earthly life and human responsibilities as valid symbols
of the ideal unity of transcendental reality can be traced
back to the period immediately after the completion of
Die Schlafwandler. I have suggested that at least
indications of such a change can be seen in Esch, There
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is no doubt that the passages to be quoted from the
3ergroman and Per Tod des Vergil imply a radical revision
of Broch's original criticisms of Esch's final insights
and decisions at the end of the second novel of the
trilogy.
All the quotations reveal a similarity in language
and theme to the comparable passages in Each.
Just before her death, Mutter Gisson speaks the
following words to the narrator.
"Alle Sehnsucht gilt dem fernen Licht, den unsichtbaren,
immer nur erahnten, das bloss im Bild und Aberbild den
Schein der Helle hinterl&sst, so gross sein Glanz, dass
keines Menschen Auge es je erspfthen vrird, kein kftnftigstes
Geschlecht ...
Poch bildlos whre deine LJelt, whr's nicht ein
US
Ruhen. Und all dein Schreiten wltr'^oin leei^es Hasten
vora Unerfassten zu dem Unerfassten, w&r's es nicht ein
Ruhen. Du schaust die Zeit, ihr Quell 1st zeitenferne,
und zeitenfern' kehrt sie zum Quell zurttck, ein Hinunels-
schacht, in dessen tiefster Erde, dir selber Quell und
M&ndung, deine Seele ist, und einer Mutter gleich, die
ihrem Kinde ein Bild urns andere aufschl&gt und ihm zaigt,
so ahnt sie weisend dir das feme Licht, dein Wissen, das
Bild urn Bild aus deinem Dunkel steigt. Denn nur in Bilde
deiner Irdischkeiten siehst du das Licht, zu den du
heimwhrts strebst, und wire nicht dein irdisch ruhig
Schreiten, der Himmel wire nicht, in dem du ruhend schwebst.
Und in der Mitte ruht dein fernstes Ziel." (Bergroman I;
428-429)
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The impressive beauty of the Austrian Alps leads the
narrator to contemplate: "Hohe Erde, in der das Echo
klingt, spiegelnder Garten, der die Mitte des Seins
umschliesstJ Suchte nicht auch ioh den Quell des eigenen
Schos, da ich nach dem Slick fahndete, der aus mir
hinausdringt, das Seiende umfassend, mich zu ihm
hintragend?" (Bergromaa I: 379)•
One of the most important passages for our purpose
is that describing how the narrator tries to forget the
pain caused by the death of his lover by immersing himself
in the duties of life and work.
" Er sehnt sich nach der befehlenden Stinime, die sein
inneres Grauen hbert&nt, nach der Stirame, die ihn zur
Pflicht ruft: sei treu, tue deine Arbeit, halte aus, . . .
tue es urn deiner Ewigkeit willen, denn ich, die Stimme
deiner Pflicht, ich habe die Last deiner Entscheidungen
und deiner Verantwortung auf mich genomnien, ich bin lie
Stiimne deines Gewissens, und ich ffthre dichj Es ist die
Stimme dor Icleinen Erlbsung, dor irdischon Eribsung, sie
ist nicht die der grossen, die aus den Sph&ren komr.it und
das Herz erbehen macht, sie ist nicht die des erlbsenden
Wissens, aber sie wird dem Menschen eher zuteil, unl auch
in ihr schwingt die Ewigkeit, freilich nur die Ewigkeit des
Irdischen, nichtsdestoweniger auch sie zura Unendlichen
hintftnend und es verheissend, unendlich wie der irdische
Zeitablauf, nicht mehr, doch auch nicht weniger, ewig wie
der Rhythmus dei1 Arbeit, der die irdische Zeit erfttllt."
(Eergroman II: 519)^1
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It can be argued that in his commitment to Mutter
Kentjen Esch achieves this "kleine Erlbsung", which
compares very favourably with the wildly impossible and
confused dreams of salvation he has earlier in the novel.
It is still, however, only "die kleine Erl&sung". Final
salvation, perfect pjeace and security, the ideal union
with all Being can be attained only through death.
When the narrator makes fun of Mutter Gisson's
seeming approval of certain local superstitions she
repi'oves him with the following words.
"lierr Doktor ... muss ich dir eigens sagen, dass aus
dem Hinschauen und Kinlauschen immer nur das Echo zu
gewinnen ist? Zeit urn Zeit sind miteinander verschlungen,
uad jede gibt ihr Bild weiter, eia Echo urns andere, so
dass wir nie das letzte kriegen und trotzdem damit zufrieden
sein miissen, dean nicht einiual las Echo, niclit das
leisaste, wiirde die Welt hergeben, wenn lu keine Lieb fiir
sie hast iui Ilinlauschen und Hinschauen und schon vorher,
ja bevor las Lauschen und Schauen begoaaan hat . . ."
(Dei'fcToaaa III; 191-192)
The narrator accepts this reproof and concludes:
"Sich mit dera Echo bescheiden und doch Jabei seinen
Reichtum suchoa, das war Mutter Gissons Weisheit und das
Wissen ihres Herzans,"
The final quotation is from a lengthy meditation of
the narrator's about the problematical relationship between
man and the higher world of transcendental reality. Again,
as so often in this novel, such thoughts are stimulated by
o on/wjU
the contemplation of Nature.
"Aus den unbekannten Ordnungen, hinter denen, ilinen
zugehbrig and zugleich nicht-zugehbrig, freiheits- and
unfreilieitstrftchtig zugleich, unser letzter gemeinsamer
Ursprung sich verbirgt, sind wir, Raumschicht urn
Kaumschicht durchquerend, unablBssig unserer irdischen
L'ohnstatt zugewandert, und obzwar wir sie unablftssig
erreichen, nimmt die l-'anderung kein Ende, denn so
unerinnerbar die LapdGchaftslosiglce.it auch ist, ihr Bild
hat, wiewohl bewusstseins-stuirun, unsern Blick erfftllt,
ist unsere traumhafte Sehnsucht nach dem vollkommenen
Abbild im Irdischen gev/orden und darum unsere Entt&urchung,
da wir es in solcher Vollkommenheit hier kaur: finden und
noch viel weniger su errichten vermbgen, so dass wir,
miide der Suche, ursprungswhrts zuriickstreben, gebannt an
das Zwischenreich. Doch der Alternde, sorerne es ihm
beschieden worden ist, sein Auge mehr und mehr mit der
Landschaftslosigkeit zu erflillen, er, der solcherart mehr
und mehr die grcsse Gemeinsamkeit erahnt, er weiss, dass
es kein vollkonuaenes Abbild gibt, dass aber dafiir dem, der
wirklich sucht, das vollkommene Sinnbild in der Seins-
ganzheit sichtbar v/erden kann. " (Bergroman II1: 142-
, A N 3 214a)
One of the main themes of Per Tod dcs Vergil is
man's need to understand the significance of his finite,
temporal existence within the context of infinity and
eternity. Only such an understanding can overcome fear
of deathj death should ideally be seen not as the ultimate
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extinction, but as the gateway from a lower to a higher
plane of reality. It is regxilarly emphasized that,
except through death, man cannot escape the limitations
imposed on him by empirical reality. Any knowledge he
can gain of transcendental reality must necessarily be
partial and limited, based as it is on human experience.
Nevertheless, by extending the range of human knowledge,
by using the divine gift of reason to attempt to under¬
stand all life as a meaningful unity, man symbolically
recreates on earth the perfect harmony which is inherent
in and guaranteed by the Logos, the formal Ground of all
being. Man fulfils his humanity specifically by the
creative application of reason within the bounds of his
temporal, finite existence. "Und mag die Erkenntnis-
fl
aufgabe auch oft und oft bis ins Uberirdische reichen, mag
ihr sogar die Vereinigung der getremiten All-Sph&ren
aufgetragen sein, es gibt keine echte Aufgabe ohne
irdischen Ausgangspunkt, keine, die niclit mit MBglich-
keiten ihrer LBsung irdisch verwurzelt wftre.B (GT 3:
115)3-^
One of the consequences for Vergil of the
revelations granted to him in the "Schicksalselegien"
(GW 3: 221-227} is a heightened perception of the positive
value of earthly reality, a reality from which he had
previously taken refuge in the ivory tower of aestheticism,
as the complement of transcendental reality. He conies to
realize that death is merely the border between the two
planes of reality and is prepared tc welcome it as such,
rs nrs
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longing; to hear "die neue Sprache, das neue Wort, die
neue Stimme" (GW 3: 235), "die Stinime der Grenze" (GW 3!
236) which will explain and reveal this other reality to
him. He even Irishes he could reproduce this new
knowledge in his. poetry in order to communicate it to
others, But it is made clear that this voice and its
message, which come from beyond the barrier of death, are
incomprehensible to man unless expressed in human terms
and earthly symbols: transcendental reality is by
definition beyond human comprehension and can only bo
approached and symbolically realized through empirical
reality,
"fie, Stimme dor Stimmen, ausserhalb jeglieher Soroche,
gewaltiger als jede, gewaltiger sogar aIs die dor Musik,
yewaltiger als .jeglicher Sang, sie, die ein Herzschlag
ist, ein einziger Herzschlag, well sie nur do die
Erkenntniseinheit des Seins herzschlagrasch, augenblicks-
rasch zu umfassen imstande sein wird, sie, eine Stimme
der Unerfasslichkeit, das Unerfassliche au.sdrf.Vckend, das
Unerfassliche seiend, unerreichbar der menschlichen Sprache,
unerreichbar dem irdischen Sinnbild, Urbild aller Stinunen
und allor Sinnbilder dank unorroichbarster Unmittelbarkeit,
sie kann solch unausdenkbaror Grenzjenseitigkeit bloss
riann genttgen, ist nur dann mhglich, wenn sie selber alles
Irdische hbertrifft, und w&ro doch wieder unmftglich, ja
unausdenkbar, wttrde sie den Trdischen nicht Hthneln; mag
sie also auch nit irdischen Stimmen, nit irdischen "sort
und irdischer Sprache nichts raohr gemein haben und kaum
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mehr irdisches Sinnbild sein, sie kaan das Urbild, auf
dessen unirdische Unmittelbarkeit sie gerichtet ist, erst
daaa offenbarea, wena sie es in einer irdischen
Unsaittolbarkeit spiegelt: Bill a.a Bill gereiht> so
fiihrt im Irdischen jade Sianbildkette zu einer irdischen
Uniaittelbarkeit, zu oiaom irdischea Gesehehaa, uad muss
trotzdoiii - ein Susserster Zwaag filr den Menschen -
dai'ttber hinausgefiihrt werden, muss Ciki* jeie irdische
Unmittelbarkeit lie ihr zagehbrige und doch h&here jonseits
dor Grease finden, muss las irdische Geschehea ftber seine
Diesseitigkeit hiaaus zura nochinaligon Siaabil l srheben,
und ob die Sinnbildketto auch iramer wieder an dor Gr jnze
zu zerroissen droht, zerbrechond an der Grease des
• 1
Uberirdischen, vergeherid am "diderstand der Unerreichbar-
keit, fttr immerdar unfortsetzbar, fftr immerdar zerrissen,
es wir 1 lie Gefahr gebanat, wird iinaier wieiar gobanirt, es
wir l die ?ianbildkette iiiuuer wieler geschlossen, sooft das
Unerreichbare sich selber ins Brreichbare verv/andelt und,
iaimoi* wieder, ins Irdische horabsteigt, ixm sich selber zum
irdischen Ceschehen, zur irdischen Tat zu verdichten, zu
verkloinern, zu versichtbarlichen, urn lcraft solcher
Selbstvorsinnlichung selber die Greaze aufzuheben, so dass
auch die Kette des Ausdrftckbaren zu einem Auf- und Absteigen
werden kann, und sie sich zura ICreise schliesse, sum
r
.'ahrheitskreis, zum ewigen Sinnbildkreis, wahr in jedeia
seiner Bildar, wahr durch das iinmerw&hrende Kreisgleich-
gewicht, das urn die gebffnote Grenze spielt, wahr im ewigen
Austausch der gBttlichen und tier menschlichen Tat ..."
(GW 3: 236-237).
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It is significant that the passage from which the
above quotation is taken culminates in the following
words: "Oh Heimkehr in die Tat, welche die Liebc ist,
«lcnn nur die dienend hilfreiche Tat, da sic den Namen
gibt und die leere Schicksalsforra erfhilt, ist sthrker
als das Schicksal#" (H,T 3: 238). By commitment to the
service of humanity man can give a meaningful content to
the otherwise purely formal and impersonal dictates of
fate.
Only once a man has ■■"'led, once he has passed through
the gateway of death and been wholly assimilated into the
higher reality is there no need for such a symbolical
representation of that reality.
UT)enn die ■iurchsiehtigo hhmmersehichf, die gwisrhon lem
Oben und Tinten gespannt ist und, undurchdringlich ftVr
alias Irdl.scho, dem Lied dor irdisrhon Sehnsucht das
Eindringon ir lie unendlichen Sph&ren verwehrt, so dass es
an solcher TJndurchdringlichkeit sum Echo wird, ztim Echo
•ler Seele, zum froilich unvollkommenen Auseen-Echo des
sturamaa Trinen—Oesichtas und noch unvollkommeneren des
ersehnten Sph&rengesanges, diese trormende Echowand lbat
3-ich auf und verschwindet, wonn das Wunder dos Unirdischen
sich vollzioht, wenn Aussen und Innen ineinandor tlbergehen*
Ich und All miteinander vereinend," (0T1 3' 508)
At the same time it is only in death that Vergil,
reunited with the creative source of the universe, the
Word or Logos, receives full assurance of the value of
human life and endeavour, despite all their limitations.
-iav feauze des unendiichen Geschehens ... die
laiid-furchtbare Gerrlichkeit des menschlichen Loses, ge-
zoug'o /oiit oi'ee uuu xii deA" Leu.gu.ng sclioii des .ortos Linn,
Ues Wortes Trosfc, des L'orLes Gnade, des Worths piirsprache,
des oi-tes Grlbsuugsst.&rke, des 'v'ortes Gesetzeskraft, des
xOlwOo IOv.Ci (jjObi..! W, . . ,, X. V ...V ^k^cll'
in den unzul&n.clich.en end dccli allei-, uoch zulSneilchen
e..,. .o u.i ■. e.L.-- , 1.. ihnen




3. DIE UNBEKANNTE GR5SS£
Broch's second novel, Die unbekannte Grbsse, is a
very minor work and can be dealt with very briefly.
Broch's opinion of this work, which he completed in six
weeks, is clearly documented in his correspondence. A
chronological study of the relevant letters suggests that
he originally attached some importance to the novel, but
then became increasingly critical of its literary value as
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the years passed. In October 1947 he referred to it as
a "Dreckroman" (BB: 486). At first he refused to consider
its publication in any collected edition of his works
(BB: 501), but then conceded that it might be included,
but only "aus historischen Grttnden" (BB: 521-footnote).
Its main relevance to this thesis lies not in any
direct reference to the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute",
which is a much later development, but in its auto¬
biographical content, which reflects the author's personal
dilemma at the time of writing. This is the only one of
Broch's novel/s in which such obvious autobiographical
material can be found. In a commentary for the
publisher, "Grundzttge des Romans Die unbekannte Grbsse".
Broch describes the work as a "Roman des intellektuellen
Menschen, d.h. jenes Menschen, dessen Leben ... rein auf
Erkenntnis abgestellt ist" (GW 10: 168). Such a
definition of the intellectual clearly applies to Broch
himself.
Even the physical description of the main character,
Richard Hieck, points to Broch. Hieck is described as a
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tall, rather clumsy person, but this statement is
qualified as follows. "Aber ungeachtet solch massiger
Unbeholfenheit, ja geradezu ihr widersprechend, war der
starkknochige Sch&del vorn mit einem Gesicht versehen, an
dessen Fettlosigkeit und Sch&rfe man erkennen konnte, dass
es sich mit der Zeit - entsprechenden Lebenswandel
vorausgesetzt - in die asketische H&rte eines Antlitzes
spanischer Pr&gnanz verwandeln wilrde." (GW 10: 39)
Those familiar with photographs of Broch in his later
years will at once recognize him in this description. It
is also interesting to note that Broch once mentioned to
Dr. Brody that his Jewish ancestors had been driven out of
Spain in the fifteenth century (GW 8: 52).
At one point in the book one of Hieck's academic
colleagues responds sarcastically to the former's
metaphysical speculations; "Da h&tten Sie Dichter, aber
nicht Mathematiker werden milssen." (GW 10: 67). The
relevance of this to the problem experienced by Broch in
his choice between a literary and scientific career is at
once evident. Hieck's personal dilemma, like that of
Broch in the years 1933-1935* concerns the pursuit of
objective knowledge, "Erkenntnis", as a means of under¬
standing life and providing a firm foundation on which to
construct a reliable code of conduct for the individual.
In "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch had proved to his own
satisfaction that the only demonstrably reliable absolute,
the only unifying factor in all modern life was the purely
formal one of logic. The results of this conclusion are
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expressed in the two essays, "Einheit wissenschaftlicher
und dichterischer Erkenntnis" (1933) and "Gedanken zum
Problem der Erkenntnis in der Musik" (1934)> which have
already been discussed in part two of this thesis. In
these essays he concedes the subjective value of intuitive
knowledge, but insists that such knowledge must somehosv be
incorporated into the unitary, formal structure of all
objective knowledge before it can be generally accepted
as a basis on which to construct a new, binding ethos
commensurate with the demands of modern reality.
At that time Broch could suggest nothing better than
the progressive, rigorously logical extension and develop¬
ment of the scientific disciplines with the aim of
constantly expanding the range of objective knowledge.
The problem about such a solution is that it offers no
qualitative, central value to direct and control the purely
formal pursuit and acquisition of knowledge. Every
discipline, every system of values, if developed with
rigorous logic, fulfils, formally at least, an ethical
purpose, in Broch»s use of the word "ethical". In such
a situation humanitarian considerations can be disregarded
or over-ruled if shown to stand in the way of scientific
progress.
In Die unbekannte Grftsse we see Richard Hieck
undergoing the change of heart which eventually led Broch
to develop his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", At
first Hieck has only disdain, perhaps even hatred for "das
Irdische und Konkrete und Sichtbare" (GW 10s 6l). He
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fears, distrusts and tries to ignore anything he cannot
understand in scientific terms, especially the complications
of personal relationships, sexual attraction and love.
For him the study of mathematics represents "Rettung vor
der Sftnde" (GW 10: 91)• His ideal is to reduce his entire
experience of life to a coherent scientific formula.
"Das Slindige in der Welt ist das Unberechenbare. Was aus
dem kausalen und gesetzlichen Zusammenhang gelftst ist, und
sei es bloss ein einsam im Raume schwebender Klang, das
ist silndig. Das Isolierte ist sinnlos und slindig
zugleich." (GW 10: 110) He describes his goal in life
as: "die ganze Welt im Spiegel der Mathematik zu
erfassen" (GW 10: 125).36
Gradually his own experiences force him to realize
the futility of such an ambition and compel him to see
that he is doing himself and others an injustice by
concentrating on the acquisition of formal knowledge to
the exclusion of his own humanity and that of others.
His confrontation with the phenomena of love and death
finally opens his eyes to his failure. He accepts that
the pursuit of formal knowledge, despite its very real
value, is in itself not the key to the understanding of life
and is very often irrelevant to the personal problems, hopes
and fear of the Individual. Finally he comes to appreciate
the need for personal commitment to his fellow-men in a
spirit of love and service. It is important to note that
Hieck, like Broch at that stage of his life, accepts the
necessity of such a commitment as an intuitively perceived,
self-evident truth which cannot be explained or justified
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scientifically. Later, in his theory of "das Irdisch-
Absolute", we see Broch attempting to prove that
humanitarian considerations must be the central,
qualitative value in all human thought and action.
Die unbekannte Grbsse can be seen as the transitional
novel between Die Schlafwandler and the later novels. Die
Schlafwandler is both formally and thematically the novel
of disintegration, which shows contemporary realits'
dissolving into the empty formalism of conflicting value-
systems where human values are \>?holly irrelevant. In
Die unbekannte Gr&sse is seen the start of the process of
reintegration with which Broch attempted to give literary
expression to his vision of the re-introduction of
humanity as the absolute value in all life and thought.
This applies not only to the themes, but also to the form
of this and the later novels, Broch here attempts to
depart from the analytic construction of Die Schlafwandler
and develop a synthetic form for his novels in which
literary expression and philosophical content are
harmoniously united and not deliberately isolated and used
37
contrapuntally for mutual emphasis and illumination.
In this respect Die unbekannte Grftsse represents the first
tentative stage in the stylistic transition from Die
Schlafwandler to Per Tod des Vergil and the various
versions of the Bergroman.
It must be said that Die unbekannte Grftsse, a novel
of only some 130 pages, is too slight a vehicle for the
weight of ideas with which it is invested. The most
important themes, above all the realization of the j>ositive
value of death as a revelation of the full meaning of life
(GV. 10: 150-151) and of love as a form, or rather the form
of knowledge (G1T 10: 161), are arbitrarily imposed on the
characters instead of developing convincingly out of their
personal situations and developing insights. Only in the
later novels, particularly in for Tod -ts Vergil and the
) err.rcr nn, are these themes more convincingly presented.
Nevertheless, fie erbokannte Orhsso clearly indicates the
subsequent development and direction of frock's thinking.
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4. PER TOD PES VERGIL
a) The Relationship of Per Tod des Vergil to the Earlier
Novels®
Broch intended Per Tod des Vergil to be the last
novel he wrote before giving up his literary career in order
to concentrate on the episteraological, psychological and
legal studies of the 1940's which eventually led to the
formulation of his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute".
Thematically, structurally and linguistically this is an
extremely complex novel; the complexity is intensified
because so many of the insights expressed are of a highly
personal and, at times, mystical nature. The one aspect
of the novel I wish to examine is Vergil's progressively
developing understanding and redefinition of the concept
of knowledge ("Erkenntnis") in terms of human love, duty
and service. It is possible to see reflected in Vergil's
revelations, and often his insights are genuine revelations
rather than logically formulated conclusions, the stages
through which Broch's thinking passed after the writing of
"Der Zerfall der Werte". Having proved, as he thought,
that the only absolute in modern life could be the purely
abstract, formal one of logic Broch, realizing the
disastrous implications of such a conclusion, then
proceeded to try scientifically to reintroduce humanity as
the central, qualitative value in life. The details of
this attempt have already been discussed. In Per Tod des
t/ergil Broch gives literary expression to some of his most
243
deeply held beliefs, anticipating in this essentially
subjective form the theoretical writings produced after
1945» in which he tried to raise his personal convictions
to the status of objective, scientifically verifiable
knowledge.
The definitive concept of human knowledge expressed
by Vergil before his death represents the union and
culmination of two lines of thought which are first seen
in Pie Schlafwandler and Die unbekannte Grttsse respectively.
In the former novel the modern era, i.e. post-1918, is
depicted as one of chaos and inhumanity, a void betiireen
the collapse of one unifying system of values and the rise
of the next. Those unfortunate enough to live at such a
time are described as "ein verlorenes Geschlecht" (GW 2:
449» 684)» condemned to live "zwischen dera Noch-nicht und
dem Nicht-mehr" (GW 2: 678). There is a suggestion, and
it is no more than that, expressed by Bertrand MilHer and
Dr. Flurschtltz, that the only hope for mankind lies in
accepting the reduction of life to its simplest form, to
the most basic human needs, in order gradually to
reconstruct a new humanitarian civilization from the ruins
of the old one (GW 2: 609, 621). This theme is not
developed at length and carries little conviction against
the weight of the apocalyptic reality depicted by Broch
in the last chapter of the novel.
The second, at first sight seemingly unrelated theme
is found in Die unbekannte GrBsse. In Die Schlafwandler,
"Der Zerfall der Werte" and the related essays of that
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period death is seen almost entirely in a negative light.
It is the most basic cause of fear although, as such, it
admittedly provides the stimulus for the creation of
values. lie unbekannte Grfesse, written only a year after
the completion of lie Schlafwandler, opens up a completely
new perspective on the phenomenon of death, revealing it
in a much more positive light. Unfortunately, the
failings of this short work are such that these new
insights into the value of death in human experience are
neither convincingly presented nor explained.
Of the two relevant passages, the first is the more
comprehensible. Professor Weitprecht, an aging
mathematician who until recently has been wholly absorbed
in his work, realizes that he may die soon. This shock
opens his eyes to the fact that, despite years of scientific
research and the pursuit of formal knowledge, he has
completely ignored the relevance of death for human life.
He explains this revelation to his pupil, Richard Hieck.
"'Lassen Sie nicht ab in Ihrem Streben nach wissenschaft-
licher Erkenntnis. . . auch sie ist heilig ... doch es
ist die Heiligkeit des Lebens, und der Tod wird darilber
vergessen ... hbren Sie, die Heiligkeit des Todes ...
wer an der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis arbeitet, arbeitet
mit siebzig genau so wie er mit dreissig gearbeitet hat . .
und schliesslich wird er gef&llt, mittendrin gef&llt, aber
an keinem Ende, weil er seines eigenen Todes vergessen
hat ... ein bfeser Mensch mit einem bbsen Herzen . . . ja,
ja, lieber Freund, mit einem bftsen Herzen, das im Namen der
Erkenntnis viel Unrecht geilbt hat ... wer alt wird, ohne
245
den Sinn seines Todes zu erfassen, der stirbt als schlechter
Mensch ... ohne Erkenntnis ... auch wenn er noch so
viel erkannt und gearbeitet hat . . (GW 10: 151)
The meaning of this passage is clear enough: death
is an integral part, an unavoidable fact of human life.
To ignore death, to fail to try to understand its
significance is a wilful refusal to understand the human
condition in its entirety and to view it "sub specie
aeternitatis". Exactly what is meant by knowledge of
death is not further specified. The second relevant
passage is much more obscure. Confronted with the corpse
of his dead brother, Richard Hieck suddenly realizes that
life and death are complementary facets of human experience
and that death is the final, meaningful goal of life. If
this is not true, then life is an empty and pointless game*
Richard summarizes his new found knowledge as "die grosse
Erkenntnis des Seins schlechthin", concluding, "dass
dieses Erkennen die Liebe sei, und dass auch die Liebe
nichts anderes ist als Erkennen ... die Heiligkeit des
Todes ist die Liebe: erst Tod und Leben zusammen bilden
die Ganzheit des Seins, und das Gesamterkennen ruht im
Tode." (GW 10: l6l).
This abstruse passage in which love, death and
knowledge are so closely associated receives no further
explanation. The reader must accept it as an intuitive
perception on the part of Hieck. Only in Der Tod des
Vergil does this complex association of ideas receive any
further clarification, although this lies in the practical
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reactions of Vergil to similar insights rather than in
any logical explanation. In Per Tod des Vergil the themes
of knowledge of death and the need for a humanitarian
3 8
commitment to one's fellow-men are united.
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b) Vergil's Decision to barn the Aeneid.
"Das echte Cpfer, welches die letzte and entscheidende
Form der Erkenntnis im Irdischen sein wird." (GW 3: 424)
With these words the dying Vergil finally gives definitive
expression to the new insight into the nature of knowledge
which has been gradually evolving in his mind during the
hours before his death. The historical reference is to
the coming of Christ and his sacrificial death through
which he redeemed mankind by identifying himself with it
to the point of taking upon Himself all human sin and its
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punishment of death. Of greater interest is the way in
which Vergil attains his new insight and then seeks to put
it into practice, thus setting an example for following
generations and, as far as is humanly possible, symbolically
anticipating the sacrifice of the coming Saviour. This
development can be traced by investigating two themes in
the novel: that of "der goldene Zweig" (Sir James Frazer's
"Golden Bough"), and the fate of the Aeneid. Vergil's
new understanding of knowledge develops around these tivo
objects and finally crystallizes in the course of his
confrontation with Augustus in the course of the third part
of the novel.
Broch's Vergil, like his creator, conceives of his
art as a cognitive instrument with which to extend know¬
ledge of the human condition. When Vergil is brought
back to Brundisium in the first part of the novel he is
forcefully compelled to admit that his greatest work, the
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Aeneid, which is still unfinished, has failed to achieve
such a purpose. This admission is wrung out of him in the
episode of the "Elendsgasse" (GW 3: 42-50). He is carried
through the slums of the town and forced to realize that
he has completely ignored the unpleasant realities of life,
the physical limitations of human existence, the suffering
and depravity of which man is capable. By concentrating
on and glorifying the heights of human achievement he has
forgotten or suppressed his own essential humanity with
all its failings and limitations. He has escaped into
the ivory tower of aestheticism. "Dieses immer wieder
verachtete nnd iromer wieder gelebte Leben, er hatte
Missbrauch damit getrieben, er hatte es missbraucht, um
sich selbst au ttbersteigen, um sich ttber sich selhst
hinauszuheben, ttber jede Grenze hinaus, ttber alle
Zeitliehkeit hinaus, als g&be es ft\r ihn keinen Absturz,
als hfttte er nicht zurtickzukehren in die Zeit, in die
irdische Verkerkerung, zurftck ins Kreatttrliche, als gfthnte
ftir ihn nicht der Abgrund." (GW 3: 45-46)
It is this experience in the "Elendsgasse" which
suddenly reveals to Vergil the hidden aim of his art (GW
3: 85-93) It dawns upon him that all his life he has
been seeking "Todeserkenntnis" (GW 3: 88). Just as he
has failed to examine and illuminate the depths as \*ell as
the heights of human experience, so he has concentrated in
his art on the superficial realities of life and failed to
cast any light on the function and importance of death for
the individual. The next section of the novel (GW 3: 94-
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104) explains the ideal goal which would be achieved if
the relationship of life and death could be fully under¬
stood. Such knowledge, by definition beyond the reach
of mortal man except in symbolical ox"- visionary form,
would enable him finally to understand his role in the
overall plan of the Creation and formulate a definitive
code of ethics to direct his actions in fulfilling this
role. This ideal but unattainable goal is described as
"die Erkenntniseinheit des Seins zu erfassen" (GW 3: 99)•
If this could be realized the result would be
"Allerkenntnis" or "Weltenallerkenntnis" (GW 3: 97). In
such knowledge man would have attained a state of
salvation, "Erlbsung" (GW 3: 84-85) or "Heil" (GW 3: 98-
99)» which for Broch always means freedom from the fear
and insecurity inspired in man by death and the relentless
passing of time.^
Vergil's despair at his failure to achieve
"Todeserkenntnis" is temporarily overcome in the next
stage of his development (GW 3: 104-118). Having
realized that no literal achievement of "Todeserkenntnis"
or "Allerkenntnis" is possible, he draws comfort from the
consideration that the coherent, unitary structure of
transcendental reality is reflected in the rational
functioning of the human mind and in man's inbox-'n impulse
to try to understand his world as an objective unity of
experience. This progressive, systematic pursuit of
knowledge is a distinguishing characteristic of humanity.
"Nur aus seiner fragenden Erkenntnis heraus und in ihr
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vermag er die Einheit, die Gleichzeitigkeits-Einheit der
Welt und ihrer Sph&ren wiederherzustellen, nur im
strbmenden Kreislauf der Frage vollbringt er das Jetzt
seiner Seele, ihre innerste irdische Notwendigkeit, ihre
Erkenntnisaufgabe von Anbeginn an," (GW 3: 105-106)^*
There follow three pages of verse, interspersed with
prose commentary, which trace a growing optimism in Vergil's
mood to the point where he feels he could and should
finish the Aeneid because, however imperfect it may be, it
still represents a genuine search for knowledge. He
believes at this stage, "dass das um der Erkenntnis \'.rillen
Getane nicht umsonst getan worden ist und dank seiner
Notwendigkeit nicht umsonst gewesen sein konnte" (GW 3s
113)«. Thus reassured he can feel a degree of hope:
"Iloffnung im Nichtvollendeten und Nichtvollendbaren, und
daneben, ganz schfichtern, die Hoffnung auf Fertigstellung
der Aneis" (GW 3: 113-114)• Even with the aid of the
prose commentary the three verse passages are almost
impossibly abstruse, containing as they do the lyrical
expression of subjective, intuitive insights rather than
reasoned argument. They contain in compressed, poetic
form the same beliefs which Broch soon afterwards tried to
establish on a sound scientific basis in the two long
essaj's, "Das System als Weltbewbltigung" (GW 7: 111-149)
n
and "Uber syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" (GW 7:
. 42
151-202). Basically, the verse passages assert the
essential unity of all Being and try to reconcile the
paradox that man, subject as he is to temporal and spatial
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limitations, has a meaningful role in infinity and eternity.
Endowed with the gift of reason, man reflects the divine
creative power, which has ordered all potential reality in
a harmonious unity, by constantly seeking to reduce his
knowledge of himself and his world to an objective,
systematic unity of experience. In doing this he creates
earthly or empirical reality, a concrete symbol of
transcendental reality. If man knows this, if, by a
process of introspection, he can see that the microcosm of
the mind mirrors the macrocosm of divine, ultimate reality
then he can accept the grim fact that all human endeavour,
all knowledge is limited and subject to constant revision,
even extinction, in the process of time.
"Denn wer die erste Pforte des Schreckens hinter sich
gelassen hat,
der ist in den Vorhof der Wirklichkeit eingezogen,
da seine Erkenntnis, sich selbst entdeckend und wie fcum
ersten Male
auf sich selbst gerichtet,
das Notwendige im All, das Notwendige jeglichen Geschehens
als das Notwendige der eigenen Seele zu begreifen anhebtj
denn der, dem solches widerfhhrt,
der ist hinausgehalten in die Einheit des Seins,
in das reine Jetzt, das dem All und dem Menschen gemeinsam
ist." (GW 3: 108)43
Such a realization helps man to accept that his
paradoxical situation as a temporal and finite creature in
infinity and eternity is the distinguishing feature of his
humanity. He realizes that his humanity expresses itself
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in the attempt to reconcile that paradox. By recognizing
the need for the progressive pursuit and constant revision
of knowledge, i.e. the constant creation and re-creation
of his reality, man shares in the basic formal principle
of all Being, namely the endless cycle of creation and
dissolution, form and chaos, life and death. It is
regularly emphasized that he gains such an insight into
the essential unity of all Being, in which he plays an
integral and meaningful part, through self-knowledge,
knowledge which paradoxically demands that he accept his
own insignificance and limitations.
"Denn nur im Irrtum, nur durch den Irrtum,
in den er unentrinnbar hineingehalten ist,
wird der Mensch zum Suchenden,
der er ist,
der suchende Mensch;
denn der Mensch braucht die Erkonntnis der Vergeblichkeit,
er muss ihren Schrecken, den Schrecken jeden Irrtums
auf sich nehmen und, ihn erkennend, bis zur Neige
auskosten,
er muss des Schreckens inne werden,
nicht aus Selbstqual, wohl aber
weil nur in solch erkennendem Innewerden
der Schrecken zu hberwinden ist,
weil nur dann es mbglich wird,
durch des Schreckens hftrnerne Pforte hindurch
ins Sein zu gelangen;
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. . . derjenige, hinter dem
die schweren Torflhgel des Schreckens sich geschlossen
haben,
der hat den Vorhof der Wirklichkeit erreicht, und
das nicht-erkannt Fliessende, ttber das er schwebend
dahingleitet,
das Nicht-Erkennen, es wird ihm sum Wissensgrund,
da es das fliessende Wachstum seiner Seele ist,
das unvollendbar Unvollendete des eigenen Selbst,
dennoch als Einheit sich entfaitend,
sobald das Ich seiner selbst inne wird," (GW 5: 111-112)^
Above all, Vergil feels reassured that no human
knowledge is entirely futile, and he welcomes all know¬
ledge even if it is harmful to man, In this we can see
reflected Broch's thinking in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and
the associated essays. "0 Zuversicht, welcbe weiss, dass
selbst dort, wo es zum Unhe.il au.sschl8.gt, der Erkenntnis-
gewirin des Erlebten gewachsen ist, bleibend der Erkenntnis-
zuwachs in der Welt." (GW 3: 114)
Immediately after expressing his confidence in the
cognitive value of the Aencid Vergil undergoes a traumatic
spiritual experience which leads him to revise his view and
decide to burn the poem,, He is first confronted with
three drunks (GW 3: 118-138) who appear to him as
" Abgesandte der Ilftlle" (GW 3: 126). It is their complete
lack of humanity, their obsession with superficial
material values and animal lusts, and, above all, their
nihilistic laughter which horrif}' Vergil.
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"Es war die Furchtbarkeit des Sachlichen, das sich nicht
mehr an den Menschen wendet, weder an ihn, der es hier
am Fenster gesehen und vernommen hatte, noch sonst an
irgendeinen Menschen, gleichsam eine Sprache, die nicht
nehr Brticke zwischen Menschen ist, gleichsam ein
aussermenschliches Lachen, desscn Ilohnbereich den sach¬
lichen Weltbestand. als solchen umfasst, und das, hber jeden
menschlichen Bereich hinausreichend, den Menschen nicht
mehr verlacht, wohl aber mit der Blossstellung der Welt
ihn einfach vernichtet; oh, so hatte es im Lachen der
drei Gestalten geklungen, Entsetzen ausdrftckend, Entsetzen
vermit telnd," (GW 3 s 126)^**
The full significance of this laughter is revealed
to Vergil in what follows (GW 3: 129-145). He is forced
to realize that such laughter makes a mockery of his
flight into aestheticism and unmasks his failure as an
artist. He has purveyed beauty, not knowledge; he sees
the laughter for what it is: "das Lachen, verzweifelter
Ersatz ftir die verlorene Erkenntniszuversicht, das Lachen
als Ende ftir die abgebrochene Flucht in die SchBnheit, das
Ende des abgebrochenen SchBnheitsspieles." (GW 3: 133)
Aestheticism, the conscious search for beauty is
directly contrasted with the pursuit of knowledge- The
latter implies a constant, progressive development, for
which the insecurity caused by man's fear of the unknown,
eternity and infinity provides the essential stimulus.
The aesthetic perception of the world is, by nature, static
and therefore false. It does not relieve human fear, but
conceals it by attempting to present the world as a finite,
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harmonious, formal unity and by ignoring the problems
raised for man by such concepts as infinity and eternity.
Beauty is "die begrenzte Unendlichkeit" (GW 3: 133) and
art creates "das Unsterbliche ira Raum, nicht in Menschen"
(GW 3: 134). Above all else, art is inhuman and
impersonal because it can treat humanity only as the
material with which to play its aesthetic games.
"T!art gegen menschliches Leil, weil es nicht mehr bedeutet
als verg&ngliches Rein, nicht mehr als WpjPt $ Gestein,
GetBn oder Farbo,
benlVtzt zur Sch&nheitssnche und Sch&nheitseatdeckung
in steter V'iederholung;
und es enthhllt sich dem Menschen die Schbnheit als
Grausamlce.it,
als die wachsende Grausankeit des ungezfigelten Spieles, das
im Sinnbild Unendlichkeitsgenuss verspricht,
erkenntnisverachtenden, geniesserischen Genuss
irdischer Schein-Unendlichkeit
und darob unbedenklich Leid und Tod zuzuflIgen vernag,
da es im grenzentrhckten Gebiet der Schftnheit geschieht."
(GW 3: 134-135)
Once nihilistic laughter destroys this aesthetic
vision of the world, the horrific chaos concealed by such
a vision is revealed. It is the human function as a
rational creature to create reality out of such chaos by
progressive!} reducing it to a coherent, systematic unity
of experience.
At this point mention must be made of Broch's
dualistic view of the philosophical concept of Nothingness
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or the void of non-existence out of which creation takes
place ("das Nichts"). As has already been stated, Broch's
theory of creation fails to draw any clear distinction
between this Nothingness and a primeval, amorphous chaos
which he refers to variously as "die Vorschbofung" or
"Humus des Seins" (GW 3: 85) or "Humus des Anfangs (GW 3s
465)* The only possible differentiation which can be
read out of this novel, and it is not rigorously maintained,
is that "das Nichts" is a spiritual extinction or void, and
"die Vorschftpfung" or "Humus des Seins" represents the
dark, mysterious origins of physical life, His dualistic
interpretation of the origins of life, whether spiritual
or physical, is that if they are accepted, if man can
respond to the creative challenge to impose order on his
experience and understand life and death to the best of
his ability, then those unknown, dark origins assume a
positive value and provide the rich material from which
man can mould his reality. Where man refuses to
acknowledge the dark and frightening roots of life, then
thejr become a source of fear for him. Metaphysically
speaking, this is the reciprocal relationship of "das
A fx
Nichts" and "das Sein" which Broch describes, Psycho-
legieally speaking, it is the same relationship in the
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human psyche of the unconscious and the conscious. In
both cases the determing factor is the individual's ability,
or inability, to come to terms with the unknown.
When Vergil's aesthetic view of the world is
shattered by the drunks' laughter he is confronted with a
vision of the formless chaos of life which he has
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deliberately ignored or concealed. Finally his failure
as an artist is given articulate expression.
"Aufgebrochen das Nirgendv.ro des Gel&chters,
lachend aufgebrochen die Weltenumsthlpung schlechthin,
als hhtte es niemals jenen Bid der SchBpfung gegeben,
den Bid, ntit dem Gott und Mensch sich gegenscitig
verpflichtet haben,
verpflichtet zur Erkenntnis und wirklichkeitsschaffenden
Ordnung,
verpflichtet zur Ui.lfe, welche die Pflicht zur Pflicht istj
oh, es ist das Lachen des Verrates,," (GW 3; 1'2)
Vergil believes in a mutual oath of creation binding
God and nan, obliging the latter to fulfil his humanity by
creating on earth an empirical reality which reflects the
A O
transcendental reality of Divine Being. By acquiring
knowledge, by creating a harmonious empirical reality man
helps his fellow—men to find peace and security and under¬
stand their role in infinity and eternity. The mission
of the three drunks now dawns upon Vergil: "jene drei,
die d.rei Torkelnden do. drunten, sie waren die Zeugen des
Meineides gewesen, Und sie hatten Zeugenschaft wider
ihn abgelegt, Dies war ihre Notwendigkeit•" (GW 3: 144).
The theme of the golden bough is introduced in the
next stage of Vergil's developing awareness of his failure
and guilt as artist and man (GW 3: 146-179). He admits
that his ambition has been to emulate Orpheus, "Orpheus,
arkoren zum FOihrer der Menschen" (GW 3: 148). As an
artist lie had wanted to help man overcome his fear of death
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and the unknown. He has been forced to realize that art
can, at the most, temporarily conceal such fear in
aesthetic intoxication; but it can never relieve that
fear by contributing tc an understanding of it. That
cannot be dene by the aesthete in his ivory tower, but only
by someone who knows and shares that fear and who fully
appreciates the true function of death in lite.
"Der heilsbringende Ffihrer nhmlich hat die Sprache der
Schbnheit abgestreift, er ist unter ihre kalte Oberfl&che,
unter die Oberflhche der Dichtung gelangt, er ist zu den
schlichten Worten vorgedrungen, die krnft ihrer Todesn&he
und Todeserkenntnis die F&higkeit gewonnen haben, an die
Versperrtheit dee Nebennenschen zu pochen, seine Angst und
seine Grausankeit zu beruhigen und ihn der echten Hilfe
zug&nglich zu machen, er ist vorgedrungen zxi der schlichten
Sprache unmittelbarer Ghte, zur Sprache der unciittelbaren
menschlichen Tugend, zur Spx^ache der Erweckung." (GW 3:
150)
This new language is not that of poetry, but that of
active commitment to one's fellow-humans and identification
with, their needs,
Vergil then thinks again of Orpheus, He suggests
that the latter descended into Hades not so much to find
Eurydice as to experience death himself, be reborn and
return with the gift of a new language capable of expressing
that nev; found knowledge to all men. Broch then quotes,
in translation, the famous passage from the sixth book of
the Aenoid. lines 126-153, which opens with the words
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"facilis descensus averno . . ." (GW 3: 151). Aeneas is
there contemplating visiting the underworld. The right
to enter and leave Hades is granted to a mortal only if he
can present to Proserpina a golden bough torn from an
eternally flourishing tree dedicated to that goddess,.
The passage from the Aeneid states explicitly that the
bough cannot simply be broken off by anyone, but only by
someone chosen by fate and who has performed the necessary
sacrifice of expiation and purification, "das Sfihnoofer"»
The due sacrifice demanded of Aeneas is that he bury the
corpse of his "fidus Achates". Once he has done this he
is able to break off the golden bough and thus gain access
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to, and exit from the underworld.
Vergil now draws a much more general conclusion from
this passage in his poem and in doing so re-interprets the
mythological descent into Hades in order to express his
new insight into man's need to accept the mystery and
insignificance of his own life in the face of eternity and
infinity. The underworld now refers, for him, not only
to the mystery and threat of death, but to all the dark,
implumbed depths of the human psyche, the fears and hopes,
needs and weaknesses inherent in the human condition.
Human life can he lived to the full only once all this is
recognized. The first gloss Vergil offers to the passage
from the Aeneid generalizes its particular significance by
saying that access to the underworld is granted only to
those who have fulfilled their duty to their fellow-men,
as did Aeneas in burying Achates, "also von Gott wie voin
Schi.cksal berufen, gemeinsam ihr Wille, ist jenem die
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Grenze ge&ffnet, deni die Heiligkeit letzter Pflichter-
fttllung und Hilfeleistung zusteht." (GW 3; 151)•
He feels that, unlike Aeneas, he has been refused
"der Zweig der Fflhrung, der 7weig der Erkenntnis" (GW 3:
152), "der goldene 7weig der Wahrheit" (GW 3 J 153) because
he has failed to fulfil the basic demands of human love,
duty and service. Because he has refused to share the
lot common to all men he cannot plumb the depths of the
human condition in order to reassure others that humanity,
desnite its finite and temporal limitations, has a
meaningful function in the realization of the divine order
on earth, A harmonious social and humanitarian order is
the empirical complement on earth of the ideal unify of
divine, transcendental reality. He has not shared in the
creation of that order,
"Verwehrt war ihra der Abstieg, verwehrt erst reoht die
titanische Wiederkunft aus der Tiefe, die Wiederkunft, an
der das Menschlic.he sich bestHtigt, verwehrt war der
Aufstieg zur Erneuerung des Schftpfungseides, und hatte er
es stets gewusst, er wusste jetzt deutlicher denn jo zuvor,
dass er von der Eideshilfe des Heilbringers ausgeschlossen
war, ein fttr allemal, weil Eideshilfe und Menschenhilfe
einander bedingen und nur in ihrem Zusammenhalt die
gemeinschaftstiftende, die menschheitstiftende Aufgabe des
Titans slch erfttllt, erdgeboren, himmelszugekehrt, weil
nur in der Menschheit, weil nur in der echten Gemeinschaft,
spiegelnd die Ganzheit alles Menschenturas, spiegelnd die
Menschheit, der erkenntniagetragene, erkenntnistragende
Kreislauf ghttlicher Frage und Antwort sich vollzieht«"
260
(GW 3: 152)
From the point in the novel where the golden bough
is first mentioned knowledge, "Erkenntnis", is increasingly
defined, not just as formal, scientific knowledge, but in
terms cf "Liebe", "Tat", "Pflicht", "Hilfe" and "Opfer" •
The purely formal, epistetiological aspect, yields
progressively to a definition of knowledge which implies
acceptance of the qualitative criterion of humanity, with
all its limitations, as the central standard around which
alone a harmonious earthly reality, the mirror of
transcendental reality, can be constructed. If this is
not accepted, and it Implies the moral commitment of the
individual to his fellow, the result is chaos, as shown
in "Der Zerfall der Werte", and not a systematic unity of
experience, social or otherwise.
The only expiation for his failure that Vergil can
imagine is "Selbstausl&schung und Ted" (GW 2: 157) j but
this is not granted to him. He is subjected to a vision
of primeval chaos devoid of order and meaning and ruled
only by chance (GW 3; 153-165); he realises that such a
vision of the world is inevitable if death is not properly
understood, but seen simply as an arbitrary end to life.
Unless man's experience of death can be integrated into
his understanding of life the latter must seem ridiculous
and senseless. v,rhere this is the case, death clearly
assumes a negative value and Vergil feels that he himself
is dead because he has not understood death, but lived an
empty and superficial life, "er selber , , . abgestorben
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in den Vortocl :er Unschbpfung, abgestorben ins Meineidige,
ins Hinkende, ins Verbogene" (GW 3: l65)» He has lived
life at an empty, aesthetic level, failing to identify
himself with his fellow-men, failing to understand and
respect their fears, anl treating them as mere lifeless
material for his art.
"Oh, er hatte ein Leben in der Nicht-Gemeinschaft der
Tot en verbracht, er hatte irrrr.er nur rrit Toten gelebt und
desglelchen die Lebsnden zu ihnen gerechnet, er hatte die
Menschen immer nur als Tote gesehen, hatte sie immer nur
als Bausteine zwr Errichtung und Erzengung von todeserst-
arrter Scbftnbe.it genommen, und es waren die Menschen ihm
darum aidesamt ins Unbewftltigte entschwunden, in die
Unerlcenntnis ewiger Unerschaffenheita" (GW 3" 168)
Again Orpheus is recalled. By virtue of his love
for Eurydiee he had at least penetrated into the under¬
world, even if his purpose in ioing so is nob fulfilled.
Vergil has never known love in any form; he has always
maintained a cool distance to other people and has thus
never been able to find the golden bough which would grant
him access to the underworld (Gr; 3: 166-167). Vergil's
final realization of his failure as an artist and man is
expressed in the following passage, the importance of which
is emphasized by the use of italics throughout.
"Der liebe ErinnemngsstSrke hatte Orpheus den Bintritt in
die Hadestiefe erzwungen, allerdings urn ihmzugleich den
letzten Abetleg zu verwehren, so dass er, verloren in der
Unterweltlichkeit des Gedhchtnisses, zur vorzeitigen
Umkehr genfttigt war, unkeusch noch in der Keuschheit und
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zerrissen im Uaheil. r hingeger., liebelos von Anbeg ,nn,
unf&hig, das liebende Ged&chtnis voranzuschicken und von
keiner Erinnerung gefiihrt, er war nicht einmal in die
ersten Tiefen des erzbeherrschenden Vulcanus gelangt,
geschweige denn zu den Bereichen der gesetzes-stiften len
vliter, geschweige denn nocli tiefer in die des weltgebhrenden
erinnerung-geb&renden, heil-geb&renden Nichts, und er • v
in der erstarrten Leere der Oberfl&che geblieben." (G. 3:
174)
Because of his lack of love, his lack of identific¬
ation and involvement with mankind, he has failed to
appreciate and reconcile the paradox of man's weakness and
insignificance with his role in the creative process. As
a punishment he must undergo "die Strafe des irkenntnis-
verlustes und der Verlassenheit im Kerker des blind-
notwendigen DahindSimmerns, die Verlassenheit der Niclit-
r q
rrkenntnis in unerkennbarer Notwendigkeit" (GW 3: 176).
Vergil experiences a spiritual contrition in which his
individual consciousness is almost completely exti gguished.
"Has Ich ... hineingeschleudert in die Zerknirschung
seines Selbst, geschleudert in Zerknirschung und Aber-
Zerknirschung, es war gedemlitigt zur Notwendigkeit, auswe-
gios, zur Notwendigkeit seiner Zerknirschung, liineinge-
demtitigt in die Zerknirschung des leeren, des schieren
Mijtht-mehr-Bestehens; das Ich war seiner selbst verlustig
gev/orden, war beraubt seines Menschentums, von dem nichts
geblieben war, nichts als die nackteste Nacktheits-Schuld
der Seele, so dass auch sie, ich-verlustig und doch
unzerstftrbar als Menschenseele, nun nichts mehr war als
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zerknirscht leere Nacktheit ..." (GV 3: 177}
"hat follows is problematical. It would seem
reasonable to assume that Vergil here undergoes death in
life and will recover from the experience with a genuine
knowledge of death which he can communicate to others.
This is not and cannot be the case, A. mortal is granted
knowledge of death, symbolized in the golden bough, only
if he fulfils his obligations to his fellow-men. Vergil
has not yet done this. Instead he is forced to experience
a "Scheintod" and realize that he has lived a "Seheinleben".
Both words are regularly identified with the amorphous,
primeval chaos cf the " Vorschftpfung" . In this passage
(OV* 3; 179-197) there are drawn numerous obvious parallels
between the emptiness and unreality of his "Scheintod" and
the earlier description of the superficiality of his life
and work (CF 3: 168-171) • The suggestion is that ^ergil
cannot yet die properly because he has not lived properly,
lie realizes that up to this point he has misunderstood
death, seeing it and fearing it only as the physical
extinction of the human animal with no prospect of rebirth.
This is the "Scheintod" he feared and tried to conceal in
his work, but which he must now experience in visionary
for;.. "Nacht fttr JTacht hatte or in eitler Selbstthuschung
vermeint dcro Sterben zu lauschen, und doch war es bless
Afcwehr des Scheintodgrauens gewesen, Abwehr dor* Scheintod-
bilder, "io sich Hacht ffir Vacht gemeldet hatter, und von
denen or nichts hatte wissen wo11en, die zu sehen er
abgelehnt hatte, und die trotzdem gefclieben waren." (GW 3J
186-187)
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Real death, death in its positive function, is the
total extinction of the individual spirit and its reunion
with the creative power of the universe. Tn order to
appreciate this man trust strip himself of all animal
qualities, especially the desire and instinct for life,
and accept that rebirth is possible only in spirit.
"Scheintod" and "Scheinleben" are regularly associated with
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the words "Tier" and "Freatrr" in r negative connotation.
Only once Vergil accepts that death, in itr positive
function, implies absolute spiritual extinction ar a
prelude to spiritual rebirth is the word "CoschBpf" applied
to man, used with its associated ideas of "Scbhpfung" and
"schhpfen". Man can share in the creative process only
when he accepts his transient role in its cyclical process#
"Oh, nur dasjenlge 1st GeschBpf, darf OeschBpf genannt
warden, riur darjsnige, das irar.er wieder hirsabsteigt su den
Flaiur.en. der TAiedergebwrt, u.nab.l&ssig bemfiht, dass das
Unbesiegte nicht neuerlich aufquelle, dass das vormfltter—
lich Vnsrschaffene nicht neuerlich awfbreche m steinerner
Stusroheit, oh, CsschBnf ist das Schb'ofTJ.npssohaffende, das
in ITinahstoigen sich selbst ztun np£er bringrt, rftckhaltlos
und uiawendungsbefrsit, bar jeder Umkehrung zum Rawsche, J a
nienr noeh, bar jodor Vmkdhrung zu irgendeinem Rrkennen oder
V.'i odoror?: ennen, abtuend ledwele kreathrliche Angst, abtuend
auch lan letzten kreathrlichen h'unsch, oh, wir sind bloss
dann Geschttpf der SchBpdung, wenn wir das T'.reatttrliche
g&nzlich von uns abstroifen," (Ghr 1: 1.02-101)
Vergil's vision of his "Scheintod" and "Scheinleben"
yields only when he decides to burn the Aeneid, to destroy
265
it because it has failed to illuminate the positive value
of death in the cycle of creation® It must be noted
that Vergil has not yet himself attained knowledge of
death: at the most, ho now knows what death is not® He
has not yet found or broken off the golden bough which is
the passport to such knowledge, "die decision to burn
the ' cnwr is essentially self-centered, taken, an Vergil
thinks, as personal atonement for bin failure to achieve
for himself or communicate to others any genuine knowledge
ef "'"he full si gnifinance of death. Such a sacrifice
■oes not itself contribute to the attainment of this
knowledge, nor does it help to clarify the positive,
reciprocal relationship between earthly and transcendental
reality.
266
c) "Erkenntnis" and "Liebe",
Just before he dies Vergil, renounces his decision
to burn the *erteid« ' of destroying it as a
worthless oi°ce of art which has failed in its cognitive
function he H.ves th ns a token of rv'.. and :*h i 1 to taosar
\uojstn-, It would seen thai the cause of knowledge is
pip. OPT to % O *"> ft -n j O *"W:* > noo 1 <■» q ° yr^io •l-'1 w* ' * > "1 1
reassurance. This is not the ease. * if a -Hreot result
of oresanting the noes to dugustus, 'rergi 1 is giver, the
golden bough, thus sr-mbo lieally gaining a. true knowledge
of death while still alive. berth reveals its full
significance for man on1y in the light of a life lived in
the service of others.
The nrocess bv which tarai 1 attains this new insight
is. seen in his vrogressive re-ry?1"aidon of aitral" formal
knowledge in terms of human commitment and love. This is
of course relevant to the theory of "das Irdisch—Absolute"•
Vergil, like Broch, re.iects reliab.ee on a purely formal>
abstract concent oa knowledge in favour < p a qualitative
definition of knowledge centered on humanity as the
absolute criterion of value. Up to the point where he
decides to burn the *-e.nci<1 Vergil has attained a. theoretical
insight into this new concept of knowledge. It is
theoretical because he is aware only that he has not
realized such knowledge in his own life. llir. first reaction
is not to remedy this error, but to want to destroy the
Aeneid as an act of sqcritic:" nl .-s- -.aa? • -ut.
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Man's cognitive function as a rational creature has
been defined as his duty to create a unitary, harmonious
reality on earth as a concrete symbol of transcendental
reality. In doing this, he helps his fellow-men
understand their role in eternity and infinity and thus
calms their fear of death and the unknown. If such fears
are suppressed rather than accepted and explained they
can lead man to seek refuge and false security in
materialism, mass hysteria and nihilism where individual
dignity and integrity have no part to play. Vergil then
begins to see knowledge less as the understanding of the
purely formal, abstract relationships underlying reality
and more as a positive commitment to humanity. Humanity
is understood as the community of all individuals who
recognize their active responsibility to each other and
God, however the latter may be conceived of, progressively
to realize the ideal, divine reality on earth. "Erkennt-
nis" becomes increasingly associated with "Liebe", "Tat",
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"Gemeinschaft" and "Hilfe"• Such knowledge implies an
acceptance of the essential dualism of human nature, an
awareness of the animal depths to which man can fall and
of the spiritual and intellectual heights to which he can
rise, although it is emphasized that man can never and should
never try to sever himself from his animal origins. This
knowledge demands a complete identification of the
individual with his fellow-men. Standing as they do
between the extremes of the purely physical and the purely
spiritual world all men share the same fate, the same fears,
hopes and weaknesses. Such identification is the highest
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ideal of human love: "jene menschlichste aller Aufgaben,
die allzeit und ausschliesslich Schicksal-auf-sich-Nehmen
c6
heisst#" (GW 3; 166)• Sexual love is in itself not
enough# This is made elear when Vergil, in his delirium,
tries to close his mind to the new insights pressing in
upon him by taking refuge in sexual fantasies# He is
forced to realize that such a form of love will never
enable him to break off the golden bough (GW 3s 324-329)#
In Vergil's re-interpretation of the concept of
knowledge Broch has transferred to the qualitative,
anthropological plane the purely formal, epistemological
criterion of knowledge. In all his epistemological
writings, but probably most clearly in "Werttheoretische
Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse", Broch sees the attainment
of knowledge as the formal identification of the subject
and object of cognition, the assimilation of the latter
into the unitary, systematic, epistemological structure of
the former. On several occasions Broch explicitly equates
this formal relationship of the subject and object of
cognition with the complete identification ideally existing
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between a lover and his loved one# It is in the light
of these considerations that Vergil's statement, "die
Wirklichkeit ist die Liebe" (GW 3: 276), must be understood#
Reality is what man can understand as a systematic unity
of experience; it is what he has created out of chaos by
imposing on it the formal, rational relationships of his
own mind. He has thus identified himself with and
assimilated his own creation, his reality.
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Human love can never achieve such a perfect
identification, but it can provide a valuable symbolic
experience, given the limitations of empirical reality,
of the ideal unity of all Being, a unity into which man
enters fully only through death, Vergil expresses this
knowledge in the words "Liebeswirklichkeit, Todeswirklich-
keit, ein und das n&mliche" (GW 3: 284) •
It is significant that the symbolic value of human
love, however imperfect, is positively affirmed in Per Tod
des Vergil. In Pie Schlafwandler, especially at the end
of Esch» it is criticized and indeed rejected by Broch,
being interpreted as an attempt to halt or at least escape
from the inexorable historical processes leading to the
final dissolution of values® The reason for this
different interpretation can be found in the gradual
development of Broch's theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in
the years between writing the two novels. This explanation
is further confirmed by another important change in Broch1s
thinking which is revealed by a comparison of the two works.
In Die Schlafwandler Broch suggests that no love, no
new human community can evolve until the old value-system
has wholly disintegrated, exposing man to the horror of
existential isolation. The dominating and pessimistic
note on which the novel closes is that of man lost in the
void between the collapse of one value-system and the birth
of another. That generation is "ein verlorenes Geschlecht"
(GW 2: 469» 684) lost "zwischen dem Noch-nicht und dem
Nicht-mehr" (GW 2s 678). The message at the end of
iluguenau is quite unequivocal: there is no point in trying
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to form a community of love and human commitment because
the final crisis must run its course.
Vergil also stands on the threshold between two
civilizations with their unitary system of values: the
Golden Age of Roman antiquity and the Christian era. In
a very obvious contrast to his first novel Broch repeatedly
j 9
emphasizes the theme of "noch nicht und doch schon"•
It is made clear that any act of humanity is valuable and
relevant in itself even in the face of the relentlessly
logical developments of history. Vergil's final gift of
the Aeneid to Augustus and the re-making of his will in
the interests of his friends and slaves are not only a last
fulfilment of his humanity and a re-asse"tion of the values
of earthly reality. They also represent a prophetic
anticipation of the new Christian doctrines of love and
self-sacrifice. Vergil's acts are no less relevant an'
they are in no way devalued because the coming era must be
preceded by the total collapse of its predecessor. It
should be noted that one single variation of the theme of
"noch nicht und doch schon" occurs in Die Schlafwan Uer
(GW 2: 609). Dr. Bertrand Miller', who expresses broch's
own thoughts in "Der Zerfall der Werte" , has an intuitive
perception of a higher, Platonic reality lying beyond the
chaos of disintegrating values: "es war eine Art
Schwebezustand zwischen Nochnicht-hissen und Schon- issen
. . ." He cannot communicate this knowledge to anyone
and he fails to translate it into any positive action
relevant to his own life or to that of others. Vergil
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succeeds where Bertrand Mtiller fails.^
Vergil 's nexv insight into the nature of knowledge is
confirmed in the five "Schicksalselegien" (GW 3: 221-227)
tl
and the conclusion which finally dawns upon him "Offne die
Augen zur Liebei" (GW 3s 244)• he responds to this
imperative only when he gives up his intention of burning
the Aeneid and presents it to Augustus.In the elegies
and Vergil's response to the new perceptions gained in
them we can see a condensed, poetic expression of the
development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". Fate
is first seen as the purely formal structure of existence,
so abstract and impersonal as to be irrelevant to human
needs, beyond human influence. As such it seems to the
individual to be identical with chance. "Schicksal" is
progressively described as "allesdurchdringende Form und
kalt", "Abgrund der Form", "Leerform" and finally "Zufall"
(GW 3: 221-224).
The potentially nihilistic reaction of man to his
destiny can be overcome only if he recognizes his creative
duty in empirical reality and actively takes upon himself
his fate and that of his fellow-men, thus filling the empty
form of fate with significant human content, "denn
Schbpfung ist mehr als Form" (GW 3: 225)• This can be
done only through a positive commitment to humanity* this
is the essence of knowledge and love, the fullest
expression and realization of man's divine duty on earth.
"Oh Heimkehr in die Tat, welche die Liebe ist, denn nur
die dienend hilfreiche Tat, da sie den Namen gibt und die
leere Schlcksalsform erflillt, ist st&rker als das
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Schicksal." (GW 3J 238)
In this novel Broch repeatedly emphasizes that the
empty, impersonal form of fate loses its threat and horror
for man only when the latter accepts and imposes human
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values on it. "Form" yields to "Inhalt". Later love,
"die liebend dienende Tat", is explicitly described as
"der unsichtbare Weltinhalt" (GW 3s 319)•^ Clearly this
is a poetic and visionary expression of the theory of
"das Irdisch-Absolute" with which Broch attempted to
re-introduce the human factor into every formal discipline
and upon which he tried to found a new, humanitarian system
of political legislation. It must be added thatthis
literary formulation is far from convincing, largely
because it presents a subjective, visionary revelation and
not a reasoned argument. Walter Baumann has already
pointed out the disparity between the turgid metaphysical
speculation of the elegies and the simple moral conclusion
drawn from them. It is also evident that the elegies
reflect the unresolved conflict of free will and fate
which is found in "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit".
As a result of the revelations granted to him through
the "Schicksalselegien" Vergil knows where redemption lies:
it is to be found in knowledge, but a knowledge defined in
terms of love and human service. This insight is still on
the theoretical plane; it still has to be put into
practice. This finally happens when the dying Vergil is
visited by Caesar Augustus.
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d) The Meeting of Vergil and Augustus.
There can be little doubt that the description of
Vergil8s last meeting with his friend and emperor (GW 3s
333-440) is central to the whole novel. Quantitatively
this is the most important single episode, occupying more
than 100 pages. The critics are virtually unanimous in
interpreting the meeting and the gift of the Aeneid in a
positive light. The only exception I know of is Karl
August Horst, who curiously, and ivith very little support
from the text, takes a very negative view of the
conversation between the two men and the final gift of the
poem.^ 3roch himself referred to the scene of
reconciliation between poet and emperor as "der mensch-
liche Kern des Ganzen" (GW 8s 270).
The greater part of this episode is taken up by the
argument in which Vergil attempts to defend his decision
to burn the Aeneid and Augustus claims it as public property
because it will, so he believes, immortalize his achieve¬
ments and those of the Roman state he has created. Vergil
maintains that the poem must be destroyed because it has
failed in its cognitive purpose of contributing to an
understanding of death and the spiritual reality beyond it.
Although Vergil only gradually realizes it, he is
attempting to justify an essentially self-centered
decisionj he is concerned only to expiate his personal
failure as an artist. He has convinced himself that the
poem now represents a barrier between himself and the
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ultimate spiritual reality; in the destruction of the
poem, his life's work, he sees a symbolical form of self-
immolation through which he can gain knowledge of death
in life.
"Und nun hiess es das Opfer vollziehen, nun hiess es
selber mitsamt deia Gedicht das Nichts erreichen, auf dass
die Todeswirklichkeit erstehe." (GW3: 359) "'Das
Gedicht ... ieh muss zum Wissen gelangen ... das
Gedicht steht vor dem Wissen, es steht mir im Wege.•"
(GW 3: 364)
In the argument Vergil appears as the advocate of
metaphysical, spiritual reality against the demands of
empirical reality. He does not seem fully aware of the
implications of his words, but there is no doubt that he
devalues empirical, human reality in the light of, and for
the sake of transcendental reality. At the most, Vergil
is prepared to acknowledge that human experience and
knowledge may have a symbolical value because they can
reflect the ideal unity of Platonic reality. Such a
concession cannot satisfy the emperor. The conflict
between the two men is best seen in their viewson the
state. For Vergil the Roman state, which has united the
known, western world, is merely a transient, earthly symbol
of transcendental reality (GW 3: 390-401). He also sees
it as the basis on which a ne\\r and greater civilisation
with genuinely spiritual values, namely the Christian one,
will develop (GW 3: 420-421). The emperor's view is
understandably diametrically opposed to this. He is the
representative of the empirical world and is depicted as
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a somewhat disillusioned and cynical realist. For him
the state is the ultimate realityj "Hbchste Wirklichkeit
ist der Staat." (GW 3j 409). As ruler of this state he
demands that everyone and everything be duty-bound to
serve it (GW 3s 401-411). His opinions are certainly
extreme in this respect, but one can feel a degree of
sympathy for the exasperation he expresses when constantly
challenged by Vergil to acknowledge the claims of what
seems to be some indefinably vague higher reality.
" 'Wohin noch, Vergili wohin nochj Dies alias filhrt
weit iibers Irdische hinaus und enth&lt keine irdische
Aufgabe rnehr. Ich jedoch, ich bin ins Irdische gestellt,
und ich habe raich damit zu bescheiden.*" (GW 3s 414)
These words of Augustus reveal not only an angry
frustration, but also a genuine pathos which becomes
increasingly evident in Augustus*s conversation throughout
this episode. We see him becoming increasingly irritated
and aggressive because Vergil*s words touch on a raw nerve.
The emperor knows he is mortal; he is only too well aware
of the transience of earthly reality. For this reason
he wants to create a lasting state as a monument to himself;
for the same reason he wishes to preserve the Aeneid for
posterity because it glorifies his achievements and those
of his state.
The beliefs of the two men are irreconcilable.
There is no possibility of compromise. Vergil is talking
about a spiritual reality, Augustus about a material one.
Nevertheless, a solution is found, not through rational
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argument or persuasion, but in an act of loving friendship.
Towards the end of this scene Augustus becomes increasingly
"
gry. The human weaknesses of fear and insecurity in the
face of eternity and infinity finally drive him to lose his
temper with Vergil. At once, and for the first time,
communication is possible between the two by a mutual
recognition of each other's humanity in all its limitations.
"Kein Zweifel, der Geheiligte zetei'te, und er geriet immer
weiter ins Zetern. Und doch war es so sonderbar gut,
dass das geschah, es war so sonderbar gut, oh, so gut, dass
das noch mftglich sein konnte, und es war als zeigte sich im
Unsichtbaren ein unsichtbar fester' ooden, jener unsicntbar
feste Grund, von dem aus wieder die unsichtbaren Brllcken
sich spannen wilrden, die Brttcken des Menschlichen und der
Menschlichkeit, verkettend das Wort mit dem Gegenwort,
verschrhnkend den Blick mit dem Gegenblick, so dass r»rb
wie Blick wieder sinnerftillt wiirden, die Menschheitsbrticken
er Begegnung. Oh, dass er nur weiter spr&che." (G. 3:
428)
In a spontaneous act of friendship Vergil offers
Augustus the Aeneid, knowing why it means so much to him.
Augustus's response is described as follows: "aus des
Cftsars Seele lbste sich nun ... eine Sekunde der
reundschaft, eine Sekunde der Zuneigung, eine Sekunde
der Liebe." (GW 3: 431). The word "Liebe" is carefully
chosen here and is later repeated with reference to
Vergil's gift of the poem when he says: "'In I.iebe habe
ich die Aneis dem Augustus zugeeignet.'" (G\ 3: 456).
Love is tiie highest form of knowledge: it implies
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a complete identification of subject and object. Vergil
gives Augustus the Aeneid because he recognizes the latter's
hope, fears and insecurity as being characteristically
human and the same as his own, although they are differently
expressed. In giving the emperor the poem Vergil does
make a sacrifice of it, but not in the way he originally
intended. With the gift of the Aeneid he at last puts
into practice his insight that the highest form of knowledge
is love and self-sacrifice. He had wanted to destroy the
poem because it failed to provide knowledge of death.
The paradox is that by preserving it, by sacrificing the
pursuit of abstract knowledge in. the interests of human
friendship, Vergil attains the knowledge he sought. The
harmony attained in human love symbolically anticipates
the perfect union of the soul with the Divine after death.
Hermann Weigand has neatly described Vergil's action in
giving Augustus the Aeneid as "reversal ... from sacrifice
(\ c
as renunciation to renunciation as sacrifice".
In Vergil's action can also be seen a variation of
the theme of "noch nicht und doch schon": transcendental
reality can be experienced or at least anticipated in this
world. In the light of Vergil's gift and the subsequent
ordering of his earthly affairs the title of this third
part of the novel, "Erde - Die Erwartung", assumes its
full significance. Vergil has come to realize that all
earthly life can and should be an act of preparation for,
and a progressively developing understanding of death as
the gateway to eternity and infinity. As such the value
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of earthly reality should be positively affirmed. This
is clearly a complete reversal of the philosophical
content of Die Schlafwandler.
The gift of the Aeneid is only the first step of
Vergil's positive re-affirmation of earthly and human
reality. After presenting the poem to Augustus he sets
his earthly affairs in order and revises his will. He
makes more generous provisions for his friends (GW 3: 459-
460), sets aside a sum of money for the poor of Brundisium,
the city where his intellectual and aesthetic arrogance
was finally stripped from him (GW 3: 460), dictates the
principles on which the Aeneid is to be edited (GW 3s 473f)»
and sets all his slaves free (GW 3: 480). Gnly once he
has fulfilled these responsibilities can he die in peace;
"Dem Irdischen war Genllge getan." (GW 3: 482).
All Vergil's words and thoughts in the last minutes
of his life are either prompted or accompanied by comments
from the slave who has been with him since he entered the
palace at Brundisium. For Vergil in his delirium the
slave ceases to be a concrete figure of empirical reality
and becomes part of his visionary experience. The figure
of the slave assumes an increasingly complex symbolical
meaning for Vergil. He regularly symbolizes death and
time.^ It is the slave who speaks out against the
materialistic values of Augustus's empire and prophesies
67the triumph of the spiritual freedom of Christianitj'.
As the prophet of Christianity he is concerned with the
future (GW 3: 437). At the same time, and this is
probably his most important role, he represents the claims
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of human responsibility in the present, or at any time.
Although, as the messenger of death, he points to a new
spiritual reality, he releases Vergil from his grip long
enough to allox/ the latter to fulfil his duty on earth
before dying. "'Nicht urn der Bitten der Frau, nicht urn
der Bitten des Knaben willen gebe ich dich frei, nicht um
deiner eigenen Angst willen; ich gebe dich frei, weil du
deinen irdischen Dienst zu vollenden gedenkst."' (GW 3:
448) Thereafter he regularly reminds Vergil of the
pressing need to carry out his earthly responsibilities
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before dying. Me urges Vergil to admit his weakness
and failure and pray for help from the unknown Father,
presumably the God of Christianity (GW 3: 467-468). Once
Vergil has done this the slave again urges him to accept
earthly existence to the full and not to regard it simply
as a transient symbol to be sacrificed for transcendental
reality (GW 3: 473).
Only once Vergil responds to this advice can he, with
any genuine conviction, acknowledge that the Aeneid has
any real value beyond that of the gift of friendship. He
finally recognizes that the poem, despite its many
deficiencies, represents a real, valid attempt on his part
to understand death and man's place in eternity and
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infinity. It is significant that this insight is
gained only after the act of love in giving the poem to
Augustus. This is a further reminder that the transcen¬
dental reality of the spiritual world can be understood
through positive commitment to one's fellow-men. Vergil
is allowed to die only when he has come to terms with his
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earthly duties.
It might be argued that the figure of the slave has
to carry such a weight and diversity of symbolism that it
ceases to be convincing. In reply to such an objection
it can be said that the various symbolical meanings
assigned to the slave are all closely related and that
no incongruity occurs. Furthermore, the symbolism is
clearly attributed to the slave by the delirious Vergil.
As such it is an expression of the latter's confused mental
condition and reflects his fears and hopes.
Vergil's positive affirmation of earthly reality as
a necessary pre-condition to, and complement of man's
understanding of transcendental reality is much more
briefly and successfully expressed in the symbol of the
golden bough. As has been shovm, before the meeting with
Augustus Vergil had despaired of ever finding and breaking
off the golden bough, an act which would symbolize that he
had been granted knowledge of death in life, that he had
descended into the underworld and returned to tell others
of the real meaning of death. During the conversation
between the two men Augustus plays constantly with a laurel
leaf plucked from a v/reath on the candelabra. As he
becomes more and more angry and frustrated in the course
of their argument he shreds these leaves, the symbol of
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earthly power and success, in his fingers. As long as
Vergil defends his decision to burn the Aeneid he despairs
of ever winning "den goldenen Zweig der Erlbsung" (GW 3:
422). After he has given the poem to Augustus the latter
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places a new laurel twig on the poet's bed as a seal on
their friendship (GW 3: 437» 439)* Once Vergil has
sacrificed the Aeneid to friendship and is in the process
of ordering his affairs he has a delirious vision of the
golden bough almost within reach but still on the far
side of the river of death# " Inmitten des Griins glhnzte
ein Strauch nit goldenen Blhttern, fast der Hand erreichbar,
obwohl man liber den breiten Strom hinlibergreifen musste,
der unbewegt, kaum rieselnd hier voriiberzog, unaufhaltsam
das fliessende Geheimnis." (GW 3: 471) Only once he has
fulfilled all his responsibilities in this world does he
once more notice the laurel twig lying on his bed, and it
now assumes a new symbolic value. "Indes, man brauchte
gar nicht hinliberzugreifen, denn bereits hier am diesseit-
igen Ufer, hier auf der Bettdecke, der Hand erreichbar,
schimmerte as golden: der Lorbeerschbsslingl von Augustus,
von don GBttern, voni Schicksal, von Jupiter selber hierher
gelegt.; golden schimmerten die Blhtter." (GW 3: 479)
The golden bough, and thus knowledge of death, can be won
in this life through love for one's fellow-men, through
an identification with the hopes, fears and limitations
common to all men. That unity symbolically anticipates
the ideal unity of all Being into which man enters through
death.
Clearly, a parallel can be drawn between Vergil's
developing insight into the positive, complementary
relationship of empirical and transcendental reality and
Broch's attempt to formulate his theory of "das Irdisch-
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Absolute" which was intended to restore man as the central,
qualitative value in reality, Like Broch, Vergil
eventually rejects purely formal, abstract knowledge and
comes to see humanit}' as the absolute qualitative criterion
in life. The emphasis is very much on the affirmation of
empirical reality and earthly responsibilities as the
means of understanding and approaching transcendental
reality. The dialectical pessimism of Die Schlafwandler
which welcomed the catastrophic dissolution of values as
the only hope for a re-birth of human values has yielded
to a quiet optimism that man can anticipate and work for
such a new value-systoui by a positive commitment to
humanity in his own era, whenever that may be.
283
5. PER BERGROMAN.
a) Some Comments on the Genesis of the Novel.
Broch completed the first version of the novel early
in 19365 he gave up work on the second version late that
year while working on the eighth chapterj the third
version, begun late in 1949* had progressed as far as the
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fifth chapter when Broch died in 1951* The publication
of the critical edition of all three versions by Frank
Kress and Hans Albert Maier in 1969 makes it possible to
qualify some of the comments in the two most important
articles dealing with the genesis of this work. These
articles, by Manfred Durzak and Gfttz Wienold, both appeared
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before 1969. It should also be remembered that the
third version of the novel was published separately by
Suhrkamp in 1969 under the title of Demeter and that a
comparative study of the first chapter of the three versions
was available in Frank Kress's doctoral dissertation of
1966.73
Any comment here on these articles is limited to their
relevance to the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-
Absolute".
Durzak suggests that the thematic emphasis in the
first version is religious, in the second mythical, and in
the third political. He also maintains that the last
version not only contains the literary expression of Broch's
political and psychological studies of the 1940's, but has
a much simplified style of the type described by Broch in
284
1947 in the essay, "The Style of the Mythical Age" (GW 6:
249-264)# It is Durzak!s contention that in the first
two versions of the novel Marias Ratti is depicted as a
misled and self-deluded messianic figure, whereas in the
final version he assumes the political and psychological
characteristics of Adolf Hitler. In support of this
view Durzak quotes Broch's description of the novel in
his "Autobiographic als Arbeitsprograram" : "in diesem
Roman habe ich versucht, das deutsche Geschehen mit all
seinen nxagischen und mystischen Hintergrlinden, mit seinen
liiassenwahnartigen Trieben, mit seiner ' nlichtei-nen Blind-
heit und niichternen Berauschtheit' in seinen Vurzeln
aufzudecken. " (GW 9 i 46) «
The following objections can be made to Durzak's
theory. The xrords x/hich ha quotes x^ere written in the
early 1940's and can refer only to the existing versions,
the first txvo, of the novel. Contrary to Durzak's
suggestion, they indicate that the early versions of the
novel must have been xv'ritten as an explicit criticism and
analysis of the rise of Nazism. It is now possible to
confirm this by comparing the texts of the first two
versions. The first version seems to have assumed the
role of a rough, x/orking draft tor the second. The second
version introduces numerous lengthy and detailed passages
x/hich expand on Marius's psychological condition and,
above all, his irrational appeal to a mass audience.
There seem to be obvious parallels to Hitler's demagogic
talents here.^
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Broch's later "Massenwahntheorie" (1939-1941)
contains many passages which are directly relevant to
Marius and the tactics he uses to win over the villagers
in the first two versions of the work, but especially in
the second® This is particularly the case where Broch
analyses the psychology of the madman as the outsider who
attempts to break into and control an existing social
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order® Such passages are particularly interesting when
compared with the changes in the description of Marius
which Broch made from the first to the second version®
In the "Massenwahntheorie" Broch also examines the
psychology of the pursuer and the pursued in pogroms
(GW 9; 190f)» We find here a detailed analysis of the
way in which Marius stirs up hatred against Wetchy in the
Dergroman. The second version of the novel devotes
considerably more detail and. attention to the Wetchy
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episodes than the first.
All these facts would seem to indicate that the
second version of the novel anticipates Broch's detailed
scientific research in politics and psychology or at
least its systematic formulation in the "Massenwahntheorie" •
Durzak argues that this research is reflected only in the
last version of the novel, but there is no textual evidence
in the existing fragment of that version to support such
a view, Durzak is certainly correct to emphasize the
stylistic differences between the second and third versions#
A comparison of the texts reveals that the third version
is generally much more compact and has a more concise
sentence-structure. There are more finite verbs and less
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present participles. Abstract nouns, especially verbal
and adjectival nouns are reduced in number. The expansive
and complex passages of natural description and associated
mythical speculation are also greatl}" reduced, and there
is less meditation and speculative commentary from the
narrator.
Wienold suggests, correctly in my opinion, that the
second version was conceived of as an analysis of Nazism.
In support of his vieiv he uses the same quotation from
"Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm" as does Durzak to
confirm his different theory. Wienold, however, correctly
relates these words to the earlier version of the novel,
to which they must refer. He further disagrees with
Durzak when he says that Broch intended the third version
of the novel as a general examination of the phenomenon
of mass-hysteria, whereas the second dealt \i/ith Nazism in
particular. This is certainly more tenable than Durzak's
view, since there seems little point in writing an analysis
of Nazism some five years after the end of the war. Again
it can only be said that there is no textual evidence in
the third version to confirm Wienold's suggestion.
Both Durzak and Wienold published their articles
before the three versions were all available in their
entirety. In general they support their arguments with
external evidence, such as letters, or reasoned speculation.
The most important external evidence is provided by two
summaries of the novel written by Broch which are now in
the Broch Archive of Yale University. They were published
for the first time in Wienold's article and are now avail-
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able in the fourth volume of the critical edition of
Kress and Maier. The difference in the interpretations of
the genesis of the three versions of the novel advanced
by Durzak and V'ienold is accounted for almost entirely by
the different datings they suggest for these summaries.
It is not within the scope of this thesis to make a more
detailed examination of the genesis of the three versions
of the novel, but it can be said that Durzak's dating of
the summaries seems the more probable. Unlike T'"ienold,
who relies on speculation about Broch's intentions with
each version, Durzak works Prom the more reliable, concrete
evidence of the type-script and the type and format of
paper used. For further details the reader is referred
to the articles in question.
The reason for this criticism of the views of Durzak
and U'ienold has been to make clear that Broch's political
and psychological studies, which play such an important
part in the development of the political application of
the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", can be seen reflected,
even if only in embryonic form, in the second version of
7 Q
the Bergroman in 1936.
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b) The Bergroman as a Novel of Transition.
For the purpose of tracing the development of the
theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in Broch's novels the
third version of the Bergroman may be ignored because,
when compared with the first two, this brief fragment
reveals stylistic rather than thematic differences. Broch
completed only slightly more than four chapters, and if he
intended to make important thematic changes they are not
evident in the existing fragment.
We can therefore concentrate exclusively on the first
two, and especially on the second version. In as far as
the novels reflect the develooment of the theory of "das
Irdisch-Absolu.te" it can be shown that the Bergroman of
1936 represents a stage of transition. In it are
expressed ideas already contained in Die unbekannte GrBsse
and the concluding section of Bsch. Broch later expressed
these ideas much more clearly and forcefully in Per Tod
des Vergil and Die Schuldlosen. Per Tod des Vergil has
been discussed before the Bergroman partly because of the
complicated genesis of the latter, but also because many
of the more vaguely expressed ideas in it which are
relevant to "das Irdisch-Absolute" can be more clearly
understood if referred back to Per Tod des Vergil.
At the outset, Broch's reasons for abandoning work
on the Bergroman should be remembered. One of the most
important of these was his desire to make a direct,
practical contribution to preserving humanitarian values
in the face of the threat of Nazism. He gave up work on
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the novel to produce his "Vblkerbundtheorie" (1936-1937)
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and his "Theorie der Demokratie" (1939-1940). It was
precisely this desire for a personal commitment to human
values which provided such an important stimulus in his
work to the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-
Absolute".
A similar impulse is to be seen in the life and work
of the doctor who narrates the events of the Bergroman.
Because he feels his work in. medical research is too
impersonal and abstract he gives it up to become a village
doctor who is directly and personally involved in helping
his fellow-men. This is present even in the first
version of the novel, but the second lays much greater
emphasis on the doctor's decision. The "Vorwort" to both
versions discusses the doctor's reasons for changing his
job, but in the second these words are added,
" :»ort war das Unendlicho fftr immer und ewig der unerreich-
bare Zielpunkt, hier ist es in sich beschlossen, aingesenkt
in jedes Einnelelonent, eingesenkt in jede Handreichung,
die in dera Dianste der Ordnung vollzogen wird; und war es
dort das Erkennen gewesen, las den Eintr.itt in die Ordnung
gewhhrleistet hatte, so wird hier Tun und Leben, Mitleben
und Mithelfen gefordert; es ist eine Ordnung, die das
hissen der Seela und deren Unendlichkeit spiegelt."
{Jerxronan II: 4-5)^
Just as the doctor abandons the endless search for
knowledge, without ever denying its ultimate value, in
order to become more involved in the immediate problems of
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humanity, so Broch progressively turned away from his
reliance on the transcendental Absolute of the Logos, which
guarantees the systematic unity of all formal knowledge,
to the earthly Absolute of man as the central value which
should impose a limiting, qualitative factor on the pursuit
of knowledge, Walter Baumann has suggested that the
doctor represents a positive advance on the figure of
Bertrand in Die Schlafwandler, The latter, whether as
Eduard v, Bertrand or Dr. Bertrand Miiller, is able to give
a ohiloscphical analysis of the crisis of western
civilization, but he is so paralysed by his knowledge that
he cannot or will not make the slightest endeavour to help
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othex's in that crisis.
To Baumann's comments it may be added that in the
narrator of the Sergrorian we can see a complement to
Richard Hieck of Die unbekannte Crfesse. The latter comes
to accept human values without comprehending them fully
and remains dedicated to the pursuit of scientific
knowledge. The doctor in the Bergroman follows the
opposite path, committing himself to the active, if limited
furtherance of human values at the expense of abstract
knowledge. In view of what we know of Broch's personal
decisions in developing his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute"
there seem to be grounds for regarding the doctor's
position less as a complement to that of Hieck's and more
as an advance upon it. Finally as to this point, it can
be said that the doctor anticipates the insights of the
dying Vergil, who comes to understand love and human
service as the highest form of knowledge.
As has already been shown, love assumes for Vergil
the value of "Erkenntnis"• This is the word regularly
used by Broch for objective, formally valid knowledge as
distinct from subjective, intuitive knowledge which Eroch
normally describes as "Wissen". It can be shown that in
the Dergroman love and the acknowledgment of the calls of
friendship and moral responsibility are generally subsumed
under the rubric of "Wissen" • The change in terminology
from the mereroman to the later Per Tod des Vergil gains
a particular relevance when seen in the context and chron¬
ology of the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-
Absolute" « In the mid-1930*s Broch believed that
humanitarian values should be the central consideration in
every field of life and thought. At that time that was
a personal conviction, a subjective view ("Wissen"). The
purpose of his political and psychological and mathematical
studies of the 1940's was to "prove" this belief, set it
on a scientific foundation and thus raise it to the status
of "Erkehntnis", since only in this way would it command
any general support and recognition. Dor Tod Jos Vergil
was finally published in 1945, only two or three years
before broch femulated the definitive epistemological
#1
basis of his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in "Uber
syntaktische und kognitive Einheitea".
Izx the Bergx'oman "Wissen" has two complementary
meanings. It implies an intuitive awareness of the ideal
unity of ail Being, a belief that the finite and temporal
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world is an integral and significant part of an infinite
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and eternal reality,, The complement to this is the
conviction that man can understand that higher reality
only through affirmation of, and commitment to human
existence and earthly reality in all its limitations. In
order to understand transcendental reality one should look
not be3rond oneself, but into oneself. These facets of
Broch's concept of "Wissen" are united in the two most
important themes of the novel, "das Wissen des Herzens"
and "die Mitte des Seins".
There is evidence to suggest that Broch intended to
add considerable emphasis to these themes in the second
version of the work. Bergroman II introduces five new
passages relevant to "das Wissen des Herzens". Of these,
two refer to the intuitive perception of the ideal unity
of all Being (op. 216, 249)• Two others emphasize that
man must look into himself and attempt to realize his own
humanity to the full in order to be able to understand and
accept the seemingly paradoxical function of his temporal
and finite condition within that unity (pp« 3^7, 397).
In this respect the Bergroman takes up and expands
on the conclusions of F-sch at the end of the second part
of die Schlafwandlor. The doctor and, to a lesser extent,
Mutter Glsson have the same perspective of life as Esch
comes to rely on, a perspective explicitly rejected by the
dialectical pessimism of "Ber -erfall der Verte" and the
conclusions drawn from Hupuenau. Some qualification about
Mutter Gisson's attitude is necessary because, although
actively committed to helping her fellow-men wherever and
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whenever possible, 3he believes in a regular cyclical
development of life between catastrophe and peaceful
harmony. She refuses to try to halt what she sees as
inevitable, notably the growth of Marius's influence over
8 3
the villagers. ' Nevertheless her behaviour represents
an advance on Bertrandf s impotent pessimism in "He
Schlafwandler and anticipates the important theme of
"noch nicht und doch schoa" in her Tod des Vergil. Frank
Trommlsr suggests briefly that in many respects the
Bergroman expands on Esch's insights that man is the central
value in life and that he creates on earth a concrete,
empirical reality which reflects the ideal, formal unity
of all Being which is guaranteed by the transcendental
8 A
Absolute of the Logos. ' The relevance of all these
considerations to the development of "das Irdisch-Absolute"
is at once obvious.
The conviction that humanity and humanitarian
considerations must be the central, qualitative value in
life appears even more clearly in the theme of "die
Mitte des Seins". This does not occur in the existing
eight chapters of Bergrcman II. but it plays such an impo¬
rtant part in the first version and is sc closely related
to "das Wissen des Herzens" that there is good reason to
believe that Broch would have expanded on those passages
if he had not given up work on the novel before reaching
them. In all of them the anthropocentric perspective is
again very evident.
"Nur in der Mitte unseres Seins ist das Wissen, ist
das Wissen um das, was der Mensch braucht, um Mensch zu
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sein, ist das Wissen urn seine Humanit&t und seine Kultur,
3 a . in der Mitte uaseres Seins, nur in seiner Mitte,
nicht im dunklen Rausche seiner Grenzen, weder im Rausche
des Urgrilndigen, noch im Rausche des Technischen, sondern
im Sein seiner solbst wohnt das Gftttliche in uns,"
(Dergroman 1: 337-338)
"Die Zwiesprache der Lebenden ist kein geringeres
/under als das der Toten, und die Mitte unseres Lebons und
uaseres Wissens ist die Schlichtheit, in der alleln das
dudatmen des I'erzens ist. seine Zwiesprache und seine
Wahrheit, beschlossen das Unendliche in einean einzigon
Atesazug des Gndlicben«" er,m:u.. I: 366)
"!!ohe drde, in der das Echo klingt, spiegelnder
Garten, der die Mitte des Seins urisehliesstI Suchte nicht
auch ich den Quell des eigenen Echos, da ich nach dem
Blick fahndete, der aus rair hinausdringt, das E eiende
nmfassend, mich zu ilim hinrtragend? « . . Nimmer kftnnen
wir weitcr gelangen, als zu jener schwebenden hohen I itte,
in der das Erfassende und das Erfasste sick einen, Quell
des Schos und Aber-Echos, das die Srkenntnis ist, gbttiich
und irdisch zugleich, das Jenseitige im Riesseitigen
ttffnend: dies ist die Wohnstatt der Heiligen, die ihr
menschliches Leben .leben und doch dem Gbttlichen zugewandt
sind wohin auch immer ihr Blick fhilt, da ist ihnen
die Erde hocli und erhaben, wohin iimi.er sie horehen, da
orklingt ihnen der Spiegelgesaag des Echos, denn lurch das
Nahe hindurch die Ferae sehend, ist ihr Leben zur liabenden
Brkermtais und damit zur Ileiligkeit gev/orden, im
Unzulhnglichen schamhaft und demutsvoll das Unsterbliche
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enthttllend und verhllllend, und je tiefer sie hinabtauchen
in die Einsamkeit ihres Selbst, je hbher sie emporschweben
zu den Hfthen des Unbenennbaren - und wer verrnag dann noch
zu sagen, wo das Gben, wo das Unten isti - desto
schwebender, strahlender, heiterer wird ihnen die irdische
Wohnstatt der Mitte, erfttllt von der Sicherheit der
Horizonte." (Bergroman I; 379-380)
All the ideas which are so vaguely contained in the
two concepts of "das Wissen des Herzens" and "die Mitte
des Seins" are developed in greater detail in the process
of revelation by which Vergil comes to understand love as
the highest form of knowledge.
In the Bergroman and even more so in Der Tod des
Vergil love in its widest sense, which includes that of
complete identification with, and commitment to humanity,
is shown to be central to life. This was not the case in
Die Schlafwandler: Esch's attempt to build a nexv and
better life on such a foundation is rejected explicitly and
implicitly by Broch, explicitly in the letters already
discussed and implicitly in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and
the philosophical speculations of Bertrand in Pasenoxv and
Esch. There love is shown to be a phenomenon possible
only on the very periphery of human experience. It can
occur only in the extremes of the human condition when
existential fear and isolation force the individual to seek
the comfort and reassurance of a fellow-creature suffering
in the same way.
The first detailed statement of Broch's re-evaluation
of love as the central experience of life is found in his
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description of the passionate but tragically brief affair
between the doctor in the Bergroman and a professional
colleague* Barbara. The importance of love is also
mentioned in Die unbekannte Grbsse. but only briefly and
vaguely because Richard Hieck cannot analyse or understand
its significance for him very clearly. Such an analysis
falls to the lot of the doctor in the Bergroman. The
first version of the novel contains the Barbara episode,
85but it is considerably expanded in the second version.
In Bergroman II Broch clearly intended to emphasize the
importance of the memory of that love for the doctor more
strongly. He introduces several new passages which
anticipate the doctor's eventual account of this part of
his life. These integrate that particular part of the
narration more satisfactorily into the whole novel and
help to stress the lasting influence of that love in the
86
doctor's ovra positive affirmation of life. Thematically,
the description of the doctor's love for Barbara points
forward to similar passages in Per Tod des Vergil, which
have already been discussed, where human love is seen as
the symbolical fulfilment in empirical reality of the
ideal spiritual union which man can achieve with God or the
Absolute of the Logos only through death. In both novels
the emphasis is that a practical commitment to humanity
is the only way in which man can start to understand the
relevance of that Absolute for his earthly life.
"Von ihr (Barbara) kam die Sicherheit des 'Du bist' und die
jenes ahnenden Wissens, das die Erreichung des Ichs und
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seiner Einheit nicht mehr in unendlichen Fernen, sondern
in erlebbarer N&he vor sich sieht, weil das Du sich ihm
enthiillt hat: lauschend dem Echo des Du, das eigene
hbrend, wird der Mensch zurn Gleichnis des Menschen, vermag
er sich selber aufzugeben und in das grosse Gleichnis der
Natur heimzakehren, versinkend im Sein, im All, im
lebendigen Sterben#" (Bereroiaan II: 503)
Both versions of the novel also contain the
definition of love which plays such an important part in
Der Tod des Vergil: love is described as "ein Schicksal-
auf-uns-nehmen" (Bergroman II: 456) and "Schicksal-auf-
sich-nehmen" (Bergroman I: 201)•
In conclusion to this chapter the reader is referred
to a passage from Bergroman II: 519 which has already been
O rj
quoted at the end of the chapter on Esch. In that
passage the doctor describes how he tried to forget the
pain caused by Barbara's death by immersing himself in the
daily round of work. There is the suggestion that the
fulfilment of moral responsibilities rather than simply
personal, sexual love is the means through which man can
come to understand his role in infinity and eternity.
Once again Broch appeals for a positive affirmation of
life as the necessary foundation for such knowledge# In
this can be seen the essence of the theory of "das
Irdisch-Absolute", Man, not an impersonal abstract,
transcendental Absolute must be the central value in life:
that Absolute does exist, but it can only be approached
and partially realized on earth through man.
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6, DIE SCHUL3L0SEN
Soon after the publication of Die Schuldlosen Broch
referred to it in a letter as "der so merkwtirdig zusammen-
gewiirfelte Roman" (GW 8: 406). In the "Entstehungsbericht"
published with the novel he confesses: "Die Schuldlosen
sind auf etwas abenteuerliche Art entstanden." (GW 5: 359)•
The complicated genesis of this novel, the last to be
published before Broch's death, is described in admirable
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detail by Richard Thieberger and Manfred Durzak. As in
the study of the other novels, so too with Die Schuldlosen,
reference is made here only to those aspects relevant to
the question of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute"•
Die Schuldlosen consists of eleven Novellen written
over a period of thirty-one years from 1918 to 1949•
They are set within a lyrical framework, entitled "Stimmen",
which, like six of the Novellen, was written in 1949*
These later Novellen and the "Stimmen" are of particular
importance because they clearly reflect Broch's interest
at that time in the possibilities of formulating a theory
of politics and a new humanitarian ethos based on the
concept of "das Irdisch-Absolute". His two most important
theoretical writings on this subject, "Politik: Bin
Kondensat" and "Trotzdem: Humane Politik", were \^ritten
in the period 1949-1950. In her dissertation oh Die
Schuldlosen Gerda Utermfthlen has pointed out that the
thoughts expressed in these two studies are very evident
89
in "Stimmen 1933" and the Novelle, "Steinerner Gast".
The table of contents in the novel suggests that
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"Steinerner Gast" was first conceived of, "im Haupttheraa",
in 1941» Like so much else in that table of contents
this is misleading. The only possible source for such a
suggestion is a letter written by Broch in 1951 (GW 8s
418). There he says that the first, visionary
inspiration for the figure of the old bee-keeper came to
him in 1941 and that he gave it concrete literary
expression in a poem. The poem in question is almost
certainly that now published under the title of "Der
Urgef&hrte" (GW 1: l63)« A comparison of it with the
Novelle reveals certain parallels, notably the wintery
setting and the concept of the mysterious companion as a
guide through death. In the Novelle, however, a new and
dominating emphasis is introduced with Andreas1s long,
detailed confession of his moral guilt in failing to accept
his political and human responsibilities. Here the
influence of Broch's research on the theory of "das
Irdisich-Absolute" can be seen. Thieberger and Durzak both
correctly show how the earlier Novellen were altered in
order to accommodate the new, central theme of the whole
novel, namely that of the need for individual moral
responsibility and human commitment, regardless of how
futile that might seem in a world devoid of any generally
recognized values.^
When referring to Die Schuldlosen Broch regularly
emphasized that his purpose in writing the novel was to
exemplify the possible range of human reaction to a new,
higher plane of reality. Replying to criticism of the
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novel by Karl August Horst, Broch talks of a "neue
Realithtsaufdeekung" and "Realithtsahnungen" (GW 8s 418).
In two summaries of the novel written by Broch for his
publisher and published for the first time in Burzak's
article the same claim is repeated with almost monotonous
o i
insistence. There he states that Andreas's confession
and suicide reveal "der Keim eines neuen Realit&ts-
bewusstseins" and that precisely this is "letztes Ziel
der Romankunst Hermann Brochs" (p. 390). Lebrecht Endeguth,
the old bee-keeper who realizes the complementary roles of
life and death in the cycle of existence and who knows
that earthly reality represents only a small, if significant
and integral part of a higher, transcendental reality, is
described as "der geisthafte Trhger einer neuen
Welteinsicht" (p. 391)• Referring to Andreas's confession
and suicide, Broch writes: "er scheidet in der Gnade
einer neuen Realit&tseinsicht." (p.392). The purpose of
the novel is described as "einerseits die Schilderung
einer ganzen Epoche, andererseits die Aufzeigung (zumindest
andeutungsweise) der in ihr schlummernden Zukunftsmftglich-
keiten" (p.397).
We know from the above mentioned letter to Karl
August Horst that when Broch re-read the original Novellen
from 1918 and 1933 before beginning work on the definitive
version of the novel he was not satisfied with them. He
felt that something new, something more relevant had to be
added to justify their second publication. In that
letter he continues as follows. "Und das konnte bloss
geschehen, wenn etwas wirklich Neues hinzutrat, um sie
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allesamt in sich aufzunehmen. Da fiel atir auf, dass die
'Leichte Entt&uschung' ein allerdings hbchst unzureichender
Versuch zur Gestaltung des Erlebnisses absoluter Leere
gewesen ist. Das war der Ansatzpunkt, und ich stellte
daher diese Novelle in den Mittelpunkt des Buches, das
Vakuum, die leere Zeit als Zentrum eines Geschehenssytems."
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(GW 8j 418) This quotation and Broch's own emphasis
in it suggest that in Die Schuldlosen "Eine leichte
Enttbuschung", in its revised form, contains a new or at
least more clearly presented analysis of man's reaction to
the void of the dissolution of values which is not present
in the original. It is precisely the individual's
reaction to a world without coherent purpose and lacking
any generally binding values which Broch chose to develop
as the central theme of the new novel.
According to Broch, man's first encounter with the
new reality involves "das Erlebnis absoluter Leere", This
is man's situation in a world where the progressive
dissolution of values has run its full course. All
conventional criteria of behaviour and thought have lost
any claim to absolute validity. All things are relative;
the individual can no longer find security and peace of
mind by relying on some universally recognized ethical
code. The very structure of normal daily reality, the
basic concepts of time and space have been called in
question by developments in physics, especially by Einstein's
theory of relativity, Broch describes Andreas's final
insight before his death as follows! "er beginnt zu
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ahnen, dass der Mensch in eine neue Welt gesetzt ist, in
eine, fttr die sogar die alten Grundscheraen von Raum und
Zeit nicht mehr gelten, so dass ein neues Realit&ts-
bevusstsein im Werden ist«" (p. 3 96).
All such comments made by Broch about the novel
suggest that he consistently saw this new reality in a
positive light, showing it as the characteristic situation
to which modern man must reconcile himself if he is to
realize his full human potential# Such a view is entirely
in keeping with the necessary relationship between ethics
and epistemology postulated by Broch in his theory of
values: any advance in knowledge, any extension of
experience, any destruction of outdated modes of thought
and conduct is to be welcomed because the new found freedom
will allow man progressively to formulate a code of ethics
commensurate with the demands of his new reality# Such
a theory led Broch, a victim of his own inexorable logic,
to conclude in the last chapter of Die Schlafwandler that
revolution and all its concomittant inhumanity were
ethically and epistemologically necessary within his
cyclical interpretation of history.
A study of references to the new reality within
Die Schuldlosen reveals an ambivalence in Broch *s evaluation
of it xdiich scarcely reflects the enthusiastic affirmation
expressed in his letters and commentaries# It can be shown
that his doubts as to the positive value of this new realm
of human experience occur in those parts of the novel
written in 1949* These doubts ax'e clearly influenced by
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his research on the theory of the "das Jrdisch-Absolute"•
The new reality with which the individual must come
to terms is regularly described through the visionary,
mystical revelations of the old bee-keeper and Andreas.
These descriptions are reminiscent of many similar passages
in all of the earlier novels. The essence of this new
reality, as thus revealed, is that it transcends the
empirical boundaries of time, space and three-dimensional
reality, harmoniously embracing within its multi¬
dimensional unity the whole cycle of creation. Broch
sees this cycle flowing constantly between the poles of
timelessness ("Zeitlosigkeit") and eternity ("Ewigkeit"),
Non-Being ("Nicht-Sein") and Being ("Sein"), Nothingness
("Niehts") and infinity ("Unendlichkeit"), ooncepts so
absolutely opposed to each other that they meet and
become identical in the mystical "coincidentia oppositorum"•
Subject as he is to the finite and temporal limitations of
empirical reality, man finds such concepts terrifying and
incomprehensible.
Seen in simpler, human terms, the only way man can
reconcile himself to the new reality is to recognize the
limitations of his finite existence, acknowledge that his
reality is merely an integral part of a higher, ideal unity
of all Being, and accept that death has a natural, positive
function within the ceaseless flux of the creative process.
If man can do this his life assumes a new significance
even in a world seemingly devoid of absolute values. Two
304
quotations from the above references will suffice to
illustrate this. Broch describes the old bee-keeper as
"eingebettet in die Verwobenheit von Leben und Tod, die
in seinen Schlummer drang", and then continues as follows.
"Und bffnete er inmltten des Nachtdunkels oder innersten
Vormorgen das wiedererwachende Staunen seiner Seele,
hinaufsphhend zuni schwebenden Firmament, hinablauschend
zur ruhendon Erde, so wurde er selber zum schwe'oenden und
ruhenden Erspiiren der Ganzheit, er selber Ganzheit, welche
die Ganzheit der Welt erfilllt und von ihr erftillt wirdj
das Gestein unter ihm und das Gebein in ihm ivurden eins
mit dem kttiilen Leuchten der Sterne, einvermhhlt in dieses,
einvermhhlt in die Lebensbereitschaft des toten Stoffes,
whhrend die Vielfalt des Lebenden ringsum, nicht minder
aber auch die seiner eigenen lebenden Person, seines
eigenen lebenden Fleisches, seines eigenen lebenden Herzens
mitsar.it seinem Pulsschlag die Bereitschaft zur Pdickkehr
ins Unbelebte offenbarte, und dicser unendlich gesparmte
Austausch zwischen den Polen des Belebten und Unbelebten
enthiillte sich als das Uniuittelbare schlechthin, als das
innerste Gezeite der Ganzheit, als die unmittelbare
lleiligkeit der Dauer, die aus dem unendlichen Wechsel von
Tod und Leben hervorgeht, als die Ileili&keit der unmittel-
baren Feme, die den Menschen aufnimmt, soferne er sich
rftckhaltlos unterwirft. Er aber hatte sich unterworfen,
und sein Erwachen war Wissen ma die heiligo Feme, in der
er sich befand," (GW 5; 126-127)^
At a later point in the novel Andreas is overwhelmed
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by the following revelation.
"Oh, unvorstellbar ist schon das Wegsterben des Ichs aus
der verbleibenden Welt, unvorstellbarer jedoch das Nicht-
Sein als solches, das totale Nicht-Sein, das auch das der
Vorstellung miteinschliesst, das Sein der Nicht-
Dimensionalit&t, in der letztlich das der unendlich vielen
Dimensionen aufgeht, und wer bis zu solch &usserstem
Vorstellungsrand vordringt, dera ist es flir diesen
Augenblick, allerdings bloss fttr diesen einen Augenblick
gelungen, nicht-seiend zu werden, ftlr diesen einen Augen¬
blick den Tod zu iiberwinden. Das ist die Todesttberwindung
des Sterbenden, dem die Gnade eines vollbewussten Lebens
zuteil geworden war und nun die eines vollbewussten Sterbens
zuteil wird." (GW 5: 250-251)95
Andreas, regularly described as "entscheidungs-
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schttchtern" and "schicksalsgl&ubig", has occasional
visionary glimpses of the higher reality and the new harmony
and unity of experience idiich it offers. He does not,
however, have the strength of character to accept the full
implications of this new situation. Acceptance of this
new plane of reality demands that the individual
acknotviedge that the conventional facade of familiar
reality with all its moribund values and criteria of
thought and behaviour has finally collapsed. The indivi¬
dual now stands in an exposed position of complete
existential isolation and can no longer retire into the
comfortable, deceptive security of existing systems of
values. He is thrown back upon himself; he must
reconcile himself to his own transient, finite nature and
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yet seek within himself# as the only source left to him,
some reliable principle on which to establish a new social
and moral order commensurate with a new reality in \tfhich
all things seem relative.
On at least three occasions Andreas suppresses or
ignores the otherwise attractive vision of the new reality
because he is afraid to acknowledge the responsibility
it would demand of him. He realizes that the new reality
has to some extent already dawned upon his generation.
"'Noch nicht und doch schon", sagte etwas in A.; er
ftihlte die Auflbsung der Welt ins Vieldimensionale, und er
filhlte durchaus, dass er selber, dass sein eigenes Sein
davon mitbetroffen war: indes, da dear) Vorgang kaum etwas
Abnormales oder gar Gespentisches anhaftete, vielmehr die
Menschen - erstaunlich genug - unver&ndert in Fleisch und
Blut belassen wurclen, und auch sein eigenes Lebensgeftthl
keinerlei unmittelbare Verhnderung oder Beeintr&chtigung
erfuhr, so schien man kaum verpflichtet, der Erscheinung
gewahr zu warden, obwohl gerade die ungespenstige
Natiirlichkeit, mit der sie auftrat, ihre tiefere
Gespenstlgkeit enthielt." (GW 5s 240-241)^
It can be argued that up to this point, even in the
Novellen of 1949# Broch still sees the new reality in a
positive light. Die Schuldlosen seems simply to present
an extension of the philosophical content of Die
Schlafwandler. namely that the dissolution of values
reveals a higher, ideal unity of all reality in which human
life plays an integral part. For better or worse man
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must come to terms with this new reality which is
inevitably dawning upon him. By refusing this challenge
Andreas is clinging for security to an outdated, closed
system of values. This is confirmed in one of the
earlier Novellen, "Verlorener Sohn". There Andreas has
a vision of the new reality, but instead of accepting its
implications he tries to give concrete expression to the
vision of its harmonious unity by integrating himself into
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the baroness's family. Here he is distorting the vision
of the new reality, because, by assuming the role of the
son and seeking shelter in an established matriarchal order,
he is abdicating personal responsibility and trying to find
a false security in empirical reality. He is guilty of
Romanticism, defined by Broch in Pasenow as what happens,
"wenn Irdisches zu Absolutem erhoben wird" (GW 2: 19)•
The symbol is taken for the reality.
In one respect, however, Andreas welcomes the
distractions afforded him by his revelations of the new
reality, and it is significant that this particular aspect
is introduced only in 1949# in "Erkaufte Mutter". Andreas
has become casually and irresponsibly involved with a
young, innocent girl of a social status inferior to his
own, wholly failing to realize that the girl, Melitta, has
become deeply attached to him. For a time he vacillates
between fulfilling his responsibilities to her or
consolidating his position in the affections of the
baroness. Finally his indifference leads indirectly to
99Melitta's death. Of particular relevance here is a
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passage where Andreas explicitly states, somewhat guiltily,
that he had welcomed his Utopian visions and transcendental
speculation as a means of forgetting Melitta. He is
sitting in a crowded station-restaurant after leaving the
baroness's garden-party where he has had a number of such
visionary revelations.
"Und fast war es ihm, als wolite er die Degradation, die
er, berechtigt oder unberechtigt, in der Kumpanei ftihlte,
das M&dchen entgelten lassen, indem er, auf dieses die
Degradierungsgefilhle ausdehnend, sich in der Baronin und
Hildegards feinem Haus wenigstens tagsttber solch simpler
Liebe nicht zu erinnern wtinschte und tats&chlich auch just
die feine Teegesellschaft zum Anlass genommen hatte, urn
zur Legitimierung der Vergessenswiinsche alles innere und
Stussere Sein so grtlndlich ins Nicht-Dimensionale und Viel-
Dimensionale aufzulbsen, dass jegliche Erinnerung daraus
verschwinden musste." (GW 5: 253-254)
In these words there is a very strong suggestion that
experience of the nevi reality can also be a pretext for the
individual to ignore the immediate human problems and
responsibilities of empirical reality.
What is no more than a suggestion in the above
passage becomes an unequivocal statement in Andreas's
confession before his suicide. This too occurs in one of
the Novellen written in 1949 > "Steinerner Gast." (GW 5:
327-335)* Andreas confesses that his guilt is that of
indifference to his own essential humanity and consequently
to that of everyone else: "Ur-Gleichgttltigkeit ist es,
n&mlich die gegen das eigene Menschtum; die Gleichgilltig-
309
keit vor dem Leid des Nebenraenschen aber ist eine Folge
hiervon." (GW 5s 328). His explanation of how this has
come about is very similar to the final analysis of the
dissolution of values in Die Schlafwandler. In a world
where all existing values have collapsed and the
currently accepted view of reality is losing its validity
the individual feels terrified and isolated. He cannot
cope itfith this new experience because he has no binding
or reliable standards of thought or behaviour to fall back
on. He seems at the mercy of an impersonal development
beyond his control and can onlj' withdraw into a selfish,
protective indifference.
"Unsere Aufgabe ist zu gross, und darum wappnen wir uns in
blinder Gleichgiiltigkeit. Die Zersprengungskraft unseres
Ichs ist uns zu gross. UneindSunmbar in Folgerichtigkeit
und furchtbarer Logik hat es eine Welt geschaffen, deren
Vielfalt uns undurchschaubar geworden ist, sie gleichfalls
uneind&mmbar in ihren entfesselten Kr&ften. Die Folger¬
ichtigkeit unserer eigenen Zersprengungsleistung hat uns
gelehrt, wie unentrinnbar das Seinsgeschehen ist, und wir
haben daran gelernt, dass wir es achselzuckend geschehen
lassen alissen; ja selbst vor dem Morden, das im Gestrttpp
der Undurchschaubarkeit allenthalben statthat, schliessen
wir die Augen und lassen es geschehen." (GW 5: 330)
The result is that the individual flees all personal
responsibility and seeks any sort of security even if, as
in Andreas's case, it is only the false, deceptive security
of the baroness's family. This offers no permanent
solution. That can be found only by accepting the dawning
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new reality and somehow attempting to relate it to the
basic human condition. It is here that Broch's theory
of "das Irdisch-Absolute" reveals itself in T)ie Schuldlosen,
a theory not evident in the conclusions of Die
S ch1a f1wand1er.
In Andreas*s confession Broch suggests that man can
come to terms with the new reality only b3^ acknowledging
it, accepting that he cannot yet fully understand it and
rejecting any Utopian dreams or transcendental speculation
about it. He must then turn in upon himself, direct his
attention to the current human situation and concentrate
on developing and preserving man's essential humanity.
We do not knoiir what man ideally could or should be; we may
not know the ideal good to be sought after; but we know
from practical experience what man should not be, and lire
can see and reject the obvious evils apparent in the
current situation. Where the new reality is breaking in
upon current, familiar reality, where traditional values
and standards are losing their validity man can still seek
progressively to eliminate inhumanity, defined by Broch
as slavery and murder, and thus gradually approach the
ideal human condition as human freedom approximates ever
more closely to the unattainable ideal of divine or
absolute freedom. This can be done only by concentrating
on the immediate human problems, by practising an active
moral commitment to man in his given situation. This
primary concern must not be sacrificed to vague Utopian
dreams or futile speculation about the new reality to come.
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No matter how misapplied or wasted such an undertaking may
seem, it is grounded on the only absolute value left to
man in his present situation. It is an earthly Absolute
in the two meanings discussed by Broch in "Polltik; Bin
Kondensat" and "Trotzdem: Humane Politik": murder and
slavery can. be shown to be the lowest pole of the human
condition, and, scientifically speaking, nan is the
necessary and only reliable standard, the earthly Absolute,
against which such an evaluation can be made and
empirically tested.
Clearly Broch is appealing for a direct, practical
commitment to humanity at the expense of vague, distracting
theorizing about some impossibly distant Utopia. The
new reality loses its threatening aspect for man only when
approached from affirmation of the human situation in
empirical reality. All of this is summarized in the
centi'-al passage of Andreas's confession.
"Das Gute ist selbstverst&ndlich, aber es ist diffus, und
nur im Dreidimensionalen gewinnt es Form, nur hier ist es,
war es Befolgung des Befehls, der als absolut-gftttlicher
Vcrantwortungsaufruf das menschliche Tun zura Unendlichen
hingewendet hat; dahingegen wird das Gute seiner richtung-
gebenden Kraft verlustig, j a ist seiner bereits verlustig
gegangen, da der Mensch selber ins Grenzenlose versetzt
worden ist, denn in der Dimensionsvielfalt gibt es
ttberhaupt keine Zielpunkte mehr, so dass die absolute
Richtung nicht mehr durch ein Hinwenden, sondern nur noch
durch ein Abwenden gehalten werden kann, also nicht mehr
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durch eine Hinwendung zum Guten, sondern nur noch durch
eine Abwenduag" vom irdisch Bbsen, kurzum durch die
Bekhmpfung des Tierischen und Untertierischen, das daran
ist, sein Kbchstniass, seine wahrhaft konkrete Absolutheit
zu erreichen. Konkrete Karapfansage an das apal:al3'pt ische
Ilier und Jetzt des Untiers, das ist der neue Verantwortungs-
aurruf, dessen Absolutgeltung v/ir anzuerkennen haben,
anerkennend den Befehl zur aktivea Auflehnung gegen das
B5se, und solcherart ebenso fern dem dumri-verlogenen Gut-
Seia des unbedingten Pazifismus wie der duumn-ehrlichen
Kampflust, die zugunsten ki\nftiger Generationen und ihrer
Traumlaadschaft das Blutvergiessen bejaht und fferdert und
eben hiedurch schon selber tierhaft handelt, ist uns, fern
von dieser wie von jener utopischen Grossartigkeit, die
Pflicht zur schlichten Anst&ndigkeit auferlegt worden, zu
sinor AnstSndigkeit dos unniittelbaren Augenbliclcs, v/eil es
inner nur auf die Reinigung des j eweiligen Weltaugenblicks
ankoBisrt, wenn Gut und B6se aus ihrer heillosen und
unheiltr&chtigen Vermischung wieder entmischt. v/erden sollen.
Nichts kann uns dieser h&chst militanten Anst&ndigkeits-
pfiicht entheben, nicht einrnal die Aussichtslosigkeit
ihres Beginnens, vieliaehr wird joder Verstoss gegen sie,
und sei er noch so gut bagrttndet, eine Manifestation unserer
Gleichgiiltigkeit Und ist durch keinerlei Guttat wett-
zvuaachen." (GW 5: 333-334)
The influence of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute"
is also to be seen in the "Stinmen", which like the
Novellen already discussed, were written in 1949. In
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"Stiramen 1923" we read: "N&chstenhilfe 1st gat, Mord ist
schlecht,die einfachste Absolutheit#" (GW 5: 73)* This
is followed by an appeal for "schlichter Anstand".
Similarly^ the "Prophetengedicht", as Broch referred to it
(BB; 523), in "Stimmen 1933"* in its appeal that man should
look for the Absolute within himself, clearly reflects
ideas expressed in the theoretical writings oa "das
1 09
Irdisch-Absolute",
The conclusions of Die Schuldlosen invite comparison
with those of die Schlafwandler. Any discrepancy between
what are basically analyses of the same situation can be
attributed to the influence on Broch's thinking of his
research on the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" which lay
between the writing of the two novels#
In Bie Schlafwandler revolution is welcomed as a
historical necessity, an ethical act which finally and
violently sweeps away the debris of a moribund system of
values and prepares the ground for the development of a
new, unitary system of values: "Revolution ... Tat der
Selbstaufhebung unci der Selbsterneurerung, letzte und
grbsste ethische Tat des zerfallenden, erste des neuen
Wertsystems, Augenblick der radikal geschichtsbildenden
Zeit aufhebung im Pathos des absoluten Nu.llpun.ktes] " (GW
2: 685)* Any inhumanity or suffering caused by revolution
must be accepted as the price of progress# Here the
opposite view obtains to that later expressed in Bie
Schuldlosen# In the earlier novel humanitarian
considerations are considered of secondary importance to
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the attainment of some vaguely understood, distant Utopia.
Twice in the later novel the ethical conception of
revolution as a necessary instrument in historical develop¬
ment is explicitly and strongly rejected. On both of
these occasions the futility and inhumanity of revolution
is criticized. In these passages humanity and not ethical
progress, as Broch originally understood it, is the
, . , , , 103
hxghest value.
It is at once evident that the behaviour advocated
by Andreas in his confession and so clearly approved of
by Broch, namely a direct moral commitment to the immediate
needs of humanity, is precisely that for which Broch
criticizes Ecch in Die Bchlafwandler. At the end of Each
the eponymous hero, like Andreas, has a vision of the new
reality which is both attractive and disturbing. Esch's
reaction is that which Andreas confesses his own should
hove been. Esch accepts the existence of the new reality,
acknowledges the transient nature of human life as an
integral part of it and, in his love for Mutter Ilentjen,
tries to understand, as far as possible in the human
context, the ideal unity of that reality. By accepting
his own limitations, by probing the depths of his own
humanity and thus understanding the needs, hopes and fears
of others he can identify with another fellow-being and
at least approach a better understanding of the new reality
and the ideal unity of all Being.
In Huguenau, too, Esch reveals a dogged moral
commitment to his fellow—men, sullenly convinced of the
need to stand by Major v. Pasenow in his difficulties, to
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help the inmates of the military hospital and to provide
a home for Marguerite. By this time his previous vision
has faded and he is wallowing in religious sectarianism.
Nevertheless* he can still speak the following words with
complete sincerity even although his thinking is clouded
by religious fantasies: "auf das neue Leben konirat es an
• « . auf die Anst&ndigkeit." (GW 2: 5^7)* As has been
shown already* Broch5 s letters and. commentaries written
when he was working on Die 5chlafwandlor show that he
condemned Eschds behaviour as a reactionary morality which
obstructed the ethical course of the progressive revelation
of the new reality. Broch criticizes Bsch for acting
morally correctly but ethically wrongly.
The views expressed in Die fchuldlosen confirm a
development in Broch's thinking which has already been
discussed in this thesis in another context and which is
associated with the formulation of the theory of "das
Jrdisch-Absolute", namely the gradual abandonment of his
opistemological conception of ethics in favour of a more
conventional interpretation of morality. In the later
writings particularly* the words "ethisch" and "moralisch"
are frequently used synonymously in a way foreign to the
earlier works. Such a development is further confirmed
by a number of broch5s comments on Die Schnldlosen which
suggest that he was more concerned with the immediate
humanitarian problems raised by the dissolution of values
than by the potential Utopia revealed by that crisis.
In the "Sntstehungsbericht" Broch repeatedly uses
"ethisch" and "moralisch* without differentiating between
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them» He claims that the novel must present the fullest
possible range of human experience "bis hinauf zu den
moralischen und metaphysischen" (GW 5* 360). Such a
statement, which places moral and metaphysical experience
on the same plane, is Inconceivable in the writings of the
early 1930's. There metaphysical experience and
particularly the perception of the higher plane of reality
are subsumed under the epistemological conception of ethics,
xdiiie morality is pejoratively associated with the
limitations imposed on man by dogmatic social and
religious conventions* At one point in the "Entstehungs-
bericht" Broch writes: "Politische Gleichgttltigkeit
n&mlich ist ethischer G1eichgti.lt igkeit und damit ira letzten
ethischer Perversion recht nahe verwandt. Kurzum die
nolitisch Schuldlosen befinden sich zumeist bereits ziera-
lich tief im Bereich ethischer Schuld." (GW 5s 36l),
Soon after this, in the space of one paragraph, he refers
to "moralische Schuldhaftigkeit" and "ethische Schuld"
withotit distinguishing between them in any way (GW 5 s 364) •
What seems to be little more than a question of semantic
nedantry helps to illuminate the change in Broch's interest
from speculation about a new Utopian reality, to be realized
at great human cost, to a more practical commitment to the
immediate needs of humanity.
This change of perspective is clearly seen in Broch»s
comments on Lebrecht Endeguth, the old bee-keeper, whose
very name is relevant to the point in question. Broch
makes clear that Endeguth, despite his mythical qualities
317
and mystic communion with the higher plane beyond
empirical reality, is a real person, a character of flesh
and blood who is firmly rooted in earthly reality.
The importance of Endeguth in the final plan of the novel
is emphasized by Broch in one of his publisher's comment¬
aries, where he states explicitly that the old bee-keeper
is a new figure introduced during work on the novel in
1949 (p» 397)• On several occasions he states that
Endeguth's message, his appeal for practical involvement
in life, is convincing only because he speaks from
practical experience, from personal knowledge of the
problems of life. In the letter to Karl August Horst in
which he talks of "das Erlebnis absoluter Leere" in the
novel, Broch goes on to refer to this experience as "das
moralische Zentrum" of the book. This is presumably
because such an experience forces the individual to accept
his existential responsibilities. Broch adds, however,
that without the figure of Endeguth this point could not
have been made: "Erst durch ihn - well er eben 'Person'
ist - konnte der Vorstoss ins Moralische gelingen."
(GW 8: 118).105
Two passages from the commentaries published by
Durzak confirm Broch»s view of Endeguth*s role in the novel.
In the first commentary Endeguth is described as folloi*/s.
"Er ist uralt, und gerade kraft dieses mythischen, dieses
zeitlosen Alters wird er zum Tr&ger des Neuen, zum
geisthaften Trftger elner neuen Weltelnsicht, welche berufen
sein mag, die terroristische Menschheitsepoche zu tiber-
winden und an ihre Stelle wieder die der ewigen Absolutheit
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des moralischen Gebotes zu setzen." (p.391) In the
second commentary exactly the same point is again made,
fndeguth is said to represent the spirit of the netv era.
"Bieser . • representiert den Geist elner neuen
Uelteinslcht , religibs, aber nicht kultisch, aber auch
nicht eigentlich pantheistlech, sondern eher agnoetisch
und ebendarum zur alt-ewigen Absolutheit des Moralischen
zurftckkehrend." (p. 394)
In both cases the emphasis is on a new reality. As
has been shown, Droch regularly defines morality as a
series of negative commandments of the "thou sha.lt not"
variety. Until he began to formulate his theory of "das
Irdisch-Absolute" he compared this unfavourably with his
original conception of ethics which ideally should dictate
how everyone should behave. After evolving his theory of
"das Irdirch-Absolute" he regularly insisted that the new
reality could only be progressively realized through a
practical commitment to the advancement of humanity, namely
by progressively eliminating what is evil in the currently
obtaining human situation rather than by sacrificing
humanity for the sake of some ideal which is necessarily
unknown and beyond definition. In the light of this change
in his thinking the prohibitions of morality assumed a new
positive value for Droch. Human salvation must be sought
and found in earthly, not in transcendental reality, in
this world and not in. the next, fndegutb*s words to
Andreas just before the letter's suicide confirm this,
" 'Ifftre ich ein Geist und nicht wie du Fleisch und Blut,
ich w&ro nicht f&hig', dir Botschaft und Hilfe zu bringen;
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das Wort wird irn Diesseitigen, wird im irdischen Raura
getragen, von irdischem Ilund gesprochen, von irdischem
Ohr gehhrt.'" (GW 5s 336)
A number of critics have already suggested, implicitly
or explicitly, that hie Schuld.losen reflects a revision of
the original theory of values, as expressed in die
>Sohlafwnndler, which postulated as a historical and ethical
necessity the complete destruction of the current system
of values and the sacrifice of all humanitarian consider¬
ations as the prelude to the dawning of a new Utopia.
Liselotte v. Borcke suggests an unusual interpre¬
tation of the frequently recurring symbol of the triangle
in die r-chrldlosen, particularly as it occurs with
reference to the three—sided olockfaee in the centre of
the triangular garden in front of the baroness's house or
to the position of the hands of the clock at eleven
107
minutes past five. According to her, one function of
this symbol is to emphasise the unavoidable limitations of
the three—dimensional, temporal world in which man livesi
his responsibilities lie there and not in some vaguely
1 OP
perceived, higher plane of multi—dimensional reality.
Eric Herd maintains that Andreas falls in his moral
responsibilities because he is distracted from human
problems which he encounters by the lure of that same
109
higher reality. Such an interpretation does not take
account of the fact that this reality can and does assume
a positive value if seen in the correct perspective, from
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a position of affirmation of earthly reality.
Heinz Politzer asserts that Broch's last novel goes
beyond all his previous ones by re-introducing an unequiv¬
ocal appeal for ^irm moral values.
Only Qerda Utermbhlen, in her dissertation on "'ie
chuldlosen. advances the view that the change in
perspective seen there may be directly related to the
political and legislative theories incpirod if*o <■ >oarch
into "das Irdisch—Absolute". She also suggests that the
aesthetic of this novel is radically different from that
of the earlier novels. In the previous novels Broch
concentrated on their epistomological, ethical function,
namely to reveal the -potential net: reality which is
disclosed by the dissolution of values. In tie Ichuldlosen
this ethical concern, as Broch understood it, yields to
the moral one of exemplifying how man should meet that
crisis in his own life.***
Erich Kabler, in his "Rede tiber Hermann Broch",
refers to Broch's final realization that for man there can
be no escape into some ideal, transcendental reality. Man
is a creature of this earth and must fulfil his duties
there. Kahler»s words could well apply to Andreas's final
insight in Bio Eehv.ld.losen: " es gibt fftr den Henochen
kein Entrinnen in ein Jenseits integraler Reinheit."
In conclusion, some comment must be made about
Andreas's suicide. Broch repeatedly states that Andreas
' 13
dies an a state of grace. By this we must presumably
understand that Andreas has finally realized the moral
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responsibility of the individual to his fellow-men at a
time x/hon a moribund system of values is disintegrating
and exposing him to the challenge of a new, higher plane
of reality, Andreas's suicide seems to be the complete
negation of his new found knowledge. Ho preaches direct,
moral commitment to humanity and then fails to accept the
implications of this for himself. Instead, of facing up
to those responsibilities he escapes through death into
the ideal unity of transcendental reality. His suicide
seems a futile, even selfish gesture.
Broch seems to have bean aware of such a possible
criticism. In the "Entstehungsbericht" he refers to a
central problem of all art and, more particularly, of this
novel. ""as soil also ein solcher Roman? Hie Frage
rhhrt. an ein wesentlichst.es Problem der Kunst, an ihr
Sozialproblem." (^T~r 5? 363) He goes on to argue that
art cannot and. should not attempt to convert people to
any point of view, social, moral or religious; it can
have only exemplary value.
"So wenig das Kunstwerk zu bekehren oder in irgend eineni
konkreton Fall Schuldeinsicht zu erwecken vermag, der
L&uterungsprozess selber geh&rt. trotzdem dem kunstwerk—
lichen Bereich an; ihn zu exemplifisieren i.st dem Kunst—
werk mftglich ... und durch diese FWiigkeit Kur Darstell-
ung und (was noch mehr ist) zur Vermittlung von L&utorung
gelangt die Kunst zu ihrer bis ins Metanhysische
reichenden so.zia.1 en Bedeutung." (GhT 5s 364)^ ^
In the commentaries on the novel Broch also
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emphasizes that he ivished to exemplify an act of purific¬
ation and expiation.115
All of these comments still leave open, the question
of why he chose to have Andreas commit suicide. It would
seem that the novel could better fulfil the social function
demanded of it by Broch if Andreas wore shown to accept the
moral responsibilities implicit in his new vision of the
world instead of avoiding them through suicide. The
novel would still have the exemplary function postulated
by Brceh, but the behaviour exemplified would bo socially
much more relevant. Andreas's death reveals a resignation
not in beeping with his vision of the need for human,
commitment and moral resp- mr.il ility demanded of man by the
now reality. Mis death compares unfavourably with that
of Vergil in for Tod d ,y foryil. Like Andreas, Vergil
has a vision of the new reality, but resists death until
he has fulfilled all his obligations in this life. Mutter
Ginson, in the crgroran i also shares the same vision as
Vergil and Andreas, but, like the former, she dies only
after <.1 life lived in the service of her fellow-men.
Villi "eismann, who first published Vie chnldlosen.
cast doubts on the motivation of Andreas*a guilt and
confession in the context of the novel, and his criticism
could be just as well applied to Andreas's suicide
itself.**^ Doth Gerda Uternbhlcm and Robert Mandelkow
are critical of Andreas's confession and suicide. They
suggest that the confession is far from convincing and
scarcely motivated by Andreas*s character as revealed in
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tne novel up to that point. As a result, the
confession seems to be a didactic conclusion grafted
arbitrarily onto the and of the novel, and as such it is
I1 iX-i. t>0ant of the unconviacingly optimistic ending of
die 3chlafwand1or. It is certainly true that midreas' s
confession would carry much more weight if it leu him to
put into practice the new morality revealed to him. Eric
Herd specifically questions the value of Andreas6s
expiation in making iifo more meaningful for himself or
118
anyone exso.
T2ie curious disparity between the reassurance and
hope expressed in the confession and the resignation
revealea ujf one suxoxac rexiocos roo±& * s ov/ti ax*j»onxia m
^yrOciX i> Oi» HJLKJ h.«Lx. O# xojL.i'wCi i'klivXi*idi>00*l
iJoXxO"/Cu uUcib Iicivu JL OXillvm. oWi o,2i&>WOi* v/O v*iO ^)X'0LfJLCXLUfJ
;olu L<XOiZ Oi. v viJLifCJXJe o.1aJLkJ iiO 1 OX•Dialated
OX O -i. -i. O JkO X.1X d/iti'li «p »•/"*_.. to JLOilo ifically
louadeu, as no w»exisveu, on tne newly discovorea concept
ox '-das xraisca-iVDSoluco". ^rocii was convxncea xnat his
theory was demonstrably valid, out he despaired of over
seeing his theories generally recognised and put into
practice. in the first part of this thesis it has been
shown than Brock finally gave up any hope of making a
practical and practicable contribution to the improvement
of the human condition in his life-time* The resignation
aim possxnioXi v/iixch mam die lusi> owo o* enree j eai'a of his
life are revealed in his decision to forsake the practical
prooleias ox ^oxXoxxx ana iiincs*-peyoiioxog^ iox the mono
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abstract realms of mathematics and epistenology. This
frustrated resignation may well explain the curious
dissonances in nje Sch.nldlosen discussed above.
This study of the development in Broch*s writings
of the theory of "das Trdisch—Absolute* enables us to see
ir Broch's work a paradigm of the dilemma of the artist
and intellectual} torn as he Is between thought and action,
tbeorr and practice, in the troubled history of Western* X S




1. The most comprehensive bibliography of published work,
primary and secondary literature, is that compiled by
Klaus W. Jonas and Herta Schwarz for inclusion in
Hermann Broch. Daniel Brody. Briefwechsel 1930-1951.
edited by Bertold Hack and Marietta Kleiss (Frankfurt/
M, 1971)* columns 1081-1168. This supersedes all
other bibliographies compiled before 1970. It is
referred to in the notes as Jonas and Schwarz, followed
by the relevant number of the work in that bibliography.
Any works used which were published later than 1970
are referred to individually, as are all major works
to which detailed reference is made in the course of
the text.
2. Christa Sammons has compiled a bibliography of all the
material in the Broch archive at Yale University.
This is of particular importance because it refers to
so much unpublished material. Christa Sammons,
•Hermann Broch Archive. Yale University Library',
Modern Austrian Literature. 5(1972), 18-69.
3. Paul Michael Ltttzeler has compiled a useful bibliography
of Broch8 s political t>rritings, published and unpublished,
in Hermann Broch. y&lkerbund-Kesolution. edited by
P.M. Liitzeler (Salzburg, 1973)* pp. 102-105# Useful
though it is and despite Lhtzeler's claims, this
bibliography is not exhaustive.
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Main Sources of Broch's Work.
1. The standard work of reference is the Gesairimelte Werke.




3. Per Tod des Vergil
4. Per Versucher
5. Pie Schuldlosen
6. Dichten und Brkennen - Essavs I
7. Erkennen und Handeln - Essays II
8. Briefe 1929-1951
9* Massenpsvchologie
10. Pie unbekannte Grbsse. Und frilhe Schriften.
Hit den Briefen an filla Muir.
These are referred to in the text and notes by volume
and page number, e.g. GW 8: 123.
2. Hermann Broch. Bergroman. Kritische Ausgabe in vier
B&nden. edited by Frank Kress and Hans Albert Maier
(Frankfurt/M, 1969). This edition is referred to by
volume and page number, e.g. Bergroman 111: 456.
3» Hermann Broch. Daniel Brodv. Driefwechsel 1930-1951.
edited by Bertold Hack and Marietta Kleiss (Frankfurt/M,
1971). This is referred to by the number of the
individual letters, e.g. BBj 321.
4. "Trotzdem: Humane Politik", Die Neue Rundschau. 61(1950),
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MLQ - Modern Language Quarterly,
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of America.
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1. Paul Michael LUtzeler cites evidence from contemporary
personal documents of Broch's, such as his "Studien-
biicher", to suggest that Broch's professed
disillusionment with his early studies is not fully
justified. LUtzeler maintains that Broch!s comments
in "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm", which was
written c. 1942, are retrospectively coloured by later
developments in Broch's life. See Paul Michael
Liitzeler, Hermann Broch. Ethik und Politik (Munich,
1973), pp. 33-34.
2. This is only a very general description of how Broch
envisages the loss of the absolute value-system of
the Middle Ages. A more detailed and critical
examination follows in Part II.
3. Another brief autobiographical sketch is contained in
a letter of December 1931 to Willa Muir, GW 10s 329-330.
4. See Jonas and Schwarz, Nos. 60.24, 65.10, 66.10, 66.16,
67.09, 67.10, 70.11, and also the first part of the
above mentioned book by Liitzeler.
5. Recently published material reveals that this period
in Broch's life of practical work in industry and
politics was not as devoid of more intellectual pursuits
as critics once assumed. Under No. 77 in her biblio¬
graphy of the Broch archive at Yale University Christa
Sanuaons lists a collection of reading and lecture notes
from Vienna university for the years 1915-1921.
6. Wolfgang Rothe, 'Der jungle Broch', NDH, 77(1960),
780-797 (p.796).
7. See the Jonas and Schwarz bibliography for the years
in question. Christa Sammons, under No. 95, lists
the titles of thirty-eight reviews or articles written
by Broch in the period 1919-1930. Of these thirty-
six v/ere ivritten 1919-1921.
8. See also GW 8: 85, 322.
9. See note 7»
10. The poem appeared in Der Brenner. 3(1913), 136. The
story appeared in Summa. 2(1918), 151-159.
11. Manfred Durzak, 'Ein Frhhwerk Hermann Brocks', NDH,
13(1966), 10-18 (pp. 10-11).
12. See also GW 8: 13: "Der Bereich des Dichterischen wird
ja durch die rationale Wissenschaft immer mehr
eingeschrhnkt•"
13. Broch's view of the cognitive or epistemological function
of art is discussed by Manfred Durzak in his article,
•Hermann Brochs Auffassung des Lyrischen', PMLA,
82(1967), 206-216, For a general discussion of this
role of art see Dorothy Walsh, 'The Cognitive Content
of Art', The Philosophical Review. 52(1943), 433-451.
14. See also GW 8: 103 where, in a letter written in 1934,
the following words appear. "Befriedigt Dichtung
heute ilberhaupt noch ein soziales Bediirfnis? ...
Antwort: Ja."
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15. See the relevant sections in the Jonas and Schwarz
bibliography for details of the published work.
Reference to the unpublished material can be found in
the archive bibliography compiled by Christ a Sanraons.
The original versions of the five short stories, which
belong to the "Tierkreiserz&hlungen", have recently
been published in a collected edition by Paul Michael
Liitzeler, Hermann Broch. Barbara und andere Novellen,
edited by Paul Michael Ltttzeler, (Frankfurt/M, 1973)*
A general survey of Broch's literary work in the years
1928-1936 can be found in Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch
(Stuttgart, 1967), pp. 25-47. Durzak also discusses
the two plays, the tragedy and the comedy respectively,
in his •Epilog des Wertzerfalls•, GR, 41(1966), 218-
242, and 'Epitaph auf einen Industriellen', LuK,
7(1966), 21-28.
16. An article by Robert Neumann, itfho knew Broch at the
time of his arrest, suggests that in later years Broch
considerably over-emphasized the traumatic effect of
his detention. Neumann writes: "Als er recht direkt
aus der Haft - drei Wochen nicht ganz - nach England
kam, sah er's noch anders. Da erz&hlte er mir, seine
Ausseer Kerkermeister seien alte Bekannte gewesen, wir
hatten ja damals jeden Soxamer in der Gegend verbracht,
und die seien hbchst verlegen gewesen iiber seine
Inhaftierung." (Die Zeit. 28 October 1966, p.22).
17. See "Bemerkungen zurn Tod des Vergil" (GW 6: 265-275)
and also GW 8: 172, 181-182; GW 10: 365, 377, 379.
18. GW 8: 216, 280.
19. GW 8: 172, 246, 281-282.
20. GW 8: 246, 280j GW 10: 379.
21. GW 8; 246, 281; GW 10: 379.
22. In her memoirs, Private Collection (New York, 1965)*
Jean Starr Untermeyer devotes a long chapter, 'Midwife
to a Masterpiece', to describing her experiences
working with Broch on the translation.
23. GW 8: 216-217# 247, 281-282; GW 10: 379.
24. Broch was well aware of this compromise. In a letter
of November 1947 to Egon Vietta he three times refers
to the novel as "ein Zwitter". (GW 8: 280-283).
My purpose has been to outline the personal conflicts
underlying the writing and publication of this novel.
For a more detailed analysis of the origins of the
novel reference should be made to Manfred Durzak,
'Hermann Brochs Vergil-Roman und seine Vorstufen',
Literaturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch. 9(1968), 285-317.
25. For detailed studies of the origins of Die Schuldlosen
see Jonas and Schwarz, Nos. 57.07# 62,36, 65.26, 69.06,
69.06a. See also Llitzeler's 'Nachivort' to his edition,
Hermann Broch. Barbara und andere Novellen, pp. 336f.
Broch's own comments can be found in the "Entstehungs-
bericht", which is published with the novel, and in
his correspondence. The index at the end of GW 10
gives the references to the novel contained in the
correspondence in the Collected Works. The relevant
letters in Hermann Broch und Daniel Brodv. Brief-
wechsel 1030-1051 are Nos. 505-507, 510-513, 515, 518-
525, 535.
26. Stbssinger's edition, of which even the title is an
arbitrary choice, is of no value for research purposes.
Frank Kress and Hans Albert Maier published a critical
edition of all three versions of the novel in 1969,
accompanying these three volumes with a fourth
containing variant readings and a critical apparatus.
This is the only reliable edition for research purposes.
For details see the bibliography of this thesis.
27. The references to the novel in the correspondence of
the Collected Works can be found in the index of GW 10.
The Broch-Brodv Briefwechsel contains a large number
of direct and indirect references to the novel. They
serve largely to emphasis Broch's own doubts and
confusion about this work. The relevant letters are
Nos. 220, 277, 286, 327, 360, 370, 372, 376, 382, 385,
391, 395, 399, 401, 403-405, 407, 411, 429, 430, 438,
447, 451, 460, 496-498, 500, 501, 513, 514, 529, 538,
539, 543.
28. Up to the time of writing two diverging interpretations
of the genesis of the novel have been advocated by
Manfred Durzak and Gbtz Wienold, See Jonas and
Schwarz Nos. 67.16 and 68.29.
29. Kress and Maier discuss the question of the choice of
title in vol. 4 of their edition, pp. 15-17.
30. The ivory tower, the symbol of irresponsible, aesthetic
isolation recurs frequently in Broch's 'writings. See
GW 8s 131, 216, 248} BB: 45, 441, 492 - footnote.
It is also to be found in the "Schloss" symbol in Die
Schlafwandler and Die Schuldlosen. Walter Bauaann
argues with some cogency that the tower in which the
dying Vergil spends his last hours in Per Tod des
Vergil represents the ivory tov?er of aestheticism
which the poet must renounce before he can understand
the full significance of his life and death. Walter
Baumann, 'The Idea of Fate in Hermann Broch's Tod des
Vergil'. MLQ. 29(1968), 196-206, (p.201).
31. The full text of the resolution Broch planned to
submit to the League of Nations was published by Paul
Michael Ltttzeler in 1973, Hermann Broch. Vblkerbund-
Resolution (Salzburg, 1973), This edition also
contains an earlier draft of the resolution, Broch's
own commentary on it and some relevant correspondence.
32. See Jonas and Schwarz, B 29# This essay is now
contained in GW 7s 83—89• Hannah Arendt's editorial note
which suggests that the essay had not been previously
published is wrong.
33» The essay is now contained in GW 7: 61—81j Broch
discusses his "Vblkerbundtheorie" in GW 9: 46-51,
Broch had published a number of short articles on
political theory before 1936, but it was not until
after 1936 that he approached the matter systematically,
with special reference to the problems of mass
psychology and with a view to seeing his theories
put into practice. See Liitzeler's bibliography,
op. cit., pp. 102-105.
34. It is indicative of Broch's personal situation that he
repeatedly discusses the role of the intellectual in
his generation. See GW 8: 207-208, 375-376j GW 9:
302-309J GW 10: 276-277.
35. See also GW 8: 182, 188, 340.
36. For further evidence of this unity of Broch's work see
also GW 8: 210, 248, 265, 300, 384, 386, 394.
37. My emphasis.






See Jonas and Schwarz, Nos. B 91 and B 113• Both
quotations come from contexts in which Broch analyses
the epistemological consequences of the Renaissance and
discusses their influence on modern thinking. This
makes the difference in his conclusions all the more
striking.
Traces of this unfortunate trend can be found in
articles which are too numerous to mention individually.
Four major works which are guilty of this fault are;
Thomas Koebner, Hermann Broch (Berne and Munich, 19^5);
Hermann Krapoth, Dichtung und Philosophic. Sine
Studie zum Uerk Hermann Brochs (Bonn, 1971)5
Ernestine Schlant, Die Philosophie Hermann Brochs
(Berne and Munich, 1971);
Paul Michael Ltttzeler, Hermann Broch. Ethik und
Politik (Munich, 1973)•
The dates of the above books are so recent because it
is only in the last ten years that full-length book
publications have started to appear in any numbers,
but the above books reflect the earliest trends in
criticism of Broch's theoretical writings on philosophy
and politics.
An honourable exception must be made of Erich Kahler's
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Die Philosoohie von Hermann Broch (Ttlbingen, 1962).
In this first detailed exposition of Broch's philoso¬
phy Kahler does not hesitate to point out some of the
inherent contradictions, even dangerous implications
in Broch's thinking.
5. Karl Menges, Kritische Studies zur v'ertphi1osophie
Hermann Brochs (Tftbingen, 1970).
Heinz D. Osterle, 'Hermann Broch: Die Schlafwandler.
Kritik der zentralen Metapher', DVJS, 44(1970), 229-
268.
Heinz D. Osterle, 'Hermann Broch. Die Schlafwandler:
Revolution and Apocalypse', PMLA. 86(1971), 946-958.
Timothy Casey, 'Questioning Broch's Der Versucher1,
DVJS 47(1973), 467-507.
Menges' book is by far the most rigorous, and
destructive, criticism yet made of Broch's philosophy.
Its real value lies in the attention it draws to the
numerous weaknesses and contradictions in Broch's
philosophical system,
6. 1932 was the date of publication of the third volume
of Die Schlafwandler. in which "Der Zerfall der Werte"
appears.
7. Ernestine Schlant suggests that this study was written
in 1942, basing her assertion on knowledge of
unpublished material from the Broch archive, about
which she then fails to give any further details, op.
cit., p. 187, note 1, Her reluctance or failure, to
be more precise^is all the more surprising since she
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quotes passages from other unpublished material else¬
where in her book.
8. These five works, which are central to this thesis,
are published as follows.
"Der Zerfall der Werte" (GW 2: 400-403, 417-419, 425-
427, 442-444, 450-455, 474-477, 510-517, 554-559, 592-
598, 661-687).
"Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse" (GW
7: 6l-8l).
"Uber syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" (GW 7: 151-
202).
"Politik: Ein Kondensat" (GW 7: 203-255).
"Trotzdemi Humane Politik" NR., 61(1950), 1-31.
9. The most important of these studies are listed by Jonas
and Schwarz, see Nos. 57.04, 64.31, 66.08, 66.26, 68.23.
More recent contributions are Hartmut Reinhardt's
book, Erweiterter Naturalismus (Cologne and Vienna,
1972) and the second part of Liitzeler's Hermann Droch.
Etliik und Politik.
10. References to studies of Broch's earliest philosophical
writings, which are not discussed in this thesis can
be found in Jonas and Schwarz, Nos. 60.06, 60.24,
67.10, 68.09, 70.11.
11. Broch makes frequent references to his view that the
"Ich" unites within itself the two functions of thought
and existence which are contained in the Cartesian
formula. The main references are listed here: GW 2s
443, 593, 662, 6Slj GW 6: 209, 318-319; GW 7: 47-48,
67-71, 93, 113-114, 263; GW 10: 281, 297-299.
12. The detailed analysis of this conflict is found in
"Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse".
It does not form part of "Der Zerfall der Werte".
13. Paragraph 36 of "Prolegomena", Kants Werke. edited by
the Royal Prussian Academy, 9 vols (Berlin, 1902-1923),
IV, 319-320. Kant's emphasis.
14. Broch regularly differentiates between "Erkenntnis"
and "Wissen". Only the former earns the accolade of
being designated as objective knowledge which is
logically valid, formally correct. "Wissen" always
refers to intuitive perception, irrational or visionary
insights which, however valuable to the individual,
cannot be shown to be objectively valid.
15. My emphasis.
16. The implications of such a view for Broch's aesthetic
theory do not fall within the compass of this thesis.
Broch discusses them in "Das B6se im Wertsystem der
Kunst" (GW 6: 311-350), "Einige Bemerkungen zuru Problem
des Kitsches" (GW 6: 295-309), and "Das Weltbild des
Romans" (GW 6: 211-238).
See also Manfred Durzak, 'Der Kitsch - Seine verschie-
denen Aspekte', Der Deutschunterricht. 19(1967), 93-
120.
17. Wiedergeburt der Liebe. edited by Frank fhiess, (Berlin,
1931), pp. 361-380, The essay is now reprinted in
GW 7: 45-60.
339
18. Broch's epistemology and ultimately even his political
theory are founded on an analysis of the history of
Western European civilization. From this relatively
narrow basis he formulates general theories of
epistemology and politics which he claims to be
applicable to all men everywhere. This would seem
to be a weakness in his position. It can probably be
argued that much oriental thought, philosophy and
history has little in common with its Western counter¬
parts and that generalizations should not be made from
the latter to the former.
19. See also GW 2: 475 and GW 6: 324-326.
20. Because of Broch's frequently repeated views on the
Middle Ages a number of critics have erroneously placed
him in the tradition of German Romanticism, comparing
him especially to Novalis. Such an interpretation is
advocated by the following critics.
J-J Anstett, 'Le romantisme de Hermann Broch', EG,
11(1956), 224-239 (p. 226).
Peter Hasubek, 'Geschichtstheorie und Erzhhlkunst.
Bemerkungen zu K. Gutzkow und Hermann Broch', EG.
22(1967), 517-537 (pp. 536-537).
Karl August Horst, Kritischer Phhrer durch die deutsche
Literatur der Gegenwart (Munich, 1962), p.111.
Heinz D, Osterle, 'Hermann Brochj Die Schlafwandler.
Kritik der zentralen Metapher', DYJS. 44(1970), 229-268
(p. 266).
Wolfgang Rothe, 'Der junge Broch', NDH, 7(1960), 780-
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797 (p. 791).
Frank Trommler, Roman und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart,
1966), p. 103.
What all such critics overlook is the fact that for
Broch the Middle Ages represented the ideal model for
an absolute value-system. He has no emotional
attachment to the Middle Ages and never appeals for a
return to them. His thinking is most emphatically
directed towards the future. Indeed he regularly
criticizes the German Romantics, as in GW 6: 296, 301
and GW 8s 236, 345.
A more accurate discussion of Broch's relationship to
Romanticism is offered by the following.
\
Jean Boyer, Hermann Broch et le probleme de la solitude
(Paris, 1954), p.59.
Manfred Durzak, 'Apokalypse oder Utopie? Bemerkungen
zu Hermann Brochs Schlaffwandlern'. EG, 24(1969)* 16-
35 (p. 19).
n
Wulf D. Hund, 'Zerfall der Werte 1-10. Uber den
erkenntnistheoretischen Ansatz bei Hermann Broch*, LuK,
4(1969), 400-410 (pp. 406-407).
Leo Kreutzer, Erkenntnistheorie und Prophetie (Tttbingen,
1966), pp. 50-54.
Paul Michael Liitzeler, 'Die Kulturkritik des jungen
Broch', DVJS, 44(1970), 208-228 (pp. 213-214).
It is interesting to note that Broch's analysis of the
decline of the Middle Ages displays close parallels to
that of a famous professional historian, Johann
Huizinga, in the latter's book, The Waning of the
Middle Ages (first English edition, London, 1937)•
These similarities are particularly evident in Huizinga's
discussion of medieval religion and symbolism, chapters
14-17. As yet there is no evidence that Broch read
Huizinga's book, although it seems likely.
21. Broch frequently analyses the Reformation and Renaissance
in this light. See GW 2s 510-517, 544-549, 6765 GW
6: 316; GW 7; 54-56; GW 10: 290.
22. Karl Menges, op. cit., pp.102-109, subjects this theory
of Broch's to a rigorously destructive criticism, which
is largely justified. What matters, however, is not
whether Broch's theory is correct, but that he believed
it to be correct.
23. My emphasis.
24. Two exceptions can be made here.
Walter Baumann, 'Hermann Broch und die Lyrik', Colloquia
Gercianica, 1( 1967), 174-205 (p. 186).
Erich Kahler, op. cit., pp. 2, 5, 16, 38, 76f.
25. See also GW 8: 387, 389.
26. See also GW 9: 68-69, 155, 174, 189.
Similarly, one of Broch's aims was to show that death
need not be feared because it is not the dreadful
extinction envisaged by most men, but is merely a
normal human experience within a higher reality of
which human life is only one limited aspect. This is
a conviction which an individual may believe and
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finally experience, but it is not open to proof.
Broch regularly admitted this: GW 8: 186, 193, 230.
27• The full list of references to the Logos in the
Collected "Works is given below in chronological order
of occurrence.
GW 7: 49-60; GW 2: 450-451, 595-598, 677, 683, 687;
GW 7: 89; GW 7: 91-101; GW 10: 293-301; GW 6: 204;
GW 7: 106-108; GW 9: 241-246; GW 6:239-245; GW 7:
200-202; GW 6: 252-253; GW 6: 283-293; GW 7: 218.
28. See GW 2: 598, 677; GW 10: 276, 293, 294, 297.
29. For this identification, see GW 2: 450, 451, 596, 683;
GW 6: 204; GW 7: 53, 54, 94, 200.
30. Karl Menges, op. cit., p.41, correctly draws critical
attention to Broch's dubious reliance on tautologous
arguments.
31. Kant, op. cit., pp. 241-244.
32. My emphasis. See also GW 2: 401, 596, 598; GW 7: 48.
Under the fourth reference can be found a very
revealing summary of Broch's view of the way the
individual rationalizes his own situation: "Trivialst
ausgedriickt: in seiner kontrollosen Autonomie ist die
jeweilige Welt filr das Ich stets die relativ beste."
Clearly there is no question of a qualitative criterion
here, merely the formal one of reason. Here too is
the explanation of the latter part of the last passage
quoted in the text from "Gedanken zum Problem der
Erkenntnis in der Musik".
33. See GW 6s 235, 243-246, 322; GW 7: 122, 126, 194-195.
34. Quoted by Hannah Arendt from Broch's unpublished
"Entwurf fiir eine Theorie masseriwahnhaftiger Ersch-
einungen" (GW 6: 20).
35. See especially GW 6: 333-334, 339-341 and also GW 2:
671 and GW 6: 213-214.
36. Paul Michael LiVtzeler, Ethik und Politik, p. 83, has
suggested that Broch's distinction between "ethics"
and "morality" may be traced back to a distinction made
by Kant between the formal nature of ethics as the
expression of a rational free will and the qualitative
nature of moral judgments derived from practical
experience. See Kant's preamble to his "Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten", op. cit., pp. 387-392. A
reading of Kant's argument does not confirm Liltzeler's
suggestion. Nowhere does Kant take such a critical,
even derogatory view of morality as Broch does in the
early writings.
37. See GW 8: 84-85, 140; GW 10: 323, 336.
38. In a letter written in October 1931 to the English
translators of the novel, Edwin and Willa Muir, Broch
referred specifically to the ninth chapter of "Der
Zerfall der Werte" as evidence of the optimistic
conclusion of the whole novel (GW 10: 335-336).
39. Egon Vietta criticizes the novel for precisely this
failure in his article, 'Hermann Broch', NK, 45(1934),
575-585 (p. 583).
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40. The date of this letter, July 1930, makes it clear* that
these words were written before Broch started the
definitive version of Huguenau, but, as all the other
evidence confirms, they are obviously no less relevant
to the final version. The complex genesis of Die
Schlafwandler and especially of Ilug;ueaau is discussed
at length by Manfred Durzak and Theodore Ziolkowski.
See Jones and Schwarz, Nos. 64.31* 67.15* 69.05.
41. A review in Times Literary Supplement of Broch's works
criticizes Die Schlaf'.vandler> with characteristically
English pragmatism, for having been too obviously
written to conform to a preconceived theory. TLS
29 March 1963* p. 210. In another letter to Wi.Ha
Kuir Broch himself reveals, perhaps unwittingly, the
extent to which he was a victim of his own theories.
V/illa Muir had warned him not to expect too much acclaim
from the British public when the translation of Die
Schlafwandler appeared in Britain. Broch replies that
he is aware of the limited appeal of his novel and
concludes humorously: "Und im Grunde darf es gar
nicht anders sein, - es wlirde sonst meiner Geschichts-
philosophie widersprechen, und da will ich lieber, dass
die Schlafwandler unverstanden blieben, als dass meine
Theorie ins Wanken k&melj" (GW 10: 320). As is so
often the case, the ironical or humorous statement of
a view often unintentionally reveals more than it
conceals.
42. Again it must be stressed that this letter describes
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the original version of the novel, but Broch's own
analysis of his novel is equally relevant to the final
version of the book* This is confirmed by the
description here of the main characters, a description
which could equally well have been written for the
characters in the definitive version of the novel.
43* Detailed studies of the influence of mysticism on
Broch's thought and language can be found in E.W.
Wolfram's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 'Der Stil
Hermann Brochs: Eine Untersuchung zum Tod des Vergil'
(Freiburg, Switzerland, 1958), and in Walter1 Soinm's
book, Hermann Broch. Geist, Pronhetie und Mystik
(Freiburg, Switzerland, 1965)*
44» teo Kreutzer, Erkenntnistheorie und Prophetie, pp.
173-193.
Manfred Durzak, loc. cit.
Kreutzer's basic argument is that the Gbdicke episode
in Huguenau. with its account of Gbdicke's miraculous
recovery from being buried alive and his subsequent
efforts to rebuild his life and understanding of reality
from the simplest possible foundation, symbolically
presents Broch's hope of how a new humanitarian ethos
might grow out of the chaos of the Great War. To this
one can only reply that this episode may symbolize hope,
however weak, but there is not the comfort of logical
certainty which Broch postulates in his theory.
Kreutzer's interpretation is taken up and developed by
Durzak, in the article already mentioned, and also by
Hartmut Reinhardt, Erweiterter Naturalismus pp. 158-185#
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Reinhardt adds a further refinement to the argument by-
admitting (p. I58f.) that any possible conclusions to
be logically drawn from the Huguenau action are negative
and pessimistic, but he then qualifies this somewhat
confusingly, by concluding that the contrapuntal struc¬
ture of all the other episodes in the novel justify the
final statement of optimism in the novel (p. 185)•
Optimistic interpretations of Die Schlafwandler are also
advanced by the following critics,
Gisela Brude-Firnau, 'Die 9» Episode der Gesehichte des
Heilsarmeem&dchens', in Materialen zu Hermann Brochs
Die Schlafwandleri edited by Gisela Brude-Firnau,
(Frankfurt/M, 1972), pp. 180-195.
v*
Karl August Horst, 'Methodisch konstruiert. Uber das
Romanwerk Hermann Brochs', Merkur, 5(1951)> 389-395 (p.
394).
Paul Konrad Kurz, 'Hermann Brochs Schlafwandler-Trilogie
als zeitkritischer Erlbsungsroman', Stimmen der Zeit,
91(1966), 25-45 (p. 43).
Paul Michael Liltzeler, op. cit., p. 82f.
Leslie Miller, 'Hermann Broch's Die Schlafwandler. A
/
Critical Study in the Light of his Letters, Exposes and
an Unpublished Manuscript Version of the Novel'
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley University,
1964).
Ernestine Schlant, 'Hermann Broch, The Unity of his
Thought in Essay and Novel' (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Emory University, 1965)» p. 152.
These two articles can be found respectively in DVJS.
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44(1970), 229-268, and in PMLA, 86(1971), 946-958.
Other critics who comment on the inconsistency between
the theory of the dissolution of values and the
optimistic ending of the novel are noted below.
Helmut Arntzen, 'Hermann Broch. Die Schlafwandler1,
in Per aoJerae deutsche Roman (Heidelberg, 1962), 58-75
(p. 75).
Timm Collmann, Zeit nnd Geschichte in Hermann Brochs
Roman Per Tod des Vergil (Bonn, 1967), p. 2.
Manfred Durzak, 'Die Wandlung des Huguenau-Bildes in
Hermann Brochs Schlafwandlern', Wirkendes Wort,
17(1967), 41-47 (p. 47).
Karl Robert Mandelkow, Hermann Brochs Romantrilogie Die
Schlafwandler (Heidelberg, 1962), p. 135.
Hermann Pongs, Romanschaffen ira Umbruch der Zeit, fourth
edition, (Tttbingen, 1963), p. 58.
Hartmut Steinecke, Hermann Broch und der nolyhistorische
Roman (Bonn, 1968), pp.145-147.
Frank Trommler, op. cit., pp. 115, 130.
Broch envisaged a cyclical movement in scientific
methodology and ontological speculation between the
extremes of Platonic Idealism and Positivism. The most
important point for this thesis is the fact that he
believed this cycle, and consequently the concomittant
developments in culture and civilization, to be
logically inevitable. This conviction is restated on
numerous occasions. See also GW 2: 510-512, 663, 678,
681, 683, 685; GW 6: 312, 323; GW 10: 294-295, 303,
317.
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47. GW 9: 44, 100; BB: 434.
48. GW 7: 271? GW 9: 93-99; GW 10: 299-300.
49. Wolfgang Rothe, 'Hermann Broeh als politischer Denker',
Zeitschrift fttr Politik. 5(1958), 329-341 (p. 333).
50. See GW 6: 263; GW 8: 173, 188, 238? GW 9: 92.
51. GW 9: 237-312. In the above mentioned article Rothe
gives a general but accurate account of Broch's
political writings as then known. Ernestine Schlant
also gives a general, if uncritical presentation of
Broch's political writings and other related studies
in her book, Die Philosophie Hermann lirochs, pp. 108-
180.
52. GW 9: 97, 132. This pendulum theory is also mentioned
in "Trotzdem: Humane Politik", NR, 61(1950), 1-31
(p. 3).
53. See GW 9: 93-94 and GW 10: 299-300.
In Per Tod des Vergil Vergil realizes that the Golden
Age of the classical period is coming to an end and he
has a prophetic vision of a new culture to come. The
symbolism used by Broch in the novel leaves no doubt
that Vergil forsees Christianity as the unifying power
behind the new European civilization.
It is now generally accepted that Broch envisaged a
2000-year cycle. See John White, 'Broch, Virgil, and
the Cycle of History', GR, 41(1966), 103-110; Theodore
Ziolkowski, Hermann Broch (New York, 1964), p. 6;
Fritz Martini, Das Wagnis der Sprache (Stuttgart, 1954),
p. 425.
54. Those essays are all contained in the Collected Works.
The references are respectively: GW 7: 45-60; GW 10:
276-282; GW 6: 211-238, 311-350; GW 10: 288-310.
55. GW 7: 83-89, 91-101.
56. See GW 8: 136, 148, 155, 156, 171-172.
57» Hermann Broch, 'Ethik", Per Brenner. 4(1914), 684-690
(p. 687).
58. These references are in chronological order from essays
xvritten in the period 1914-1936.
59* This essay also reveals one of the most frequently
recurring weaknesses in Broch's system of philosophy,
namely his reliance on tautological argument. He
regularly describes the rational function in man in
the Kantian terms of "das autonorae Ich". Despite this
assertion of the autonomy of human reason Broch
repeatedly insists that the absolutely invariable
logical structures of reason are derived from and
guaranteed by the Logos. The starting point of his
argument in this essay is the Cartesian "eogito" or
"ich denke". He analyses this statement into two
components: "das Ich denkt sich selber", and "das Ich
denkt sein Denken"• This leads him to the conclusion
"das Ich denkt etwas". From this Broch deduces that
the thinking subject can distinguish between itself and
something external to it and concludes as follows.
"Von hier aus lhsst sich weiter deduktiv erschliessen
•Das Ich unterscheidet im Etwas verschiedene Denkin-
halte, darunter das Ich und ein Non-Ich'. Mit andern
Worten: obwohl das Denken dem Ich unlbsbar angehbrt,
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unterscheidet es sich vom Ich-Subjekt, gehbrt also
einem Non-Ich zugleich an.
Sowe.it das Denken dera Non-Ich angehbrt (also Denkinhalt
des Denkens ist), pr&sentiert es sich derri Ich, als sei
es ihm 'aufgezwungen' worden. Folgt also schon aus
der Autonomic des Ich: 'Das Ich kann nicht anders
denken, als es denkt', so wird dieses 'Nicht-anders-
denken-K6nnens nun unter pr&ziserer Beleuchtung zu
einem • Zv/ang', der vom Non-Ich auf das Ich ausgettbt
xvird, als ein ihm auferlegtes 'Gesetz' (mag auch
dieses als ein solches erst nach mancherlei anderen
Erfahrungen erkannt werden), und eben solcher Zwang
rechtfertigt es, den Begriff der 'Wahrheit' aazuwendea,"
(GW 7: 67-68)
Apart from the dubious nature of such a tautologous
argument, it is hard to see how Broch can really believe
that he has demonstrated "die Autonomic des Ich" when
he explicitly states that the "Ich" or subject of
cognition is compelled to think rationally by some
external force. The compulsion is clearly that
applied by the transcendental Absolute of the Logos.
All are contained in the Collected Works. The
references are respectively, GW 9: 77-236; GW 7i 257-
282; GW 9: 239-312; GW 9: 315-360.
The "Preliminary Table of Contents" is in English
because it was written in America for submission to
Princeton University when Broch applied for a
Rockefeller scholarship to carry on his research there.
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6l„ Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch (Stuttgart* 1967)* p. 59.
62• ifttzeler, Hermann Broch. Vblkerbund-Resolution
(Salzburg, 1973)* p. 105.
Durzak, op. cit., p. 59.
63. GW 9: 97, 108, 140-143, 144, 151, 177.
64. GW 9: 68-69, 155, 174, 180, 189.
65. GW 8: 174, 179, 189, 199, 216, 222, 223, 246, 248.
66. GW 9: 155, 156, 168, 175, 185, 235.
67. The importance of the somewhat glibly stated assumptions
and qualifications in the latter half of this quotation




71. See also the use of these words in GW 8: 141 and GW 10:
367.
72. Broch's emphasis.
73. In a letter written in 1947 Broch comments on the
writer's task, as he sees it, of heightening his public's
perception of the world it lives in. This is an
ethical responsibility, which he then deliberate^
contrasts, somewhat criticcilly, with the writer's active
involvement in political and moral questions. Despite
this, he comes to the following conclusion about the
creative writer's ethical responsibility to heighten
his readers' response to reality. "Es 1st eine
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Sisyphusarbeit, darftber sine! wir uns wohl einig und
klar, aber sie Fiat etivas Trbstliches an sich: nicht
das Tragen und Befbrdern des Steins 1st da3 Wesentliche,
nein, der Akt des Aufnaluneus 1st das Wesentliche - hat
man den Stein nur wirklich erst auf die Schultern
gehoben, so ist oin Sti\ck Wirklichkeit » ein Stlick
Horalitbt geschehen." (GW 8: 268)
The first emphasis is Broch's, the second mine.
74* To my knowledge little reasoned comment has been made
on the problematical relationship in Brock's work of
ethics and morality as he understood them. The
majority of critics, especially in discussions of the
novels, accept Broch's definition of ethics without
considering the difficulties of its practical
application in the real ivorld. A smaller number of
critics have mentioned the problem, even fewer have
attempted to discuss it in any detail.
Helmut Arntzen, op. cit., pp. 73-75» is highly critical
of the definition and exemplification of ethics in
"Der Zerfall der Werte" and Die Schlafwandler.
Walter Baumann, 'The Idea of Fate in Hermann Broch's
Der Tod Des Vergil', MLQ» 29(1968), 196*206 (p. 205)»
emphasizes the disparity between Vergil's metaphysical
(ethical) speculation and the practical (moral)
conclusions he draws from this. The close personal
identification bettvreen Broch and Vergil is of
particular relevance here.
James Hardin, 'The Theme of Salvation in the Novels of
Hermann Broch', PMLA, 85(1970), 219-227* outlines a
development in Broch's novels away from a formal,
abstract conception of ethics to a more humanitarian,
active one. He does not, however, explicitly discuss
Broch's use of the words "ethisch" and "moralisch";
he merely equates the two. Erich Kahler, op. cit.,
pp. 42, 58, also emphasizes Broch's increasing interest
over the j^ears in the need for a practical humanitarian
morality and immediate intervention in human affairs.
Hermann Krapoth, op. cit., pp. 120-121 apologetically
mentions the difficulties raised by Broch's highly
personal interpretation of ethics but fails to discuss
the question any further.
Hartmut Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 101 - note 3t also
comments on the distinction Broch makes between ethics
and morality without pursuing the question further.
Ernestine Schlant, Die Philosophie Hermann Brocha.
pp« 38-39* admits the problems raised by Broch's
definition of ethics in Die Schlafwandler but also
takes the matter no further.
Iiartmut Steinecke, op. cit., p. 30, comments on and
accepts Broch's differentiation between ethics and
morality, but he clearly does not consider the practical
implications of this.
Gerda Utermbhlen, 'Hermann Brochs Novellenzyklus Die
Schuldlosen', (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Heidelberg,
1965)> pp« 14*21, 36, 139-145, suggests that the Novellen
comprising this novel, which were written over a long
period of years (1918-1949)* reveal and confirm a change
in Broch's thought from his original conception of
ethics to a more practical view of active, humanitarian
morality.
75. GV/ 9: 233-235, 3l5f., 342f.
76. References to this research can be found in GW 8: 288,
291, 294, 296, 328.
77. See the editor's notes to letters No. 186 and 193 in
GW 8: 451.
78. On similar grounds I question the date of 1946 which
Binde suggests for the essay, "Zur politischen Situation
unserer Zeit". This study contains specific references
to "das Irdisch-Absolute" which could not have been
written before 1948. The analysis of totalitarianism,
democracy and the need for a new, humanitarian, legal
system is very similar to Broch's discussion of these
themes in "Politik" and "Trotzdem". It is certain
that "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit" was
written in 1948 at the very earliest because Broch
refers to the independence of India (1947) and the
accession of the nationalist government in South Africa
(1948) as past events (GW 9: 389, 428). It is even
possible that it was written as late as 1950. This
date is mentioned once (GW 9: 391), although the
context suggests Broch selected that date as the
nearest round figure to the time of writing. He also
talks of anti-communist trials in the United States at
which the accused were charged with "Unamerican
Activities" (GW 9: 422). This must be a reference to
the McCarthy pogrom.
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79« Broch's theory of intuition is developed in length in
the essay, "Das System als Weltbew&ltigung" (GW 7s
111-149). His interest in this question is evident
even in the early 1930!s, especially in the essays,
"Logik eixier zerfallenden Welt" (GW 7: 45-60),
"Einheit wissenschaftlicher und dichterischer Erkenntnis
in der Musik" (GT* 7; 91-101). As the following
quotation from the last of these essays shows, his
ideas at that time were very vague. "Das erkennende
ii
iissen, dieses Yor-Vissen, das zugleich Uber-Wissen
ist, Yor-Erkenntnis und zugleich Uber-Erkenntnis,
unfassbar und doch all-hberall, wird in seiner Unfass-
barkeit dem Menschen als Gefttnl habhaft: nur als
Gefiihl, und eben als Geftthl jeden Einzelnen das
Wertvollste seines Lebens. Es ist das Geftthl, mit dem
der wahrhaft dem Leben zugekehrte Mensch die Einzeler-
scheinung begreift und mit dem er von der Welt ergriffen
wird, es ist das Gefiihl, mit dem er unablftssig den
Bogen vom Einzelphhnomen zur* Totalitht der Welt und zu
dex* seines eigenen Seins zu spannen befftliigt ist."
(GW 7: 95)
»•
In the later essays, "Uber syntaktische und kognitive
Einheiten" and "Das System als Weltbew&ltigung", we
see Broch's attempts to establish his theory of
intuition on a scientific basis. Karl Menges, op.
cit., pp. 83-120, subjects this theory to a very
rigorous criticism.
For a general study of the problems of intuitive
reasoning, see G.H. von Wright, The Logical Problem of
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Induction, second edition, (Oxford, 1957) •
80, It does not lie within the scope of this thesis to
discuss the mathematical details of Broch's theory,
Ke envisages two types of problem in any cognitive
system, "eine Plus-Unbekannte" and "eine Minus-Bekannte"•
The former represents a new unknown factor which can
be logically integrated into the existing system; the
latter is a problem which cannot be so resolved and
thus reveals deficiencies xvithin the system and leads
to its complete revision. In her exposition of
Broch's philosophy Ernestine Schlant repeatedly misquotes
"Minus-Unbekannte" for "Minus-Bekannte", op, cit,,
pp« 74-78, This rendei^s Broch's argument and her
presentation totally incomprehensible.
81, My emphasis. Again, typically, Broch yields uncritic-
ally/his own flow of thought. At the start of this
quotation he is discussing the linguistic device and
convention of personification, but he then proceeds as
if it were not simply a metaphor but an ontological
postulate.
82, Broch's interest in the theory of relativity is evident
throughout most of his theoretical writings from an
early date. See GW 2: 476, 597; GW 6: 197, 227,
318-320; GW 7i 131-133, l80-l8l, 192-193, 202, 215-
217, 247-248, References can be found also in his
correspondence. See GW 8s 15, 22, 57, 106, 350, 356,
369*
Paul Michael Lhtzeler, Hermann Broch. Ethik und
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Politik, p. 14S - note 55» has pointed out that the
views formulated by Broch on the unavoidable error
factor caused by the observer in the field of obser¬
vation are not based, as Broch wrongly supposed, 011
Einstein's theory but on theories of Iieisenberg.
Broch's application of the theory of relativityto his
own literary work and especially to Die Schlafwandler
is discussed by Leo Kreutzer, op. cit., pp. 15-48, and
Richard Brinkiaann, 'Romanform und V/erttheorie bei
nermann Broch: Struktux'probleme moderner Dichtung' ,
DVJS. 31(1957)* 169-197# Theodore Ziolkowski deals
more generally with the same question in 'Hermann
Broch and Relativity in Fiction', Wisconsin Studies.
8(1967), 365-376.
For the non-specialist there is a very useful and
entertainingly written Introduction to the theorj'- of
relativity by James A. Coleman, Relativity for the
Dayman (New York, 1954, and also available as a Pelican
book)•
83# Karl Menges, op. cit,, pp. 102-109.
84# The occasions when he mentions the "ideale Person"
occur in GW 215-219 and 247-248. The validity of
the first of these arguments in v/hich the concept is
used is very much open to question.
85. As always in Broch's writings, scientific validity
implies that a theory can be shown to be logically
sound and confirmed by empirical evidence. Any such
theory is thus removed from the realm of subjective
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belief and elevated to the plane of objectives knowledge.
86. Broch's argument can be found at the given references:
GW 8: 210, 354-355, 386, 387, 389, 393-394, 403; GW 9s
402, 405-406, 410, 411f.; "Trotzdem", NR., p. 13f.
It must be mentioned that Broch was equally critical of
the capitalist exploitation of the individual. But,
as he saw no threat from a general, scientifically
presented ideology of capitalism, he regarded Marxism
as the greater danger to humanity.
87. See also GW 9: 383 where the following passage occurs.
"Gerechtigkeit ist ein transzendentaler Begriff, und
wenn es auch der Hunger ist, der den Proletarier die
Forderung nach Gerechtigkeit erheben ihsst, er wird
sie auch damn erheben, wenn ihre Erfiillung ihm nur
selir wenig Nahrung verschafft. Dagegen wird er uiaso
lieber ftir sie kikmpfen, wenn er in ihrem Naruen seine
sadistischen Xriebe befriedigen darf: der kuf nach
Gerechtigkeit ist ein immanenter Bestandteil alles
Menschlichen, und das sadistische Bediirfnis ist es
gleichralls, n&mlich als Bediirfnis zuia Ilerabsinken ins
Untercienschliche; aber beidcs ist nicht auf den
Proletarier beschrhnkt."
88. See "Trotzdem", NR, pp. 2-7; "Politik" (GW 7: 210-215)
and "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit" (GW 9:
392f•)•
89* Broch's emphasis.
90. See also GW 7: 222: "Die Abstraktions-Tendenz des
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Rechtes verwandelt den Menscheu fiktiv in eine Sadie."
91. Mentioned also by Hannah Arendt (GW 6; 19-20) and
Ernestine Schlant, op. cit., p. 152.
92. The argument (GW 7: 204-209) with which Broch claims
to prove that man is created in God's image and thus
inherits the divine gift of reason, from the autonomy
of which he then in turn derives the terrifying concept
of absolute freedom, is one of the clearest examples of
Broch's habit of confusing logical reasoning and
metaphysical speculation. The basic problem, which
he never openly acknowledges, is that he is trying to
provide logical proof for what is essentially a matter
of belief.
A basic premise in Broch's argument is that all men are
born free and equal and that a desire for the greatest
possible degree of freedom is a characteristic of man.
In this desire for freedom he sees a reflection of the
divine nature of God or the Logos. In this argument
Broch first sees God or the Logos as an ideal anthro¬
pomorphic projection of man's own rational faculty,
whereas in most of the writings before this he has
described that power of reason as a derivative of the
Logos. Here he states that man, as it were, creates
God in his own image and not vice versa. His
explanation proceeds, initially at least, logically
enough from the autonomy of reason, but then degenerates
into subjective speculation about the myth of Paradise
or the Golden Age of Innocence.
36o
"Der Mensch mag die Gottes-Existenz leugncn, aber nie-
mals dass seine eigene deren Ebenbild ist. Seitdem
es ilua dhmmernd aufgegangen ist, dass etwas Absolutes
in ihia wirkt, die Logik seines Denkens, die ihm
auferlegt ist, das Bewusstsein seines Ichs, das
Bemisstsein des in seinem Ged&chtnis geordneten zeit-
lichen Ablaufes, das Bewusstsein des Nichts and des
Unendlichen, beides unbegreiflich, dennoch von st&rkster
denkerischer Existenz, hat er die Existenzquelle hiezu
in etivas verlegfc, das liber ihm lebt, und das er mit
dem Namen Gottes, freilich ohne ihn aussprechen zu
dlirfen, zu bezeichnen wagte. Und ^eitdeia dies erst-
malig geschehen war, wusste er, dass die Ebenbildhaftig-
keit eine Verpflichtung darstellt, der er nicht
gewachsen ist. Der Mythos vom goldenen Zeitalter der
Mythos voxa verlorenen Paradies, das wiederzugewinnen
es gilt, l&uft bis zur Aufkl&rung, lhuft bis zu
Rousseau und Marx, und es ist der Mythos des schlechten
Gewissens; der Mensch iveiss, wie schlecht er sich
benomraen hat und vor ailem wie grundochlecht die von
ihm geftihrte Politik gewesen ist." (GW 7j 204-205)
The dubious logical justification for this proof of
II
God's existence is to be found in "Tiber syntaktische
und kognitive Einheiten", where Broch states: "der
Gott, der das Ebenbild des Menschen ist, verdoppelt diesen
nicht, sondern ist etwas anderes, ist es sogar, etwas
paradox ausgedriiekt, schon verrabge seiner Nieht-
Existenz, d.h. verm&ge der logischen Operationen, denen
es gegeben ist, ira Nicht-Existenten Setzungen
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vorzunehmen. " (GY" 7 s 158) •
In simpler terms, Broch is saying that man has a vaguo
intuition of certain absolute ideals which he constantly
fails to realize and cannot realize because he does not
know how they can be expressed in the human context of
empirical reality. Ideally man should be the perfect
image of the God of his ox/n creation, a God so perfect
and absolute that he cannot bo understood or defined
in human terms. Broch concludes that in the realm of
politics we cannot say definitely and positively what
man should be or should do. In empirical reality a
humanitarian system of politics can be formulated only
on the knowledge of what man should not be if he is
to remain human. "Kurzum, ohne zu wissen, was der
Mensch sein sollte, lhsst sich kaum liber Politik
sprechen, aber konkret l&est sich erst darliber sprechen,
wenn man v/eiss, was der Mensch nicht sein sell, nicht
sein darf." (GY/ 7: 205)
According to Broch the distinguishing characteristic of
the human species is the desire for absolute freedom,
a desire inherited from God or the Logos and
experienced through the autonomy of reason. In the
first long quotation above Broch suggests that God is
a creation and projection of the human mind and repres¬
ents man's attempt to rationalize his experience of the
autonomy of reason. Soon after this he quotes the
biblical words about man being created in God's image
and suggests that this is a similar rationalization,
"Als vor dreitausend Jahren der all-umfassende Satz
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'Gott schuf Gen Menschen nach seinera Ebenbilde'
gedacht und aiedergeschrieben wurde, da war ftir den
uugoheueren Geist, der dies tat, die En&wxcklung zur
absoluben Eiasamkeit dos lehs bercits voliendet, dean
dieser Satz, der die gesamte idealistischc Philosophie
des Abendlandes von Plato bis zu Descartes und bis zu
Kant vorwegnahm, ist eben in der Autonomic des
Bewusstseins begrtindet, in der Autonomie eines Denkens,
das ?iber sein eigenes strenggebundenes Sein erstaunt
und zugleich auch weiss, dass es in seiner unbrechbaren
Abgeschieuenheit bestimmt ist, alles Sein in sich
aufzunehmen: das GerB.cs der Welt, ihr schbpferischer
Spiegel, ohne den sie dein Menschen nicht vorhanden
w&re, die Erkenntnis, in der die Welt immer wieder zum
ersten Mai ersteht," (GW 7: 208)
In the very next sentence Broch proceeds to discuss
the phenomenon of freedom as if God really had created
man in His own image. He fails to realize that he is
regarding as fact what he previously expressly stated
to be metaphysical speculation based on a desire to
rationalize man's experience of the autonomy of the
conscious self. ,!Indem Gott den Menschen in seineni
Ebenbild erschaffen hat, l&sst er ihn die Welten-
schftpfung unaufh&rlich wiederholen, hat er der
Erkenntnis diese Schbpfungspflicht fftr ewig aufgetragen,
vereinigt er ties Menschen Erkenntnxs mit seiner exgenenj
u:id der Mensch, der solcherart in seiner Erkenntnis
Gott wiedererkannt hat, demlitig sich selber als das
Geschftpf des Schbpfers erkennend, erkennt damit auch
die f&rchterliche Pflicht zur Freiheit, die er mit
seinem Schftpfer tei.lt, ICein Zweifel, ait ier
Forraullerung der Gbenbildhaftigkeit wurde der
Prometheus-Gedanke in einer Weise zu Ends gedacht, zu
dor die griechische Mythologie niemals f&hig war,"
(G77 7: 208)
This tautological argument, based on highly
speculative premises, enables Broch to conclude that
man's desire for absolute freedom, and the associated
problems which such a desire must create in the political
and social context, are inherited from Go 1 through the
experience of the autonomy of reason. "Es 1st sin
uagehouerer und ungeheuerlicher Gedanke, denn er
bringt das Feuor der unbesohr&nkt gftttlichen Freiheit
ins Irdische, fiirchterlich folgerichtig und hart wie
der alttestanientarische Gottesgedanke selber, Und
mit dieser Folgericht.igkeit wird dem Henselae- prome-
theisch etwas gegeben, was kein Tier besitzt, das
Streben nach absolute!' Ungebundenlieit, so dass er liber
die geschaffene Natur und ihre Ordnungen hinausgehoben
wird, obvohl er mit seinem Kbrper ihnen unentrinnbar
verhaftet bleibt, und obwohl sie ausschliesslich kraft
seiner Erkenntnis manifest sind: ungezhhmt ist das
Feuer in der irdischen Natur, ist Vulkan und Blitz,
ist immer ihr Widersacher, und ungez&hrat ist die Frei¬
heit in der Menschenseele, ist Vulkan und Blitz, so
'ass er, des Feuers Hliter, immer wieder daran verbrennt,
sein Fluch, dennoch seine Gnade, Kein Naturrecht kann
solchen Gnadenfluch verblirgen, nur das gbttliche Recht
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war iiiezu imstande." (Gt 7J 208)
The above confused argument has been quoted in
detail because it is so important for* Broch's political
application of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute"•
He believed that this argument proved that the desire
for absolute freedom is the distinguishing character¬
istic of man. This was necessary because his
legislative theory is based on the fact, as he saw it,
that to deprive man of all freedom is, literally to
dehumanize him and reduce him to the level of an
inanimate object•
It is interesting to note that this highly dubious
argument does not recur in "Trotzdem", which was
written for publication, and that in the earlier "Zur
politxschon Situation unserer Zeit" Broch describes
the assumption that all men are born free and equal
as "eiue zwar plausible, dennoch mystische Annahme, su
doren StUtzung man sich noch wahrlich am besten auf
ein Gottesrecht berief" (Gl*T 9: 392), The argument in
"Politik" is obviously Broch's attempt to lend
scientific weight to his "mystisehe AnnahmeV.
93. See also GV7 7; 231 j GW 3; 356j GW 9: 409; NR: 11,
18-19.
94. Ernestine Schlant discusses the complications of Broch's
view of slavery in greater detail, op, cit,, pp. 151-
154. Again it must be recognizee that Broch's
thinking at this stage was still coloured by still vivid
memories of the Nazi concentration camps and current
developments in Russia.
95. My emphasis.
96. Such an anomaly can be avoided only if the death
penalty is abolished. Broch never discusses the
problems raised by extremely long prison sentences,
even in the most humanitarian conditions. The normal
duration of life puts a practical limit on the length
of prison sentences.
97. The first two emphases are mine, the third Broch's.
This statement, which demonstrates the need for a
qualitative humanitarian standard in legislation, is
central to the political application of the theory of
"das Irdisch-Absolute"• Variants of it can also be
found in GW 8: 330 and GW 9s 410.
98. See also GW 8: 333, 335, 340, 393, 395, 413, and BBj
537. Discussion and criticism of the practical
complications of Broch's political theories can be
found in Wolfgang Rothe, 'Hermann Broch als politischer
Denker', Zeitschrift ftlr Politik, 5(1958), 329-341j
Karl Kenges, op. cit., pp. 129-178$ Ernestine Schlant,
op. cit., pp. 163-178; and in the special edition of
Literatur und Kritik, 6/54-55(1971), which is devoted
entirely to Broch with the emphasis on his political
writings.
A number of critics have commented on the futility and
even naivety of Broeh's belief that he, a poet and
amateur political theorist, could ever convert anyone
to his theory of humanity. Giinter Blftcker, Die neuen
• irklichkeitea (Munich, 1958), p. 259*» unites as
follows* "Brochs 'Metapolitik' ist die kaum naoh-
prtifbare Illusion aines Maanes, der sich seiner
eigentlichen Bestiramuag eatzogea hat* • . tin zentraler
Gains-hart Icaaa aieht gelehrt odor gepredigt, er kann
nux» erlebt uad das heisst: durch Crschtt.iterung
verriittelt werden."
The following words appear in an article by harry Pross,
* Hermann Broch o ler das Irdisch—Absolute' , Jeutscho
lluadschau, 86(1960), 237-244 (p. 237)* "Die
haaseansYehologie also wird es schon aus dieson ttusseren
Gr'dnlea aieht leicat habea. v/arm hhtten Vissenschaftler
Rat von einem Dichter angenoEiinen, wann Politiker
Ansichten oines Theoret. ikers aicseptiei't, sofera er nicht
die Gewalt predigte?"
99* See also GW 7: 205, 209, 212, 232, 240, 245, 249;
GW 8t 356; GW 9: 424; Ms 13, 30.
100. See GW 2: 671; GW 6: 213-214, 333-334, 339-341.
101. Broch' rs emphasis.
102. Compare the use of "moralisch" (NR: 12-13) and "ethisch"
(WRj. 18).
103* See also HR: 14.
104* Kant, Die Krxtik der reinen Vernunft. Kants . erke»
edited by the Royal Prussian Academy, 9 vols (Berlin,
1902-1923), III, 12.
105* Interesting confirmation of the importance attributed
by Broch to the principles of the theory of relativity
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in Ills own theory of "las Irdisch-Absolute" can bo
found in Arnold Toynbee's book, Nan's Concern with
loath (London, 1963), pp. 179-180. There Toynbee also
suggests that the theory of relativity represents a
break from past historical developments because, to a
certain degree at least, it restores man as the central
creative power in his own universe. Man, as the
"ideal observer", is necessary to the under-standing of
his own reality. No matter how relative such reality
may be, it is at least relative to man, A similar
point is also made by Erich heller in The ~ 1.sinherited
hind (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 9-26, especially pp. 20-22.
106, A similar statement can be found in "bur politischen
Situation unserer Zeit" (GIV 9; 365-366).
107. Some letters written late in his life would seen to
confirm that Broch was not fully aware of the extent
to which his research on "das Irdisch-Absolute" implied
a revision of the views expressed in "Der Zerfall der
Werte". In a number of letters written to the
publisher, Kurt Wolff, in June and July 1946, Broch
discussed the possibility of having Die Schlafwandler
re-printed in the United States. In this correspondence
he repeatedly states that the philosophy of history
expounded and exemplified in the novel is undoubtedly
correct. Kurt l/olfr. Briefwechsel eines Verlegers,
edited by Bernhard Zeller and Ellen Otten, (Frankfurt/M,
1966), pp. 463-465.
Broch makes a similar claim to Wilhelm Einrieh in April
1 " 4 f Q 4 * ■» 1 \I S J 1 V J v ^ r ■*> 6 ) «
This all suggests that even at that late stage Broch
still adhered to the original, essentially pessimistic
ethical credo at a tine when he had in fact already
been working for years to establish a practically
viable humanitarian morality which implied a radical
revision of the earlier theories,
ffcijtf!T ft-
108. Ivaxm, 1 Hermann Brooh and die Gescnicntsphilos-
opixie', Hiscui'lca. Btudien sum geschichtiicxien J cm:en
imu r Oi'Hchexi. edited by Hugo Hantsch, trie Yogelin and
franco /alsecchi, (Vienna, 19^5)# 37-50, quoted from
the reprint in Hermann Broch. Persnektiven der
forBeu.iag, edited by Manfred Durzak, (Munich, 1972),
P» 395.
109. Harald Binde, 'I)as Ziel iia Unendlichen1 in Hermann
Broch. Die lleixakehr. edited by liaraid Binde,
(Frankfurt/M,, 1962), 7-24 (p« 10). Binde has
distorted and re-arranged a quotation from Broch's
essay, "Die mythische Erbschaft der Dichtung" (GW 6:
243)? an essay which has absolutely no relevance to the
question of "das Irdisch-Absolute"•
110. Helmut Arntzen, op. cit., p. 69.
Ill# Timothy Casey, 'Questioning Broch's Der Versucher*,
dvjs, 47(1973), 467-507 (p. 506).
112. loo. cit. p. 244.
113« Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch. Dei1 Dichter und seine
text (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 132. This same, too
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narrow interpretation of "das Irdiscli-Absolute" is
made by Beate Loos in her book, I-lythos Zeit und Tod
(Frankfurt/M, 1971), p. 144.
114. GV7 6: 5-42, especially p. 32f,
115. Erich Kahler, op. cit., p. 20-38, 44-57.
Wolfgang Iiothe, loc. cit.
Ernestine Schlant, 'Hermann Broch. The Unity of
his Thought in Essays and Novels' (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Emory University, 1965), pp. 73-82.
Ernestine Schlant, Die Phliosophie Hermann BrochSi
pp. S2-90, 146-163.
Joseph Strelka, Ralka. rlusii. Broch und ale ontwicklung
ties iiiodernea Romans (Vienna, 1959), 65-101, especially
p. 9If.




1. Walter Bauxnann, 'Hermann Broch und die Lyrik',
Colloquia Germanicai 1(1967), 174-205 (p. 185)•
2. The critics who mention it briefly are listed below.
Timm Collmann, Zeit und Geschichte in Hermann Brochs
Roman Per Tod des Vergil (Bonn, 1967), p.2.
Karl August Horst, Kritischer Fllhrer durch die
deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart (Munich, 1962).
PP. 384-385.
Thomas Koebner, Hermann Broch (Munich, I965), p. 43.
Ernestine Schlant, 'Hermann Broch. The Unity of
his Thought in Essay and Novel' (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Emory University, 1965)» p. 195.
Hartmut Steinecke, Hermann Broch und der polyhistori-
sche Roman. (Bonn, 1968), pp. 156-157.
Frank Trommler, Roman und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart,
1966), p. 115.
3. In Pasenow and Esch Eduard v. Bertrand's analysis of
the dissolution of values and especially of the
resultant alienation of human relationships can be
found in GW 2: 100-106, 141-147, 319-326. His words
are also quoted by others, as in GW 2: 282-283, 349-
351. Dr. Bertrand Miiller, the narrator of the
"Geschichte des Heilsarmeem&dchens" and the writer of
"Der Zerfall der Werte", is Eduard v. Bertrand's
successor in spirit, although not in body. A comment
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of Broch's in a summary of the novel makes it clear
that the two Bertrand figures are not physically
identical. This summary was first published by
Theodore Ziolkowski in his article, •Zur Entstehung
und Struktur von Hermann Brochs Schlafwandlern', DVJS,
38(1964), 40-49, It is now reprinted in full in the
notes to BB: 14, Despite such an explicit statement
of Broch's intention, critics are divided about the
identification of the two Bertrand figures, although
it must be stated that, with the notable exception of
Dorrit Cohn, who lists Ziolkowski's article in her
bibliography, most critics who identify the two
figures did not have the relevant summary of the novel
at their disposal at the time of writing. Neverthe¬
less, their arguments deliberately and arbitrarily
ignore the explicit statement in Esch that Eduard v,
Bertrand commits suicide. He cannot, therefore,
appear in Huguenau.
The following critics identify Eduard v, Bertrand and
Dr, Bertrand Miiller.
Dorrit Cohn, The Sleepwalkers, Elucidations of
Hermann Broch's Trilogy (The Hague and Paris, 1966),
pp, 61-102,
Karl Robert Mandelkow, Hermann Brochs Romantrilogie
Die Schlafwandler (Heidelberg, 1962), p. 151,
Felix Stbssinger, Deutsche Literatur im zwanzigsten
Jahrhundert« edited by Hermann Friedmann and Otto Mann,
fourth edition, 2 vols (Heidelberg, 1961), II, p, 217,
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Gerda Utermbhlen, 'Hermann Brochs Novellenzyklus
Die Schuldlosen1 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Heidelberg University, 1965)* p. 34.
The following critics argue against the identification
of the two figures.
Leo Kreutzer, Erkenntnistheorie und Prophetie (Ttibingen,
1966), pp. 145-149, 152f.
Paul Konrad Kurz, 'Hermann Brochs Schlafwandler-
Trilogie als zeitkritischer Erlbsungsroman', Stimmen
der Zeit, 91(1966), 25-45 (pp. 29, 41).
Manfred Lange, 'Die Liebe in Hermann Brochs Romanen'
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ttibingen University,
1966), p. 33.
Paul Michael Ltitzeler, Hermann Broch. Ethik und
Politik (Munich, 1973), p. 76.
Hermann Pongs, Romanschaffen im Umbruch der Zeit,
fourth edition (Ttibingen, 1963), p. 58.
Hartmut Reinhardt, Erweiterter Naturalismus (Cologne
and Vienna, 1972), p. 200.
Hartmut Steinecke, op. cit., p. 140f.
Theodore Ziolkowski, loc. cit., p. 51.
4. For references to Bertrand as a doctor see GW 2s 66,
83, 98, 119, 130, 142, 322.
Dorrit Cohn has made a detailed study of Bertrand's
role in the trilogy as a whole, op. cit., pp. 61-102.
See also J.J. White, 'The Identity and Function of
Bertrand in Hermann Broch's Die Schlafwandler'. GLL,
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24(1970-1971), 135-144.
5. Mandelkow, op. cit., pp. 123-129.
6. Cohn, op. cit., pp. 80-89.
7. Heinz D. Osterle, 'Hermann Broch. Die Schlafwandler.
Kritik der zentralen Metapher', DVJS, 44(1970), 229-
268 (p. 252).
8. Schlant, op. cit., pp. 137-138, 141-143.
9. Helmut Arntzen, Per moderne deutsche Roman (Heidelberg,
1962), pp. 70-72.
10. Kreutzer, op. cit., pp. 143-152.
The problem of whether Bertrand can be seen as Broch's
mouthpiece in the novel is the centre of some
controversy. Broch once ironically rejected any such
intended identification, but the obvious humour of his
comment might permit the reader to doubt the serious¬
ness of the opinion expressed (GW 10: 332). He also
writes elsewhere that he dislikes the technique of
using a character in a book for such a purpose (GW 8;
321). Despite such comments the fact remains that
throughout the novel it is the Bertrand figure who
presents and explains Broch's theory of values and
all its implications. Steinecke's view that Bertrand
reflects Broch's ideas but not his committed way of
life is one attempt to solve the question, op. cit.,
pp. 79-80, 142. Kreutzer rejects completely any
possible identification of Broch and Bertrand, op. cit.,
p. 162. Nevertheless, a large number of critics see
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Bertrand as his creator's mouthpiece or suggest that
Bertrand's dilemma of correct but impotent analysis
of the current crisis directly reflects the conflict
Broch himself felt between his pessimistic interpre¬
tation of history and the need to undertake something
practical to help his fellow-men in their difficulties.
The following critics suggest some sort of identific¬
ation between Broch and Bertrand.
Cohn, op. cit., pp. 88, 95.
Koebner, op. cit., pp. 37-39#
Kurz, loc. cit., p. 35.
Lange, op. cit., p. 55.
Llltzeler, op. cit., p. 75.
Mandelkow, op. cit., p. 15If.
Pongs, op. cit., p. 58f,
11. Steinecke, op. cit., pp. 115-127.
12. A few other critics also take a positive view of
Esch's final position in the second part of the trilogy,
although they all mention the point only very briefly.
So far Steinecke's interpretation, limited though it
is, is the most detailed attempt to show the positive
value of Esch's final decision. See also the critics
listed below.
Jean Boyer, Hermann Broch et le probleme de la solitude
(Paris, 1954), pp. 37, 59#
Walter Jens, Statt einer Literaturgeschichte. fifth
edition (Pfullingen, 1962), pp. 188-189* 192, 196.
Thomas Koebner, 'Die mythische Dimension in Hermann
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Brochs Romantrilogie Die Schlafwandler1 (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Munich University, 1967), pp.
78, 81.
Paul Konrad Kurz, loc. cit., pp. 28, 33* 40.
Manfred Lange, op. cit., pp. 32, 33* 120, 130.
Manfred Sera, Utopie und Parodie bei Musil, Broch und
Th. Mann (Bonn, 1969)* pp. 96-97* 120, 130.
Frank Trommler, op. cit., p. 109.
13. See GW 2; 102, 105, 283, 292, 349-351.
14. These passages refer to the Huguenau figure of the
first version of the novel of that name. In the
final version of the novel the optimistic prophecy is
carried not so much by Huguenau as by the sub-plots
of Hanna Wendling, Ludwig Gbdicke and Heilsmarie.
Nevertheless, even in the definitive version Huguenau
is shown to be vaguely aware of "die platonische
Freiheit" and its possible consequences (GW 2: 677-681).
15. This summary is reprinted in the footnote to BB: 14.
16. Steinecke, op. cit., 103-155.
17. The ironic grimace and the movement of the hands are
characteristic of Bertrand in the first two novels
in the trilogy. See GW7 2: 21, 55* 111, 323, 324* 325.
18. To my knowledge Liitzeler is the only critic to comment
in any detail on the importance of Martin Geyring in
the novel, op. cit., pp. 116-121,
19. Steinecke, op. cit., p. 123.
20. Kreutzer, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
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21. Kreutzer, op. cit., p. 151*
See also Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 130-131, where
Esch's marriage to Mutter Hentjen is criticized as a
form of sectarian Romanticism.
22. Kreutzer, loc. cit.
23. Lange, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
Sera, op. cit., pp. 106-114.
24. For Bertrand's views on love as expressed by himself
or by others who have adopted his ideas, see GW 2:
101-106, 283, 292, 349-351.
25. For a discussion of the concept of salvation in Broch's
novels see James Hardin, 'The Theme of Salvation in
the Novels of Hermann Broch', PMLA. 85(1970), 219-227.
26. The symbolic significance of America and its association
with Bertrand and the idea of freedom are developed at
some length throughout the novel. See GW 2: 27, 200-
201, 223, 233, 239-242, 274, 288, 291-292, 295, 304,
307, 312, 323, 338.
27. Steinecke, op. cit., pp. 126-127.
28. My emphasis.
29. A different emphasis is evident in Ltitzeler's
interpretation of this passage, op. cit., p. 124. He
compares Esch unfavourably with Geyring, saying
paradoxically that the former is too distant in his
Utopian dreams from the concrete problems of daily
reality and that as a result he finally sinks back
into his old ways. This scarcely does justice to
Esch and seems to ignore most of the content of the
last four pages of the novel. One could even argue
that Esch, despite his many faults, has a breadth of
vision far beyond that of Geyring, a lack of vision
which may largely stultify the latter's work by
involving him too deeply in the immediate problems
and preventing him from looking at all to the future.
30. In both of these quotations the emphasis is mine.
See also GW 2; 685-686.
31. My emphasis. See also Bergroman II: 462 where the
rhythm of work is described as "irdisch geformtes
Leben, Gleichnis irdischer Ewigkeit"•
32. The passages quoted are the best representative samples
chosen from the Bergroman to illustrate the point in
question. Variations of this same theme occur
repeatedly throughout the novel.
33. See also GW 3: 104-118, 153-154, 168.
34. The first emphasis is Broch's, the second mine.
35. The letters in question are BBs 283, 304, 344, 356,
379, 486, and also those in GW 8: 135 and GW 10s 354,
360.
36. See also GW 10: 45-46, 68, 76.
37. Broch discusses this point in BB: 377-379.
38. Walter Hinderer's unpublished dissertation, 'Die
Todeserkenntnis in Hermann Brochs Tod des Vergil'
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(Munich, 1961), is the best study yet available of the
problematical concept of "Todeserkenntnis"• It helped
me greatly to clarify my own thoughts on the subject,
even where they disagree with Hinderer's, Another
useful study of the same theme can be found in Beate
Loos, Mythos Zeit und Tod (Frankfurt/M, 1971), pp.
142-182. One of the best general introductions to
the meaning of the novel is Aniela Jaffe's article,
'Hermann Broch. Per Tod des Vergil. Ein Beitrag 2am
Problem der Individuation' in Studien zur analvtischen
Psvchologie C.G. Jungs. II, (Zilrich, 1955), 288-343.
This is now reprinted in Hermann Broch. Perspektiven
der Forschung. edited by Manfred Durzak (Munich, 1972),
pp. 135-176. Any references will be made to this
edition.
The prophetic tone of Vergil's words is emphasized by
his next speech1 "'Den Menschen zur Liebe, der Mensch-
heit zur Liebe wird der Heilbringer sich selber zur
Erkenntnistat machen, zur Tat, die er dem All
entgegenwirft, auf dass aus solch hbchstem Wirklich-
keitsbild dienender Hilfe sich aufs neue die Schbpfung
entfalte.'" (GW 3s 424).
In his novel Broch uses the medieval legend that Vergil
foretold the advent of Christianity in his fourth
Eclogue. References to the coming of Christianity,
with particular emphasis on a self-sacrificing Saviour
and the symbolism of the Virgin and child, recur with
increasing frequency towards the end of the novel.
See GW 3: 238-239, 240-241, 291, 297-298, 311, 371,
379
395, 413, 419, 424, 455, 523, 53lf.
The Christian doctrines themselves are of no direct
interest to Broch. He wants to depict Vergil as a
visionary at the end of an era who prophesies the
eventual rise of a new ethos and civilization based
on human love and self-sacrifice. Christianity simply
provides the historical model for this.
40. For a further discussion of the complementary functions
of life and death in the context of transcendental
reality see GW 3s 353, 358.
In this novel as in all the others, it is an unquestioned
premise that there is an ultimate, Platonic reality in
which man has a part to play and the full significance
of which is revealed to him only in death. Broch's
"proof" of the existence of this reality is contained
II
in "Uber syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" (GW 7:
151-202).
41. Broch's emphasis. Here, as so often, Broch uses
"Seele" in a very loose way, seemingly identifying
mind and soul, intellect and spirit.
42. In his literary work Broch attributes a special cognitive
function to the lyric, seeing in it the only suitable
vehicle for the deepest personal feelings and
irrational intuitive insights. This view of the lyric
is summarized in the two lines which introduce the
first verse passage in the "Geschichte des Heilsar-
meem&dchens in Berlin" in Die Schlafwandlo a There
he writes: "Gar manches l&sst sich bloss in Versen
sagen,/ so sinnlos scheint es dem, der bloss in Prosa
spricht." (GW 2: 411)• For a more detailed study
of the lyric in Broch's work see Walter Baumann,
•Hermann Broch und die Lyrik', loc. cit., and Manfred
Durzak, 'Brochs Auffassung des Lyrischen', PMLA.
82(1967), 206-216.
43« "Die Pforte des Schreckens" is first mentioned on p.
102 when Vergil suddenly realizes with horror that he
may never finish the Aeneid and that his whole life's
work has been futile, vain and transient.
44» It must be said that Broch's thinking on the Creation
and the creative process is contradictory. Throughout
the novel explicit statement and the frequent use of
ring symbolism suggest that the Creation is in a
constant state of flux between the polar extremes of
perfect formal unity and chaos, Being and Nothingness
(das Sein - das Nichts). Even the two suggestions
of creation out of nothing and creation out of chaos
are hardly consistent. At the same time Broch seems
to envisage the Creation as a stable, but abstract
structure of potential reality which is progressively
given concrete expression in empirical reality by man.
45» For a detailed discussion of the role of laughter in
Broch's work see Dorrit Cohn, 'Laughter at the Nadir.
On a Theme in Hermann Broch's Novels', Monatshefte.
61(1969), 113-121.
46. References to the positive and negative value of "das
Nichts" can be found respectively in GW 3: 174, 294-
381
295, 394 and GW 3: 100, 171, 186-187, 224-225, 368-
369.
47• For a detailed psychological analysis of this central
/
theme of the novel see Aniela Jaffe, loc. cit., pp.
139-140.
48. In Vergil's belief, which is expressed in religious
metaphors, we can see clearly mirrored the epistemo-
logical theories formulated in more scientific terms
by Broch in "Uber syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten"
and "Das System als Weltbew&ltigung".
49« Strangely, Hinderer completely mis-reads this passage
in his discussion of the golden bough, op. cit., pp.
139-141• He says that the bough is given as a
symbol of knowledge of death to the mortal who enters
and successfully returns from Hades. The exact
opposite is the case: the bough must be won in this
world as a guarantee that the mortal will be allowed
to return from the underworld with his knowledge of
death.
50. Broch's emphasis.
SU "Scheintod" occurs in GW 3: 179, 181, 185, 186-187,
189, 190, 191* "Scheinleben" is mentioned in GW 3:
179, 181, 191, 193.
52. GW 3: 179, 186, 189-190.
53• Vvalter Baumann has drawn attention to the fact that
in "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" (GW 9: 283-
284) Broch contradicts his analysis of Vergil's motives
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in the novel by stating that Vergil wanted to burn
the Aeneid because of its Promethean nature, its
cognitive content. Baumann, 'The Idea of Fate in
Hermann Broch's Tod des Vergil'. MLO, 29(1968), 196-
206 (p. 201).
54. •'•••-'•O GW 3s 97-98, 108-109, 114, 116, 142, 144.
55. See GW 3s 146, 152, 156, 158, 166-167, 168.
56. The key phrase of "Schicksal-auf-sich-Nehmen" recurs
in a number of variations. See also GW 3: 168, 231,
232, 238, 283.
57. GW 6s 155; GW 7; 59, 235-236.
58. See also GW 3: 413 where we find the words "die
todesaufhebende Erkenntnis der Liebe".
Similarly, when Vergil despairs of human knowledge
ever rising above the limits of empirical reality in
order to reveal the ideal harmony of transcendental
reality, he realizes that love is the highest form of
knowledge open to man. Identification with a loved
one affords a vision of the ideal unity in which the
individual is perfectly at one with all Being and
from which perspective life and death can be seen
as complementary functions of human existence. This
important role of love is expressed in the following
quotations. "Immerzu durchbricht Liebe die eigene
Grenze." (GW 3s 382-383) "... die verkttndigende
Stimme der Liebe, in der Tod und Leben sich eint."
(GW 3: 452)
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59. GW 3: 218, 219, 234, 238, 239-240, 249, 296, 368-369,
456, 500.
60. Some critics have already suggested, correctly I think,
that Per Tod des Vergil represents a positive
philosophical advance on the views expressed in Die
Schlafwandler. Hannah Arendt specifically mentions
the change from "nicht mehr und nocht nicht" to "noch
nicht und doch schon" in her article, 'Hermann Broch
und der moderne Roman', Per Monat. 1(1949), 147-151.
Walter Jens even identifies Vergil's vision of a
higher reality and his subsequent actions with Esch's
visions at Badenweiler and his final return to Mutter
Hentjen, op. cit., pp. I88-I89, 192-196.
See also Michel Ilabart, 'Hermann Broch et les ran^ons
de la creation poetique', Critique. 10(1954), 310-322.
61. Walter Baumann has already discussed the function of
these elegies in the novel, but he mentions only
briefly their possible relevance to the theory of "das
Irdisch-Absolute". Baumann, 'The Idea of Fate in
Hermann Broch's Tod des Vergil', loc. cit., p. 205.
62. GW 3s 154, 234, 238.
63. My emphasis.
64. Horst, op. cit., pp. 393-394.
65. Hermann Weigand, 'Broch's Death of Virgil - Program
Notes', PMLA, 62(1947), 525-554 (p. 530).
Similar interpretations are also offered by the
following critics.
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Maurice Blanchot, •Hermann Broch: La Mort de Virgile',
La Nouvelle Revue Francaise, 6(1955)* 747-759 (p* 751).
Albert Fuchs, 'Der Tod des Vergil' in Per deutsche
Roman, edited by Benno v,Wiese, 2 vols (Diisseidorf ,
1963), II, 326-360 (pp. 342-343).
^ietrich Meinert, Die Parstellung der Dimensionen
menschlicher Existenz (Berne and Munich, 1962), p. 26.
Frank Trommler, op. cit., p. 124.
66. GW 3: 355, 373, 420, 437, 444-447, 448, 465, 466, 470,
477.
67. GW 3J 401, 405, 406, 413.
68. GW 3s 455, 469, 472.
69. GW 3s 477-478, 479-482.
70. GW 3s 354, 357, 427.
71. For further details see the first part of this thesis.
72. Manfred Durzak, 'Zur Entstehungsgeschichte und zu den
verschiedenen Fassungen von Hermann Brochs Nachlass-
roman', ZfdPh. 86(1967), 594-627.
G&tz Wienold, 'Hermann Brochs Bergroman und seine
1
Fassungen: Formprobleme der Uberarbeitung', DVJS,
42(1968), 773-804.
73. Frank Kress, 'Kritische Ausgabe des Vorwortes und
des 1. Kapitels der drei Originalfassungen von Hermann
Brochs Bergroman nebst Herkunftnachweis des 1953
gedruckten Textes' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Connecticut, 1966).
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GW 9: 78, 85f.» 100-104.

















78. In the next section of this chapter the second version
of the novel is used for the source of reference as
far as possible, i.e. the first eight chapters. For
subsequent chapters the first version is used.
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79. See GW 9: 46, 52.
For further details of Broch's rejection of his liter¬
ary career in the mid-1930's, see part I of this
thesis.
80. Bergroman II introduces another new emphasis on the
doctor's decision in chapter 5* pp. 272-273* and also
expands on an original passage in the eighth chapter,
cf. Bergroman I: 233 and Bergroman II: 515-516.
81. Baumann, loc. cit., p. 182.
82. See Bergroman lit 2, 376, 439, 477-478, 502-503, and
Bergroman I; 424-425, 427.
83. See Bergroman II; 391-392, 460, and Bergroman I: 170,
202-203, 280-281, 296-297, 205, 367-368.
84. Trommler, op. cit,, p. 115.
85. cf. Bergroman 1; 216-235 and Bergroman II: 488-518.
86. Bergroman II: 250, 281, 283-284, 325.
87. ioted on p. 22^.
88. Richard Thieberger, 'Hermann Brochs Novellenroman und
seine Vorgeschichte*, DVJS. 36(1962), 562-582.
Manfred Durzak, 'Die Entstehungsgeschichte von Hermann
Brochs Die Schuldlosen'. Euphorion, 63(1969), 371-405.
This article contains two summaries of the novel
written by Broch for his publisher and not published
before.
89. Utermbhlen, op. cit., pp. 8, 139-145, 191, 216.
90. Thieberger, loc. cit., p. 573f.
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Durzak, loc. cit., p. 368f.
The original versions of the Novellen are now readily
available for comparison in Hermann Broch. Barbara
und andere Novellen, edited by P.M. Ltltzeler
(Frankfurt/M, 1973).
91. burzak, loc. cit., pp. 388-398.
Unless otherwise stated all subsequent page references
in the text are from this article.
92. Broch's emphasis.
93• Some of the most important references to this cycle,
where these polar complements are specifically mentioned
are given below.




96. GW 5: 129-130, 190, 273, 309, 322.
97. See also GW 5: 236-237, 251, 254-255.
98. GW 5: 106, 108-109.
cf. also Andreas's words of confession: "Unser
Getanes l&hat unser Tun, hat uns zur Unterwerfung
gebracht und zu tief verschreckten Fatalisten degrad-
iert, so dass wir zur Mutter zurilckflfichten, heim zur
einzigen Beziehung, die ungespenstig und eindeutig
bleibt in der unerkl&rlichen Vielfalt, gleichsam als
w&re das Haus der Mutter eine Insel der Dreidimension-
alit&t im Unendlichen und jenseits jeglicher Aufgabe."
(GW 5: 330-331).
My emphasis.
99. Andreas1s indecisive, selfish behaviour towards
Melitta can be traced through the following passages.
GW 5: 255, 26l, 263-268.
100. cf. also GW 5: 310 where a similar point is again made.
101. As Broch grew older, so the appeal for common decency
("Anst&ndigkeit") recurred with increasing frequency in
his work. See GW 8: 129, 267, 318, 333} GW 9: 155,
156, 168, 175, 185, 235, 365, 423; and NR.: 25, 31.
102. cf. GW 5: 299-302 and GW 7: 158, 204-205.
103. GW 5: 297-298, 330-331.
104. Whether the reader finds the portrayal of this
character convincing is another matter.
105. My emphasis.
106. My emphasis. The two phrases in each quotation are
chosen because they are relevant to the change in
Broch's thinking from "ethisch" to "moralisch". In
the early writings a new insight into reality would
certainly be designated as ethical, but for that
very reason it would be dissociated from any concept
of morality.
107. GW 5s 78f•, 237, 338.
108. Liselotte v. Borcke, 'Das Romanwerk Hermann Brochs'
(unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Bonn, 1956), p. 104.
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109* Hermann Broch. Short Stories, edited by Eric Herd
(London, 1966), p, 25.
110. Heinz Politzer, 'Jenseits von Joyce und Kafka1, NR.
63(1952), 152-159 (p. 158).
111. Uterm&hlen, op. cit., pp. 7-8, 14-21, 36, 139-145*
153, 158, 161-162, 192-198, 216.
112. Erich Kahler, 'Rede liber Hermann Broch', NR. 63(1952),
232-242 (p. 239).
113. Durzak, loc. cit., pp. 392, 394, 396.
114. There seems to be a clear parallel to Schiller's
*
words in Uber das Pathetisches "Es ist bloss die
vorgestelite Mbglichkeit eines absolut freien Willens,
wodurch die wirkliche Auslibung desselben unserm
&sthetischen Sinn gef&llt."
115. Durzak, loc. cit., pp. 390, 396.
116. Daniel Brody comments on Weismann's criticisms in a
letter to Broch dated 2 January 1950 (BBj 524).
117. Uterm&hlen, op. cit., pp. 164, 192-198.
Mandelkow, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
118. Herd, op. cit., p. 17.
